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This thesis examines the Scottish Presbyterian Churches anti-Irish campaign in the inter-war 
period with particular emphasis on the governmental response. It can, and has been, argued 
that the Church campaign was driven more by sectarian sentiment than by any other motive, 
however, the Church made a determined attempt to make their case on racial grounds. 
Discredited as those theories now are this thesis will carefully examine intellectual basis of 
the Church’s case. It has not thus far been considered how much the Church’s arguments 
were influenced by academic opinion in the United States and by the American experience of 
immigration restriction.  It has also been argued that politically the campaign was a failure as 
no measures to restrict Irish immigration were ever imposed. Equally, it has been held that 
politicians of all parties were either hostile or indifferent to the Church campaign. It will be 
demonstrated here that this was far from the case and that the Church had its supporters on all 
sides of the political divide and that at various times the issue was seriously considered by 
Governments whether Unionist, Labour or National and that arguments for restriction did not 
emanate solely from the Scottish Churches or indeed solely from Scotland.   
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     Introduction              
                                                                                                                
       In the last twenty years, partly as a result of c nstitutional change and partly because 
‘sectarianism’ in Scotland has occasionally caught the media and political, if not necessarily 
the public, imagination there has been an increased int rest on Scotland’s history of religious 
controversy. It remains an emotive issue for many and there are few aspects of recent Scottish 
history that attract such a rich amount of mythology. James MacMillan’s controversial lecture 
at the Edinburgh Festival in 1999, ‘Scotland’s Shame,’1 in which he argued that Scotland was 
an inherently bigoted and anti-Catholic country, caused considerable comment at the time, 
not least amongst historians. It prompted a volume of essays edited by Tom Devine 
Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and sectarianism in modern Scotland in 2000. This collection, 
while emotive and even polemical in some of the contributions, either for or against 
MacMillan’s argument, is an invaluable guide to theinking behind some of the current 
scholarship on the period. It does also raise one oth r and possibly controversial point in itself 
but one that should not, in that fine and apposite Victorian phrase, be burked, the similarity in 
background and often geographical origin of many, although certainly not all, of the 
contributors. Tom Gallagher in his preface to Edinburgh Divided makes the point: ‘I grew up 
a Catholic in a working class area of Glasgow, which some readers may consider a double 
disqualification for writing such a book about Edinburgh.’2  It is fair to say that there has 
generally been something of a West of Scotland perspective on the subject. It is perfectly 
understandable that scholars with a personal experience should be particularly drawn to the 
field but perhaps that has resulted in one particular approach becoming the dominant 
narrative for the period. In the case of the Presbyterian Churches’ anti-Irish campaign 
between the wars there has been a certain unanimity about the nature, conduct and response 
to that campaign.  The purpose of this thesis is toexamine whether there is another narrative 
and approach, one that will hopefully complement previous scholarship and at the same time 
provide a fresh perspective. 
                                                 
1 For the full text of the lecture see T. M. Devine(ed.), Scotland’s Shame: bigotry and sectarianism in modern 
Scotland ,(Mainstream, Edinburgh, 2000), pp13-25. 
2 T. Gallagher, Edinburgh Divided  John Cormack and No Popery in the 1930s, (Edinburgh, Polygon, 1987), 
p5. 
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   In 1985 Steve Bruce published No Pope of Rome: Anti-Catholicism in Modern Scotland 
with the intention of filling ‘an embarrassingly large gap in the literature on Scotland and 
Protestantism.’3 Certainly Scottish historiography on the subject prior to the publication of 
this book, with the exception of James Handley’s The Irish in Modern Scotland4  was 
somewhat thin, particularly on the inter- war period.   Since then many scholars have sought 
to fill this particular gap and the body of work devoted to the subject is now substantial. Any 
scholar of the period must take as their starting point the pioneering works of Bruce, Tom 
Gallagher’s Glasgow the Uneasy Peace: religious tension in modern Scotland5  and 
Edinburgh Divided: John Cormack and No Popery in the 1930s6, Callum Brown’s The Social 
History of Religion in Scotland since 17307and Stewart J. Brown’s seminal article in the 
Innes Review ‘“Outside the Covenant”: the Scottish Presbyterian Churches and Irish 
Immigration, 1922-1938’.8 All these works are products of the 1980s and early 1990s and, in 
the intervening period a considerable body of scholarship has followed. As Michael Rosie has 
it: ‘These authors are to be commended for their pioneering work but like all pioneers they 
could only sketch the outlines and contours of the p nomena they were explaining. And like 
all pioneers they need to be followed by others filling in the gaps and redrawing the 
contours.’9 The main gaps and contours to be filled in the following pages will be the 
political ones.  It is not proposed to consider this period as a traditional orange versus green 
controversy.   This thesis will concentrate largely on the anti-Irish campaign as a discussion 
between its proponents and those it sought to convince. Stewart J. Brown had a similar focus 
in his 1991 essay but the aim here is to explore the issue from the governmental rather than 
the Church side.10  
   The arguments the Churches made for the restriction of Irish immigration were largely 
those of an elite for an elite.  Dr John White’s interests in pseudo-scientific race theory and 
eugenics were not, by and large, the interests of the working man or woman. Equally, prior to 
the Great War the middle classes in Scotland, either within or without the Church, had shown 
little inclination to involve themselves in sectarian controversies other than for the Unionists 
                                                 
3 S. Bruce, No Pope of Rome: Anti-Catholicism in Modern Scotland,  (Mainstream, Edinburgh, 1985), p1. 
4 J.E. Handley, The Irish in Modern Scotland, (Cork University Press, 1947). 
5 T. Gallagher, Glasgow the Uneasy Peace: Religious tension in modern Scotland, (Manchester University 
Press, 1987). 
6 T. Gallagher, Edinburgh Divided: John Cormack and No Popery in the 1930s, (Polygon, Edinburgh, 1987). 
7 C.G. Brown, The Social History of Religion in Scotland since 1730, ( Methuen, London, 1987). 
8 S.J. Brown, “Outside the Covenant”: The Scottish Presbyterian Churches and Irish Immigration, 1922-1938, 
Innes Review 42;1 (1991) . 
9 M. Rosie, Protestant Action and the Edinburgh Irish, n M.J. Mitchell (ed.) New Perspectives on the Irish in 
Scotland (John Donald, Edinburgh 2008),  p148. 
10 S. J. Brown, Innes Review 42;1,(1991),  pp19-45. 
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to consider the Orange Order as a useful repository of working class votes or, in the case of 
the Liberals, to rely on those Home Rule supporting Catholic Irish who actually had the vote. 
In fact, as Callum Brown points out, there was something of a suburbanisation of the 
Churches in the nineteenth century with the growth of middle classes.11  Why then should it 
have been the case that presence of the Irish in Scotland suddenly emerged as matter of 
national survival, (if the Church and others were to be believed), for the Scottish bourgeoisie?  
  As Scotland emerged from the Great War traumatised by its battle casualties and ill-
equipped for an economic crisis, its certainties of m ral, intellectual and religious superiority 
challenged, it turned anxiously in upon itself. There can be few examples amongst the 
victorious powers of that conflict where a sense of defeatism set in so rapidly amongst its 
middle and upper classes as they surveyed their country. Many of the fundamental 
convictions that had underpinned pre-war Scotland seemed to be disappearing.  As a partner 
in the project of Empire, Scotland’s voice appeared to have been marginalised if not ignored, 
her loyalty and sacrifice apparently given scant rega d in relation to the disloyal and 
rebellious Irish; her industries, converted wholeheart dly to the war effort, given little help to 
adjust to the post war conditions; her working class, eemingly unruly, disaffected and 
inclined to Bolshevism; her politics changed out of recognition with the collapse of 
Liberalism and the rise of Labour, and, lastly, her r ligion threatened by a resurgent 
Catholicism, a product of Irish immigration, and the apparent indifference of its own people, 
a product of the war. As Callum Brown has shown: 
 
 By the end of the war, the social Gospel of Christian Socialism which had brought a 
consensual approach to social politics in the 1890s and 1900s and which had brought 
church and Labour close together in the pursuit of a fairer society was in tatters. Not 
only had the advent of rent strikes and “Red Clydeside” produced a politicisation of 
social improvement which alienated Church leaders, but the churches themselves took a 
surge to the political right…The First World War heralded a profoundly confrontational 
era for inter-war Scottish religion, characterised by classism and eugenics, and 
incorporating an hostility to the Labour movement ad Irish Catholics.12 
  
                                                 
11 C.G. Brown,, The Social History of Religion in Scotland since 1730,  pp. 167-208. 
12 C.G. Brown, Piety, Gender and War, Scotland in the 1910s in C. MacDonald and E. McFarland (eds.) 
Scotland and the Great War,  (Tuckwell Press, East Linton, 1999),  pp. 174-5. 
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  The ‘Grand Peur’ of the Scottish middle class was reflected in the Protestant panic of the 
Scottish churches. The Church of Scotland and the United Free Church filled with Jeremiahs 
pronouncing the impending doom of the land of Knox. Scotland appeared to some to be 
threatened on all sides, from prolific aliens within, to alien ideologies and religions from 
without. The idea took hold of Scotland as a dead or ying country, reinforced by writers like 
George Malcolm Thomson in Caledonia or the Future of the Scots13 which provided a 
dystopian vision of a future Scotland in which it had become an Irish colony and the original 
inhabitants a minority in their own country:  ‘The first fact about the Scot is that he is a man 
eclipsed. The Scots are a dying people. They are being r placed in their own country by a 
people alien in race, temperament and religion.’14  Scotland was neither dead nor dying but in 
an almost indefinable way it felt defeated. Such views were taken seriously by many in 
Scottish society and it will be the purpose here to sh w how that sense of defeat came to be 
directed against the Catholic Irish. 
      The experience of Scotland in the 1920s and 1930s has been described as a sectarian 
crisis and as a crisis of confidence. The historiography in religious terms has tended to 
concentrate on the rise of militant Protestantism, particularly in the work of scholars like 
Handley, Gallagher and Walker. The Church of Scotland’s anti-Irish campaign of the inter-
war period has been considered as part of a long standing Scottish tradition of ‘No Popery’ 
and seen in the tradition of Jacob Primmer in the nineteenth century and the later  
demagoguery of the Scottish Protestant League and Protestant Action led by Alexander 
Ratcliffe and John Cormack respectively. However, as Bruce has suggested, the idea of the 
prevalence of Scottish anti-Catholicism, particularly in the 19th century, can be and has on 
occasion been overstated: ‘in some places there was some sympathy for aggressive anti-
Catholicism but local preferences were invariably over-ruled by cosmopolitan elites who 
regarded social order as more important than local values.’15  It will be argued that to regard 
the anti-Irish campaign as simply a manifestation of ‘No Popery’ is to miss several 
fundamental points about post-war Scotland. For example, the impact of the Irish War of 
Independence on Scotland has not so far been assessed. The contemporary intelligence and 
police reports gave credence to the idea that there was an armed Sinn Fein presence of twenty 
thousand men in the West of Scotland and that the IRA were only waiting their opportunity to 
                                                 
13 G.M. Thomson, Caledonia or the future of the Scots, (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1927). 
14 G.M. Thomson, Caledonia in  R. Finlay, Nationalism, Race, Religion and the Irish Question in Inter War 
Scotland Innes Review, 42;1 (1991) p53. 
15 S Bruce, T Glendinning, Iain Patterson, Michael Rosie, Sectarianism in Scotland (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004),  p24. 
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launch this ‘army’ against targets in Scotland. Groundless though those fears were in reality, 
it will be shown that the psychological effect of the Irish War impacted far more on Scotland 
than it did on the rest of the United Kingdom and consequently the perception of the Irish 
was radically altered.  
   It should be noted that before the Great War the majority of Irish Catholics were firmly 
rooted to the bottom of the economic pile. As Tom Gallagher puts it: 
 
In Glasgow the Irish would dominate the unskilled labour market for generations, 
finding work…as casual construction labourers, coal heavers and as sweated labour in 
textiles….They were an indispensable mobile workforce whose contribution to the 
‘Second City of the Empire’ went unappreciated by contemporary chroniclers.16 
 
It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to describe the Irish Catholics in Scotland 
before 1918 as a coolie class although, as Bernard Aspinwall has pointed out, there were 
more instances of upward mobility than have been appreciated and ‘that far too many myths 
and ideological assumptions bedazzle writers on the Catholic Irish in Scotland.’17  
Nevertheless, it is also true that the vast majority of the men were either in unskilled or semi-
skilled work and the women in domestic service or factory employment. Derided and 
despised by the middle-class and treated with resentment and suspicion, they were still not a 
political or social threat. The restricted franchise before the 1918 Reform Act ensured that a 
sizeable proportion of their number did not have thvote and for those that did the Irish 
Home Rule issue could generally ensure their loyalty to the Liberal party. In any case the 
Labour party with certain significant exceptions was still in pursuit of the votes of the 
respectable working class. In 1909 the Majority and Minority reports of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws ‘the latter drafted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb and signed by 
George Lansbury were as one in their support for the forcible segregation of those inefficient 
parasitical elements, the so called residuum who were d emed incapable of improvement.’18  
In 1914 you could not be more a member of the ‘residuum’ than an Irish Catholic in 
Glasgow.  In 1914 the Irish could be safely seen as hewers of wood and drawers of water. Yet 
                                                 
16 T. Gallagher, The Catholic Irish In Scotland,  in T.M. Devine (ed.), Scotland in Irish Immigrants and Scottish 
Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the Scottish Historical Studies Seminar, 
University of Strathclyde 1989 – 1990,  ( John Donald, Edinburgh, 1991),  p21. 
17 B. Aspinwall, The Catholic Irish and Wealth in Glasgow in Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,  p91. 
18 J. J. Smyth , Labour in Glasgow 1896 -1936: Socialism, Suffrage, S ctarianism, (Tuckwell, East Linton, 
2000),  p26. 
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by 1924 John Wheatley would be one of the most effectiv  Cabinet ministers in the first 
Labour government, an Irish Free State had been created in twenty-six counties of Ireland 
and the 1918 Education Act in Scotland had ensured a place for state funded Catholic 
education that was in advance of any other part of the United Kingdom. The Catholic Irish 
had lived in Scotland in considerable numbers since the 1840s but they arrived in the 1920s. 
Ironically this arrival coincided with the very moment at which they were ceasing to be 
‘Irish’. 
      It was this new awareness of the Irish that prompted and fuelled the Church’s anti-Irish 
campaign. ‘No Popery’ was an element, and in the 1930s an increasing important one, but the 
reasons for the attack were more complex than simple religious bigotry. The Churches were 
not engaging in a proletarian crusade, but a bid for m ral leadership backed up by legislative 
sanction. The arguments employed, while discredited an  distasteful by present standards, 
were at the forefront of intellectual discourse at the time.  Race theory and Social Darwinism, 
while familiar concepts in the Nineteenth century, were reaching their popularity in debates 
over eugenics and ‘Race Suicide’ in the 1920s. The C urch of Scotland would attempt to 
conduct its case as a racial rather than a religious issue. The work that has been done on the 
Church of Scotland campaign, most notably by Stewart Brown, has demonstrated that the aim 
of the Church was to place itself at the head of a nativist movement that would return the 
Kirk to its position of pre-eminence in Scottish society.19 At its root was the Presbyterian 
concept of ‘Twa kingdoms’, the idea that the nation c sisted of two kingdoms, Christ’s and 
the King’s, and that the state or ‘civil magistrate’ had a duty to be guided by the Church. 
   It will also be argued here that the Church campign lasted longer than has been previously 
considered and ended more suddenly and dramatically. It will be demonstrated that between 
the General Assemblies of 1935 and 1936 a major change of heart took place and the reasons 
and personalities behind this change will be examined. Stewart Brown has argued that the 
reasons for the end of the campaign were a steady wning of interest in the Church and the 
rising concerns at developments across the Rhine.20 This was undoubtedly a major factor, but 
at the General Assembly of 1935, when the Church Interests Committee was arguably at its 
most influential, the incoming Moderator was Dr Marshall Lang, brother to Cosmo Lang 
Archbishop of Canterbury, who would argue for a more ecumenical approach. The realities 
within the Church of Scotland by this time were as complex as anywhere else. 
                                                 
19 S.J. Brown, ‘Outside the Covenant’: Scottish Presbyterian Churches and Irish Immigration 1922-38. Innes 
Review vol 22;1,(1991),  p20. 
20Ibid p39 
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    The Government response, as will be shown here, diff red in Scotland from that of the 
United Kingdom. What has generally been accepted is that the Church case fell on the 
‘Imperial’ issue of the position of citizens of the Irish Free State as British subjects. What has 
not been considered to the same extent is how succesful the Kirk was in winning influential 
adherents to its cause within the political elites of all parties and how close they came in 
Scotland to successfully persuading successive Governments of their case. Tom Devine, 
along with every almost every other scholar of the period has stated that ‘Neither the 
Conservative nor Labour party was prepared to introduce the legislation for which the 
General Assemblies…pressed so enthusiastically year after year.’21 While this is substantially 
correct it does not wholly reflect the actual positi n in Government at the time. The 
discussions that took place within the Scottish Office and with United Kingdom departments, 
as shown in the files, were considerably more complex than the idea of a flat refusal would 
suggest. To some Scots the Irish War of Independence a d the creation of the Free State 
effectively made the Irish foreigners. To the British, Ireland was still firmly within the 
Empire and citizens of the Free State were British subjects. The latter interpretation prevailed 
but it will be demonstrated that this was not without considerable resistance from the Scottish 
Office. 
   Lastly there is the response of the forgotten people of the controversy, the Catholic Irish 
themselves. This is still an under-researched area very probably because the archives of the 
Catholic Church in Scotland contain certain surprising lacunae for the 1920s. For example, in 
the minutes of the meetings of the Catholic hierarchy throughout the 1920s there is no 
reference to the Presbyterian campaign, nor in the archives Archdiocese in Glasgow, does 
there appear to be any correspondence on the issue. This appears at first sight to be rather 
baffling but it will be seen that the Church did respond to the attacks on the Irish but that the 
concerns of the Scottish hierarchy were not necessarily those of the Irish Catholic community 
and that the chief spokesman for that community, Charles Diamond, was in many ways a 
hindrance to Irish integration in Scotland. It will be considered whether the Scottish Catholic 
hierarchy’s problematic relationship with Irish clergy may not have inclined them to rise to 
the defence of the Scoto-Irish with any great enthusiasm. Colin Barr’s work on Irish 
‘ecclesiastical imperialism’ in the empire sheds some interesting observations on this issue.22 
                                                 
21 T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1707-2007, (Penguin, London, 2006),  p384. 
22 C. Barr, Imperium in Imperio: Irish Episcopal Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century in English Historical 
Review 123; 502, (2008). 
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    The inter-war period in Scottish history is one of considerable complexity. Bernard 
Aspinwall in Scotland’s Shame repeatedly made the point that ‘Reality is complex.’ This may 
be something of a truism but nonetheless valid for that. It also has to be pointed out that here 
one is dealing with more than one reality. There was the ‘reality’ of the police and 
intelligence services view of the IRA threat and the reality of that threat. There was the 
Church ‘reality’ of an Irish invasion and the reality of that invasion. It raises an interesting 
question as to the correct methodological approach to all these realities. As this period is 
receding, but not entirely gone, from living memory there is limited value in using oral 
history which on this subject tends to be clouded with mythologies on all sides. It would also 
be perfectly possible to take a Marxist perspective and consider this as an economic issue. 
One could equally apply any number of economic, sociol gical or historical theories to the 
problem. In the 1990s there emerged a theory, which enjoyed a considerable vogue amongst 
American scholars, that the Irish, particularly in the 19th Century occupied an indeterminate 
space in which they were not quite ‘white’. David Roediger first argued the thesis in the 
Wages of Whiteness23 followed up by Noel Ignatiev’s, How the Irish became White24. 
Essentially, the Irish, and particularly the emigrant Irish competed for the lowest rungs of 
employment and were considered by the ruling elites to be racially inferior to the highest or 
‘Anglo-Saxon type’. As much of what follows in this thesis will deal with race theory as it 
was understood in the 1920s and with self-perceptions f racial identity, both that of the 
Church and of some, at least, of the emigrant Irish community a brief mention of this 
particular theory is necessary. It has to be said at the outset that the ‘Whiteness’ argument 
does have its attractions particularly when considering the Church case. As it will be 
discussed further on this was a racial campaign and, s is argued elsewhere in this thesis, the 
Irish prior to the outbreak of the Great War were considered something of a ‘coolie class’ 
largely, but not entirely, occupying the lowest economic rung.  Considering that the Kirk 
would spend a great deal of time on pseudo-scientifc, eugenicist race theory, largely, as will 
be shown, derived from the United States it has a double plausibility. 
   There are, however, problems with this analysis in a Scottish and indeed wider context. As 
Eris Arnesen argued in 2002, in the case of American historians of immigration ‘their 
reluctance to engage with the arguments of the whiteness historians has permitted an 
unfortunate “jargon creep” in scholarly discussions about race…It is not uncommon to 
                                                 
23 D.R. Roediger, The Wages of  Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class, (Verso, New 
York, 1991). 
24 N. Ignatiev,  How the Irish became White, (Routeledge, London 1995). 
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stumble upon the phrase “how the Irish became white” and the assertions of Irish non 
whiteness in writings by scholars of a “progressive” orientation who are not specialists in 
immigration history.’25 In the past decade the criticism of immigration historians is perhaps 
less valid than it was, although the point about ‘jargon creep’ and the whiteness, or otherwise 
of the Irish immigrant is still frequently revived.  What is of more concern here is Arnesen’s 
later point in the same article: 
  
 After a decade of growing popularity, however, whiteness studies – or “critical 
whiteness studies” as Roediger prefers – remains a vague and intellectually incoherent 
enterprise. Its core concept of whiteness defies singular definition. On one level, 
whiteness is about “identity”: how those in power identify a subordinate group, and 
how that subordinate group identifies itself. Elites rarely if ever employed the 
terminology of whiteness, so whiteness scholars presum  to deduce from their 
statements their true intents. 26  
 
  On balance the approach here will be an empirical one. The evidence in some cases speaks 
for itself and in others it requires interpretation given what is known about the personalities 
and circumstances at the time. There are times when the straightforward traditional method is 
the best for the subject and to intrude too much theory is an unnecessary distraction. The aim 
is not to be ‘bedazzled with myths and ideological assumptions’ but to give a clear and 
concise account and interpretation of a particular controversy that still has echoes in Scotland.  
   First it is necessary to examine the course of the Irish War of Independence as it was played 
out in Scotland. The events of the years 1919 to 1921 were to have a fundamental effect on 
the Scottish perception of its Irish population. The armed struggle between the republicans 
and the British Government, though it saw little in the way of actual violence in Scotland, 
profoundly altered the image of the Irish. It will be a central contention here that much of 
what followed in the 1920s in terms of anti-Irish sentiment had its roots in that conflict. 





                                                 
25 E. Arnesen, A Paler Shade of White, New Republic June 24th 2002 p34 of pp33-38. 




Sinn Fein and the Scottish Office 1919-1923 
 
 ‘It is probably well to consider the position of Sinn Feiners here. They, equally with 
their Irish associates are levying war against this country and against the Executive 
Government of Ireland. They are instigating the disorders in Ireland, supporting the 
IRA with money, arms and ammunition, and I apprehend, even supplying them with 
men.’ 




I  Introduction 
   The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of Sinn Fein on Scotland during the 
period of armed struggle for Irish independence and to consider its possible implications in 
the later anti-Irish immigration campaign. In the academic work that has been done on this 
period comparatively little has been produced from a specifically Scottish perspective. It is 
perhaps natural that the ‘Anglo-Irish war’ has been s en as just that, a conflict between 
Ireland and England or even between Ireland and the British Empire. The Scottish experience 
has been something of an adjunct but there has been a general assumption in the light of 
James Handley’s seminal The Irish in Modern Scotland28 that the Irish Diaspora in Scotland 
made a significant contribution to Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army in terms of arms 
and financial support: ‘It was not until guerrilla fighting broke out in Ireland that 
sympathisers in Scotland had an opportunity of renderi g effective service. That service in 
money and materials was given so generously that the contribution of Scotland to the Sinn 
Fein campaign far exceeded that of any other country, including Ireland, and was in the 
opinion of Mr de Valera the chief factor in its success.’29   Even though de Valera always 
understood the necessity for, and was a master of, politic flattery of the Irish Diaspora, his 
assessment that ‘The financial contribution to the Irish struggle from among the Scottish 
                                                 
27 National Records of Scotland, Irish Disturbances Correspondence file, HH55/69.  
28 J. Handley, The Irish in Modern Scotland, (Cork University Press, 1947). 
29Ibid,  p297 
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communities was in excess of funds from any other country, including Ireland,’30 may not 
have been too much of an exaggeration. However, later scholarship has questioned this 
assumption. Most notably, Iain Patterson has argued that Sinn Fein activity was essentially 
minimal in Scotland and of little real relevance to the Anglo-Irish war.31 On the other hand, 
more recent work by Peter Hart32 and by Mairtin O’Caithin,33 have inclined more towards 
Handley’s position. In order to establish as far as po sible the reality that the lies between the 
two, (or, more interestingly, if there is a position that reconciles the two), the object will be to 
re-examine the evidence form the viewpoint of Sinn Fein’s adversaries. 
     There is a natural tendency in the historiography of the period to concentrate on the more 
‘glamorous’ aspects of the Irish Republican Army and the political activities of Sinn Fein. 
What might be termed the ‘Ballad History’ of gun running, gun battles and jail breaks, or 
rather attempted jail breaks, such as the ‘Smashing of the Van’ incident in Glasgow in 1921, 
and the arguments have tended to emphasise the effectiveness, or otherwise, of actual 
military operations. The concentration here, however, will be on the attitudes and perceptions 
of the actors primarily concerned with combating the ‘Sinn Fein threat’ as they believed it to 
exist at the time. This will be achieved by a fairly detailed analysis of some of the official 
correspondence concerning Scottish Office policy. One factor to be borne in mind throughout 
this exercise is that it is the psychological effect of an armed Irish rebellion on ‘official’ 
Scotland that is the main significance of the period. It is for this reason that much of what 
follows will be concentrated on ‘The Irish Disturbances’ files in the National Records of 
Scotland (NRS) (HH55/62-74) which provide an interesting light,  not only to the activities of 
Sinn Fein, but into the official mind-set of the period. 
    What happened in this relatively brief passage of Scottish history had a profound effect on 
Scotland that far outweighed the actual military and material support given to the Irish cause. 
Tom Gallagher has argued that ‘No evidence has emerged that Michael Collins in Dublin 
sought to foment industrial unrest in Glasgow, so a to over extend the British. The 
Republican leadership had allotted a different and more crucial role to the Irish in Scotland: 
… to provide money and military supplies to keep the war effort going back home and safe 
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houses for IRA men on the run.’34 This in purely military terms may well be true but that did 
not mean that the Scottish authorities did not believ  that this was his aim and, it will be 
shown here, that there is evidence that suggests tha  Sinn Fein deliberately encouraged them 
in that opinion. What the evidence does reveal is the remarkable effect that the Irish war had 
on official and wider Scotland.  It was certainly far in advance of any actual campaign. There 
was infinitely more damage caused by the IRA in London and Liverpool than there ever was 
in Glasgow35 and yet in Scotland there was a readiness to believe in an enemy within who 
were not only well armed and organised but might join up with the disaffected Bolshevik 
element of the working classes. It should be remembered that on 31 January 1919 during the 
‘Forty Hours Strike’ of 1919 the Government dispatched 12,000 troops, 100 Lorries and six 
tanks onto the streets of Glasgow. The Red Flag in George Square had raised the spectre of 
Revolution and, to a severely frightened middle class, there was not much to distinguish Sinn 
Fein from Bolshevism. There was also a sense of the perceived fragility of Scotland’s post 
war society and its particular economic vulnerability. Bombings and arson may cause some 
economic dislocation in England but it could not bring the country to a standstill whereas the 
geographical concentration of industrial Scotland impl ed that attacks on particular strategic 
locations could effectively paralyse an already faltering economy and in Scotland the 
majority of Irish immigration was concentrated in those very areas. Most large companies in 
West Central Scotland employed the men as labourers and many middle class families 
employed the women as servants. The Anglo-Irish war appeared to some Scots more like an 
incipient Helots’ revolt right in the heart of its pre-war prosperity and its post war anxiety. 
   What will be advanced here is not necessarily in co flict with either the Handley or 
Patterson view, rather it is an attempt to gauge the actual military and political aims of Sinn 
Fein in Scotland and to argue that the threat of sabotage or insurrection was a far more useful 
one to the republicans than actually engaging in activities for which they had neither the 
manpower or resources. Equally, and in some ways more importantly, the Republican cause 
was aided in this respect by a specifically Scottish set of circumstances at the heart of the 
administration that made the threat of action in Scotland as, if not more, effective than the 
actual action in England. 
                                                 
34 T. Gallagher, The Uneasy Peace, pp. 90-91. 
35 P. Hart, Operations Abroad, p 92. Between October 1920 and July 1921 there we58 cases of arson in 
London, 54 in Liverpool and 15 in Glasgow and 38, 41, and 5 cases of Telegraph sabotage respectively. On the 
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    It is therefore necessary to look at the specific Scottish sources.  Firstly, there are the 
official reactions to what was considered to be an undoubted threat.  There is an obvious 
difference between the actual military and security threat of Sinn Fein and the authorities’ 
perception of it. For example the quotation at the head of this chapter is from a report by the 
Procurator Fiscal of Glasgow in which he demanded the introduction of internment in 
Scotland. Some of the reactions of Chief Constables were on similar lines and while the truce 
intervened before matters got to this stage some of the policy options that were under serious 
consideration at the time make for intriguing reading, particularly the difference in attitudes 
of those in Scotland and those of the civil servants i  London. What will be of particular 
significance here is the intelligence on which much of the security discussions were based 
and its likely source.  
      It should be pointed out that at this time thGovernment minister with responsibility for 
Scotland, Robert Munro, was Secretary for, and not of, Scotland and as such outside the 
Cabinet. Equally, the Scottish Office was largely based in London therefore the civil servants 
charged with dealing with Sinn Fein did so at arm’s length. Both being outside the Cabinet 
loop and some geographical distance for the action proved to have been a considerable 
influence on the actions of the officials. G.F. Millar, referring to Munro’s actions during 
wartime and later labour unrest, states that ‘It is ea y to see the mixture of timidity and 
unimaginative overreaction in Munro’s role as Secretary for Scotland,’36 and quotes Harvie’s 
unsparing assessment of him as the ‘dim representative of a failing political party.’37 
However, ‘timidity and unimaginative overreaction’ as will be seen from the files were traits 
far from confined to Munro himself.   
    Outside of Government circles the war in Ireland was avidly followed in the Scottish press. 
This fell into two categories, the ‘mainstream’ press, particularly the Scotsman and the 
Glasgow Herald, and the ‘Catholic’ press. This may seem to be something of an 
oversimplification considering that much of the radic l press such as Forward were 
sympathetic to the Irish cause while much of the English press, for example the Times and 
especially the Manchester Guardian, were often critical  of Lloyd-George and the coalition’s 
policies in Ireland. However this analysis is, as was stated at the outset specifically concerned 
with Scotland, and official Scotland in particular, nd for this reason the stance taken by the 
Scotsman is especially interesting. Naturally both the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman were 
                                                 
36 G.F. Millar, ‘Munro, Robert, Baron Alness, (1868-1955) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online 
edition, Oxford. 
37C. Harvie,  No gods and precious few heroes: Scotland 1914-1980,  (Arnold, London, 1981),  p28. 
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politically hostile to Sinn Fein but the Scotsman took so vehemently a pro-Government line 
that it appears in some instances to be ahead of the Government itself, at least that part of it 
which had responsibility for Scotland. For example, b tween 1st  September 1920 and 31st 
December 1920 there were 330 Sinn Fein related articles and letters in the Scotsman alone38. 
For this reason reading these papers in conjunction w th the official files it is possible to see 
how much information actually reached the public and to gauge the accuracy of the reporting 
and the likely effect it was having on the thinking i side Whitehall. The second category is 
the Catholic press especially the Glasgow Observer un by the mercurial polemicist Charles 
Diamond. Originally a staunch supporter of the Irish Parliamentary Party who vehemently 
condemned the Easter Rising he was, by the end of the Irish war, jailed for incitement to 
violence for an editorial in his own paper. He was nevertheless a hugely influential figure in 
Irish Catholic circles. The natural battle lines were drawn in the press as elsewhere but if the 
forces were marshalled by late 1919 it is well at this point to examine how they got there in 
the first place.                       
                  
II The Helot’s Revolt 
‘Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she 
receives her old traditions of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her 
flag and strikes for her freedom.’ 39       
 
    On a sunny Monday afternoon on 24th April, Easter Week 1916 Patrick Pearse announced 
to a largely bemused audience from the steps of the G.P.O. in Dublin that they had a new 
Government.  One week later much of the centre of Dublin would be a smoking ruin and, 
while exact casualties are hard to ascertain, about 64 rebels, 134 soldiers and police and 220 
civilians had been killed.40 The Easter Week in Dublin was the catalyst for the greatest crisis 
in Ireland since the rising of 1798. This was far from apparent at the time. The reaction in 
Dublin and in the wider Irish community was one of almost universal condemnation. Charles 
Diamond writing in the Glasgow Observer was forthright in his damning criticism: 
 
The Irish People… will not manifest the slightest sympathy or approval of the madly 
criminal actions of the pro German plotters who reso ted to insurrection…The actions 
                                                 
38The Scotsman,  Online Archive –scotman.com 
39 R. Dudley Edwards, Patrick Pearse: The Triumph of Failure, (Gollancz, London, 1977), p280. Declaration of 
the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the People of Ireland. 
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of the Dublin revolters …was needless, foolish, wicked and unjustifiable. Irish 
nationalists will condemn it as unpatriotic folly; rash, blind, headlong, stupid and 
wrong.41  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the rising such opinions were widely held. In Scotland the 
condemnation was no less severe. The Scotsman of the 2nd May would almost seem to be 
echoing Diamond’s sentiments with a little added loca  grievance:  
 
Treasonable in its conception, mad in its methods, deplorable in its effects… Politically 
and nationally her aspirations have been gratified an nationalist Ireland seemed to 
want for nothing more… for years she has been the spoilt child of the British treasury. 
Her wishes have been satisfied when Scotland has been turned away with a curt 
refusal…Under these circumstances the rising of the past week was not merely wanton 
and criminal it was the basest ingratitude.42      
    
 The thunderous denunciations of the Rising on all sides seemed to indicate that the incident 
would be consigned to another violent footnote in Irish history and yet  within two years ‘the 
Sinn Fein banner became the rallying point for nearly every nationalist group, whether 
moderate or extremist, peaceful or violent.’43 Within four years there would be full scale 
guerrilla warfare on ‘British’ soil.  
     Peter Cottrell cites Richard Bennett’s description of the Anglo-Irish War as one that ‘the 
English have struggled to forget and the Irish cannot help but remember.’44    The creation of 
the myths of 1916 began almost as soon as the fighting s opped and another type of shooting 
began. Certainly General Maxwell’s policy of executing the leaders of the Rising engendered 
revulsion in Ireland. The executions, fifteen in all, which were carried out between the 3rd and 
the 12th of May caused a reaction to set in. ‘Mad, rash, blind, stupid folly’ perhaps but the 
British turned it into nobly brave, ‘rash, blind, stupid folly’. In Scotland, as in Ireland, Irish 
opinion changed from condemnation, to sneaking admiration, to outright support.  On May 
13th there were calls for the shooting to stop in the Glasgow Observer. By June that particular 
Irish genius for organising relief had swung into action and help was being provided for Irish 
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prisoners from the Rising held at Barlinnie and Perth p isons and advertisements for the relief 
committee were appearing in the Catholic press that had only a few weeks before been so 
hostile.45 In fact by June 15th the police prohibited a meeting in Glasgow to raise funds for 
prisoners prompting stern criticism of ‘this needless prohibition.’46 Throughout the following 
years as the old Home Rule party collapsed the Irish community in Scotland had become a 
sympathetic onlooker to events in Ireland. By 1919 however the community was in more of a 
position to take an active part in the proceedings. 
    It is not the purpose here to describe the rise of Sinn Fein and the demise of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party in Ireland between 1916 and the end of the First World War in 1918. 
However, in order to appreciate the effect of the Irish war in Scotland it is necessary to 
understand something of the political, economic and social status of the vast majority of the 
Irish in Scotland at the outbreak of the First World War.   One or two salient facts serve to 
highlight a changing Scottish attitude to the large immigrant community that had grown up in 
its midst. After the 1840s famine Scotland was host t  a large permanent Irish Catholic 
population particularly in west central Scotland. By 1851 the Irish made up 7.2% of the 
Scottish population and 18.2% of the population of Glasgow.47   Throughout the later 
nineteenth century Scotland there was large scale immigration, particularly from Ulster, as 
the mass industrialisation of the country grew apace. Not all this immigration was by Irish 
Catholics. Graham Walker gives in his own estimation a crude figure of Irish Protestant 
immigration being 25% of the total Irish immigration into Scotland.48 The influx of the Ulster 
Irish brought with it the tensions and history of the province into Scottish society. This is not 
to say that sectarianism was entirely an Irish import but without the introduction of militant 
‘Orangeism’ it is possible to make a case that the tensions would not have been so acute. 
Even although there were tribal tensions between the two groups it is debateable that 
Scotland at the period regarded the Irish as anythig like a threat. 
        What is not in doubt is that the majority of Irish Catholics were firmly rooted to the 
bottom of the economic pile. It is from this apparently unpromising material that the Irish 
Volunteers or Irish Republican Army (IRA) was drawn. The history of the Irish Volunteers in 
Scotland is one of the more controversial episodes of the Anglo-Irish war. Almost all 
commentators have drawn attention to the movement’s fractious and disputatious nature. 
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Scotland undoubtedly caused problems on a political and personal level for Michael Collins. 
As O’Cathain has it ‘it was precisely because of Collins’ nonchalant detachment from 
Scotland and the workings of his elaborate network there that many of his political and 
personal connections unravelled. Scotland and Glasgow in particular, became the primary 
weapon in the hands of his enemies.’49  There is perhaps a case that much of what was 
achieved by the Volunteers in Scotland disappeared in the wrangling between Cathal Brugha 
and Collins over the ‘Scottish Accounts’, a rather pointless squabble over arms purchasing 
funds that had more to do with personality clashes in Dublin than cash in Glasgow.  
      An examination of the organisation of the IRA in Scotland does reveal that there was a 
distinct division between the smuggling operations a d that of the ‘conventional’ volunteers. 
In 1919 Collins sent Joe Vize to sort out what was a fairly chaotic situation in Scotland and 
organise the channels for arms and ammunition. O’Cathain disputes Patterson’s suggestion 
that he was sent over as a senior officer or Hart’s view that his job was to sort out the warring 
factions in Glasgow.50 Nevertheless by 1920 he was given command of the Scottish Brigade, 
although, as O’Cathain points out he was in Scotland primarily in an IRB51 capacity ‘and it 
was the IRB who took for themselves the control of the supply chain of arms and 
ammunition.’52 This control of the smuggling and arms procurement in Scotland by the IRB 
was a crucial element in understanding the operations of the IRA in Scotland. The whole 
organisation in Scotland throughout 1919-20 was the responsibility of Vize and his colleague 
Joe Furlong: ‘Within a year he (Vize) had gone from three to twenty one companies… 
opened up several gun-running and ammunition streams …and organised a successful raid for 
arms from Hamilton barracks. Vize also counselled against deployment of the Scottish 
Brigade in Ireland citing the ever-authoritative ‘instructions from Collins to remain in place 
and concentrate on supplies.’53 This control of the Volunteers and the IRB by Vize, with 
orders to consider the lines of arms and ammunition as paramount explains much of the 
actions of Sinn Fein in Scotland and the way in which the whole movement was used in an 
intelligence war to protect the supply lines to Ireland. In fact the IRB often used ‘civilian’ 
contractors rather than Sinn Fein men to organise and purchase its arms. It may well have 
been the case that the IRB men used the Volunteers as a smokescreen for their gun running 
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activities.  The actual strength of the IRA in Scotland, as will be seen, was nowhere near what 
the authorities believed it to be but as a ‘paper tiger’ it could cause significant problems. In 
effect the IRA in Scotland, outside of those directly involved in the supply train, were 
marched up to the tops of hills and along midnight streets to distract a police force that had 
convinced itself that  a major attack was imminent.   
 
 
III  The ‘Glasgow Desperadoes’54 
There is but little evidence, our Glasgow correspondent reports to indicate that the 
organisation in Scotland is in possession of rifles and ammunition, and a report that open 
and unconcealed drilling and manoeuvring has taken place on a large scale recently outside 
the city is unfounded. The authorities are fully alive to the situation and may be relied on to 
take prompt action should anything unlawful occur. 
Scotsman 13th September 192055  
  
   At one o’clock in the morning on what was a fairly dank October night in Barrhead 
Sergeant McKenzie encountered a sizeable group of young men apparently engaged in some 
kind of military ‘route march’. The report of this chance encounter subsequently rose through 
the various levels of Government and within four days made its way to the Cabinet. On its 
journey it acquired ever more sinister overtones having gone through the hands of the Chief 
Constable of Glasgow, the Special Branch, the Directo  of Intelligence, the Lord Advocate 
and the Secretary for Scotland. A close examination of the information the reports contain 
builds a picture of an intelligence source that wasobviously believed by the Chief Constable 
and in turn was readily believed by others in the cain. The actual source for the Chief 
Constable’s alarming assessment will be discussed further on but the remarkable aspect at 
this stage is the credence to which experienced police, intelligence officers, civil servants and 
politicians were willing to give to the claims of the IRA’s capabilities: 
 
    About 1a.m. on Thursday 14th Oct, 1920 while patrolling Main St Barrhead, …I 
observed a large crowd of men, numbering about 200 coming from Glen St into Main 
St where a halt was made for a minute or two, they t n moved along Main St in the 
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direction of Neilston. I followed after them and when near the junction of South 
Arthurlie Road I met a squad of them coming back again, and saw another number 
standing near the junction of Cross Arthurlie St. I went over to the second squad, and 
turning my light on, I asked if they were looking for any particular place, but I received 
no reply, and those on whom my light was shining turned away their heads. I saw that 
they were all young and respectably dressed men, and without any word being uttered 
they moved along Main St after the first squad. I followed after and kept behind until 
they made a halt opposite St Johns R.C. Chapel, Darnley Road. After remaining halted 
for about five minutes, I could hear them in the front moving off in the direction of 
Glasgow, and the squad in rear about 80 in number turned about and proceeded along 
Darnley Road…in the direction of Paisley. 
     There was little or no talking among them, nordid I hear any word of command 
being given, but they seemed to march and halt at some command, which I think was 
passed quietly from the front to the rear. They did not keep any regular formation of 
fours, but they had what looked like connecting files between groups, and they marched 
at a quick pace behind one another and it was quiteev dent they were on a route march. 
    I did not see any sign of arms. Some of them carried coats over their arm or shoulder. 
I did not recognise any of them …and I am of the opini n that they were all strangers. 
…The morning was very dark and a slight rain was falling which made everything very 
indistinct.…’56 
  
 At this stage Sgt McKenzie had reported nothing more than 200 young men apparently on a 
‘route march’ in Barrhead at one in the morning. Granted two hundred young men walking 
around Barrhead at one o’clock on a wet night would be suspicious even now. On the other 
hand there was nothing to suggest that this was in ny way a ‘combat’ formation. However, 
as far as the authorities were concerned, this was another example of ‘illegal drilling,’ an 
issue that began to exercise their minds particularly in late 1920. There were would appear to 
be no evidence of this being an armed group or, on the basis of the police reports, that it had a 
specific objective. So the question remains is why ere Sinn Fein indulging in a tour of 
Nitshill and Barrhead on the early hours of a Thursday morning? Equally, why had they got 
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two hundred young men to participate in such an exercis  on a week night? Even in 1920 it is 
a fair assumption that many of the participants of this midnight march had work to go to in 
the morning. It was something of a feature of Sinn Fein activity, at least as far as illegal 
drilling was concerned, that it tended to take place t the weekend. The Chief Constable of 
Glasgow obviously reached his own conclusions:  
 
Sir 
    I beg to inform you that about 2.40 a.m. on 14th instant a telephone message was 
received from the police at Barrhead that a body of about 200 men believed to be Sinn 
Feiners had passed through Barrhead about 1.30 a.m.; that 100 had broken off and had 
gone towards Paisley, and that the other 100 were marching towards Glasgow. The 
information was telephoned to the divisions on the south side, and the constables on 
duty in the outlying districts on the South Side were instructed to keep watch, and to 
communicate with their divisional office on seeing the approach of these men. At 3 
a.m. they appeared at Shawlands cross, marching in parties of 3 and 4 at intervals – 103 
in all. Plain Clothes Constables, who had been previously warned, followed some of the 
parties to their destinations as they dispersed, but so far they have not been able to 
ascertain the names of the men. The parties moved qui tly and there was no disorder. 
     It is reported that many of the men ‘appeared to be carrying something bulky’ and 
that in one case what appeared to be a revolver was seen protruding from a man’s 
inside pocket. 
     This midnight marching has a sinister aspect. It looks as if the Sinn Feiners were 
preparing for action.57 
     
   Between Sgt McKenzie’s first report and the Chief Constable’s the ‘route march’ has taken 
on a considerably more ‘sinister aspect.’ Originally the nearest the marchers had to anything 
resembling weaponry is that ‘some of them carried coats over their arm or shoulder’. This in 
the space of a few hours has been promoted to ‘appeared to be carrying something bulky.’ 
Not only this but ‘in one case what appeared to be a r volver was seen protruding from a 
man’s inside pocket.’ The key phrase of the Chief Constable’s is, ‘This midnight marching 
has a sinister aspect. It looks as if the Sinn Feiners were preparing for action.’  The reason for 
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the Chief Constable’s conviction that military action by Sinn Fein was imminent became 
apparent in his letter to the Under Secretary of Sctland two days later:   
 
Sir 
    Reference to my previous letters regarding the activities of the Sinn Fein Society in 
Glasgow, I have now to report that private information believed to be reliable has been 
received that a secret meeting of the leaders of the Society was held in the League of 
the Cross Hall, Partick St, Greenock, on the night of the 16th inst when 37 Sinn Fein 
Clubs were represented. It was reported that the strength of the Sinn Fein Volunteers in 
Glasgow and the West of Scotland was 30,000, and that 20,000 had revolvers, and 
2,000 had rifles all of the modern pattern, with unlimited ammunition; that they had 
plans of Maryhill Barracks and of all the Territorial Drill Halls in Glasgow, 
Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, and Dunbartonshire. 
      The delegates were instructed to inform their s veral battalions that an order might 
be received at any time to mobilise, and to be ready to act either in Ireland or Scotland 
as might be required. 
    The Director of Intelligence, Scotland House, and the G O C the troops in the   
Glasgow area have been supplied with this information58 
   
   By now the military capability of Sinn Fein had been inflated to a potentially armed force 
of 20,000 of whom 2,000 had rifles. 2,000 riflemen would have been approximately the size 
of a British brigade of the period and would have alarmed any responsible Chief Constable, 
and yet, as Hart points out, the reality was somewhat different: ‘Glasgow began with fewer 
than a hundred volunteers in 1919, but reorganisation here and elsewhere in Scotland 
produced a potential force of 600 men by August 1920. …all told there were perhaps a 
thousand men enrolled in British IRA units in the crucial twelve months between July 1920 
and July 1921. How many of these were actually avail ble for duty or active at any given 
time was a different matter. Only very rarely were whole units mobilised for an operation, 
whereupon many so ordered failed to turn up.’59 It should be mentioned here that Hart’s 
methodology has recently come into question, particularly by John Regan,60  but his 
assessment of the actual strength of the IRA on Scotland appears on balance to be correct. 
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O’Cathain  has pointed out that there is considerabl  disagreement amongst scholars as to the 
actual strength of the IRA in Scotland, ‘prior to Hart, Aspinwall suggested 20,000, which was 
mainly based on Finlay and Handley, the latter of whom in turn based his figures on a D ily 
Record report, which also claimed 4,000 members in Glasgow. This 4,000 figure was used by 
O’Farrell, who gives a figure of 7,000 IRA members for Scotland as a whole.’61 Given the 
difficulties  of weapons and ammunition supply experienced by IRA units in Ireland it is 
highly unlikely that Collins would have tied up 20,0 0 revolvers, 2,000 rifles and ‘unlimited 
ammunition’ in Glasgow when it was urgently required, and could be profitably used, 
elsewhere.  The discrepancy between what the IRA were even theoretically able to put into 
the field and what the Chief Constable believed to be the case is so marked that the question 
has to be asked: what was the source of this ‘private information’ and why was such suspect 
intelligence believed, not only by a perhaps understandably worried Chief Constable, but by 
Special Branch and prompted no less a figure than Bsil Thompson the Director of 
Intelligence to reinforce the message by reporting it independently to the Scottish Office the 
next day? 
   In answering these questions it is useful to return in more detail to the press report quoted at 
the beginning of this section covering a Sinn Fein rally at St Andrew’s Hall Glasgow on the 
12 September 1920: 
  
Practically all the Sinn Fein clubs on the Clydesid were represented and most of the 
demonstrators arrived at the hall in charabancs, from which flew the Republican 
Tricolour.  …. Fully 8,000 Sinn Feiners took part in the proceedings …the audiences 
were composed chiefly of women and young men and cospicuous among the platform 
party was a number of priests wearing Sinn Fein rosette …The hall and passages were 
lined with young men described as Irish Volunteers The speeches were all in the same 
strain-violent denunciation of the Government and British democracy….One speaker 
contended that Irishmen were justified in employing every weapon to secure their ends, 
and confirmed reports in the press that Sinn Fein had an army in Scotland and, he said 
it would be well to remember that that army was for use.62 (my italics) 
 
This was obviously the hyperbole of a political meeting but it was nonetheless a sizeable 
demonstration of numbers if not necessarily force. What is interesting is that Sinn Fein was 
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proclaiming from a public platform that they had ‘an rmy’ in Scotland. In fact they had no 
such thing and they, or at least their leadership, knew it. This in itself would not be indicative 
of a deliberate policy on the part of Sinn Fein as inflated claims to martial prowess are part 
and parcel of the rhetorical currency of any political group with an armed wing. As such it 
would not warrant attention if it were not for one of the more remarkable documents from an 
‘informer’ which is in the papers of Sir John Gilmour, later the Secretary of State for 
Scotland.  Then in the ‘Whips’ office, Gilmour wrote to Munro one month after the 
mysterious route march described above. It is a rathe  anxious enquiry as to the safety of 
Bonar Law, leader of the Unionists  in the Cabinet and a long-time opponent of Irish Home 
Rule, should he visit Edinburgh. It should also be noted that Gilmour himself was an 
Orangeman who took a particular interest in the activities of Sinn Fein.  
 
 
My dear Munro 
    I write with reference to the activities of the Sinn Fein Clubs in this country – certain 
information which I have received in addition to what I have sent you and Morrison 
(the Lord Advocate) from time to time leads me to believe that a policy of kidnapping 
similar to that which is being used in Ireland will be tried in this country. As you are 
aware Mr Bonar Law is going to Edinburgh on December 9th and I thought it right to 
draw your attention to this matter in order that any necessary precautions can be taken. 
    I should also be much obliged if you can give m any assurance that in your opinion 
the local police force in Scotland and more particularly in Glasgow and surrounding 
district are in a position to obtain reliable information of the activities63 
    
  There is no record of Munro’s reply in Gilmour’s papers but there is, however, the 
following report sent by the Secretary for Scotland. The format is a carbon of two type-
written sheets with no indication as to the identity of the author. The information it contains 
and, importantly the style in which it was written make it worthwhile quoting in its entirety: 
    
   On Sunday evening 27th inst, three of the Southside companies of the Irish 
Republican Army met for drill in St Frances Young Men’s Society Hall, Errol St, under 
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the command of Thomas J Murray, John Ryan and P J Duffy, with their respective 
military drill instructors. 
      On this same evening groups of the Irish Citizen Army in the Anderston district 
appeared to be unusually active. About a dozen of them visited the Workers 
International Union Hall, 550 Argyle Street and had an interview within the hall with 
Thomas L Smith, the Communist leader of the Internatio l Workers of the World. 
They subsequently left and went round to Laughran’s Public House at Elderslie St. The 
employees of this spirit shop are all Sinn Feiners and the charge hand is an official of 
the ‘Thomas Ashe’ Sinn Fein Club, Anderston and the ‘Patrick McDonough’ Club, 
Partick. Nelson who is on the run probably now in Dublin and McCann who is in HMP 
Glasgow are members of the before mentioned clubs. 
   On Sunday evening at 6.30 Mr Jack Leckie was the lecturer at a meeting held under 
the auspices of the Communist Labour Party (Anderston ection) in the Socialist Hall, 
569 Argyle St. The hall was crowded. Mr Robert Fleck, Partick, occupied the chair. 
Leckie’s subject was: - ‘Irish Martyrdom’ and he deliv red an extremely violent speech 
in which he advocated physical force as the only effective means to adopt to obtain 
their rights. They had nothing to loose (sic) but their chains, etc. etc. 
    At 10 o’clock on Saturday morning a Solemn Requi m Mass was celebrated in St 
Joseph’s R C Church, 40 North Woodside Road, for the repose of souls of the Rev 
Father Griffin and Rorin (sic probably Kevin) Barry murdered by the order of the 
British Government in order to drive terror into the earts of the Irish people and kill 
the soul and spirit of the Irish nation. The Rev Joseph Reilly was celebrant and the Rev 
James McConnell, delivered the panegyric. The mass wa  arranged by the ‘Anne 
Devlin’ branch of Cumann-Na-Ban, whose members wore dark armlets. Two 
companies of the Irish Volunteers were present wearing Sinn Fein favours and 
Volunteer badges 
    There were present about fifteen hundred persons – a record attendance in this parish 
for a downright wet morning. 
    The writer desires to point out that the callous and deliberate murders, the burning of 
creameries and houses, is exasperating the Irish people of Glasgow to the utmost limit 
of human endeavour and is straining the bonds of discipl ne to breaking point. The Irish 
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Volunteers are one of the best disciplined and one of the biggest forces in Scotland and 
may break out of hand at any moment. 64 
     
  It is in the language and nature of this report that gives an inkling of the ‘private 
information’ referred to by the Chief Constable. Intelligence is an inexact science and is 
dependent on the reliability of its sources. It would appear that the Glasgow Police, and 
indeed the Scottish Office, believed that they had a reliable source of information within Sinn 
Fein. For this source to trouble the upper echelons of Government the informant would have 
to have at least some standing within Sinn Fein and be above the level of the usual police spy. 
The description of the Greenock meeting implies that it was held at Commandant level which 
in turn suggests that the Government believed that i  had an informer in Glasgow who was at 
least a company commander. Now all this implication is ot in itself evidence and without 
explicit confirmation of an identity in the files at  distance of ninety years it must be a matter 
of conjecture. However, it is possible, using the evid nce available, to posit a logical 
hypothesis and test it against what is known about Sinn Fein at the time.  
     It is reasonable to assume that the anonymous s rce quoted above was regarded 
sufficiently seriously for this report to be forwarded by Munro to Sir John Gilmour. 
Gilmour’s original request for information, while smi-official, is not that of a back bencher 
but of a rising politician in the government with a position in the ‘Whips’ Office regarding 
the safety of the second most important member of the Cabinet. The evidence that Munro 
took this request exceptionally seriously is in thefact that he instituted enquiries, as will be 
shown below, with all the Chief Constables in Scotland likely to have a Sinn Fein presence as 
to the conditions in their areas. In these circumstances it lends credibility to the theory that 
the above report was considered as genuine intelligence. 
     The content of the report quite firmly places it  location in Glasgow but it is the 
information it reveals or perhaps the lack of it that is interesting. The first paragraph gives the 
names of the company commanders of the Southside of Glasgow, and yet in the trial records 
of Sinn Fein in Scotland, the names of Duffy, Ryan and Murray do not appear. That in itself 
is not that unusual but it does seem that the informant was giving or confirming information 
already known to the police. The slightly contemptuous references to the Irish Citizen Army 
and left wing speakers are also instructive. There was tension in Scotland concerning arms 
shipments to the Irish Citizen Army which was largely dormant during the Anglo-Irish war. 
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Patterson cites a member of the Citizen’s Army describing his organisation as failing ‘to play 
a worthwhile role in the fight against the British forces during the period 1919-21.’65 As 
O’Cathain states ‘There was also an outmanoeuvring of the Volunteers though this may also 
have been related to the penchant among some of that number to collect and send arms to the 
remnants of the Irish Citizen Army. Neither Vize nor Collins had serious leftist sympathies 
and their joint fear of communist or socialist influence (a difficulty in itself in a country 
where socialist ideas had growing support) may have ff cted their actions.’66 It would 
appear that the informant shared in that opinion; in which case given the antagonistic 
relations between some Republican factions, especially in Glasgow, the inclusion of this 
information may have been a deliberate attempt to interest the authorities in the activities of 
groups considered as hindering Republican operations rather than providing assistance to the 
British Government.  
        The files concerning Sinn Fein in this period have more than their fair share of 
curiosities including a crude forgery claiming to be the oath of the Knights of Columba, an 
almost illegible scrawl addressed to Lloyd George and the idiosyncratic correspondence of 
Captain Despard, the Chief Constable of Lanarkshire. None are quite so curious as the last 
three paragraphs of this report. The style is obviously literate but it appears like a cross 
between a parish magazine and a speech from a Dublin soapbox. (It does raise the intriguing 
possibility that Munro’s correspondent was a priest). It is less than complimentary to its 
intended audience and there cannot be many instances wh re an informer actually threatens 
his employer with the very people upon whom he was presumably asked to spy. 
Nevertheless, this report must have been taken seriously. The reason for this lies in the final 
sentence, ‘The Irish Volunteers are one of the best disciplined and one of the biggest forces in 
Scotland and may break out of hand at any moment.’ There is a recurrent theme here of the 
concept of Sinn Fein having a heavily armed, disciplined, military force. It would appear both 
from Sinn Fein’s public pronouncements and in the information that it seemed to be 
providing the Government through ‘other channels’ that the message was constantly being 
reinforced. In the preceding eight weeks the Scottish Authorities had received information, 
publicly and privately that Sinn Fein had a substantial force of armed men in the west of 
Scotland who were ready to strike. The information was coming from inside Sinn Fein so the 
question remains, why were they so willing to give this credence? The almost inescapable 
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conclusion is that influential figures in the political, legal and law enforcement establishment 
believed in these reports because they had already convinced themselves of their veracity. In 
that case any report of an IRA army in Scotland wase gerly seized upon as further proof of 
an already existing position. This is apparent in some of the responses the Scottish Office 
received in their request for situation reports in response to Gilmour’s letter.  For example the 
Procurator Fiscal of Glasgow was in no doubt of Sinn Fein’s intentions, the nature of the 
threat or the remedy required: 
 
  …I have the feeling that in Glasgow we are on the point of having some serious 
outbreak of Sinn Fein activity and the week-end happenings in Liverpool strengthen me 
in that view. It is known that this hostile organisat on is in some strength in this district 
and it is reasonable to suppose that active steps involving disorder will early ensue. All 
our information points in this direction. 
   … In the present case, while we have authentic iformation, we are in the position of 
having no sufficient legal evidence, and it has occurred to me that other means of 
dealing with this organisation must be found. 
     From the public press I gather that it is now accepted that a state of war exists at 
least in some parts of Ireland and these parts are pr ctically under military control. The 
Government of Ireland are now apprehending the leaders of this hostile movement and 
interning them and this course seems fully justified. 
         … It is beyond all question that Republican Troops are in this city with the 
avowed object of taking part in hostile operations both in Ireland and here. That seems 
to me to be an intolerable position of matters. It is neither fair to the law abiding 
citizens here who are or might be victims of these men’s violence at any moment, nor is 
it fair on those in Ireland who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order. 
     I have already pointed out that I can see no means of dealing with these Sinn Feiners 
in our Civil Criminal Courts and it occurs to me tha  the Government of Ireland should 
instruct the Glasgow Police to apprehend for them and hand over the most active Sinn 
Feiners in this City who would then be interned. The justification for this would be that 
the persons apprehended are engaged in levying war on the Irish Executive. Such 
apprehensions would be quite in accordance with the declared policy of the Irish 
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Executive and the facts, so far as Glasgow is concerned appear to fully justify such a 
course…67  
    
   Again we have the Fiscal’s assertion of ‘authentic information.’ On the basis of this 
information the Procurator Fiscal was calling for the effective suspension of Habeas Corpus 
(Wrongous Imprisonment in Scotland) and an official recognition that a state of war existed 
in Ireland.  The policy implications for the British Government of such an action were 
unacceptable. Any move that hinted of belligerent sta u  for the IRA would legitimise the 
Sinn Fein case of being the Government of Ireland particularly in America, and equally 
important, in the Empire. As Lloyd George had already pointed out to Lord French in May 
1920 ‘you do not declare war against rebels.’68 69  Such niceties of policy were causing 
difficulties for those closer to the ‘front line’ who tended to view things in more black and 
white terms. In fairness to the Fiscal he was writing in the aftermath of ‘Bloody Sunday,’ and 
only two days before the IRA had burned seventeen warehouses in Liverpool. Coupled with 
this, ‘Several key figures in the Collins network were picked up before the November 
burnings…In fact had a raid not driven Mulcahy (IRA Chief of Staff in Dublin) to escape 
across rooftops …leaving his papers behind…very large scale operations would have taken 
place in Liverpool and Manchester during April 1921. These would have included the 
destruction of all British shipping in Liverpool and of Manchester’s electricity supply.’70 In 
view of what had happened elsewhere, and given whatthe Glasgow police believed about the 
IRA, it was a not unnatural assumption that what was pl nned for Liverpool and Manchester 
could well be planned for Glasgow. The report from the Chief Constables of Glasgow 
appeared to confirm Gilmour’s anxieties about the exist nce of a kidnap plot:    
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We have information that the question of kidnapping was discussed and that it was 
decided to kidnap the Prime Minister, Mr Bonar Law nd other important members of 
the government and Home Office officials. This information was at once 
communicated according to arrangement to the Directo  of Intelligence, London. We 
have also information that a party of six was appointed to carry out reprisals in Scotland 
and supplied with £250 for the purpose. 
    If any important member of the Government should come to Glasgow special 
precautions will be taken to ensure his safety but it might be well if none came for the 
present.71 
 
The response of Captain Herbert J. Despard, the Chif Constable of Lanarkshire, was no 
more comforting: ‘There is always a danger of trouble in this County as the Sinn Fein and 
Orange parties are fairly well balanced, with the natural consequence that if Sinn Feiners are 
in the majority in one place they molest the Orangemen and vice versa, …there is always a 
danger of conflict between the two parties, large numbers of young men habitually carry 
pistols and at any time there may be trouble’72 
      By late November 1920 the Government as a whole was in a state of some panic. Bloody 
Sunday and the captured Sinn Fein documents revealed an organisation that was far more 
formidable than the Government in Westminster had been willing to admit. The privately 
expressed views of the Chief Constable of Glasgow that he could not guarantee the safety of 
the leader of the Conservative party on British soil and his recommendation that major 
politicians stay away from Glasgow says much about police’s belief in the strength of Sinn 
Fein. Sir Hamar Greenwood73 in fact mentions in the House of Commons on 24th November 
1920 that ‘the organisation has spread to this country and £3,500 had recently been sent to 
Scotland, particularly in Glasgow to buy firearms for assassins.’74 Strangely this particular 
piece of information does not feature in the Scottish Office files. Presumably they thought to 
let Munro know. In any case the idea of Sinn Fein attacks on the British mainland had now 
taken hold in Scotland is shown in an examination of tw  cases, one of a private company 
and another of a major military installation.                      
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IV Barbarians at the Gates 
      
  The press publication of the captured plans for the destruction of the Manchester Power 
Station obviously had an effect on the board of the Clyde Valley Electrical Power Company. 
In December 1920 the board wrote to the Secretary for Scotland requesting a military guard 
for their three power stations pointing out their importance to the economy: ‘These stations, 
…serve an area of 730 square miles, embracing most of the important shipbuilding and 
engineering works of the Clyde and the Lanarkshire coalfields.    Upwards of two hundred 
industrial works and forty collieries derive their power from our power stations, in addition to 
Tramways and other public services… Having regard to the disastrous consequences which 
would result from damage to our stations, we submit that a Military Guard should be 
provided forthwith, at each power station’.75  What is striking is the picture of vulnerability 
that it presents of the industrial heart of Scotland. The Scottish Office was aware that there 
was little chance of maintaining a regular military guard for industrial sites in Scotland. The 
suggested solutions raised the possibility of what would have, in effect, been an armed militia 
being formed to guard strategic sites. The police wre, in the opinions of the Chief 
Constables, far too overstretched to provide the type of protection requested and yet both 
Despard and Charles Harding (Chief Constable of Renfrewshire) were agreed that the 
installations were vulnerable. The officials were caught between their apprehension of a Sinn 
Fein attack, something they have been warned about for the last two months, as has been 
shown by the previous files, and the desire to avoid any extra expense. At the same time the 
solution of arming the workers was almost as alarming to the authorities as Sinn Fein itself.  
    On the 7th December 1920 the Scottish Office wrote to the Chief Constables concerned 
asking for their observations on this request. In their replies both Harding and Despard 
forcefully made the point that they were in no positi n to protect the power stations 
adequately. Despard pointed out that although ‘Arrangements have been made by which it is 
hoped that the nearest Police Stations will get warning, even if telephonic communication is 
interrupted, if an attack is made on the works. If such a warning is received, an armed body 
of Police will be sent, …The Secretary for Scotland will notice that all the Police can hope to 
do is to arrive on the scene as soon as possible after an attack has been made, as, however 
constant the visits may be, it is unlikely that an attack will be made when the Constables are 
actually visiting.’ Harding was even more pessimistic in his assessment: 




I can only give them extra police protection which they do not consider sufficient, and, 
as a matter of fact, if this place or police stations were invaded by armed Sinn Feiners 
the occupants would nearly be powerless against them. 
   I ought to mention that during the whole of the war we kept rifles and ammunition at 
the more important police stations, but since then these were recalled by the Military 
Authorities without the instructions, so far as I am ware of the Scottish Office. 
    I may also add that a large number of employees at these works are either Irish or of 
Irish extraction.76 
   
These senior policemen were in no doubt about the power stations’ vulnerability and their 
own lack of resources and were taking the opportunity of going on record to stress the point.   
Harding’s observation that he had been disarmed by the military without the sanction of the 
Scottish Office implied that any attack on the facility at Yoker would be partly the fault of the 
army. The last, rather ominous sentence, on the ethnic origins of the employees at the power 
station was that of a Chief Police Officer displaying his deep concern in the face of an armed 
attack. It may well indicate that the Renfrewshire Constabulary may have been more wary in 
tackling the IRA. It is remarkable that Lanarkshire seems to have had a mobile armed force 
on call but Renfrewshire did not. Even so, Despard held out little hope of being able to 
prevent any attack on the power stations in his area.77 Following these gloomy assessments 
from the Chief Constables, efforts were made by the Scottish Office to find a solution. 
    In December 1920 a Scottish Office official, John Rose, later Sir John Gilmour’s Private 
Secretary, reported that there had been a Home Office conference to consider the protection 
of stores for the Ministry of Munitions. The dilemma was identical to that faced by the 
Scottish Office in providing military guards for strategic sites. The War Office refused 
military protection. However, it is the suggested alternatives, that provide the most interesting 
example of government thinking at the time: 
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  The proceedings at this conference make pretty clear what could be the attitude of the 
W.O. (War Office) towards this request for a military guard. They also throw doubt on 
the expediency of a suggestion that has sometimes be n made that the factory workers 
should be enrolled as Special Constables ‘provided with arms’. 
   There is a suggestion by the Secretary of State th t if the C.Cs think the arrangements 
for protecting the Ministry’s depots are not satisfactory they should, after consulting the 
managers, appoint themselves appropriate watchmen and swear them in as Special 
Constables. The Secretary of State could defray the cost. It may be assumed that the 
Secretary’s objection to arming ordinary factory workers could not apply to the arming 
of these picked men.78 
     
  This particular correspondence highlights the problems facing the Scottish Office. They had 
a threat which they believed to be substantial but there was little likelihood of obtaining any 
extra help from the British Government. As the report on the Home Office conference 
reported above shows, even the Ministry of Munitions could not ensure a military guard for 
its installations. The suggestion that the factory workers be provided with arms received short 
shrift. It is an intriguing thought, although the idea of providing weapons to workers on 
Clydeside must have seemed to the Scottish Office akin to the US Cavalry running guns to 
the Apaches. Nevertheless, it was the War Office in the shape of the Royal Navy that came 
back to the Scottish Office with an almost identical problem the following year. This 
correspondence again highlights the problem of protection for vulnerable installations and the 
perennial inter-departmental problem of financial responsibility. Rose was this time consulted 
by the Admiralty concerning protection of the oil ppeline which ran along the Forth and 
Clyde canal: 
 
I said that we could of course ask the police of the counties where the pumping stations 
are, to give special attention to the stations, but tha  they could not provide continuous 
watching. There were objections to increasing the police forces for temporary purposes 
and the appointment of police would be expensive. I suggested that the Chief 
Constables might be asked by the Admiralty to select men as watchmen and have them 
sworn in as Special Constables. 79 
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The Admiralty made a formal request for assistance but the Scottish Office was in no real 
position to help and they were determined that they would not incur the cost of recruiting 
extra police. However, in their reply to the Admiralty in January 1921, Munro made a 
suggestion, which, had it been taken up may have had far reaching consequences: 
   
  It would probably be possible to engage a force of Special Constables for the duty 
under the general control of the Chief Constables. Such a force would cost less than an 
equal number of ordinary Constables. It is understood however, that it is intended that 
the men would be armed, and the Secretary for Scotland would have great difficulty in 
assenting to the arming of Special Constables in such circumstances. 
   In all the circumstances, the Secretary for Scotland would suggest that their Lordships 
should consider whether their object could not be attained by the recruiting of a special 
body of watchmen – possibly army and navy pensioners – who would form a 
uniformed and disciplined force and would be armed.  
Sir John Lamb80 
 
  What in effect Munro proposed was the formation of a uniformed and armed militia to 
guard a military installation. The rather vague notion that they would be found from navy and 
army pensioners would very probably not have reflected the reality. Considering that the 
Orange Order made frequent representations to be allowed to do this sort of work it is not 
hard to envisage the take up of posts in this force. At any rate it is highly unlikely that anyone 
from an Irish Catholic background would have been recruited. The idea of Special Constables 
or picked watchmen had connotations of the B Specials in Ulster. Had  Scotland gone down 
this route it is difficult to see how any force recruited to guard against Sinn Fein could have 
been anything other than wholly Protestant, if not entirely Orange. 
      As it turned out the Admiralty apparently did not reply to the Scottish Office’s letter, very 
probably because the Truce and Treaty negotiations re dered them redundant. In which case 
it is possible that Scotland escaped what could have been a very divisive development 
especially in view of what was to come with the emergence of growing sectarian tensions in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Nonetheless, there were those in nior positions in Scotland that 
believed they were in a war situation and that the en my was capable of deploying a 
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considerable force in the middle of Scotland. They ad had in fact an almighty fright that 
arguably ranked alongside the threat of Bolshevik revolution from Clydeside workers.                   
 
              
                         
V  Aftermath: ‘The Irish Menace’ 
    They cannot be assimilated or absorbed in to the Scottish race. They remain a people by 
themselves, segregated by reason of their race, their customs, their traditions, and above 
all by their loyalty to their Church and gradually and inevitably dividing Scotland 
racially, socially and ecclesiastically.81 
      
  The Sinn Fein campaign remains a contentious one in Scotland.  As was pointed out in the 
introduction to this chapter there are differing opinions on the effectiveness of the campaign 
in military terms. Hart makes the point that ‘If success is measured in terms of public and 
governmental attention and alarm, the guerrillas achieved what they set out to do. The IRA 
threat was the subject of numerous Cabinet reports and discussions. It was raised regularly in 
the House of Commons. It provoked an unprecedented and highly visible internal security 
regime. Most importantly it provoked headlines.’82 Certainly this conclusion is borne out by 
the documents considered here. Nonetheless there was a peculiarly Scottish dimension to the 
period. Hart perceptively states that ‘It is its identity as much as its violence which makes the 
IRA in Britain historically significant… All these organisations had also internalized a very 
British sense of localism, with the movement as a whole split at the Scottish border’83 (my 
italics). It is certainly the case that the activities of the IRA in Scotland differed from those in 
England.  It has been argued here that the threat of acti n was as useful to the IRA as a cover 
for their gun-running activities and that there is evidence that the IRA, or more likely the 
IRB, were deliberately fostering the idea amongst the authorities in Scotland that there was a 
large potential armed force in Scotland which, had it existed, would have been beyond the 
capability of the civil police forces to control. It may well have been the case that much of the 
activities in terms of illegal drilling took place in order to promote this perception. O’Cathain 
has shown that Collins used trusted IRB men like Vize and Furlong to control his munitions 
stream in Scotland. The fact that there were undoubted tensions inside the IRA in Scotland 
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may well have been caused by the need to keep the Volunteers out of the gun-running 
operations and yet give the appearance to the authorities that there was a substantial armed 
threat. It is a not unreasonable proposition that as long as the police were chasing a phantom 
‘army’ around the Ochil Hills or, has been seen, the streets of Barrhead they would not be 
concentrating on the more important arms routes. O’Cathain states that  ‘The agreed premise 
is tight IRB control of arms procurement and supply, deliberate obfuscation of the IRA, and a 
similar ostracisation of the Volunteers from full access to funds.’84 If, as has been suggested 
here, the IRA in Scotland were deliberately not engaged but being used as a distraction it may 
go some way to explaining the bitterness of the ‘Scottish Accounts’ wrangle and why 
disgruntled IRA men in Glasgow who felt left out of the action may have appealed to Brugha 
as minister of Defence.  O’Cathain points out that e only Volunteers’ action, the ‘Smashing 
of the Van’ in 1921, was contrary to the wishes of Dublin. ‘…a rescue attempt for an ‘on-the-
run’ Sligo IRA leader, Frank Carty who had fled to Glasgow after escaping from jail in 
Northern Ireland. The resulting ‘Smashing of the Van’ ended in two policemen being shot, 
one of whom was killed in a city centre shoot-out forever embedded in Glasgow mythology, 
a massive crackdown and round-up of republicans in Glasgow, no release for Carty and an 
incandescent Minister for Finance back in Dublin.’85 Thus the only really notable action 
throughout the whole war in Scotland could have effctively scuppered a highly successful 
piece of intelligence deception and endangered the vi al supply lines. 
   Nevertheless the ‘Deception Plan,’ deliberate or fortuitous, had a definite effect on the 
Scottish establishment.  The traumatic experience of the Great War changed Scottish society 
for ever and its attitude to the Irish. Scotland halost proportionately more men in battle per 
head of population than any other nation involved in the conflict and this was a shattering 
blow that left no community and scarcely any family in the land untouched. The profound 
effects on the national psyche were incalculable. The political results of the war also had an 
effect on the confidence of the establishment and its institutions.  As has been pointed out the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia engendered a ‘gr nd peur’ in the upper and middle 
classes unseen since the French revolution. The crisis in confidence ended forever the Liberal 
hegemony in Scotland as the middle classes rushed to the safety of the Conservatives and the 
working class to the hope of the Labour Party. The Irish issue itself disappeared off the 
political radar for England but it came haunt Scotland in a different guise throughout the 
inter-war years.   
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     The Irish War of Independence between 1919 and 1921 must have been profoundly 
unsettling viewed from the perspective of Presbyterian Scotland. It is perhaps difficult from 
the perspective of the secular twenty-first century to conceive how much of Scotland’s 
identity was a Presbyterian identity, certainly forthe middle classes. If one considers the 
family background of Munro for example, he was the son of a Free Church minister and his 
maternal grandfather was also a Church of Scotland minister. His first wife was similarly a 
daughter of the manse.86 The Civil Service and the legal establishment were men of a similar 
stamp, in many cases Church elders as well as professi nals and these were the men who 
would have had access, directly in some cases, and through connections in others, to at least 
some of the information contained in the documents xamined above87. They were also men 
who had in a comparatively short space of time seen all the assumptions of superiority with 
which they had grown up profoundly challenged. Three hundred years of Protestant 
ascendancy in Ireland collapsed as a British Empire, which had emerged victorious at 
phenomenal cost from the greatest conflict in history, had been apparently fought to a 
standstill by the despised Irish. Not only that, but their co-religionists, who had loudly 
proclaimed their loyalty to that Empire, had been rduced to ruling a laager of six counties 
still with a dangerously  disloyal element, while a C tholic state had been set up not only a 
short  journey away but within what had been a unitary state. This war had also been fought 
on their own territory. At any time there might have been an ‘outrage’ on the streets and 
certainly the authorities believed that at one stage there was an Irish Army in the west of 
Scotland. These dangerous and disloyal radicals were now making common cause with the 
socialists. 
          By May 1922 the brief post war boom was ending and Scotland was entering what 
would be an almost twenty year economic slump. The immediate hopes of the post war 
period were waning and the country entered a crisis of confidence and identity as the pre-war 
arrogance gave way to uncertainty and mass unemployent. At the same time the Church of 
Scotland’s General Assembly took its first steps in a concerted anti-Irish campaign. That this 
was to be a racial as well as a religious campaign can be seen from the speech of the Rev 
Duncan Cameron who asserted that ‘Roman Catholics of Irish origin were not only alien to 
Scots in religion; they were alien in race. They had come to Scotland to take jobs from 
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Scottish workers to exploit Scotland’s welfare system and to stir labour unrest. Their 
presence had a still more sinister aspect….There was a conspiracy on the part of the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy to bring Scotland under Roman domination.’88 The General Assembly 
appointed a committee of leading churchman to examine the problem of Irish Catholics in 
Scotland. The result in 1923 was the report to the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland on the Irish Problem entitled The Menace of the Irish race to our Scottish 
nationality.  The irony about this document is that the Irish, even during the ‘war’ were never 
much of a menace and certainly were not during the twenties and thirties but the language 
used in the General Assembly of 1923 was of a ‘menac ’ to be combated. The Scotsman 
report of the speech of the Rev. William Main who introduced the report illustrates the 
political as well as the religious anxieties 
    
  The problem was both a political and religious one. The political influence in this 
(Irish) immigration was already seen in the West. It was very largely due to that fact 
that they had in the House of Commons… men who represented or were supposed to 
represent constituencies in Glasgow and the West but who did not represent them 
really. (Applause). They had been elected…just by the fact that they had this enormous 
Irish Roman Catholic population in this area. And hence the type of men they had there 
were bringing disgrace and scandal on the House of Commons…. When it came to pass 
in certain localities that the Irish population were in the majority both in religious 
influence and in respect of the control of the polls those men and women held the 
balance of power. That was the danger that was the problem that was before the country 
at the present time.89 
 
It was not a long step from an armed Irish ‘army’ of 30,000 in the West and the fears of the 
Chief Constable of Glasgow, to the idea of an Irish political ‘army’ in the West electing the 
dangerous Bolsheviks of the ILP. The fact that, of the men bringing ‘disgrace and scandal on 
the House of Commons,’ ten were members of the Church, one of whom had been a 
missionary and the other, a minister, as was vehemently pointed out by the ILP two days 
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later, mattered not.90 Truth in politics tends to be what is believed by the majority at any 
given moment.  
     The Scotsman leader of the following day concurred with the report’s analysis. Entitled 
‘The Irish in Scotland: A Serious Problem’ the fears of an Irish take over had gone from a 
military to a social and political threat: 
 
The danger lies in the influence the immigrants by their increasing numbers are able to 
exert in the life of the community in educational, municipal and parliamentary 
affairs….the Irish form the most solid bloc among the newcomers. They are bound 
together by religious ties, which are preserved in their attitudes to social and political 
questions. They vote practically as one man, and their numbers are such that they 
virtually hold the balance in municipal and parliamentary polls in certain districts. It 
was largely due to the Irish vote that so many Socialists were elected to the present 
parliament by the West of Scotland.91     
    
By 1923 it was obvious that large and influential segments of Scottish society had come to 
fear the Irish in their midst. Ironically the fears of Irish immigration in the twenties and 
thirties were groundless as the economic conditions slowed it to a trickle and yet a 
specifically anti-Irish campaign carried on. The basis of this chapter has been to suggest that 
some of the roots of that campaign lie in the events of the Irish War of Independence and its 
specific effect on the leaders of a significant section of Scottish opinion. The analysis of the 
official documentation of the time demonstrates how Sinn Fein, often divided and fractious in 
Scotland, was yet portrayed as serious military threat.  
      The Irish Disturbances files do not portray the Scottish Office as a dynamic department of 
state. It was often nervous, constantly looking over its shoulder to the Cabinet for policy 
advice and ready to believe exaggerated intelligence reports of the threat it faced and yet too 
often too timid, and too penny pinching, to take action. It displayed a lack of self-belief that 
in many ways became endemic in Scotland in the inter-war years. On the other hand its 
inertia may have been its saving grace. The idea floated that a uniformed force of armed ex-
service men be recruited to protect the Navy’s pipeline thankfully never came to pass. 
Perhaps this was too uncomfortably redolent of the ‘Black and Tans,’ or at least the B 
Specials, to be contemplated in Scotland. Equally the wilder demands from Procurator Fiscals 




and Chief Constables were quietly shelved The overwh lming impression is that is that the 
Scottish Office feared that  if they had not lost control of the country it could have happened 
at any time. It is precisely that same fear of losing control that permeated the anti-Irish 
campaigns of the twenties and thirties. An educated elite, many of whom who would have 
considered themselves liberal (with a small l), allof whom would have considered 
themselves Christian, lent support and crucial respectability to a campaign of effective 
demonization of the Catholic Irish in Scotland. To middle class Scotland the creation of a 
Catholic Irish Free State was a defeat for the Empire, it was a defeat for previously 


























An Inferior Race 
 
 With the census report of 1871 the Committee hold that this invasion of the Irish is likely 
to produce far more serious effects upon Scotland than even the invasion of warlike 
hordes of Saxons, Danes and Northmen.’  
Report of the Joint Committee of the Scottish Presbyterian Churches on Immigration 




  The 1920s should have been a triumphant period for the Church of Scotland. It achieved 
union with the United Free Church ending in large part the schism of the 1843 ‘Disruption.’ 
It successfully piloted two bills through Parliament establishing a new system of church 
finance and squaring the circle between establishment and disestablishment giving the 
‘Established Church’ in Scotland far greater powers than its counterpart in England for it was 
“recognised” by the state to be independent in doctrine and government.’93 It had, as its most 
eminent churchmen, Dr John White, a skilled political operator as well as a considerable 
scholar with undoubted powers of leadership, and Lor  Sands,94 one of the foremost Scottish 
judges and lay churchmen of his day. It was hoped by many contemporary ministers that the 
post war period would see the return of the Church of Scotland to the centrality of Scottish 
life, not only spiritually, but also in cultural and political terms. The Kirk would regain its 
place as the leader and arbiter of Scotland. In effect there would be a new ‘covenant’ where 
all sections of society would coalesce around a Scottish identity that was paternal, Protestant 
and led by the ‘Auld Kirk’.  
  On the other hand, as Callum Brown points out, the war had changed society profoundly: 
 
 Churchmen were shaken by what appeared to be public indifference to the churches as 
institutions, but they were also racked with doubt concerning the theological 
implications of the war…the war had severe consequences for the social vision of the 
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Presbyterian churches. Initially filling them with self-confidence regarding their place 
in a society that required moral and spiritual direction in the midst of crisis by 1916 and 
1917 the experience of war had led to a failure of h pe for a religious revival in 
Scotland.95  
    
  Much of what has been written about Scotland in the inter-war period refers to a crisis of 
confidence amongst the Scottish middle classes. In the case of the Presbyterian Churches this 
crisis may also be considered as something of a Protestant panic. Brown cites John Wolff on 
the effects of the Great War on religious organisations: 
 
British society during the war, and religious organis tions in particular evoke the image 
of a fitness and health food fanatic who, after a long period of life afflicted by nothing 
worse than colds and migraines, has to face up to the awareness that he has a disabling 
cancer.96 
   
Scottish Presbyterianism, despite its tendency to split over matters of a doctrinal and 
administrative nature, had not had cause to doubt its pre-eminent position for almost two 
centuries. The war, however, had forced it to consider the idea that it may have lost its hold 
on the nation. The effects of trench warfare and the prospect of imminent death may have 
turned the soldiers thoughts towards God but not in the manner hoped for by the Church. A 
report published in 1919 entitled The Army and Religion, the Rev David Cairns, Professor of 
Dogmatics and Apologetics at the Free Church College in Aberdeen, noted ‘that the men who 
had been in the trenches had experienced an awakening of the primitive religious convictions 
- God, Prayer, Immortality, but they did not associate these with Jesus Christ, that their 
thought of God was not Christianised.’97 Or as another observer noted, ‘The soldier has got 
religion, I am not so sure that he has got Christianity.’98 In any case the post war world was 
not one in which Protestantism, never mind the Churc  of Scotland, could take its position 
for granted. This realisation prompted the Churches for the first time to take serious note of 
their Catholic neighbours. Faced with dwindling attendances and what appeared to be an 
increasingly secularised, and indeed paganised, pleasur -seeking society the apparent loyalty 
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of the Catholic Irish to their Church stood as something of a rebuke and a threat. If the 
Protestant Churches could not hold on to Scotland then here appeared the possibility, even if 
it was no more than a possibility, that they could be supplanted by Catholicism.  
     As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, the events of the Irish War of 
Independence had a marked effect on the upper echelons of Scottish society but why was that 
effect so profound on the Presbyterian churches? After all, as far as the political classes were 
concerned, the Irish problem was now off the agenda with the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty and the setting up of the Free State. Prior to the First World War the Church itself had 
had little to do with extreme anti-Catholicism. The Disruption of 1843 may have altered the 
centrality of the Established Church in Scottish life but did not alter the perception that 
Scottish Presbyterianism was a matter of national ad international import and whatever its 
form, was the settled religion of the country. The Catholic Church in Scotland was not 
considered a threat to that order. Thomas Chalmers, who was to become leader of the Free 
Church, had been the main speaker at a rally in 1829 in favour of Catholic emancipation. 
Even the massive numbers of Irish immigrants that flooded into Scotland in the 19th century, 
in the wake of the famine and to provide the manual labour for industrial Scotland, while 
undoubtedly provoking clashes with native Scots, and particularly with Protestant Irish 
immigrants, did not promote Catholicism to the leve of a challenge to Protestant Scotland. 
As Steve Bruce has pointed out: ‘In class terms, the strongest opposition came from the 
skilled manual working class in those areas where it competed with Irish Catholics. But what 
is most significant, and what underlies the whole subsequent development of anti-
Catholicism in Scotland, is the absence of any active anti-Catholicism from a large part of the 
leadership of the Churches.’99 Essentially the Irish Catholics in Scotland were not worth the 
notice of a Presbyterian Church embroiled in its own controversies and the religion of 
navvies and parlour maids were of no concern to a Scottish middle class growing rich on the 
proceeds of Empire. If Irish Catholic labourers and Irish Protestant labourers wished to 
belabour each other in the working class districts of the West of Scotland, that was 
deplorable, but nonetheless an issue for magistrate not ministers. 
  The central questions of the ‘sectarian issue’ of the inter-war years are why the Irish, why 
then and why did the Church persist in a campaign for so long in the face of apparent public 
indifference? It has been suggested by Gallagher and Walker that this was a continuation of a 
Scottish tradition of ‘No Popery’. ‘Strongly worded attacks on the Catholic Irish presence in 
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Scotland became a feature of the annual General Assembly of both the Church of Scotland 
and the United Free Church during the 1920s as senior clergymen, like the Very Reverend Dr 
John White, perhaps the most eminent Scottish churchman of the first half of the century, 
quietly endorsed the bitter critique of inveterate No Popery campaigners.’100 Undoubtedly 
there were elements of this in the campaign but the C urch, particularly in the person of 
White, vehemently, and none too ‘quietly’ asserted that the anti-Irish campaign was a racial 
and not a religious issue. Professor S.J. Brown has pointed out that ‘leading churchmen 
sought to place the national Church of Scotland at the head of a nativist anti-Catholic 
movement and to make the Church the defender, not only of the Reformed Faith but of the 
Scottish ‘race’ as well’.101   Scholars of the period have generally made reference to the racial 
nature of the campaign and the particular demonization of the Irish.  The Irish had been a 
threat to the peace, they appeared to be a threat to the political and social order, and in the 
Church’s case for the first time in over three hundred years Catholicism was a credible rival, 
not simply because the Irish had suddenly become more assertive but because 
Presbyterianism in comparison appeared to be in decline. How then was Presbyterianism to 
respond? An attack on the Catholic Irish purely on grounds of religion would have begged 
many questions about the validity of an Established Church and of the place it claimed in 
Scottish society. Besides such an attack would lay them open to charges of religious bigotry 
and reduce the effectiveness of any appeal it made to government and the wider public. An 
argument had to found that would be based on wider considerations than the purely religious 
and that could be presented as a defence of the national interest. 
          It is for this reason that this chapter will focus on the intellectual justifications behind 
the Church’s campaign. The notes in the John White papers held in New College Library on 
the subject of Irish immigration and on the concepts of race and class in general provide an 
insight into the mental processes of the Church and its leading figures. Much scholarly time 
has been spent in Scotland on the question of ‘identity.’ Here, however, we have a national 
institution that not only considered itself, but proclaimed itself, the guardian of Scottish 
identity while seeking to re-establish an identity for itself at the same time. This may sound 
like the paradigm for a peculiarly Scottish form of schizophrenia but to understand the 
Church’s quest for an intellectual base for its positi n in the 1920s is to understand the larger 
question of Scotland’s view of itself and its position in the wider world in the inter war 
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period. It is also important to make a distinction between the arguments of the 1920s and the 
1930s. It should be remembered that at this stage this was an argument of an elite, for an 
elite. White would never have considered himself a demagogue in the later Ratcliffe and 
Cormack mould. He genuinely believed he was making a philosophical, scientific, political 
and moral argument and that this argument was one with which he believed that the political 
and social elite of Scotland would have, or should have, been in sympathy. 
      The more spectacular, if brief, events of the 1930s can tend to overshadow what was for 
the best part of a decade a discussion between a particular intellectual, social and political 
stratum in Scotland, and between men who were largely intimately acquainted with each 
other. More fundamentally it was an argument about what Scotland was and what it would 
become conducted, not just by a church, but by a class which had lost the certainties of the 
past and was fearful of its position in the future. What did it mean to be Scottish for the 
middle and upper classes when the economic conditios had undermined the country’s 
position as partner in Empire and where the loyalty nd massive sacrifices of the Great War 
seemed to count for little? (White’s own son had been killed while serving in the Royal 
Flying Corps). The Catholic and inferior Irish seemed to be taken more seriously by the 
British Government than the loyal, Protestant and self-evidently superior Scots. It would have 
to be proved, and proved scientifically, that the Irish were of an inferior ‘type’ to the Scots 
and that toleration of  Irish immigration was risking the social, moral and economic stability 
of the country. 
 
II A Christian Commonwealth 
    It would appear from White’s pronouncements on the issue of Irish immigration that there 
was an almost authoritarian and indeed monolithic concept behind the Church’s thinking. As 
S.J. Brown has pointed out ‘their idea of the Christian Commonwealth was based on an 
exclusive idea of a national church, one that called for a racial and cultural homogeneity. The 
national Church of Scotland was to represent a Scottish national character, and include 
among its teachings a ‘scientific’ racism in which the separation of the races was part of the 
divinely-ordained natural order.’102 There was, however, another strand to Church thinking 
and it is well to pause at this stage and consider what was meant by a Christian 
Commonwealth and whether White’s concept was a universal one shared by all members of 
the Presbyterian Church. The idea of Christ’s Kingdom on Earth as a theological and, 
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importantly, social concept was one that had a variety of interpretations within 
Presbyterianism. In the years prior to the Great War the concept of Christ’s kingdom came 
under new theological and social scrutiny. This section will attempt to put this idea into its 
context in the early twentieth century and demonstrate that not only was it complex but a 
continually shifting one. 
  The nineteenth century had seen a something of a reassessment of the traditional evangelical 
approach to social problems. While it is not unreason ble to point out that the orthodoxy, 
both political and ecclesiastical, that poverty and other social ills were a result of individual 
moral failing generally held sway it was certainly the case that this analysis was becoming 
increasingly questioned within the Church. Without digressing too far into nineteenth century 
church history it is useful to give some examples to demonstrate that there was a tradition in 
Presbyterianism that ran counter to White’s conservatism with both a large and small c.   For 
example Robert Flint (1834-1910) Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy at 
St. Andrews and later Chair of Divinity at Edinburgh sought to look farther than simple 
evangelicalism as a means of engaging with the social problems created in the wake of 
industrialisation. As Johnston McKay has put it: 
 
Somehow the Church had to escape from the trap of regarding the evangelical 
effectiveness of the parish church and minister as essential to the reduction of poverty 
and the improvement of social conditions. Robert Flint’s book Christ’s Kingdom upon 
Earth which contained his sermons on the parables of the Kingdom, gave the Church a 
new model to describe its relationship with society. He argued for cooperation with 
secular agencies and insisted that this would not udermine the influence of the Church. 
Put simply, cooperation was necessary practically but, more important, required 
theologically.103 
 
The Kingdom of God was not then exclusively the Churc . The secular had a part to play and 
the Church had to engage with the secular agencies or a  Flint put it himself: 
 
The Church is not the Kingdom of God, and these elem nts of social life in separating 
themselves from the church, have not separated themselves from the Kingdom of God; 
nay, by the very act of rejecting the control of the Church they set aside the mediation 
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of the Church between them and the Kingdom of God, an  secured for themselves, as a 
portion of their independence, the right of standing in immediate contact with the Word 
and the kingdom of God.104 
 
  This, as Johnston McKay points out, is crucial in the development of later nineteenth 
century social theology. While there was some dispute as to how far the Church should be 
involved socially and politically in advancing the Kingdom, it did mean that there was more 
to the Kingdom than the Church alone.105 This would be of considerable importance in the 
later development in the Church’s arguments and in the fundamentally contradictory stance it 
would adopt in the 1920s. In the immediate it had an effect on the development of later 
nineteenth century social thought in the Church particularly by the 1890s. 
  The appalling squalor of nineteenth century urban industrialised Glasgow prompted the 
Church to become more engaged with the social conditi s around them. For example ‘Of all 
the children who died in Glasgow before the age of five, 32 per cent died in one roomed 
houses compared with 2 per cent in five roomed houses.’106  In 1888 the Church of 
Scotland’s Glasgow Presbytery set up a housing commission to investigate conditions of 
slum housing in the city led by three ministers John Marshall Lang (1834-1909), Frederick 
Lockhart Robertson (1827-1892) and Donald Macleod (1831-1916). While it is true that their 
approach was not identical it was certainly the case that they all had been influenced by 
Flintian ideas of Christ’s kingdom.  In fact both Lang and MacLeod were friends and 
neighbours and had been contemporaries of Flint at Glasgow University. Lang’s approach to 
social issues was concerned with the ‘extent of poverty and the “threat” of socialism and 
some reactions to them both secular and Christian.’107 His criticism of socialism rested 
largely on its lack of a religious element but he recognised that the humanitarian efforts 
of individuals were not distinctively Christian but were nevertheless influenced by Christian 
thought. MacLeod differed from Lang in what he believed social reform could achieve. For 
Lang the emphasis was an evangelical one to encourage individuals to return to the Church. 
For MacLeod the there was a greater purpose. In a speech to the General Assembly of 1889 
he stated that: 
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If we are entering on this battle against the evils of ociety for the object of getting our 
Churches filled and our Church statistics run up; if in going to the people we give them 
the slightest suspicion that the chief end we have in view is to get them to go ‘to our 
Church’, we will fail and deservedly fail.108 
 
Despite their differences of approach both Lang and MacLeod recognised that the Church’s 
social theology had to engage with the wider world rather than remain as a purely in house 
affair. The significance of this point in the affairs of the Church of the 1920s will become 
apparent later on but to give some idea of how it was carried out in practice it is necessary to 
take a brief look at the Presbytery of Glasgow’s Housing Commission. 
  The Reverend Frederick Lockhart Robertson was minister for St Andrews parish Glasgow 
an area with some of the worst housing conditions in the City. In 1888 the Presbytery of 
Glasgow met to discuss the social conditions of the poor and the ‘evils of intemperance.’ 
Robertson was successful not only in convincing the Pr sbytery to set up a Housing 
Commission to look into housing conditions in the city but, equally significantly, to include 
outside expertise in that commission. It should be noted that although this was a hugely 
significant step in the Church’s social engagement it did not mean that the idea of individual 
responsibility for the conditions of the poor had been discarded. As Johnston McKay has 
argued: 
 
Because the Presbytery appointed a Commission and recognised that there were 
economic and structural causes of poverty, there has been a tendency to assume 
wrongly that blaming poor social conditions on personal irresponsibility had been 
abandoned. It also has to be recognised that while t e Presbytery had rightly been 
praised for its initiative in setting up the Commission, very few of its members 
expressed the same sort of interest in social conditi s as did Robertson, Marshall Lang 
and MacLeod.109  
 
It could also be argued that the Commission was overly influenced by the landlord interest 
and did not totally abandon the innate conservatism of the Church. Nevertheless, the efforts 
of Marshall Lang, MacLeod and Robertson in raising the social conscience of the Church 
mark an important point in the development of social theology and social engagement by the 
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Church. Although he did not live to see it Robertson’  efforts were instrumental in the setting 
up of the Glasgow Workmen’s Dwelling Company which raised £40,000 and which bought 
and renovated twenty-six slum properties and erected six new tenements. This was the 
Flintian concept of Christ’s Kingdom in action. 
  There was, however, another interpretation of Christ’s Kingdom that to all intents and 
purposes was the direct negative of Flint and which specifically repudiated the idea of Church 
involvement in social and political issues. One of the leading advocates of this position was 
William Maccallum Clow (1853-1930) Principal of the United Free Church’s Trinity College 
in Glasgow and author of Christ and the Social Order published in 1913. The following 
quotation is a reasonable summary of his views: 
 
The Church’s duty is not to make laws, not to lobby public questions, not to pronounce 
on the matter of hours and wages, not to play policeman in the streets, but to make men 
of faith.110 
   
Essentially it was not the Church’s place to become involved in, or pronounce on the political 
and social issues of the day. It was an inherently conservative position in both a political and 
theological sense. The existing social order, and economic orthodoxies were not to be 
challenged by ministers. It was a position that would have some resonance with 
predominately middle class congregations. While it has been argued, and the point is made in 
the introduction of this chapter, that the war and its immediate aftermath had a profound 
effect in turning the Churches to the right, it should also be pointed out that in the period 
running up to the beginning of the Great War there were many social issues that would have 
greatly perturbed the middle classes. Lloyd George’s social reforms, the increased industrial 
strife and the Home Rule crisis in Ireland would have been seen by some as indicative of 
wide social unrest. Christian Socialism or even social activism on the part of the Church, 
would not have been viewed favourably by those who considered the Church, and their 
membership of it, as an arm of the establishment and defender of the social and economic 
status quo. In essence the Church should stay out of politics and economics as it was not 
qualified to pronounce on either. It should instead concentrate on evangelicalism and 
improving the morals of the individual. Nonetheless it is certainly true that in the period 
leading up to the Great War that there was an increased activism in the Church and the 
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impetus for union between the established Church and the United Free Church saw both 
engaging in social issues like poverty and housing in a more concrete way than simple 
apolitical evangelicalism. It also has to be pointed out that pious non-involvement in politics 
and economics was not as apolitical as all that. In the words of the hymn All things bright and 
beautiful: 
  
‘The rich man in his castle 
  The poor man at his gate 
  God made them high and lowly 
  And ordered their estate.’  
 
Although this was an Anglican hymn there were those in the Kirk who considered the 
existing social order to be divinely ordained or at le st something that it was not the Churches 
place to criticise. This was as much a political positi n as Christian socialism. It was a 
position that the Churches would adopt in the 1920s with the major exception of the anti-Irish 
campaign which in itself was a ‘conservative’ cause. 
   The Great War was initially perceived ‘as a religious crusade, which would unite and 
transform the nation under God’s will’.111 There were hopes that it would bring about a 
religious revival and a turning away from frivolous pre-war pleasures. A revivalist campaign 
amongst the troops in Scotland claimed 12,000 converts.112 ‘Supporters were confident that 
the revival beginning among the troops would spread to the nation at large: the Presbyterian 
Churches needed only to hold out their hands to catch the ripened fruit.’113 The war was just, 
the cause was moral and Christ was on their side. As S.J. Brown has pointed out not every 
minister was quite so enthusiastic. James Barr, minister of the United Free Church in St 
Mary’s Govan and later a Labour MP was threatened with dismissal for his ‘outspoken 
advocacy of peace negotiations.’114 As the war wore on and the full horror of the trenches 
became apparent hopes of religious revival faded. At home the effects of the Glasgow rent 
strike and other industrial unrest began to be felt as socialist politicians denounced what they 
saw as a capitalist war. The troops, who the Churches had thought would lead the revival, 
appeared indifferent to organised religion and showed little respect to its moral teachings. 
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The Church was seen as a self-interested body which had little relevance in righting the social 
ills of the day.115  
   By 1916 both Churches set up Commissions on the war comprised of clerical and lay 
membership and presented their reports in May 1917. Their conclusions were radical. They 
condemned what they saw as the selfish materialism of pre-war society. ‘The war...had arisen 
out of the predominant materialism of Western culture, the decline of Christian belief and the 
abandonment of Christian morality.’116  While Germany was the main culprit all the 
combatant nations were guilty of this failing. This was quite a fundamental criticism to make 
in the middle of a war with the outcome still far from decided. Equally radical was the 
conclusion that as the war called for national as well as individual repentance there was a 
place for the Church in National reconstruction which would lead to a more socially just 
society. The Commissions engaged with the work of the Government’s Committee on 
Reconstruction, set up in March 1917, to tackle social problems after the war. The Church of 
Scotland commission invited experts to contribute papers on major social issues published in 
1918 under the title Social evils and Problems.117 Both Churches also revived the plans for 
union which had been suspended since the start of the war.  This activity, as S.J. Brown has 
shown, was not entirely to the liking of the more conservative elements in the Church. The 
‘ideas of national sin and corporate repentance had become alien to Scottish Presbyterians ... 
and Scottish Presbyterianism had become individualistic in its piety and largely voluntary in 
its organisation.’118  The more ‘socialistic’ elements of the programme alarmed some, 
especially with rising social and industrial unrest. There was a fear that the Church would be 
seen to be taking sides in the political arena, and not the side with which their largely middle 
class congregations would be comfortable. 
  By the end of the war Scotland was a nation in mourning. The horrendous battle casualties 
had a profound effect on society and initially there were hopes that Church and state could 
work in conjunction for the reconstruction of post war society and the creation of the truly 
Christian commonwealth. Hopes that had been raised during the war on social issues were, 
however, soon to be dashed although this was not immediately apparent at the time. At the 
first post war General Assembly: 
 
                                                 
115 Ibid p95 
116 Ibid p97 
117 Ibid p98 
118 Ibid p99 
 56
The Church of Scotland transformed its Commission on the War into a permanent 
Church and Nation Committee, instructed to guide the work of building the Christian 
commonwealth in all its aspects, including the social and industrial. At the close of the 
Assembly, the Moderator, Professor W.P. Paterson of Edinburgh University, called on 
the Scottish nation to ‘covenant together’ in the work of reconstruction.119   
 
  Unfortunately these words were superseded by outside events. As mentioned in Chapter 
One the Bolshevik revolution had engendered a ‘Grand Peur’ in the Scottish middle classes 
heightened by the industrial unrest and the events in George Square in Glasgow in 1919. The 
General election of 1918 had returned a Conservative dominated coalition. The Liberal Party, 
once dominant in Scotland entered a sharp decline as the middle classes fled to the perceived 
protection of the Unionists from the rise of Labour. It was equally true that the Coalition were 
determined to roll back wartime controls and return society to an economic status quo ante 
bellum.  
 
For the Churches to cling to their wartime pledges to work for radical social and 
industrial reconstruction based on cooperation would be to set themselves against the 
stated policies of the Conservative dominated coaliti n and align themselves with the 
Labour opposition. This would not be acceptable to middle class Presbyterians, who 
provided most of the financial and organisational support for the churches and who had 
little sympathy for Labour politics. In the event, church leaders decided to follow the 
Government’s lead and withdraw from the call for social and industrial 
reconstruction.120 
   
  While this meant the effective end of meaningful calls for social reform and the apparent 
triumph of the traditional ‘Clow’ position it did not mean the end of the Christian 
commonwealth or the ‘political’ Church. The Church, especially under the leadership of John 
White, would concentrate on improving its efficiency and refuse to criticise the economic and 
social order ‘which meant that they gave tacit support to the revival of competitive industrial 
capitalism with its accompanying social inequalities.’121 This attempt to define the Christian 
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commonwealth as one largely parish based and ‘non-political’ or at least non-confrontational 
to the established order was one that would be put to the test during the General Strike. The 
strenuous  efforts the Church made to hold on to its position of political detachment during 
that crisis stand in marked contradiction to its anti-Irish campaign which, as will be argued 
here was intensely political, and in some ways, highly sophisticated one. Before examining 
this, however, it is well to consider how the Churches tried to reconcile its apparently 
irreconcilable by considering the Church response to the events of 1926. The attitudes 
displayed and the positions adopted in this crisis highlight the very different approach taken 
towards the issue of Irish immigration in the 1920s. 
   The General Strike in 1926 occurred in White’s fir t Moderatorial year. It confronted both 
the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church, who by this time had succeeded in 
overcoming the parliamentary hurdles to union, with a challenge to their position of non- 
involvement in political and social issues. The strike had been brought about by the proposed 
reduction in miners’ wages in April 1926. Having alre dy suffered from a previous reduction 
in 1921 the unions refused to accept and in May the TUC ordered a co-ordinated response 
and on midnight 3rd May the General Strike began. The Churches were now i  an invidious 
position. The claims of moral and national leadership, which had been such a feature of the 
Union campaign, meant that the Churches could not remain silent. In fact ‘the pressure on 
Scottish church leaders to do something was increased by the highly visible role played by 
the leaders of the Church of England, and especially by Randall Davidson, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury.’122 Davidson made attempts to mediate the strike and made a public appeal to all 
parties to resume negotiations. For the United Free Church and the established Church some 
sort of response was required. In many cases there was thunderous denunciation of the strike 
from the pulpit although it has to be said that there were equally many cases where individual 
ministers refused to join in the general condemnatio . For the enemies of the strike, however, 
there was no equivocation. ‘James Harvey, moderator of the United Free Church, denounced 
in his sermon not only the strike but trade unionism n general as an unchristian curb on the 
industry and ambition of individual workers.’123 This was rather at odds with idea of the 
Church being unqualified to pronounce on economic and political matters. The joint 
statement put out by the moderators of both Churches, while somewhat less strident in tone, 
focused on the evils of the strike. It was a selectiv  impartiality. The Church still claimed it 
                                                 
122 S.J. Brown, ‘A Victory for God’: The Scottish Presbyterian Churches and the General Strike of 1926, The 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 42;4 (October, 1991) p603 
123 Ibid p604 
 58
was not competent to make pronouncements on questions of economics that lay behind the 
strike.124 On the other hand it could still effectively condemn the strike and the strikers. It was 
a stance that gained the approbation of the Scotsman but it was a logical inconsistency that 
was on a par, as will be seen, with its position on Irish immigration. 
   The General Strike was called off by the TUC after nine days and the miners were left to 
carry on alone. For James Harvey of the United Free Church this was nothing less than a 
‘Victory for God.’ White was less strident, calling for national reconciliation while at the 
same time holding on to the position of non-interference in politics. The General Assemblies 
of both churches had been adjourned for two weeks after the Moderatorial addresses due to 
the disruption caused by the strike and in the interim the Assemblies received a request to 
receive a deputation from the miners’ union to put their case. White had, after all, made an 
offer of mediation in his Moderatorial address.  This immediately raised the issue of the 
Church’s competence to pronounce on the issue and reception of the delegation was 
vehemently opposed by the more conservative elements who were of the opinion that 
receiving the delegation would be a definite sign of meddling with economic law.  There was 
also some disquiet that the miners might actually influence opinion. In the event they need 
not have worried. Both Assemblies agreed to hear the miners’ deputation after also issuing an 
invitation to the coal owners to put their side of the dispute, an invitation which was declined. 
The miners’ deputation was given a polite hearing but little in the way of encouragement 
although White did point out that the miners did a ifficult and dangerous job and many had 
served in the war. The prevailing opinion in both Assemblies became more apparent when a 
few days later Stanley Baldwin, in conjunction with the Secretary of State for Scotland, Sir 
John Gilmour, made an unprecedented appearance at both gatherings and was given a rousing 
reception for his stand on the General Strike. The Assemblies repeatedly stated that they 
could not pronounce on political issues but apparently that did not mean that could not give 
some expression as to where their sympathies lay. White made one further attempt to offer 
mediation which was rebuffed by the coal owners who again pointed out that the Church 
itself had resolutely disclaimed any competence in conomic matters. The Churches, despite 
an ill-fated attempt by the United Free Church to organise an evangelical campaign against 
the socialist ‘enemy’ in West Fife,125 remained largely onlookers for the rest of the dispute. 
   This slight digression into the events of the General Strike may not at first seem directly 
related to the anti-Irish campaign but it raises several important points about the nature of the 
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Churches social and political engagement which will become apparent with a closer 
examination of the campaign itself. Firstly with the defeat of social progressivism in the early 
the 1920s the Church proclaimed it lacked the competenc  to pronounce on social and 
economic conditions and tacitly, if not overtly, supported the economic status quo and yet a 
large part of the argument for introduction of immigration restriction would rest on these 
factors. Secondly, if the Christian commonwealth was henceforward to be defined in a racial 
and national way it would require the active cooperation of the secular agencies most notably 
the Government, which in turn would require the Churc es to engage directly with those 
agencies. It would in effect have to lobby for a policy to decide who was deserving of 
citizenship and who was not, to be a judge and divider of men, the very same thing it 
repeatedly claimed it was not. Finally it would have to find an intellectual justification for all 
these apparent contradictions and it for this reason it is well to turn to a closer examination of 
the Church’s dominant personality Dr John White.      
 
III The White View 
     At this point it is necessary to briefly discus the main primary sources for this section of 
the chapter, the John White papers, and their context. The Very Reverend Dr John White 
(1867-1951) is described by S. J. Brown in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography as 
‘outspoken with a forceful personality …a dedicated pastor who embraced the social gospel 
ethos of the 1890s and was committed to restoring the social influence of the National 
Church of Scotland.’126 In his correspondence he appears to have been a personally kindly 
man but no sufferer of fools and with an almost ruthless ambition for his Church. There is a 
telling passage in his papers where he quotes from an unnamed American source: 
      
  The preacher should enter politics for politics is the business of every American. The 
politicians fear the influence of the pulpit on politics. A Texan ‘statesman’ has recently 
said ‘we must drive the preacher back into his pulpit.’ But he won’t stay there; he is 
going to help purify politics. 
      The law of conscience should be applied to parties as well as individuals. 
Government after all is only a committee of citizens. We must be sure that they are on 
the right side, that is the side of right….I believe that it is possible to get conscience 
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into politics and that things are gradually to shape themselves to that end. The polls 
should be made the most sacred place on earth.127  
 
Despite the obviously American context of the quote this is a reasonable summation of 
White’s personal position. His was a ‘political’ church and there is a ‘Melvillian’ attitude to 
what its relationship to the state should be. J H SBurleigh, Principal of New College and 
author of a Church History of Scotland, described White’s reunited Church of Scotland in 
which ‘the “civil magistrate” for the first time since the Reformation acknowledged in the 
fullest sense the freedom of a Church in matters affecting its own spiritual life and work.’128 
He also added tellingly, ‘The only freedom that Andrew Melville could have asked for in 
addition would be the freedom to require the civil magistrate to compel all of his subjects to 
obey the judgements of the church courts!’129  This was not altogether unreasonable in a 
Presbyterian minister but it will become apparent what the church would require from the 
‘civil magistrate.’ 
      The actual course of the campaign will be examined in a later chapter but it is important 
to understand the nature of those conducting it and most particularly White himself. Without 
the support and active leadership of the most eminent churchman of the period it is doubtful 
whether lesser lights like the Rev. Duncan Cameron of Kilsyth could have carried it as far as 
the Scottish Office. Indeed, the original overture on Irish Immigration to the General 
Assembly of 1922 was only passed by the deciding vote of the Moderator. It is unlikely that, 
without White, the other Scottish Presbyterian Churc es could have been persuaded to 
participate in a joint campaign against Irish immigration. It was largely down to the 
determination of White that the reunification of the Church of Scotland and the United Free 
Church was made possible as this was in the teeth of some fierce internal, and indeed 
Parliamentary, opposition.130 It was White who had the extensive political connections, 
particularly in the Conservative party, that persuaded him and others that the Government 
could be made to follow the Church’s lead on vital m tters of social policy. Essentially, what 
the Church was seeking to define was what constituted the desirable and undesirable citizen 
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even to the extent of allowing them residence and exercise of the franchise. In other words 
who was and was not a Scot. The government would then be required to give that definition 
legislative force, a Melvillian ‘freedom’ indeed.  For the Church to arrogate such a significant 
role to itself in national life suggests either arrogance or fear that its influence was in terminal 
decline. The reality was a combination of the two but it needed as forceful personality as 
White’s to even consider that the Church could take on such a role. It was an ambitious 
attempt for the leadership of Scottish society which would need a modern intellectual basis 
that could be argued on more than theological grounds. 
   It should be pointed out here that there is a curious gap in the White papers concerning the 
anti-immigration campaign in the 1920s. These papers were deposited in the Library of New 
College at Edinburgh University by White’s official biographer, Augustus Muir, in the 1950s. 
Muir’s biography of White appeared in 1958 and, signif cantly, it nowhere makes mention of 
the anti-Irish campaign. Yet there is a large amount of material on the subject in the form of 
notes for speeches and pamphlets, most unfortunately undated, in the papers. Neither for that 
matter does Burleigh’s Church History make any mention of the immigration campaign. The 
collection contained in box 103 of the papers also seems to follow no chronological pattern 
and it is therefore largely through inference that it is possible to make an estimate of the 
actual time when they were written. However, White’s correspondence which is catalogued 
chronologically contains practically no reference to Irish immigration. For as prolific a 
correspondent as White this is unusual. Most of the correspondence takes the form of letters 
to White and yet it would appear that no one wrote t  him on the subject. A chance mention 
in the press that Stanley Baldwin smoked White’s personal tobacco mixture131  elicited many 
requests for the address of his tobacconist but on the other burning question of the day there 
is no correspondence either official or unofficial. It would appear that White’s biographer had 
carefully edited out any such correspondence in the 1950s. Why should he do this and yet 
retain White’s notes for speeches and articles, many of which make for uncomfortable 
reading?  It may be that in the 1950s many of the principal actors of the 1920s and 1930s 
were still alive and holding senior positions in the Church and government. Figures like 
Professor J. H. S. Burleigh, Principal of New College and Walter Elliot, twice High 
Commissioner and former Secretary of State for Scotland may have been uncomfortable if 
their pre-war opinions were given a public airing. This does suggest that the Church of 
Scotland contracted a case of selective amnesia in the 1950s. Perhaps because it became 
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uncomfortable with this episode in its past and with the 400th anniversary of the Reformation 
on the horizon, at which Burleigh would preside as Moderator, it was less than keen to have 
its own brush with racism discussed. It would not be until 2002 the Church would make an 
official acknowledgement and apology for its part in he campaign.  
    Whatever the position had become by the 1950s, in the 1920s the Church was unequivocal 
in what it saw was a threat. White, in a note entitled ‘Is restriction right,’ sets out the position 
of the state and ‘inassimilable’ minorities, in this case the Irish: 
       
   The state…exists not only for immediate administrative purposes, but also for the 
obtaining of its citizens the highest attainable political, economic and social well-being 
and thus has an undoubted right to exclude through any such legislative and executive 
action as it from time to time judge expedient. 
  …  We discover here a sound political principle which rightly controls all state action 
upon the immediate question before us. The state may exclude dangerous, ignorant, 
criminal and vicious persons from its borders- it may go further- it may justly exclude 
entire classes whose presence would be fatal to its homogeneity as a nation, which 
would introduce elements impossible of amalgamation with its people and thereby 
possibly subversive of its political institutions, whether such fears be well grounded or 
not. (my italics).132 
 
      Apart from the implication that he considered the Irish ‘dangerous, ignorant, criminal and 
vicious,’ the concept that a state may exclude entir  classes that it considered ‘fatal to its 
homogeneity, impossible of amalgamation’ and ‘possibly subversive of its political 
institutions’  was a particularly authoritarian statement but one not altogether out of step with 
rising ideologies in Europe. It should be emphasised that here White was saying something 
fundamental about his view on the relationship betwe n the state and its citizens. In effect 
any minority could be legitimately ‘excluded’ if in the opinion of the state it constituted a 
threat at any given moment. Who would decide the nature of the threat were, in this case, the 
self-appointed guardians of national identity, the Church of Scotland. The implication was 
that the Church was seeking something more formal in its relationship with government - a 
form of blood and soil patriotism which was peculiarly Scottish would be allied to Scottish 
executive action. This is not to say that White was necessarily advocating a kind of 
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Caledonian proto-fascism. However, as Owen Dudley Edwards has commented of the Irish 
Menace report, ‘If a comparable document from such a body had appeared in Bavaria 
discussing the Jews in the same year, no historian would hesitate for a moment in seeing it as 
an origin of the Third Reich….That Scotland avoided pogrom and bloodshed does not mean 
that such good fortune was inevitable.’133  Had the Church successfully convinced the 
government of the kind of restrictive measures on Irish immigration it was promoting in 1926 
a new relationship would have been formed. The Church would have established a right to be 
consulted on Scottish legislation. It is yet another irony, in an era that abounds in irony, that 
the Church of Scotland was seeking to form the typeof relationship with the Scottish Office 
that arguably the Catholic Church later enjoyed with the de Valera Government in Ireland 
while at the same time proclaiming it was not competent to pronounce on economic and 
political affairs. 
     If there appears something incongruous in a churchman arguing for such an authoritarian 
position it should be remembered that in Scotland democracy as presently understood was 
still a novel concept. Until the outbreak of war the franchise was not even universal for adult 
males far less females. For example, in Glasgow in 1911, three out of the seven parliamentary 
divisions there was an enfranchisement rate of less than 50% and for the city as a whole the 
proportion of adult males enfranchised was only 53.9. Neither White nor many of his 
contemporaries apparently saw any conflict in their assertions with that of their position of 
churchmen. They were the Church of Scotland and it was their Christian and moral duty to 
protect the people of Scotland. In a note headed somewhat disingenuously, ‘No race hatred 
no religious bigotry,’ White stated: 
 
   There is no desire to shut out any immigrant solely because he will be a competitor in 
the labour market, if there is work to be given, because he is of a different religion to 
the bulk of the community. 
   Our case against undesirable immigration is based on high moral grounds. We are not 
willing to run the chance of seeing a people educated, intelligent and moral corrupted 
by a horde of immigrants whose habits of life, whose standards of morality and whose 
standards of comfort are far below that of the existing population.134 
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The question remains why should the Irish be seen as such a uniquely morally corrupting 
force from which the Scots required the Church’s protection? As far as White was concerned 
it was the Irish inability to assimilate: 
     
The Irish do not readily assimilate our habits and become good Scotsmen. As they 
come so they for long remain, amongst us, yet not of us. 
    The Irishman, notwithstanding many virtues, seem to bring a sort of social contagion 
with him, which has the effect of seriously deteriorating the life of those of our own 
people who are compelled to be his neighbour. It isa painful thing to write but truth 
compels the statement that whenever the Irish immigrant comes in any number the 
neighbourhood in which he settles speedily drops in tone, in character and in morals. 
   It may be difficult to explain the fact but fact it is. The statement of it may give 
offence in some quarters. That is to be regretted. But the existence of the fact is an 
offence, and a grave offence, in our city life and i  our national morals.135  
 
In effect the Irish, in the eyes of the Church, were akin to a disease infecting the morals and 
habits of virtuous Scotsmen. The logical inconsistency of how this infection was supposed to 
take place if the Irish had no social contact with the native Scot and was ‘amongst us and yet 
not of us’ does not seem to have troubled White. It was ‘difficult to explain’ but still a ‘fact.’  
This argument does not say much for the idea of the moral superiority of the Scottish 
neighbour as surely contact with this example would have lifted the depraved Irishman to a 
higher moral plane. 
        The racial theories to which White subscribed were not in themselves new but why did a 
Scot subscribe to them in the case of the Irish? The idea of a ‘Teutonic’ lowland Scotland 
superior to the Celtic races was one that had enjoyd much popularity in the nineteenth 
century.  Colin Kidd has shown that race was also viewed as a determinant of religion: 
‘nineteenth century anti-Catholicism became tinged with racialism which rendered it even 
more potent, for race lent a pseudo-scientific justification to Protestant bigotry, deepening 
and hardening traditional confessional prejudices. Why, nineteenth century commentators 
asked, were Teutonic peoples more susceptible to Protestantism and Latin and Celtic peoples 
so reluctant to abandon the old superstitions of Catholicism?’136  White was a product of the 
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nineteenth century. Between 1883 and 1891 he had studied Political Economy under Edward 
Caird, later Master of Balliol, at Glasgow University and taken an MA Honours in Mental 
Philosophy as well as training for the ministry.137 He and his contemporaries did not view the 
Irish as fellow Celts.  Lowland Scotland defined itself in the nineteenth century as ‘Teutonic’ 
and the ‘Celtic’ label was one that many 19th century Scots would have strongly rejected.’138  
     Apart from the particularly Scottish concepts of racial identity the White papers also 
demonstrate the extent to which he was influenced by American sociologists who were at the 
forefront of racial theory at the turn of the century. It is particularly interesting that a man 
from a nation with a centuries-old tradition of emigration should turn to the scholarship of a 
nation made up almost entirely of immigrants. Three figures feature at length, Richmond 
Mayo-Smith (1854-1901), Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931) and Edward Alsworth Ross 
(1866-1951). Mayo-Smith was a pioneer of the use of statistics in sociology and published 
Emigration and Immigration in 1890, in which he demonstrated his belief ‘that t e enormous 
number of immigrants with disparate sociocultural hbits then entering America threatened to 
overwhelm the political institutions of the United States and would generate economic 
disturbances.’139 It was the methodology of Mayo-Smith that would materi lly influence the 
Church’s written submissions to the Scottish Office and yet it was on the basis of the 
Church’s statistics where their case collapsed.  F. H. Giddings, considered to be one of the 
‘four founders’ of American sociology, propounded a theory of four stages of human 
evolution: 
 
 ‘zoogenic, anthropogenic, ethnogenic and demogenic. He asserted that the lower stages 
were more susceptible to emotional forces. Modern society (demogenic) is not totally 
free of these forces but uses reason and critical reflection in determining its own 
destiny.   Societies could not exist without certain inequalities. Inequality was a result 
of constitutional or genetic differences forming the basis for class divisions … that 
these divisions were natural and led to permanent co fli ts.’140   
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The last of this triumvirate, E. A. Ross, had a particular influence on White in his article ‘The 
Cause of Racial Superiority’ (1901), in which he coined the phrase ‘race suicide,’ and in his 
book Foundations of Sociology (1905).141  
  In fact Ross is particularly interesting in this context as, like White himself, he was 
something of a contradictory character. A social liberal who became an enthusiastic New 
Dealer and ended his career as head of the American Civil Liberties Union he was also, until 
the end of the 1920s at least, a vehement nativist who flirted with eugenicist ideas.  Julius 
Weinberg has made the point that ‘The Social thought of Edward Alsworth Ross provides a 
fruitful ground for an analysis of the relationship between the reformist thrust of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the nativism expressed by many of these 
reformers of the same period.’142 Ross’s nativist writings brought him into contact wi h other 
American nativist organisations such as the Immigration Restriction League founded by three 
Harvard graduates, Robert DeCourcey Ward, Charles Warren and Prescott Farnsworth Hall 
in 1888. Although, originally something of an east coast or ‘Boston Brahmin’ intellectual 
group, its influence spread throughout the USA. It campaigned successfully for the 
introduction of a literacy test and had a considerabl  influence on the eventual introduction of 
national origin immigration quotas in the United States.143 Arguments about race and 
immigration restriction as developed in the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth 
and early part of the twentieth Century would be re- mployed time and again. Opinions like 
those of Prescott F. Hall, one of the founders of the American Immigration Restriction 
League found a receptive audience in White: 
 
Immigration restriction is a species of segregation on a large scale, by which the 
inferior stocks can be prevented from both diluting and supplanting the good stocks. 
Just as we isolate bacterial invasions and starve out the bacteria by limiting the area and 
amount of their food supply, so we can compel an inferior race to remain in its native 
habitat.144    
 
 Ironically enough, as will be seen later, the success of the Immigration Restriction League in 
the matter of quotas fuelled the Kirk’s (and others) fear that a reduction in the Irish quota in 
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the USA would lead to an increase in Irish immigration into Scotland.  The League had 
proved that it was possible to persuade politicians, on the basis of a primarily race lead 
argument, to impose immigration restrictions on groups from a specific national origin. It is, 
however, the personal background that informed Ross’s views that may have had a major 
influence on White. To again quote Weinberg ‘Upon closer analysis the seeming paradox 
between Ross’s views as a reformer and those he espoused as a nativist can be explained, 
although the logical contradiction between them cannot be dissolved. Ross was a Middle 
Westerner by birth and his views were fashioned by the piety of his Scotch-Irish, 
Presbyterian parents and the mores Ross identified w th Scotch-Irish as the epitome of the 
American spirit.’145  
 
The outstanding trait of the Scotch-Irish was will  (sic). No other element was so 
masterful and contentious….The stubbornness of their c aracter is probably responsible 
for the unexampled losses in the battles of our Civil War. They fought the Indian they 
fought the British with great unanimity in two wars and were in the front rank of the 
conquest of the West. More than any stock has this tough gritty breed, so lacking in 
poetry and sensibility moulded our National character. If today a losing college crew 
rows so hard they have to be lifted from their shell at the end of the boat race, it is 
because of the never-say-die Scotch-Irish fighters and pioneers have been the 
picturesque and glowing figures in the imagination of American youth.146 
    
     It is readily understandable why the sentiments and ideas of Ross would have struck such 
a particular chord with White. It is also notable how this Presbyterian mythology travelled 
across the Atlantic and then back again and was utili ed in the service of the same cause.  The 
White papers contain an extensive quotation from Ross’s Foundations concerning 
immigration in the United States which obviously resonated with the Scottish position as he 
saw it: 
    
   The newcomer counts as one at the polls, and hence it is in our politics that the sag is 
most evident. The higher types of men are prompted to act together, because they 
believe in the same principle or love the same ideal. The inferior pull together from 
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clannishness or allegiance to a leader. The growing d sposition to rally about persons 
and the rising value of the saloon keeper, the ex-pugilist and the boss in controlling city 
voters would indicate that the electorate has been debased by the too free admission of 
political incapables.147 
 
   The terms saloon keeper, ex pugilist and boss were synonyms for the Irish in Scotland and 
America. The influence of the American arguments on the way in which White presented his 
own case is apparent from the following, again from White’s notes for speeches and articles: 
 
 Many of our immigrants are out of sympathy with our institutions. They form a large 
percent of our voting population in our large towns. A  a rule their votes are under the 
control of a few leaders…there can be no question as to the moral right to restrict 
immigration. It is our duty to develop our institutons and our national life in such a 
way that they will make the largest contribution to the good of humanity then it is 
manifestly our duty to exclude from membership elements which might prevent our 
institutions from reaching the highest and best development. All restrictions to 
immigration it must be admitted must be based, not up n national selfishness, but upon 
the principle of the good of humanity; and there can be no doubt that the good of 
humanity demands that every nation protect its people and its institutions from 
elements which may seriously threaten their stability and survival.148 
 
It was, therefore, not only for the good of Scotland that the Irish be excluded but for the good 
of humanity. White essentially maintained that the economic, social and political problems of 
Scotland could be defined as a racial problem. Having made that diagnosis it followed that 
the solution to these problems was a racial one: in the first instance the restriction of Irish 
immigration.   
       Lower down the ecclesiastical ladder there was more probably the desire to ‘throw 
prudence to the winds and put in some strong ginger re the R Cs.’149  Yet, what is notable is 
that in their public utterances most ministers followed the White line. The issue was to be 
primarily racial and not religious. For example, in the meeting held with Sir John Lamb, the 
Under Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, on September 24th 1926 and not attended by 
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White, the Rev John Maclagan put the case in the following way: ‘It was as custodians of the 
fine traditions of Scotland that the committee approached the Secretary of State and not at all 
in the narrow religious sense. They approached the problem as loyal Scotsmen who loved 
their country and wanted to do what they could to ensure that the heritage handed down to 
them would be handed down to the next generation.’150  The White line was the Church line 
and it was a position held not only by the Church of Scotland but by the United Free Church 
as well. It is something of a tribute to the esteem in which White was held that throughout the 
1920s that it was the race issue as defined by White t at was official Church policy. 
       Of course, it was a subtle distinction that w s probably lost on the wider public. Abusing 
the Irish for their racial origins was tantamount to abusing them for their religion. Irish meant 
Catholic and Catholic meant Irish, however hard White tried to make the distinction but then 
this was not intended, as was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, to be an argument 
for the man in the street. He was to be protected and led by the Church. Indeed, the Church 
considered itself the genuine voice of the Scottish working class as the remarks made by the 
Rev Duncan Cameron at the same meeting with Scottish Office show:  
   
  During the General Strike in the industrial areas nearly all the leaders were Irish. In 
course of time instead of a Scottish proletariat there would be a body of people who had 
no regard for the United Kingdom and who were prone t  revolutionary ideas. From the 
point of view of the interest of the United Kingdom and the existence of the Empire it 
was important that the Government should tackle the qu stion. No political party 
should be afraid of tackling the question. The Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman did 
not give a true reflection of the working classes in Scotland. There was great bitterness 
among them against the growing numbers of Irish immigrants.151 
 
This was plainer language than White’s scholarly and scientific sociology. The Irish were 
potentially dangerous revolutionaries, they were replacing the Scottish proletariat and, for the 
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    It can be seen from the foregoing that the leadership of the Church of Scotland, as 
epitomised by White, went to considerable lengths to make an intellectually coherent case for 
the restriction of Irish immigration into Scotland on the grounds of Irish racial inferiority. It 
also made strenuous efforts to distance itself from any suspicion that it was motivated by any 
religious consideration, although this was, even then, scarcely credible. The fact that the 
effort was made is important. It suggests that the Church at the highest levels was 
uncomfortable with simple ‘No Popery’. Certainly it had a tradition of distancing itself from 
the more rabid proponents of that cause. The career of the 19th century controversialist Jacob 
Primmer is a case in point. Primmer was a tub thumping anti-papist who ‘loved the thrill of 
the outdoor meeting’ and conducted a fourteen-year s ries of meetings around Scotland in 
which he luridly described the imagined exploits of nuns and priests and the pagan symbols 
of Romanism.152  At the same time he was consistently in conflict with his own presbytery in 
Dunfermline and with the General Assembly which frequ ntly voted to withhold a proportion 
of his stipend.153  The Church of Scotland had a distaste for vulgar anti-Catholicism and ‘No 
Popery’ street preachers were vulgar. As Bruce has pointed out, they were a form of popular 
entertainment154 and Ratcliffe and Cormack would carry on in that tr dition in the 1930s. Dr 
White was not a public entertainer. 
    Aside from naturally wishing to have its arguments considered on a higher plane the 
Church was engaging with the intellectual debate of its day. Eugenics and race theory were 
concerns of individuals like H G Wells, George Bernard Shaw, Marie Stopes and Dean Inge 
of St. Paul’s.  The carnage of the First World War h d made questions about the survival of 
the ‘race’ topical as never before. As that carnage had been so marked in Scotland it is not all 
that surprising that the Church engaged in that debate using the terms current at the time. 
There had been a long nineteenth-century tradition n Scotland of commingling racial and 
religious ideas These were fearful times and the Church of Scotland was a frightened 
institution in which case it was not unnatural, if inexcusable, that it turned to authoritarian 
solutions to its perceived problems or, given recent events, that the Irish were that perceived 
problem. 
         However, was this Scotland’s ‘fascist moment?’  As Owen Dudley Edwards pointed out 
it is not difficult to see elements of fascism in much of the Church’s public and private 
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pronouncements on the Irish155. Yet, as Stephen Cullen has shown recently, the British Union 
of Fascists never really made much progress in Scotland in the 1930s partly because of its 
inability to understand the religious and identity dimensions in Scotland.156 It is probably 
more accurate to describe it as an attempt to re-imagine Scotland, a Scotland secure in its 
racial homogeneity and Presbyterian identity led by a reunited Established Church. In effect it 
was an attempt to turn the clock back to a safer and less threatening pre-war world. In some 
ways the Irish were almost incidental to the whole campaign. They were a convenient, 
visible, tangible expression of an insecurity that d more to do with a sense of national loss, 
loss in terms of men on the battlefield, loss through the mass emigration of the twenties, loss 
of direction and loss of self-esteem. The movement for re-unification of the Presbyterian 
churches was part of that process, as Burleigh put it: ‘Into the re-united Church in 1929 were 
gathered the great majority of Presbyterians…The Chief rival was the Roman Catholic 
Church consisting largely of Irish immigrants settled in the industrial areas and increasing in 
numbers an consequently political influence. In numbers alone the Church of Scotland in 
1929 might justifiably regard itself as the Church of the Scottish people….More important, 
however, is the fact of its acknowledged responsibility for the spiritual life of Scotland.’157 It 
also highlights a fundamental contradiction in the Church’s position. It would go to 
considerable lengths to declare that it was not competent to pronounce on economic or 
political issues if this could in any way be seen as a criticism of the prevailing social 
orthodoxy. At the same time White was making a case for the Church’s involvement in the 
very nature and composition of Scottish society. In order to do this it would have to be in 
very earthly politics. In answering the question of how White was able to square this 
particular intellectual circle it is necessary to explore the Church’s relationship with the ‘Civil 
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Chapter Three 
The Catholic Response 
 
If no Popery orators and writers do for us individually, what heresies do for the Church at 
large; that is make us look to our defences we may almost thank God for… the service of 
slander 158 
Clydesdale Catholic Herald “7th November 1926  
 
I Introduction 
   The Clydesdale Catholic Herald on the 13th March 1926 relates a story of two Scots, one a 
Catholic the other a Protestant, discussing the Catholic Church in Scotland. The Protestant 
asks his friend what Catholicism in Scotland would be without the Irish?  The answer given 
was ‘Aye we would be sma’ but we would be an eeminently (sic) respectable body.’159 The 
humour of this anecdote probably does not translate o well now but in its way it answers one 
of the conundrums of the period for scholars. Why does there appear to be so little official 
Catholic reaction to the Church of Scotland’s anti-Irish campaign in the 1920s. The archives 
of the Archdiocese of Glasgow and the Catholic Archives in Columba House are bafflingly 
bereft of official comment and in the minutes of the hierarchy in Scotland there is not a single 
mention of the major, to the Church of Scotland at any rate, issue of the day.160 Equally the 
absence of correspondence on the matter was describd to the author by the archivist of the 
Archdiocese of Glasgow, an area containing the largest Irish population in Scotland, as 
‘tantalising’.161 It was not as though the issues were not hotly debated in the correspondence 
columns of the press, on the floor of the General Assembly, in the pages of the Catholic press 
or even, as will be demonstrated, within Government itself. Yet were one to rely exclusively 
on the information contained in the official archives it would seem that the whole controversy 
was studiously ignored by the leaders of the Catholic Church in Scotland. However,. this was 
not entirely the case and it will be the intention here to provide some explanation of how the 
Church responded to what was to all intents and purposes an attack on itself, even if the 
motivations were officially racial and not religious. This has been something of an under-
researched area in the historiography of the period which has concentrated on the louder 
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noises made by the Protestant extremists. It is not within the scope of this chapter to 
comprehensively cover the whole controversy from the point of view of the Catholic Church 
and its defenders whether conducted in the press or elsewhere. What is proposed here is to 
analyse how the Catholic Church in Scotland viewed itself in the 1920s, its mission in 
Scotland and how it regarded its   Presbyterian detractors. Equally important, is to consider 
how that those views differed from those of the most vocal of the defenders of the Catholic 
Irish, Charles Diamond. 
                                                   
II The Catholic Church in Scotland 
     The position of the Catholic Church in Scotland i  the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
century does not always fit the image of an embattled minority than it has sometimes been 
portrayed. Certainly the need to provide for a massive injection of adherents strained, almost 
to breaking point, the slender resources of the native Church. However, from the restoration 
of the Scottish hierarchy in 1878 it is not unreasonable to consider Catholicism in Scotland to 
be a religion on the move. The proliferation of Catholic societies and sodalities in the later 
nineteenth century show a confident and growing institution. Despite its well documented 
difficulties in the provision Catholic education before the 1918 Education Act and the 
undoubted poverty of many of its members many of the Church’s problems could be 
attributed to its success.  The Irish influx may have been a mixed blessing but, considering 
the logistical and financial problems that it had lrgely successfully overcome by the end of 
the Great War, it was not the Catholic Church that w s facing a crisis of confidence. The war 
itself could be seen in some ways to have been ‘good’ for the Catholic Church: ‘For the 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow, John Maguire, th  war brought a new lease of life. 
This virtual recluse, who had languished in a sick bed since 1910, became an enthusiastic 
recruiting sergeant in both sermons and pastorals.’162  Large numbers of Irish Catholics 
served in Scottish regiments and bore comparable losses. After the war those of Irish Catholic 
descent began to play an increasing part in public life and, while this undoubtedly was one of 
the reasons for Presbyterian complaint, it was nonethel ss a source of pride for other 
Catholics. In fact the 1920s were, in retrospect, something of a golden era for Catholicism in 
Scotland and the attack when it came, but for the events of the Irish War of Independence, 
may have been as from a clear blue sky. 
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        The initial Catholic response to anti-Irish agitation was one of pained surprise. A letter 
to the Glasgow Herald reprinted in the Clydesdale Catholic Herald on the 7th April 1923 
from a Scottish priest, illustrated the feeling: 
 
 Before the Great War we had been getting along comparatively smoothly together. In 
due course our brave men went forth and fought and ble and fell, inspired by the 
conviction that their sufferings were to lead to the abolition of all wars. Hardly did they 
think that other wars of camouflaged cruelty and religious hate might eventuate. But it 
has evidently done so, as shown by the agitation goi g on in certain clerical circles. 
…The general waning of belief in Protestant forms of Christianity rendered people all 
the more ready to give some heed to those admirable sentiments which if not 
counteracted by adverse or retrograde influences, would cause a vast improvement in 
our social fellowship, a noble sympathy with, and respect for, the religious convictions 
of all, however they might differ from our own. But such a state of matters was most 
alarming and detestable to some of our Presbyterian clergy. I say some because the 
higher type of clergyman never descends to such levels. The steady, though slow, 
increase of the Catholic Church in Glasgow is gall and bitterness to those partisans; and 
with a cunning worthy of a better cause, taking advantage of the fact that this increase 
is mainly due to the Irish element in our midst, they are making determined efforts to 
inflame the basest passions of their hearers against the Catholic Irish…What a spectacle 
of petty bigotry! What a horrible pose for professional teachers of Christ who came in 
love to save us all! Thank God a more Christian laity has already expressed indignation 
at their barbarous conduct. 
 John Charleson, Holy Cross, Croy, March 31 1923163 
    
   It is apparent from a reading of Father Charleson’s letter that he at least was taken aback by 
what at that stage was an attack on the Irish by the Presbytery of Glasgow prior to the 
General Assembly of 1923. He was to be disappointed i  his assessment that the higher type 
of clergymen ‘never descends to such levels’ as the C urch and Nation Committee were to 
produce their report on ‘The Menace of the Irish Race’ within two months of his letter. 
However, his tone of more sorrow than anger, does suggest that the Catholic Church was 
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somewhat surprised by the vehemence of the Protestan  Churches sentiments. What is also 
interesting is his observation on ‘the general waning of belief in Protestant forms of 
Christianity.’ It was something of an article of faith for the Catholic Church in the 1920s that 
Protestantism was in terminal decline and that it was only a matter of time before it was 
replaced by Catholicism or, in strictly more Catholic terms, before Scotland returned to its 
true adherence from the heretical error into which it had fallen at the Reformation. This was 
more than a theological point. The Church of Scotland feared the very same thing, if not 
couched in those terms, and loudly and repeatedly proclaimed the danger. If the Established 
Church feared it was in decline while at the same ti  in the process of ending the schism of 
1843, and was constantly warning of the possibility of a Catholic takeover spearheaded by 
the Irish it is hardly to be wondered that the Catholic Church was inclined to take them at 
their word. Scotland did not lack for Jeremiahs, eccl siastical and secular, in the 1920s. 
However, it was this perception of Protestant declin  that was to have a significant bearing on 
the upper levels of Catholic response to the anti-Irish campaign. 
       The Catholic press under the combative Charles Diamond was inclined to take a less 
considered view. On the same date as it reproduced Father Charleson’s letter it printed an 
article entitled ‘The Glasgow Presbytery’s Jehad (sic): “Holy War” against the Irish.’164 In a 
vehement refutation of the arguments of what are described as an ‘aggregation of Protestant 
Church of Scotland ministers who in their collective capacity are styled “The Glasgow 
Presbytery”165 Diamond was not reticent to the possible consequences of the Church having 
its way on the immigration question: 
 
 If, however, it should occur in the remote future that the British Parliament should be 
so ill advised as to meet the wishes of the Glasgow Presbytery some other things would 
happen. The Free State would certainly reply by reprisal decree which would exclude 
Scotsmen from Ireland…The Glasgow Presbytery should also consult the heads of 
some of the big Glasgow trading firms …who have andhave always had an immense 
volume of business in Ireland. Irish America would hardly remain quiescent on the 
matter and Irish influence is one of the strongest influences in American life. Scotsmen 
themselves now and then emigrate. You get a great many Englishmen and Americans 
to tell you that whenever there is a good job worth collaring the Scotsman has got it. 
The public works of England and of America are flooded with Scotch foremen who are 
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never “blate” about welcoming compatriots…The Glasgow Presbytery…may succeed 
also in raising a worldwide question and may fashion a weapon that in the long run may 
prove to be a very boomerang.166 
   
   Having delivered this warning he rather obscurely ended with a diatribe on the ills of birth 
control, or ‘Race Suicide’ as it was termed. which was apparently a direct result of 
Protestantism. (It is interesting that he used the example of the ‘Scotch foreman’ when the 
Irish foreman was be such a bogey figure in Presbytrian propaganda in the rest of the 
decade). Diamond returned to the attack in a speech to his shareholders on the 23rd May 1923. 
By this time the Church and Nation Committee had delivered its report on the ‘Irish Menace’ 
  
   The Chairman said it could not be considered inappropriate if he made some 
reference to the recent attacks on the Irish people in Scotland…It was true that the 
words Irish and Catholic in Scotland were not entirly synonymous. But the Catholic 
population was so largely Irish the two could not be well separated. There was no doubt 
that the recent attack was inspired more by religious intolerance and bigotry than by 
national rancour though the grounds of the attack were notionally national… 
   The Irish Catholics in Scotland had a great deal more in common with the history of 
Scotland for a thousand years than those who represnted an apostasy from the faith 
from their ancestors, who had a supreme contempt for their national history and who 
replaced a noble national spirit by a profession of subservience to another country and 
attachment to the crude religious beliefs of a mushroom growth that was everywhere 
disappearing.167 
  
  Diamond further averred that while they were not lo king for a fight with their neighbours 
attacks on the Irish population would not be ‘taken lyi g down’ and to this end he proposed 
to reduce the price of the Glasgow Observer and increase the efficiency of its distribution.168   
The difference in Diamond’s response to that of some of the senior Catholic clergy is what 
makes the Catholic reaction so interesting. 
     As Gallagher has pointed out, there was something of a vacuum in the leadership of the 
Catholic Church during the First World War: 
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Glasgow and St Andrews and Edinburgh…were administered by two ageing prelates 
who did not have the strength to perform many of their customary duties never mind 
issue political instructions to their flock. When Archbishop Maguire of Glasgow died in 
1920, Rome did not appoint a successor until 1922….In Edinburgh, Bishop Henry Grey 
Graham was placed in effective charge of the Archdiocese after 1917, but, as a convert, 
he may not have enjoyed the familiarity with his flock that would have enabled him to 
make ex-cathedra statements on politics and be listened to.169  
 
At the same time the Church was preoccupied with the implications of the 1918 Education 
Act. Again as Gallagher states ‘In no other predominantly Protestant country did Catholics 
enjoy such latitude in the educational sphere’170 and yet the Church was initially hesitant to 
accept its terms. It took the intervention of the Vatican in the shape of the apostolic visitor to 
Scotland to convince a reluctant Church to accept the legislation and in Glasgow it would not 
be until the end of the decade before the terms were fully implemented.171  The Catholic 
Church at the beginning of the 1920s had its own ecclesiastical concerns and in Archbishop 
Mackintosh of Glasgow (1876-1943) it had a prelate who had been rector of the Scots 
College in Rome and more at home in that city than in the rough and tumble of Glasgow 
politics. He was equally a mangerialist whose primay concern was the financial well-being 
and stability of his Church. Intemperate outbursts in the General Assembly or even Church 
and Nation Committee reports did not necessarily have first call on his time. 
    It was largely left to lay Catholics and to indivi ual priests like Father Charleson, quoted 
above, to respond. One of the most effective was Father McGettigan of Musselburgh. On the 
22nd May 1923 the Scotsman printed his detailed rebuttal of the Church and Nation 
Committee report. In a lengthy letter Father McGettigan attacked the ‘facts’ produced in the 
report refuting the Committee’s contentions that priests in Ireland encouraged their flock to 
emigrate to Scotland and that all emigrants from Scotland were Scots fleeing the Irish influx. 
He also took the Assembly to task on the assertion that Scots and Irish did not mix: 
 
   The “notable fact” is not at all complimentary to the grit of the Scottish people, and is 
besides a gratuitous assertion as anyone who knows who lives in the midst of Scottish 
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and Irish workmen. They work as harmoniously when toge her as they do when 
separate and if there is friction it is usually due to some cause which is neither racial 
nor religious. If racial or religious it is imported into Scotland by Orangemen 
who…have never fused with their fellow countrymen. But away from these, the 
Irishman in Scotland, as elsewhere, takes on the colour f his surroundings and in two 
or three generations becomes more Scottish than the Scot.’172  
 
He also pointed out the logical inconsistency in the Irish having both the ‘restless ambition to 
rule’ while at the same time being intemperate and improvident and he ‘trembled’ for the 
man who made the charge that ‘the Irishman never hesitat s to seek relief from charity 
organisations’ in the presence of the average Irishman.173 He similarly took issue with the 
concept of the Irish as ‘aliens’: ‘The statement is one which bristles with controversy of an 
ethnological and historical character, it ought not, t  say the least, to have been made part of a 
document which it was to be expected would present only bedrock facts…even granted its 
accuracy to speak of a highly gifted people…as aliens. Would we parade the offensive term 
before the eyes of the Canadian or Australian? And what if the Irish at home took us at our 
word and when the next Great War broke out (quod Deus avertat), and we were in 
difficulties, gently reminded us that they were aliens.’174 (Given Irish neutrality in the Second 
World War McGettigan was remarkably prescient). His re ponse to the charge that “the 
Roman Catholic Church has definitely committed herself to the task of converting the 
Scottish nation”175 was indicative of how the Catholic Church in Scotland viewed its role - 
‘But that surely is not an improper proceeding in the case of a missionary Church. The 
Church of Scotland claims the same right when she sends her missionaries to Ireland and 
foreign parts. If a Church has a right to live, shehas a right to propagate her spiritual species, 
and the fact that one Church is more successful than another does not abrogate that right.’176 
    Father McGettigan was an interesting character in the Catholic Church of the 1920s. Born 
in Fauldhouse in 1868 he attended Blairs’ College in 1883 and the Scots College at 
Valladolid in 1886 and he was ordained priest in 1893 when he became curate of the Church 
of Our Lady of Loretto and St Michael in Musselburgh. He was also a member of the 
Midlothian Education Authority and  promoted to theposition of Canon and Administrator of 
                                                 






Edinburgh Cathedral in November 1923. This promotion certainly implies official approval, 
indeed sanction, of the opinions he published in the press as it would have been unthinkable 
that the hierarchy would have elevated to such a prestigious post a parish priest publicly 
proclaiming a position of which they disapproved. He was in fact described in the Catholic 
press as ‘one of the warmest champions of Catholicity in the country.’177  
   The hierarchy themselves did not remain as silent as it appears from the official records 
though they couched their language in more coded terms. As can be seen from the following 
1924 Pastoral letter from Archbishop Mackintosh: 
   
  It is a peremptory duty …to pray frequently that our blessed Lord may gather these 
men and women of good will -and they are not a few- who in this country of Scotland 
have been robbed of their Christian birth right – the Catholic faith. I am quite well 
aware that those men and women may not, and probably do not, recognise the existence 
of this duty on the part of Catholics, or further that they may vehemently resent the fact 
that we Catholics find a place for the existence of a duty to pray for non-Catholics. 
There can be nothing to surprise one in such a sitution. The attitude in question is not 
unlike the attitude of Nathaniel to Our Lord. It is based on irrelevant assumptions and 
often honest prejudice, “Can anything good come from Nazareth” (St John 1.46). 
Besides St Paul when he was yet Saul was consenting to the death of Stephen the first 
martyr…It was probably with deep resentment that Saul heard the dying prayer of St 
Stephen ‘Lord lay not this sin to their charge.’(Acts 7.59) What if it does – as it surely 
does – need a miracle of Grace to bring a non-Catholic into the Faith? Who can say that 
in God’s Providence it was not the prayer of St Stephen that obtained for Saul the 
miracle on the road to Damascus (Acts 9.3)? Who can say that our prayers and our 
good works are not awaited by God in order that he may turn many a Saul into a 
chastened and humble St Paul? 
    It is certain that we are bound out of charity to pray for the spiritual welfare of our 
non-Catholic fellow citizens. It is also certain tha  this duty is incumbent upon us on 
account of the circumstances of the country in which we live. And besides praying 
there are other means we must use towards the same ends. We must support the 
Catholic Truth Society, support the Catholic press and spread its publications.178 
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   It was possibly not the most tactful way of outlining the Catholic position. As the 
Archbishop himself recognised praying for non-Catholics would provoke resentment 
amongst non-Catholics. In fact it probably provoked sterner reactions than that amongst some 
members of the Presbyterian Churches. The importance here is the tone of the pastoral and of 
Father McGettigan’s letter.  It was a theme of the Catholic Church in Scotland that the aim 
was to return Scotland to the Catholic fold. Prior t  the reintroduction of the hierarchy the 
status of the Church in Scotland had been that of a mission. In fact that had been its position 
since the Reformation. The reintroduction of the hirarchy had been recognition of the 
numbers of Catholics in Scotland due to Irish immigration. The aims of the Scottish Catholic 
Church did not change. Its primary purpose was still the conversion of the Scots not the 
adherence of the Irish. It had a duty in the education l sphere to provide Catholic education 
and so prevent apostasy but, on the principle that there is more joy in heaven over one sinner 
who repents, then conversion was a Scottish priority if not an Irish one. It also has to be 
examined from the perspective of Rome, a perspective Mackintosh would have shared, that in 
global terms the Church of Scotland was a small northern heretical sect, (however slighting 
that may have been to the pretensions of the land of Kn x) but its conversion would be a 
prize worth winning. On the other hand, Scottish Catholics knew their fellow countrymen and 
had no illusions as to the long term nature of the task. This theme was developed by Father 
McGettigan in a sermon at Fauldhouse: 
  
Another account stands against the Protestants of Scotland. Not only did they forsake 
the faith: they made it their business to misrepresent it and to bequeath this 
misrepresentation to their children. Their children have been faithful to their trust, and 
so their religious teaching has consisted not in presenting their own beliefs and 
practices but defaming ours to that campaign their leaders dedicated their gifts…Abuse 
of us no matter how wanton and gross formed the stock in trade of their religion and an 
intense conviction on their part of the truthfulness of it all, whilst it guarded them 
against contamination was a sign of predestination. 
…These then my brethren are a sample of the forces which have stood in the way of 
Catholic expansion, and if when we look back we are not gladdened by the sight of 
large additions to the Church from without, let us bear in mind that the obstacles we 
had to face were well-nigh insurmountable.179 
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     The essentially Scottish nature of the response was reinforced by Bishop Henry Grey 
Graham (1874-1959) in an address to the Caledonian Catholic Association in June 1925. He 
began by lamenting the numbers of Scots applying for the priesthood: ‘Until they had a 
priesthood produced by this country the work would not be satisfactory - priests who knew 
the condition of the people and felt at home…None could do the work so well as those who 
were native to the soil. They must have priests, else they might close up their churches. The 
priesthood should be recruited from our own boys… in that way it would be another step 
towards the greatest of their objects - the restoration of Scotland to the Catholic faith.’180  In a 
tacit recognition that the Catholic Church in Scotland had some diplomatic work to do in 
order to preach the Faith to non-Catholics he noted that ‘It was a delicate matter. In other 
countries men were specially trained to expound Catholic doctrine in a non-controversial 
manner and with great results. Until something was done in that way they would not make 
any great progress.’181 Graham was at pains to point out that there was no contradiction 
between being Scottish and being Catholic and that the Church had always been the true 
upholders of the national spirit rather than ‘the real traitors…who were under financial 
obligations to their masters in England.’ This was an unsubtle dig at the reformers of the 16th 
century but he went on to urge the Scottish Catholic laity, living as they did ‘amongst a 
largely non-Catholic population and mixing intimately with their non-Catholic friends’, to 
remove anti-Catholic prejudice. As was pointed out in the opening lines of this chapter they 
would be ‘an eeminently respectable body.’  
  There is, however, one other consideration to be taken into account in the apparent 
reluctance of the Scottish Catholic hierarchy, particularly in view of Bishop Graham’s 
sentiments, to engage with the anti-Irish campaign and that is the unhappy relationship 
between Irish and Scottish Catholic clergy in the 19th century. This may have had a 
significant influence on Scottish Catholic attitudes towards the Irish as a brief examination of 
the career of Cardinal Paul Cullen and his involvement with the Scottish Catholic Church will 
demonstrate. Colin Barr has written informatively on the career of Cardinal Cullen (1803-
1878) and what has been described as ‘Irish Episcopal Imperialism’.182 It is certainly the case 
that there was something of an Irish ‘takeover’, in the English speaking world, of the Catholic 
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dioceses both inside and outside the British Empire, and that this was largely orchestrated by 
Cullen. As Barr puts it, ‘It is possible to discern a pattern of what might be described as Irish 
Episcopal Imperialism that began to take shape first in the United States from 1830 and then 
spread to British North America, the Cape of Good Hope, Australia, New Zealand and 
Scotland….By 1900 the hierarchy in each of these countries, save Scotland, was largely Irish, 
and, in large part a particular sort of Irish, moulded by a particular Hiberno-Roman fusion of 
devotion and administrative practice. The Catholic communities, and to a certain extent the 
wider culture of each of the affected countries is t ll marked, by this particular form of Irish 
“colonisation”.’183  
   Cullen’s career began as a student in Rome at the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation 
of the Faith, otherwise known as the Propaganda, which supervised the Church in the United 
States, the British Isles and the British Empire. Cullen remained with the Propaganda from 
1820 until 1831 when he was appointed Rector of the Irish College and he was particularly 
influential within this organisation until the end of his life. A popular figure and fluent Italian 
speaker, he became the Propaganda’s trusted translaor:  
 
In almost any controversy, even if the parties involved could speak Italian, or even 
usable Latin, it was inevitable that many of the relevant documents would be in the 
vernacular. Since the Propaganda lacked English speakers these had to passed to a 
trusted translator. He was expected to master the question himself, explain it to the 
Propaganda and in many cases recommend action to busy Cardinals. Conveniently they 
had such a man at hand in Paul Cullen. When Cullen left Rome they utilised Tobias 
Kirby, his friend and successor as Rector of the Irish College. Either way Cullen 
secured a near monopoly on the explication of English anguage conflicts, either 
directly or at one remove.184 
 
Cullen used this unique influence, at its most basic, to populate the English-speaking world 
with Irish bishops. Essentially the method employed was to use a controversy in any given 
diocese as an excuse to appoint a bishop coadjutor, almost invariably an Irishman, as an 
‘assistant’ to the incumbent who then found himself, none too gently, marginalised in  the 
running of the diocese. Even in areas where there was no controversy one could generally be 
manufactured, with charges of financial incompetence, mental instability, or even, rather 
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improbably, sexual impropriety in the case of the elderly Bishop Pompallier of Auckland. 
The tactics may not have been edifying but they were effective and resulted in what could be 
described as the ‘greening’ of the English-speaking Catholic world. In 1866 it would be 
Scotland’s turn to experience Cullen’s colonisation. 
   It is not intended here to go into great depth on this particular issue but the basic outline is 
necessary to understand Scoto-Irish Catholic relations. Prior to the restoration of the Scottish 
hierarchy in 1878 the Catholic Church in Scotland was governed by three Vicars Apostolic 
each of Episcopal rank. In 1866 the Propaganda ordered the appointment of a coadjutor for 
the Western District due to the ill health of Bishop Gray.  Gray and Kyle of the Northern 
District drew up a list of three names, all Scots, while Bishop Strain (himself part Irish) of the 
Northern District wanted to include an Irish name but appeared to bow to the wishes of the 
majority. The approved list was duly sent to Rome but unbeknownst to Gray and Kyle, Strain 
had written privately to the Propaganda denouncing the choice and stating that no Scottish 
priest was suitable for the job. The Propaganda were now faced with a dilemma, an 
apparently divided leadership in the Scottish Churc had proposed ‘candidates whom the 
third identified as being involved in the disturbances that had roiled Glasgow for some years. 
This is a crucial point: the district was already divided on Scots v, Irish lines, and Irish priests 
and laity, associated with a radical newspaper the Glasgow Free Press had done much to 
make the Church there effectively ungovernable.’185 This sort of controversy was tailor made 
for Cullen who duly proposed Dr James Lynch, an Irishman, for the post of coadjutor. In this 
case though, the sequence of events did not follow the usual pattern. For one thing Lynch was 
something of an abrasive character who was unsuited to the role, for another the Scots clergy 
took his appointment as an insult and a negative refl ction on themselves. What was most 
important in this case is that the Scots had their own fluent Italian speaker with connections 
to the Propaganda, Coll Macdonald, who was dispatched to Rome post haste by Gray. ‘His 
case was simple: appointing Lynch was an insult to all Scottish Catholics; it rewarded the 
rebellion of Irish priests, laity and the Free Press; it would only make matters in Glasgow 
worse.’186 Macdonald in a telling phrase, summed up the attitude of the Scottish clergy, ‘it is 
easier to keep the Irish out of possession, than to ge  them out of it, if they are once fairly in 
it’. 187 It was a sentiment that many Catholics around the world would have recognised. 
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     Having appointed Lynch, the Propaganda could not at this point back down but the 
appointment proved to be a disaster. The relationshp between Grey and Lynch soon broke 
down in acrimony, with Lynch informing the Propagand  that Grey was hopelessly 
incompetent and sought the help of his mentor Cullen to make the case. This case Cullen 
agreed to support on the grounds that the Irish vastly outnumbered the Scots in the Western 
district.188 Cullen’s intervention was not without its effect and Grey found himself summoned 
to Rome to prove his fitness for his position. The Scots for their part had no doubt who was 
responsible for the state of affairs ‘It is clear that Cardinal Cullen and the Vincentians of 
Lanarck (sic) are the soul of the present movement.’189 Relations between the native Scottish 
Church and the Irish having irretrievably broken down the affair rumbled on acrimoniously 
for some time until the Propaganda appointed an Englishman, Archbishop Manning of 
Westminster, to inquire into the affair. Manning did find shortcomings in Grey’s 
administration but was equally critical of Lynch’s Irish allies. Manning’s eventual solution 
was to appoint an Englishman, Charles Eyre, to replace Grey and Lynch returned to Ireland 
and Cullen. 
  The main significance of this controversy is that the Scots managed to fend off a Cullenite 
takeover of their Church which would probably have had the effect of turning it into a 
province of Dublin. They were able to do so as they ad the willingness and ability to take 
their case directly to the Propaganda and for once Cullen did not have the sole power of 
explication. Maintaining Scottish ecclesiastical independence from Irish incursion became a 
feature of Scottish Catholicism up to and after the restoration of the hierarchy. Having had 
this experience it is perhaps understandable that the Scottish hierarchy, even in 1923, were 
not inclined to rush to the defence of the Irish, so long as the attack was ostensibly on their 
race and not their religion. The success of Cullen’s ‘Imperial mission’ would have been still 
very apparent in the English speaking section of the Catholic world. After all if any Church 
had a legitimate fear of being swamped by the Irish it was the Scottish Catholic Church and 
not the Church of Scotland. Given their experiences since the 1840s, Scottish Catholic 
clergymen, and laity, would not have been human if they did not occasionally consider the 
Irish something of an interloping nuisance. Undoubtedly they would have defended their 
flock as Catholics; perhaps there was less zeal, to put it no stronger than that, to defend them 
as Irish. It would go some way to explaining the curio s archival silence on the issue.  
                                                    
                                                 
188 Ibid  p 640 
189 Ibid  p 641 
 85
III The Catholic Press 
   The ‘official’ response to the anti-Irish campaign in many ways reflected traditional 
Scottish Catholic concerns but, as has been stated above, the attack nevertheless was on the 
Irish. In Ireland the Free State Government had troubles enough of its own to concern itself 
with the Church of Scotland. The Irish press, however, naturally enough took umbrage. At 
the first appearance of the Menace report the Irish Independent produced an editorial 
condemning its authors: 
 
The Scotsman is frequently accused of having no sense of humour but no critic has 
hitherto ventured to charge him with lacking a sense of fair play. There are, however, 
even Scotsmen capable of creating a bogey for the purpose of arousing racial prejudice 
and inflicting unmerited penalties on the victims of their bigotry. Amongst such, we 
fear, must be counted Lord Sands and Professor William Main who…lent their names 
to an attack on the Irish in Scotland as unjust as i is unfounded. They seek to incite the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland into approval of - if not, indeed 
participation in – an onslaught those of Irish birth or Irish parentage  now resident in 
Scotland….These Scottish scaremongers pretend that Scotland is menaced on all sides 
by the Irish.190 
 
After the Assembly passed a resolution calling on the British Government to inquire into Irish 
Immigration the Irish Independent returned to the attack: 
 
 The grievance which Lord Sands, The Rev. R. M. Main (s c), and their friends have 
striven to magnify into a sort of Raw-Head and Bloody Bones with which to terrify 
timid Scotsmen, is that the Irish immigrants are Catholics and “a menace to the 
Protestant religion in the country.” At first it was suggested that our people who 
crossed to Scotland in search of employment were criminals, but that dog would not 
hunt. Now they are merely Catholics, which, in the eyes of the bigots may be the 
unpardonable crime. The whole affair bears a strong esemblance to the recent pogrom 
against Catholics in Ulster….The wonder is the membrs of the Church of Scotland 
should lend themselves to such a campaign. If the Scots claim the right to deport 
immigrants solely on the grounds of their religious belief they are setting an example 
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which may have unpleasant consequences for themselves. It is but a step further to 
Russia’s policy of executing those who dare to remain Catholics.191  
 
 The position of the Irish Independent was fairly representative of the Irish press at the time 
and the Freeman’s Journal published a lengthy attack on the Church of Scotland’s position 
by Ruaridh Erskine of Marr on the 25th June.192  It also reported the following year on a 
denunciation of the anti-Irish campaign by the Lond branch of the Scots’ National 
League.193 As time went on ritual denunciations of the campaign in the Irish press became as 
much of a hardy annual as ritual denunciations of the Irish became at the General Assembly 
although these tended to become more mockery that outrage as time passed. For example the 
Irish Independent by 1927 was observing, with heavy sarcasm: 
 
The Scottish Churches Council appears to spend much of its time in counting heads. 
We never read of it except in connection with the agitation against the Irish in Scotland. 
Seemingly it is more interested in statistics than theology…If there is a real problem to 
be solved an embargo against ships carrying Irish immigrants is no solution. This 
would still leave about 650,000 Irish Catholics in Scotland. Unless all these people 
were deported or killed – two proposals which even the Scottish Churches Council 
would admit are unchristian and impracticable – the number of Catholics must continue 
to increase and of other denominations to decline. 194 
 
  It is to the champion of the Irish immigrant, Charles Diamond that we have to turn for a 
more visceral response. There is in his newspapers a remarkably revealing article that more 
than any other sums up Diamond’s attitude, not just to the controversies of the day but how 
he, and no doubt many other Irish Catholics in Scotland, viewed their position. It is worth 
quoting extensively from it, especially if it is read in relation to the foregoing comments from 
the Church. In March 1926 Diamond responded to a letter to the Glasgow Observer which 
complained of the Catholic press’s pro-Irish bias and suggesting that the ‘Scotch Catholic 
press should be primarily Scottish - strongly Scottish in tone and matter first and only 
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secondarily warm towards the Irish and things Irish.’195  This criticism seems to have touched 
Diamond on the raw. 
  
  But it is impossible for us to carry on Catholic papers …without leaning chiefly on the 
Irish people who by birth or descent form an overwhelming majority of Catholics of 
Scotland. 
…We do not quite know what our correspondent means by saying our papers in 
Scotland should be primarily Scottish and strongly Scottish. 
    The Catholics of Scotland are a minority and purely Scottish Catholics are a greater 
minority still. To be strongly and vigorously Scottish seems to us to involve the support 
of views and policies which are not only non-Catholic but anti Catholic. 
   
 At this point Diamond appears to be advocating a position for which he had castigated 
others: to be truly Catholic was to be Irish and comp unding it with the notion that to be 
Scottish was to be anti-Catholic. Certainly given the climate of the times it is not difficult to 
have some sympathy with his view but it demonstrates n air of persecution and retreat into 
the ghetto. Owen Dudley Edwards has contended that part of the responsibility for the attacks 
made on the Irish Catholics were brought upon themselve  and while ‘this does not discharge 
the conscience of the General Assembly…some part of the responsibility for their 
proceedings is owing to the evident contempt of Irish Catholic journalists for their duties to 
the country that had given them a home.’196   Diamond illustrated that contempt succinctly in 
the following passage: 
    
 Our critic would have some difficulty in explaining how we are to be strongly Catholic 
and at the same time strongly Scottish. 
  …We have taken up the position…that the Irish Catholics of Britain have as much 
right to their national sympathies, to their political and their convictions as any other 
section of the catholic community. Why should they c ase to be Irish? 
   We have never admitted the right of any of the anti-Irish elements in the land…we 
dared to stand up for the rights of the Irish peopl at home and in Britain because in 
fine (sic) we are too Irish! 
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  …It would be very difficult to conduct Catholic newspapers and make them strongly 
English, Scottish or Welsh because England Scotland and Wales are primarily and 
above all things non-Catholic and even anti-Catholic countries. 
    In their politics, their social life and their outlook the people of these Islands are 
either indifferent or hostile to the Catholic cause and to Catholic principles. 
   Where not frankly pagan they are anti-Catholic. How then are we to make our papers 
strongly and entirely English, Scottish or Welsh? 
….it is in the general attitude of the people as a whole that hostility is to be found to the 
Catholic cause. 
  
  Leaving aside the fact that his correspondent never said that Catholic papers should be 
exclusively Scottish, Diamond’s response was instinctively defensive and returned to the 
justifications of the persecuted. His conflation of Catholicism and Irishness seemed to deny 
the title of true Catholic to anyone in Britain who was not Irish. The very existence of his 
papers was being predicated on the continuance of there being a sort of Irish Ghetto of the 
mind. The Irish in Britain, no matter how long they were settled or how far back their 
ancestry, were to remain Irish and outsiders amidst a racially, religiously and politically 
hostile people, a clan of the perpetually oppressed. It was a curious position for a serial 
Labour candidate and who exhorted his co-religionists to become involved in politics. 
However, this was a man who threatened to sue for libel anyone who called him a socialist 
when he stood for Labour in the 1922 elections.   In the conduct of his papers throughout the 
1920s his defence of the Catholic Church against the assaults of the Presbyterians made 
much, and rightly much, of their bigotry and yet it contrasted oddly with the frequent anti-
Semitic articles which appeared alongside them. Nevertheless, Diamond is important in the 
Catholic reaction to the anti-Irish campaign but as has been shown here he was not   




   The researching of Catholic archives for the 1920s can, as has been pointed out at the 
beginning of this chapter, be tantalising and frustrating. Rather in the way that the White 
papers show some surprising omissions the Catholic Church seems to have been, at the very 
least, inconsistent with its record keeping for theperiod. For example, there are no records 
extant for the Catholic Caledonian Society before 1950 and yet, as shown above, Graham was 
 89
addressing them in June 1925. Equally there are no rec rds in the Catholic Archives for the 
Catholic Truth Society before 1930 and yet, as also sh wn above, Mackintosh was urging 
Catholics to support its activities in his pastoral letter of 1924.197 The Archdioceses of the 
Catholic Church were required to submit five-yearly reports to the Vatican commenting, 
amongst other things, on their relations with other churches but the sole ‘Quinquennial 
Report’ for the period was produced in 1932 for theArchdiocese of St Andrews and 
Edinburgh. While it expresses concern about the morals of their flock, it makes no overt 
mention of the Presbyterian campaign.198 It should be pointed out here that these reports, 
prior to 1947, were produced in Latin and to a specific format. It may well be, therefore, that 
there is more research to be done in this area, possibly in the Vatican.199 Even the minutes of 
the hierarchy, as pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, contain no references to the 
campaign. 
      The full history of the Catholic Church and its relations with Protestantism in the 1920s 
has yet to be written. What can be said with a fair degree of certainty is that while the 
Catholic Church had some staunch and redoubtable defen rs, as an organisation it did not 
appear to see the need to launch a counter attack to the Church of Scotland or even an official 
rebuttal. McGettigan’s letter to the Scotsman was the closest attempt. This raises several 
intriguing questions, the most obvious being why not? This chapter has posited some possible 
solutions although a final answer is still elusive. It may simply be that the Catholic leadership 
at the time were not personally equipped or inclined to become involved in this sort of 
controversy. Certainly neither Mackintosh or Graham was a political animal in the same way 
as White or Sands. It may be that they judged that t e Church of Scotland had no chance 
whatsoever of succeeding, especially in view of the fact that by 1926 most of the few 
remaining laws restricting Catholic practice were in the process of being repealed. It could 
also be, that as Mackintosh and Graham were Scots that they did not take attacks on the Irish 
quite so personally as they might otherwise have done. Yet Father Charleson’s letter suggests 
that some Scottish priests were quite as ready to take umbrage at the Church of Scotland’s 
language as any other Catholic. It is also just as likely that the hierarchy considered it had 
quite enough on its plate with the implementation of the 1918 Education Act without 
becoming embroiled in controversies of this nature which were perhaps no more than they 
had come to expect from the Presbyterian Churches. To take on the Church of Scotland on 
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this issue would be to inflate the whole affair into a direct confrontation between the Church 
of Rome and the Church of Scotland with incalculable consequences for civil peace. They, 
like the Scottish Office civil servant Milroy, may not have wanted ‘to throw fuel on the flame 
of racial strife.’  They may indeed have taken the Christian option and decided to turn the 
other cheek and pray that God would show the Presbyt rians the error of their ways. It may 
have been all, a combination of some, or none of the above. It is one of the reasons that the 
period remains so fascinating.  On balance it would appear that the Catholic Church in 
Scotland had a long tradition of keeping its head down politically unless it was directly 
attacked. The anti-Irish campaign of the 1920s was not ostensibly aimed at the Catholic 
Church or it at least had a certain amount of plausible deniability. The Church would become 
considerably more vocal when its members and property were physically threatened in the 
1930s. 
    
 
 





















The Civil Magistrate 
 
The only freedom that Andrew Melville could have asked for in addition would be the 
freedom to require the civil magistrate to compel all of his subjects to obey the judgements of 
the church courts! 
J.H.S Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland 1960, pp 401-2 
 
I Introduction 
    What is sometimes lost in the history of Scotland of the 1920s is how intensely 
conservative a period it was. Naturally enough with the effects of the Great War, the rise of 
the Labour party, the General Strike, mass unemployment and the development of a class 
based political system it is perfectly reasonable to see it as a time of political ferment. Yet the 
indisputable fact is that between 1919 and 1929, with only a brief hiatus, the Conservative 
party, whether in coalition or on its own, was the dominant political force in Britain. It was a 
Conservative party, moreover, benefiting from the flight from the Liberals of a frightened 
middle class, that clung to many of its more reactionary principles. The defence of the 
Empire, a bulwark against Bolshevism and the maintenance of the pre-war social system 
were the certainties that its MPs could understand and promote. It was not that they did not 
recognise that things had changed. It was because things had changed that there was a need 
for the Conservative party to stick to its traditional strengths, if only to ensure that things did 
not change any further. This required vigilance against perceived threats to the political and 
social order. God, King and Empire were to be defended at all costs from enemies foreign 
and domestic, especially domestic.  
        Why then was the Unionist party so apparently reluctant to support the Church of 
Scotland over an issue that was almost guaranteed to uni e them, namely the ‘threat’ of the 
Catholic Irish in Scotland, surely an enemy within if ever there was one? As has been pointed 
out in Chapter One the Scottish establishment in particular had had an almighty fright 
because of the events of the Irish War of Independence. Now these newly enfranchised 
‘subversives’ were apparently making common cause with the socialists. At the very least no 
more of these undesirables must be allowed to flood into Scotland to take the bread from the 
mouths of honest Scotsmen who were suffering from high unemployment and forced to leave 
the land of their birth for America where they were lost to their homeland and the Empire.  
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All this should have been good tub-thumping stuff for the constituencies especially when it 
was to be backed up by the very latest scholarship, modern social theory and the imprimatur 
of the respectability of the Church of Scotland. 
     Yet the campaign appeared to have run out of steam by the end of the 1920s in the face of 
a refusal by a Conservative Government to contemplate the imposition of restrictions on Irish 
immigration. There is even evidence to suggest that t t self-same Government may have 
been instrumental in assisting in the public demolition of the Church’s case by the Glasgow 
Herald in 1929. The purpose of this chapter will be to discuss the reaction of the 
Government, and particularly the Scottish Office, to the Church’s demand for the restriction 
of Irish immigration to Scotland. It should be pointed out that the Church did have its 
supporters in Government, notably Major Walter Elliot, Parliamentary Under Secretary of 
State for Scotland for most of the period.  The Secretary of State, Sir John Gilmour, also 
fought more of a battle for restriction inside the Government than has been recognised. 
Bruce, Glendinning, Paterson and Rosie have pointed out that when the Scottish Churches 
met Gilmour and the Home Secretary, Joynson-Hicks, in 1928: ‘The delegates were to 
receive a rude shock…they were handed government data th t flatly contradicted their case. 
With what must have required a considerable amount f self-control for a Unionist MP and 
member of the Orange Order’s Grand Lodge, Gilmour tld he petitioners that even if it had 
been the problem they asserted, migration from the Irish Free State could not be prevented 
because it was not a foreign country: it was part of the British Empire!’200 Nevertheless, it 
will be argued here that as late as February 1929 Gilmour was still attempting to persuade the 
Cabinet of the merits of some form of restriction ad  Joynson-Hicks himself was also 
suggesting employment restrictions on Irish-born labour that would be policed informally by 
employers rather than by legislative action by the Government. Equally, Elliot was arguing at 
the same time that in party political terms it would be to the Conservative advantage to use 
the Irish issue to split the new nationalist movement and head off demands for Scottish Home 
Rule presented by Labour and the Liberals. 
 
II Enter Elliot 
      In order to understand the development of the debate it is necessary to return to the earlier 
years of the decade. Even before The Church and Nation Committee of the Church of 
Scotland produced its report on The Menace of the Irish Race to Our Scots Nationality in 
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1923, J S Phillimore, Chair of Humanities (Latin) at Glasgow University, in a perceptive 
article for the Dublin Review in 1922 analysed the tensions within the Protestant churches in 
Scotland:  
 
The Holy Coalition had evidently a predisposition to work upon, and here we see it 
displayed. The perilous equation, “Irish and therefor  Catholic”= “Catholic and 
therefore Irish” had been indiscreetly obtruded…One or two ill-calculated attempts by 
Sinn Feiners at criminal violence in Glasgow produced great indignation. They were 
promptly denounced and reprobated. But the legacy of “war nerves” and the present 
“tax nerves” form a very irritable diathesis for such alarms and outrages to work upon. 
But behind the Irish complication which is our Nemesis, there is the deep growing 
uneasiness at the failure of Protestantism to keep up in the race. The movement for 
Presbyterian re-union (which looks likely to succeed) is not principally a revulsion 
against the fissiparous instinct so deeply ingrained in Scottish Protestantism…but a 
policy of shortening the front against “the growing menace of Romanism and 
Socialism.” We must think not only of the – quite natural-resentment of a threatened 
caste…but of a peculiarity in Calvinism - its fitness for a small homogenous 
bourgeoisie.201 
 
His was a not unreasonable survey of the underlying attitudes that would be borne out in the 
Church and Nation Report, even if its drafters would likely have indignantly rejected it. It 
should be pointed out that Phillimore was not an uncontroversial individual himself. A 
catholic convers, he had out raged some Protestant opi ion in a speech to St Aloysius 
Academy in 1921 in which he suggested that the univers ties were open to capture and a 
means of converting Scotland to Catholicism.202 
   By 1924, however, the Labour party was in power and ‘Romanism and Socialism’ were no 
longer a menace but an apparent reality. Although it was a somewhat abbreviated 
administration, the Church was unlikely to obtain a sympathetic hearing to combat these twin 
evils during Labour’s period in office. However, circumstances were to change drastically 
during the General Election of 1924. As David Cesarani has shown:  
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What has been less generally noted by historians is the current of anti-alienism that 
underlay the Conservatives campaign and the anti-alien, anti-Jewish furore that 
accompanied the formation of the new Government. The leader of the Conservative 
Party, Stanley Baldwin, gave the green light to the extremists in his own ranks - men 
like Joynson-Hicks - in the course of his election broadcast on 16 October 1924 and in 
other speeches. Adverting to domestic unrest and the activity of ‘alien’ subversives, he 
announced that “we cannot afford the luxury of academic socialists or revolutionary 
agitation”… He told the nation on radio that should he become Prime Minister, “I want 
to examine the laws and regulations as to the entry of aliens into this country, for in 
these days no alien should be substituted for one of our own people when we have not 
enough work at home to go around.” The Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce passed a resolution a few days after the installation of the new Government 
urging it to take measures against “undesirable alins”. The anti-alien theme was 
pushed hard by The Times, which began a series of articles on “Alien London”….The 
reports concentrated almost exclusively on the Jews in the East End…”They stand 
aloof -not always without a touch of oriental arrogance- from their fellow citizens. 
They look upon us with suspicion and a certain contempt. Mixed marriages between 
orthodox Jews and Gentiles are forbidden. These people remain an alien element in our 
land.203 
    
    In this febrile atmosphere it is not difficult to imagine the reaction of those in the Church 
of Scotland who held similar views about the alien inassimilable Irish. If the Jews were a 
problem in the East End of London how much more so were the Irish in the East End of 
Glasgow? The Jews had at least not been in direct rebellion against the Crown a mere three 
years previously and were furthermore unlikely to swamp the indigenous population. It has 
also to be pointed out that some Irish Catholics did their cause little favour.  As Owen Dudley 
Edwards has stated, ‘The difference lies in that the Jews had given far less evidence of 
considering themselves a separate people…than had the chosen spokesmen of the Scottish 
Catholics of Irish Origin. Scotsmen who read the Catholic press might indeed wonder 
whether the Irish had any loyalty to Scotland.’204 Politically, therefore, it may well have 
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appeared that the tide was running with the Church and encouraged them in the belief that 
any approach to Government would be met sympathetically.  
    This opinion was not without foundation. On the17th July 1925 Major Elliot circulated a 
note on the issue of Irish immigration in the Scottish Office. The statistics that he quotes 
were, even then, suspect but it instigated research by t e Scottish Office into the true state of 
affairs and would be frequently cited in departmental discussions:  
    
   I have had this matter under consideration for some time and referred guardedly to it 
while introducing the Board of Health Estimates, 1925. The Board of Health have since 
been collecting figures and estimate at present that a surplus of 4,000 Irish per annum 
remains as balance of immigration over emigration. We are at present supporting in 
Scotland some 10,000 paupers of Irish birth 
      In view of the very greatly overcrowded state of the Scottish labour market and the 
numbers who annually emigrate from Scotland only to be replaced here by Irish I 
suggest that the position cannot be allowed to remain. 
       I see no objection to framing a general statute limiting immigration from 
Dominions in the same way as they limit immigration from us. This in practice comes 
down to a reasonable prospect of employment with or without possession of a capital 
sum. 
     If England is not willing to do this Scotland should consider proceeding 
independently. 
    Note that the present situation will be greatly aggravated when the new American 
quota system comes into effect which restricts further Irish immigration and will have 
the effect of damming it back on Great Britain.205 
 
Elliot it should be noted had considerably more influence than his position as a junior 
minister would suggest. He was regarded as something of a right wing intellectual and party 
strategist. As Hutchison has illustrated, ‘A …Scot who had an audience throughout Great 
Britain was Walter Elliot. He was an inveterate writer of newspaper articles for both the 
London and Scottish press. In 1927 he wrote a book on Conservatism, (Toryism in the 
Twentieth Century) as part of a series of books designed to state the rig t wing viewpoint on 
contemporary politics. That Elliot should be invited to define the central theme of the whole 
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series indicates the weight he carried.’206 Certainly his memorandum would haunt Scottish 
Office thinking on the Irish issue for the rest of the decade. 
      In terms of the statistics, he was being selectiv  with the material with which he was 
provided. A Scottish Board of Health document dated 3rd April 1925 207 stated that the total 
number of Irish born persons, including dependents, receiving poor relief on 15th May 1924 
was 9,342. This figure did not differentiate between Free State and Northern Irish citizens.  
The Board of Health’s survey of the Inspectors of Por in the parishes of Coatbridge, Govan, 
Greenock, Bothwell, Glasgow, Motherwell and Port Glasgow concluded that ‘so far as the 
Parish Councils are concerned, the question of immigration from Ireland during the past three 
years has not been a serious matter.’208  His assertion that there was a surplus of 4,000 Irish
per annum was based on information provided confidet ally by the Steamship Companies 
which estimated the excess of numbers arriving in Scotland in 1924, over the numbers 
leaving, to be 3,966.209  These figures did not take into account that the majority of the ferry 
traffic was between Ulster and Scotland and not the Free State and Scotland. There was no 
possibility using these figures to establish that te final destination of these travellers was the 
West of Scotland. What is of particular interest in the Elliot note is his assertion that if 
England was not willing to restrict Irish immigration then Scotland should proceed on its own 
independently. At first glance it appears remarkable that a minister of the Crown, and a 
Unionist one at that, was advocating a quasi-nationl st idea of Scotland ‘proceeding 
independently’ on the issue. However, Elliot’s thinking on the subject was influenced, as will 
be shown, by particularly Scottish political considerations.  
          By December 1925 the Church of Scotland Committee increased the pressure on the 
Government for action and produced an open letter to Sir John Gilmour which it published in 
pamphlet form. This opened in rather sonorous tone: ‘I  accordance with a remit from the 
General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church, and the Free Church, 
and after consultation with other Churches, we desire to approach His Majesty’s Government 
upon a question of vital importance to our Scottish people – viz., the serious situation that has 
arisen in Scotland owing to the influx during the last number of years of many thousands of 
Irish immigrants, and to the emigration of many thousands of the native population.’210  The 
pamphlet itself was an updated version of the Irish Menace report of 1923 and contained the 
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usual references to the supplanting of the indigenous population by the inferior Irish. ‘It has 
been stated in the House of Commons that 9,000 persons immigrated into Scotland in 1924 
and yet there were as many as 70,000 unemployed persons in Glasgow alone.’211 As has been 
pointed out above this figure of 9,000 was not rooted in reality.212  The Church had no doubt 
of the cause of this unemployment and it also introduced what was to become something of a 
bogey figure for the twenties, the infamous ‘Irish foreman’: 
 
We know of a recent case where an Irish foreman was dismissing Scotsman and 
engaging Irishmen, and was even bringing men over from Ireland and putting them on 
the job. 
  We have known cases where public schemes undertaken o provide work for our own 
unemployed have been partially recruited from immigrants of a few weeks and months 
standing.213 
   
    It is possible to discern how the Government was now being hoist with the petard of its 
own pre-election language of only a year before. The letter itself, signed by the Rev. John 
White, concluded with a request that the Government institute an inquiry into the issue and 
then take whatever action was necessary. The Church followed this up at the end of the year 
with a formal request for a delegation to meet Sir John Gilmour in person to discuss the issue. 
It was a request that created some consternation within the Scottish Office.  
 
III Knocking on the Scottish Office Door 
   In early January 1926 the rather invidious positi n of the Scottish Office was recognised by 
officials. Rose, Gilmour’s Private Secretary, minuted the department regarding the Church’s 
request and immediately pointed out that the Dominion status of the Irish Free State made 
any solution problematical but ‘The reception of a deputation might be of advantage in that 
seeking to get a policy of restriction adopted Secretary for Scotland could point to feeling of 
responsible persons in Scotland as evinced by the deputation. ‘214 It should be noted here that 
the Church was in some haste to arrange the deputation before the annual General Assembly 
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in May. This was probably because White was ending h s first period in office as Moderator 
and to secure government assurances on action on the Irish issue would have been a 
considerable boost, not only to him personally, but to the re-unification process between the 
Church of Scotland and the United Free Church, the anti-Irish campaign having been very 
much a joint venture. Not all of the Scottish Office officials were keen to oblige the Kirk, 
however, as can be seen by the replies to Rose’s minute: 
   
  The question of Irish immigration to Scotland  is a difficult and delicate one. For facts 
in support of the menace within it would be necessary to consult a number of 
departments – Ministry of Labour, Registrar General, Scottish Board of Health perhaps 
the Prisons Commissioners … 
   Before reaching a final decision as to receiving a deputation it would be desirable to 
confer with the Dominions Office as it is not impossible that the ventilation of the 
subject by the rather conspicuous method of a deputation from an influential body, who 
moreover are not particularly reticent in their presentation of the case would be 
regarded as embarrassing. 
    In view of the notice which the subject has alre dy received (See in particular 
Captain Elliot memo) Secretary for Scotland should probably see before any action is 
taken  
Patrick Laird 2nd January 1926215 
 
The importance of the problem is undoubted. Any remedy is necessarily difficult. 
Presumably it could only take the form of legislation restricting immigration from the 
Irish Free State or from the Dominions generally. If such a measure were undertaken it 
would require careful steering. Judging by the print e closed I am apprehensive that the 
spokesman at the suggested interview might increase the difficulties by precipitating 
opposition from the FS (sic) and perhaps other Dominions. Quiet consideration by the 
Government might be better than an advertised deputation and public inquiry as 
suggested.  
John Lamb 2nd January 1926216 
     




   The use of language by these senior civil servants is interesting. Laird’s description of the 
Church as ‘an influential body who are not particularly reticent in their presentation of the 
case’ was a piece of masterly understatement. He was obviously fully alive to the possibilities 
of ‘embarrassment’. At the same time, the Elliot memo had made the issue one which the 
Scottish Office could not entirely ignore although Sir John Lamb’s suggestion that it was a 
problem that required ‘quiet consideration by the Government’ implies that he hoped it might 
be. To accede to the Church’s request would not only appear as though it was making policy 
but also had the potential to drag the Scottish Office into potential conflict with other 
departments. As far back as 1923 there had been a sugge tion made to the Dominions Office 
that there be a reciprocal arrangement for the repatriation of those charged to the Poor Law 
between Scotland and Ireland. This had already receiv d a dusty answer: ‘it would be 
possible for HMG (His Majesty’s Government) to suggest to the Government of the Free 
State that the previous power to remove paupers from Great Britain to their area should be re-
enacted on the understanding that legislation should be introduced providing that paupers 
could similarly be removed to from the Free State to Great Britain but His Grace (the Duke of 
Devonshire) doubts whether the Government of the Irish Free State would be prepared to 
concur in such a proposal; and as present advised, th refore, he does not see his way to make 
it.’ 217 If the Dominions Office did not see its way to making such suggestions in 1923 it was 
extremely unlikely that they would consider any more radical solutions at the behest of the 
Church of Scotland in 1926. Especially in view of the fact that the Boundary Commission of 
1925 had just confirmed the borders of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland to the 
disappointment of many in the South. Creating unnecessary difficulties for the Cosgrave 
Government just as De Valera was re-entering Irish politics was not to be countenanced. 
     There was a recognition that the Scottish Office had to be able to examine the actual 
position rather than the somewhat unsubstantiated figures being employed by the Church.  Sir 
John Gilmour, recognising that procrastination was the better part of valour, suggested 
putting the Church off on the grounds ‘that as thisis a UK question I think it undesirable to 
meet them at the present time.218 
    Between the months of January and March 1926 the Scottish Office consulted the Scottish 
Board of Health, the Registrar General and the Prisons Commissioners of Scotland. The 
Registrar General on January 27th in his report to the Scottish Office raised the first doubts 
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about the Church’s case. He found from the census ret rn of 1921 that the number of Irish-
born persons in Scotland was lower than in 1911. He went further: ‘The fact that the number 
found in Scotland in 1921 is the lowest since 1851 certainly does not support a view of there 
being within recent years any increase in the amount f immigration from Ireland.’219   He 
also examined the numbers of Irish marriages, another statistic often cited to ‘prove’ the 
increase in Irish immigration. His conclusions were no more helpful to the Church and 
Nation Committee: 
   
 …these percentages tend to show some, though not great increase in the frequency of 
Roman Catholic (i.e. Irish) marriages but this percentage cannot be credited with 
demonstrating increased immigration of Irish for there are good grounds for presuming 
that the children of Irish immigrants adhere to the Roman Catholic faith and when they 
grow up and marry tend to increase the number of Irish marriages. Thus the figures 
obtained from an examination of the Marriage Registrs, like those obtained from an 
examination of the census returns at least fail to sh w any evidence of any increase in 
the number of Irish immigrants. 
      …I in no way desire to state that the information supplied by the Committee of the 
Church of Scotland is erroneous, but I feel it right to point out that the information at 
my disposal from the census reports and from the marriage statistics fails to provide 
corroboration.220    
    
   There was some succour given to the Church by the s atistics provided by the Prisons 
Commissioners but the figures did not give numbers fo  those of Irish birth as opposed to 
those of Irish extraction. As Milroy, the civil servant tasked with compiling the reports 
pointed out in his summary, the assumption was that t ose prisoners classified as Roman 
Catholic were either Irish or of Irish extraction iwhich case there appeared to be a 
disproportionate number of ‘Irish’ prisoners.221 It should be remembered that this was not 
what would be considered a scientific breakdown of the figures and that the Chairman of the 
Prison Commissioners was one Lord Polwarth, who wasalso a prominent member of the 
Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland. The Board of Health reported that: 
‘The number of Irish born persons in receipt of ordinary poor relief has not grown recently; it 
                                                 




is less than it was in 1910 and the same is true as r gards the percentage of the total number 
chargeable including destitute able bodied unemployed.’222 The statistics thus obtained by 
early 1926 were far from supportive of the Church’s ca e and went a long way in refuting it, 
although the Scottish Office were cautious in their conclusions. Milroy put the position thus: 
  
  There has been no serious (sic) increase recently in the Irish population but there may 
have been some displacement of Scottish Labour by Irish. 
…In the circumstances I should be disposed to defer consulting the Dominions Office – 
one does not want to throw fuel on the flame of racial strife until we have consulted the 
Ministry of Labour and see what they have to say. If there really be a problem of recent 
growth it would seem to lie in the displacement of Scottish labour by Irish.223 
 
Milroy assiduously pursued the Ministry of Labour fo statistics that might prove or disprove 
the assertion that the Irish were in fact displacing Scottish labour. His reply, finally received 
in June, was that the Ministry did not have any information that was relevant to that in the 
Church’s pamphlet. By this time Milroy at least had concluded that: ‘the Irish “danger” is not 
appreciably increasing and does not justify any action by the British Government. Apart from 
the desirability of action, restriction of Irish immigration would raise thorny questions with 
the Dominions.’224 
   After what must have been much wearisome toil and, judging by the amount of material 
produced by the various departments, considerable departmental time, there was by the 
middle of 1926 no single statistical confirmation of the Church’s case. The Church, however, 
unaware that the Scottish Office had been scrutinising the figures, renewed the mandate of 
the Church and Nation Committee and evidently undeterr d by the earlier polite refusal, 
renewed their request for the reception of a delegation by the Secretary of State to discuss the 
issue. Gilmour was in somewhat of a difficult political position. Any further refusal to meet a 
delegation of the Church of Scotland may have been construed as a snub, especially as the 
position of Secretary of State for Scotland had been l vated to Cabinet rank that summer. 
The first Secretary of State for Scotland in the Cabinet since the eighteenth century, refusing, 
almost as his first official act, to meet a delegation from the Church of Scotland to discuss an 
issue that was being portrayed as a matter of national survival would hardly be considered an 





auspicious beginning, especially in the Scottish Unionist Party. On the other hand as Milroy 
pointed out in a memo that while he agreed that the Irish immigration question was ‘highly 
controversial and delicate, ... In these cases I think that, if the request for interview on these 
subjects were acceded to, no useful purpose would be served. On the contrary harm might 
ensue inasmuch as S of S’s agreement to receive a deputation might be construed by the 
ordinary layman - bonus paterfamilias - as an indication of concurrence with the Church’s 
views and of putting his weight in their favour.’ 225
    In the event a meeting was arranged with the Church’s delegation which took place on the 
24th September 1926 but without Sir John Gilmour who was c lled away at the last moment 
on urgent business elsewhere. In view of the advice he had been receiving from his officials 
this may have been a diplomatic absence. It is alsonotable that the Rev John White was 
another absentee. The Church’s case was presented by the Reverends MacLagan and 
Cameron while the Government was represented by Sir John Lamb and Mr Jeffrey226 from 
the Board of Health.  It was not an altogether satisf ctory occasion for the Church side. The 
usual iniquities of the Irish were rehearsed in which they were accused of taking the jobs 
from unemployed Scotsmen while apparently at the same time idling on the dole, the 
Unemployment Insurance Act being, in the words of one delegate, the Reverend Patterson, ‘a 
terrible curse on the country.’227 When not engaged in these activities they were, according to 
the Rev Duncan Cameron of Kilsyth, plotting the downfall of the Empire.228  The delegation 
called for a public inquiry which was deflected, rather than refused, by Sir John Lamb on the 
grounds ‘that it would be difficult to get a body which would be recognised as impartial to 
enquire into the matter.’229 Mr Jeffrey also refuted the claim that temporary workers from 
Ireland working on the harvest then stayed in Scotland to collect the dole. The Board of 
Health had monitored the position and found that nerly all such workers returned to Ireland 
and in any case while, ‘It might be regrettable when there was so much unemployment in 
Scotland that such a field of labour should not be kept filled by Scottish workers. It was 
nevertheless a fact that Scottish workers did not feel attracted to that class of work.’230  
     The reverend gentlemen might have been a little more encouraged had they been able to 
read some of the general conclusions contained in the briefing note for the meeting prepared 
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for Sir John Gilmour. The note itself quotes the figures given in the earlier reports and was 
not entirely unsympathetic to the Church although the suggestions for remedying the situation 
fell far short of what the Church was seeking and the tone was far from the apocalyptic. 
    
  It would appear that although the figures cited above supplied by the Scottish 
Departments do not reveal a very serious state of affairs, there is certainly an Irish 
problem in the South West of Scotland, and that there as been for some time. There is 
no doubt that the Irish impose an undue burden on the poor law authorities and that too 
great a proportion of the prison population is of Irish birth or extraction: and further it 
seems that Irish, whether by accepting lower wages and worse conditions or through 
the action of compatriot foremen, obtain employment i  the face of serious 
unemployment among Scotsmen.231 
 
As a matter of fact the Scottish Office had absolutely no figures or evidence to justify the 
existence of ‘compatriot foremen’ and, as has been poi ted out above, the prison statistics 
had a certain dubiety about them. Crime levels in the West of Scotland tended to be higher 
than elsewhere and one could have equally have made the argument that Glaswegians made 
up ‘too great a proportion of the prison population.’ Nevertheless, the government were 
sufficiently concerned by the Church’s allegations to set up an interdepartmental conference 
on the issue.232 
 
IV Behind the Scenes 
   The inter-departmental conference on Irish immigrat on took place on the 28th June 1927 
chaired by Major Elliot. Present were representatives of the Dominions Office, the Home 
Office, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, the Scottish Board of Health and the Scottish 
Office. Elliot was still anxious to reach some sort f agreement to restrict Irish immigration. 
The issue was beginning to bedevil more than the correspondence pages of the Glasgow 
Herald. Even the ‘Lady Unionists,’ as the women’s section of the Unionist party was called 
at the time, at their conference in October 1926 had debated and overwhelmingly passed a 
motion demanding the restriction of immigration of Irish manual workers into Scotland and 
‘that any such immigrants requiring poor relief within five years of their arrival be 
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deported.’233  These were sentiments with which Elliot found himself in sympathy. It is 
apparent from the minutes of the conference that Elliot was hoping to influence it towards a 
policy of restriction of immigration even if this had to be applied in general terms to all of the 
Dominions.  
    Elliot opened the conference with a restatement of the points made in the briefing note 
prepared for the meeting with the Church delegation he previous year (see above). He 
immediately ran into difficulties with the representatives of the English departments who had 
not ‘received complaints on the subject of Irish immigration comparable to the complaints in 
Scotland’ and whose inquiries ‘did not appear to shw any justification for proceeding on the 
line proposed.234 The Dominions Office representative, Mr Whiskard, was particularly 
discouraging, drawing attention to what he described as a fundamental principle that  
‘persons described as of Irish Free State nationality were British subjects by birth in one of 
His Majesty’s dominions and as such could neither b excluded or deported from this 
country. Apart from legislation no power existed to restrict immigration of British subjects 
from the Irish Free State into Great Britain’.235  The Home Office representative agreed 
stating that: ‘the Department would object to any proposal having for its purpose the sub-
division of British nationality, and it would be a complete reversal of immemorial policy for 
the Government to take power to keep or send out any British subject from this country.’236  
         Elliot was unabashed and carried on his argument that the situation could not be 
allowed to continue and that there was ample precedent in that Canada and Australia imposed 
restrictions on the immigration of Britons and in any case the policy would have no effect on 
them. As proof of his case Elliot cited figures from the Inspectors of Poor in Glasgow which 
averred that in 43 parishes ‘mainly in the West of Scotland, the number of persons born in the 
Irish Free State who entered Scotland in the years nded 31, March, 1926 and 1927 and 
became chargeable on the rates were 418 and 431 respectively.’237  This figure was 
immediately countered by Irons of the Ministry of Labour who pointed out that: ‘according to 
a census taken at the exchanges in and near Glasgow only for four weeks ended 25th April, 
1925, showed that of all applicants for unemployment benefit during that period only ten had 
at one time or another been resident in the Irish Free State. The Ministry were not aware of 
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any powers that could be invoked to regulate the entry of Irishmen into Great Britain, even if 
such regulation were considered to be necessary.’238 It was apparent that Elliot’s, and by 
extension the Church’s, case was not standing up to the scrutiny of more dispassionate 
observers and Elliot was forced into the uncomfortable position of admitting  ‘that the 
statistical information which had been collected from several sources had not assisted 
materially in providing a satisfactory basis for the examination of the problem’ nonetheless 
‘although no precise figures were available to indicate of the influx of Irish into Scotland 
there was evidence that an influx was taking place.’239 
      It is probable that it was at this conference that any realistic possibility of restricting Irish 
immigration ran into the sand. At the end of the conference the Dominions Office made the 
position clear: ‘As at present advised Mr Whiskard could hold out no hope that the 
Dominions Office would undertake to support any proposal having for its object the 
exclusion of Irishmen from this country.  Such a proposal impinged upon the important 
question of the status adhering to British nationality and was one which could not be 
proceeded upon without a decision by the Cabinet.’ It was not, however, the end of the affair. 
Sir John Lamb wrote on behalf of Sir John Gilmour to the Departments concerned on the 14th
of September restating the case that the Irish were undesirable immigrants. The reply from 
the Home Office was a firm non possumus:  
 
… As at present advised, Sir William Joynson-Hicks would be opposed to any 
suggestion that an attempt should be made to regulat  immigration of natives of the 
Irish Free State into the UK…he would point out that n tives of the IFS are in the 
contemplation of British law British subjects and could not under any circumstances be 
excluded from the UK. 
   Save on the grounds of urgent necessity he would deprecate the introduction of 
legislation with a view to making such exclusion possible.240    
     
     The Church of Scotland was in the meantime unaware of the internal discussions of the 
Government and carried on its campaign. On the 19th July 1928 there was a meeting in 
London with the joint church committee on Irish immigration and the Home Secretary 
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Joynson-Hicks and Sir John Gilmour. As has been poited out at the beginning of this chapter 
the Church delegation was shocked to find that their proposals had been dismissed and were 
taken aback by the figures that contradicted their case. By this time, by virtue of constant re-
iteration, the Church and Nation Committee were convinced that their collection of figures 
and anecdotal evidence made an irrefutable case. Th meeting sparked considerable 
correspondence between the Scottish Office and the Reverends MacLagan and Cameron 
demanding further evidence.241  The impeccably Unionist Scotsman chimed in with an 
Editorial the day after the meeting. Even though it considered that the ‘Irishman is a born 
agitator…on the Clyde and elsewhere there is a spirit of agitation and revolt which may owe 
something to Irish inspiration,’ yet the article con luded that ‘we have never had a barrier 
upon the immigration of British subjects…such a policy could not be applied to Scotland 
alone or to Irish immigration alone.’242 It would appear that by the middle of 1928 the issue 
had become effectively dead in political terms. This, owever, was not the case. 
                                                     
V The Elliot Memorandum 
   In the early months of 1929, which was to be a General Election year, the Irish issue once 
again intruded into Scottish and British politics. There was also a new dimension in the 
emergence for the first time of an avowedly nationalist party in Scotland which had secured 
the support of luminaries like the Duke of Montrose, R B Cunninghame Graham, Compton 
Mackenzie and R E Muirhead. The political circumstances were not favourable to the 
Conservatives. The Church of Scotland, about to be triumphantly reunited with the United 
Free Church later in the year, and was once again to have John White as Moderator. The 
indefatigable Elliot, by this time considered an influential party strategist, surveyed the 
political scene and found that it was not good. He was not alone in this opinion. On the 11th 
December 1928 he wrote to his mistress Baffy Dugdale:243 ‘Had a letter from Robert 
Horne244 getting panicky about Home Rule. I can see this Unionist Government introducing 
that as a last throw.’245 He elaborated on his own fears a some days later in a letter to Dugdale 
from the Scottish Office on Christmas Eve 1928: 
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 Have been written to by Horne about Scottish Home Rule and intend to compose a 
memo on the subject myself. What frightens me is the prospect of the Scottish Grand 
Committee in the next parliament. Nobody has even envisaged this but myself. I had to 
face it you see in 1923. 
   I think that the Anti-Irish Bill and the promise of a Royal Commission the absolute 
minimum that we can get away with. I think more than that, but you will see it in the 
memo.246 
   
   In response to this Elliot produced in February 1929 a lengthy strategy document for the 
Scottish Unionist Party. This is one of the first references to the consequences of a serious 
‘Home Rule’ challenge to the Unionists. The timing of the document is crucial for in March 
1929 there was a scheduled Cabinet discussion on Irish immigration in Scotland which would 
be based on a paper produced by the Home Secretary Joynson-Hicks. Elliot suggested that for 
the first time the Unionists might be facing the possibility of a Bill for a Scottish legislature 
being proposed within the next eighteen months and pro uced what can be best described as 
a Unionist Nationalist solution:247 
    
  A re-examination of Scottish government and its relation to the United Kingdom 
Parliament is imminent….It is not within the range of practical politics to suppose that 
this situation will be altered to the Conservative advantage in the forthcoming election. 
… Do we recognise, however, that this means that the establishment of a Scottish 
legislature is thus brought forward as a possibility not of the next ten years, but as a 
possibility of the next eighteen months? Both Liberal and Labour parties are deeply 
pledged to the proposal of such a measure, and resolutions in its favour have been 
repeatedly carried in Parliament, with their official support, over many years. I do not 
know that the Conservative party has recently made any clear statement of policy on 
the matter.248  
  
  In Elliot’s view the existence of the Scottish Grand Committee meant that even were the 
Conservatives to retain power at the election they would be outnumbered in the Committee 
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which would make managing the Government’s Scottish business almost impossible. He 
cited his own experience during the Bonar Law Government: ‘The difficulties in the first year 
were dealt with by ‘tacking’ carried to almost absurd lengths. (The prolongation of payments 
of relief to Scottish able-bodied unemployed for instance, was tacked to a bill regulating 
London inter-borough finance.) I do not think that affairs could thus have continued for a 
whole Parliament, and in fact the then Secretary fo Scotland had had to consider the only 
logical step. That is, the abolition of the Scottish Grand Committee.’249 Elliot recognised that 
such a step would be hugely unpopular. ‘Scottish Memb rs will readily realise the extreme 
difficulty of taking any such step in the 1929 Parliament, as practically the first proposal of 
the new administration towards the Scottish people.’ 250 There were in his view only two 
possible steps that Government could take to avoid chaos in the House of Commons and 
disastrous unpopularity in Scotland. It could set up a Royal Commission on Scottish Home 
Rule which would in his opinion recommend the setting up of a legislature in Scotland. This 
would in effect commit the Conservatives to bringing  a Home Rule Bill of their own. Elliot 
was of course well aware how the words Home Rule would send a shudder down the 
collective spine of his party. The alternative would be to suspend Irish immigration into 
Scotland. In Elliot’s analysis of the nationalist movement: 
 
It seems to me possible that the anti-Government swing of the pendulum may lead to a 
certain number of the disgruntled finding in the ‘Nationalist’ label a handy 
compromise, of the same kind as that which leads to the return of independent 
Members when discontent is about … 
        The Nationalist movement however contains two elements naturally opposed 
whose temporary union has given them strength. These elements are the ‘Gaelic-Irish’ 
and the ‘Edinburgh Protestant’. The ‘Gaelic Irish are the literary men and some of 
them, such as Compton Mackenzie, preach the re-constitution of Scotland on a Roman 
Catholic basis. Needless to say this is an anathema to the East-country men and the 
Kirks. It would be easy to split these two. The step  hereafter detailed would do so. But 
it is probable that Unionist action along the lines previously considered might 
consolidate them. 
 … These facts seem to me the justifiable basis for suspending overseas immigration 
altogether at present, (that is to say Irish immigrat on). As all Scots Members know this 




goes much deeper than any surface or temporary questions and indeed accounts for a 
large proportion of the autonomist movement.251 
 
Having presented his party with the Scylla of Home Rule and the Charybdis of restricting 
immigration from the Empire he proceeded to suggest how the objections to the latter policy 
may have been circumvented. Using the unemployment insurance system he proposed that 
new books should only be issued to home born workers. This he believed would sidestep the 
need for an ‘Ellis Island’ type control system, while at the same time leaving immigration 
open to all countries within an unemployment insurance scheme which would ‘obviate 
difficulties with England and Northern Ireland.’252 
    As a purely party political solution went it was neat and attractive for the Unionists. Elliot 
had managed to put restriction back onto the agenda a  it was an issue, whatever its merits, 
he had consistently supported since 1925. It was a ‘Scottish’ solution to the problem and 
there is little doubt that Elliot believed he was shooting the nationalist fox. In this he may 
well have been influenced by two letters that appeared in the Scotsman on 10th January 1929 
from the Duke of Montrose and R E Muirhead respectiv ly. Both argued the Nationalist case 
but Montrose’s point that a legislature was needed to control immigration while Muirhead 
dismissed a suggestion that Home Rule in Scotland would be ‘Irish Home Rule in Scotland’ 
by pointing out that the whole Irish immigration issue had been greatly exaggerated in the 
first place.253 Whatever the case it was obvious that Elliot was prepared to persevere in 
championing restriction despite his experiences of the last five years. Incidentally this is 
somewhat at odds with Hutchinson’s evaluation of him as a ‘progressive Unionist.’254 Be that 
as it may it would appear that Elliot was making something of a last ditch appeal to his party 
in terms of political self-interest to reconsider the merits of restriction in advance of the 
Cabinet meeting of March 1929.  
      This appeal was not without its effect. In adv nce of the discussion of a Cabinet paper on 
Irish immigration produced by the Home Secretary Jons n-Hicks. Gilmour discussed the 
situation with Elliot on two occasions. On the night of the 15th February 1929 they agreed the 
memo disagreeing with the Home Office255. On 4th March they met again and, at Elliot’s 
insistence, Gilmour agreed take to the Cabinet a copy f the Glasgow Herald article 
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(discussed below) on the effect of the US quota system and two letters from the Scottish 
Unionist’s Political Secretary Col. P.J. Blair256. These were addressed to Cmdr. the Hon. 
A.D. Cochrane D.S.O. MP and to F.C. Thomson MP, the Scottish Whip, outlining Blair’s 
own investigation into Irish employment on the Lochmaben Water Scheme. In this it was 
alleged that a Ministry of Labour official informed Blair, on the basis of confidentiality, that 
Irish employment on the scheme was higher than they had been led to believe: ‘You will see 
that the letter (to Thomson) covers the point about the supposed inability to know when 
books are issued. Apparently the Ministry of Labour in Scotland has no difficulty about 
this…It also says that a very much larger number of I ishmen found work on the scheme than 
apparently you were told in London.’257   Gilmour’s formal objection, agreed with Elliot, to
the Home Office paper made the following points: 
  
 As regards Scotland the main facts, as shown from the enquiries which have been 
made, would appear as follows:- 
   In each of the years 1925-6 and 1926-7 over 800 poor persons born in the Irish Free 
State became chargeable in 43 Scottish parishes, mainly in the West of Scotland. 
   In each of the years 1925, 1926 and 1927 the Irish born (covering Northern Ireland as 
well as the Irish Free State) convicted prisoners, borstal inmates and Criminal lunatics 
amounted to between 22% and 25% of the total for Sctland. 
  In each of the years 1925 and 1926 the number of convictions of persons of Irish 
extraction (including both the Irish Free State andNorthern Ireland) at Glasgow Sheriff 
Court was about half the number of persons of Scottish birth and extraction similarly 
convicted. 
       In view of these facts I should not be prepad, without further discussion, to agree 
with the conclusions drawn in the first paragraph of the Home Secretary’s 
Memorandum, and I should reserve the right to state my own views as to policy at the 
meeting at which the matter is considered. 258  
 
   The Cabinet discussion took place on Wednesday 6 March 1929. The significance of this 
date will be examined later. Joynson-Hicks himself was an old party ‘die-hard’ and of all the 
Cabinet the one who was most likely to be in favour f the case for restriction. However, the 
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first paragraph of his report, the one to which Gilmour objected, concluded that the results of 
his inquiries ‘…strongly suggest that the mischief of which the representatives of the Scottish 
Churches who came to see me in July last complained, has already been done and that the 
immigration of natives of the Irish Free State to Scotland is not now such as to affect 
materially the position created by the presence in Scotland of a large body of persons of Irish 
extraction.’ In effect the horse had long bolted an i  his opinion: ‘It is in fact the Irish and 
their descendants already in Scotland who present the real problem and, failing wholesale 
repatriation, which I take to be out of the question the only measure of alleviation which 
commends itself as being both just and practicable is the repatriation of those who within a 
fixed period of their arrival in Scotland become a charge on the rates….’259  It was not that 
Joynson-Hicks did not think that the Irish could not exert an ‘undesirable’ influence in their 
own localities or that no action should be taken. It is in the light of developments in the 1930s 
that the final paragraph of his paper takes on an added significance: 
 
I think also that the help of Scottish employers should be enlisted. Unless there were a 
demand for Irish labour there would be little encouragement for either Irishmen to enter 
Scotland or for those who have arrived to remain. Moreover if Scottish employers 
showed a decided preference for Scottish Labour the Irish elements now in employment 
would eventually be forced onto poor relief and might, subject to whatever 
arrangements are made, become eligible to repatriation. The suggestion that the 
Secretary of State for Scotland should address a circular based of course on the gravity 
of the unemployment situation to the employer’s organisations in Scotland is perhaps 
worth considering 260 
  
 In this case, we have evidence that a senior Cabinet Minister suggested that employers be 
encouraged to operate a specifically anti-Irish employment policy. Joynson-Hicks was 
doubtless referring to a policy that would affect only the Irish-born labour but in a Scotland 
where the distinctions between Irish and Catholic were blurred it is not difficult to see how 
this injunction could have been interpreted. 
    Nevertheless, a Cabinet decision having been agreed that no action on restriction would be 
taken, all members of the Government, including Elliot, were bound by the principles of 
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collective responsibility. This still left the Scottish Unionists with the political problems 
outlined in the Elliot paper. The preferred solution was finally off the agenda and so how 
were the Unionists to deal with the issue in the upcoming election? If one is unable to use a 
political issue to one’s advantage then it is obviously to one’s advantage if the issue 
disappears. It was not in the Government’s interest to release the huge volume of information 
it had gathered over the last five years itself, especially as for most of the time they had been 
claiming that they did not have it. If the Irish issue could be discredited it would possibly 
remove an incentive for their own disgruntled supporters to flirt with the new National party 
and at the same time remove an embarrassing bone of contention with Church. It would have 
had the added bonus of removing possible sources of friction, not only with the Free State but 
with the other Dominions as well, not to mention Irish opinion in the United States. It is at 
this point that the Glasgow Herald came conveniently to the Unionists’ rescue. 
 
VI The Glasgow Herald 
       Discerning Government inspired journalism, if it s done well, can be a difficult process. 
In these more cynical times when the public is more familiar with the dark arts of politics 
there tends to be more suspicion about the motives of journalists. The 1920s were a more 
deferential society and journalists, of the ‘respectable’ newspapers at any rate, could still, 
without irony be referred to as the ‘gentlemen of the press.’ This did not mean that they were 
without bias and the Glasgow Herald of the period, like the Scotsman, was soundly Unionist. 
It was in the correspondence pages of the Herald that many of the arguments concerning Irish 
immigration had been aired, naturally enough as this was always an issue of more concern in 
the West than in the East of Scotland.  What is interesting is the tone of an editorial in the 
Glasgow Herald of the 22nd February 1929 in advance of the Cabinet m eting and at 
approximately the same time as the Elliot document was circulated. The United States was 
introducing a new quota system that would drastically cut the numbers of Free State Irish it 
would admit: 
   
    …What then, is likely to happen when the 50% reduction takes place four months 
hence? Is it not more than possible that a goodly proportion of the surplus, will think of 
trying their fortunes on this side of St Georges Channel, especially in Scotland, like so 
many of their fellow countrymen in the past? 
   …we are perfectly certain that if it were attempted on any scale it would give rise on 
the part of the Scottish people to feelings of profound resentment. As it is, the great 
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increase which has already occurred in the population of Irish descent has produced an 
acute uneasiness which has only failed to lead to a resolute call for restrictive measures 
because it is believed that the influx has fallen to small proportions in the past few 
years. Any sign of a recrudescence of the flow … would provide great bitterness and 
lead to an irresistible demand for legislative action. It is not in the interests of anyone 
either here or in Ireland that such a situation should arise. Yet arise it probably will, 
unless the possibilities of the position are appreciat d and timely provision made. 261
   
  The alarm at the possibilities of an influx of Irish prompted the Glasgow Herald, if in more 
restrained manner than that of others, once again to raise the possibility of immigration 
restriction without actually advocating it outright. As has been pointed out above, on March 
6th the Cabinet met to discuss the issue of Irish immigration and decided that no legislative 
action would be taken, On March 8th the Glasgow Herald initiated an investigation that 
resulted in a series of five articles published betwe n 20th and 25th March. This was a 
considerable feat of research within the timescale se ing that it took whole Government 
departments months to collate similar material and they had been involved in the exercise for 
nearly five years. It is perfectly within the bounds of possibility that the Herald man, and it 
appears from the articles that only one journalist was involved in the investigation, could 
have amassed the information he did within the time but it is remarkable that he acquired 
much of it in the same format as the Government. As ha  been stated by Gallagher these 
articles, ‘may have had a salutary effect on middle ground opinion, made uneasy by recent 
demographic changes but prepared to take its lead from the premier reading outlet of the 
middle class in Scotland. So the Glasgow Herald may have done a singular service for 
community relations at the end of the 1920s.’262 It may be the case that the Glasgow Herald 
was at least assisted in that contribution.   
    In reading these articles it is difficult not t be struck by the similarity in tone and the use 
of statistics to that of the debate conducted inside the Government. The chronology itself is 
instructive. On the first page of the Scottish Board of Health Memorandum produced in 
response to the Church’s open letter points out that the number of English born in Scotland 
exceeded the Irish in 1921 and that the English born had been rising steadily as a percentage 
of the population while the Irish had been declining.263 The same statistics appear in the first 
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of the Glasgow Herald articles.264 It is a figure that seems to have made an impression. To 
extract the same set of figures in exactly the same manner raises the question that the research 
may have been directed. In the first article the H rald correspondent states: ‘After an 
extensive, painstaking and impartial examination…I am satisfied  that the current Irish 
immigration is not large, that compared with the str am of the past it is the veriest trickle and 
that it is barely negligible in bearing on the development of the Irish community in Scotland. 
That development proceeds almost entirely from the multiplication of the Scoto-Irish – 
natives of this country but of Irish extraction.’ 265 This is something of a paraphrase of the 
first paragraph of the Joynson-Hicks paper (see above). It is of course unlikely that the 
Herald would have seen a secret cabinet document but the sentiments expressed would have 
been common enough in Whitehall and Scottish Office c rcles and, as has been demonstrated, 
current as long ago as 1926. 
    The second Article on 21st March on ‘Insurance and the Dole’ points out that on March 8th 
there was ‘not a single native of Ireland on the Glasgow roll of outdoor relief.’266 Again, 
these are exactly the sort of figures and sources us d by the Government. For example the 
Ministry of Labour provided the following statistic for the Home Secretary’s report:  
‘Number of persons whose last place of employment was in Ireland attending at the local 
office for the first time  in October and November 1928 National Insurance book 50 Irish 
Free State Book 12 in Glasgow Greenock and Lanarkshire’. This was the same point made by 
the Ministry of Labour at the Inter-Departmental conference two years before. 
    What is interesting is where the Scottish Office had figures that were not included in the 
article, for example on the steamship returns; the Herald displays a guarded scepticism: 
‘About two years ago it looked as if the Government had the intention of collecting the 
relevant data. It was then unofficially reported that a Government Department had applied for 
returns …Similarly significant was it at a meeting of his constituents in…January 1927 Major 
Elliot made the statement after pointing out  “that accurate statistics were practically non-
existent”267 that he was attempting to collect district figures on the subject’. In fact the 
Government had steamship returns as far back as 1925 but on a basis of confidentiality (see 
above). Those figures did not show any great numbers of Irish immigrating to Scotland and it 
only took a quiet word with the companies to confirm t. 
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    In essence the argument was fully formed by 1929. The Glasgow Herald articles are 
intriguing in that, whether it is Roman Catholic marri ges or birth rate it follows the path 
already trodden by the Government. This is not unreasonable since the arguments had been 
given an extensive airing over the past decade. The Glasgow Herald, in the space of a twelve 
day investigation appears to have been remarkably well informed and relaxed for a paper that 
only two weeks before was ringing the alarm bells about a possible fresh influx of Irish 
immigrants.  
                                                    
VII Conclusion 
    The history of the Government’s handling of theissue of Irish immigration throws up some 
interesting anomalies. Why, for example, should it have taken the best part of a decade to 
refute the Church’s case when it probably could have done so as early as 1926 by releasing 
the information it already had? Indeed, why did it take an investigation by the Glasgow 
Herald to do so? It is obvious from a reading of the files that there was little prospect of 
convincing the Dominions Office about the necessity of introducing restrictions on Irish 
immigration or indeed that the Irish were aliens in the first place. Equally, despite Elliot’s 
proposed solution, was there any realistic likelihood f there being any independent Scottish 
initiative that could be taken? Both Gilmour and Elliot were highly experienced politicians 
who would go on to hold high office in the 1930s and yet they both allowed this issue to run 
longer than necessary creating political problems for the Unionists. There was a natural 
disinclination to be seen to be publicly disagreeing with the Church of Scotland, but it would 
appear that as far as the leading Scottish politicians were concerned the evidence suggests 
that they were more in sympathy with the case made by the Church than has previously been 
acknowledged. The advice both Elliot and Gilmour received was sceptical as to the 
seriousness of the problem and yet Elliot, who had initiated the inquiry, was attempting to 
persuade an inter-departmental conference of 1927 to impose restrictions on Irish 
immigration. Notwithstanding his failure there he made a direct appeal to his party to make 
Irish immigration an election issue in 1929. It has been suggested, by Bruce and others,268 
that the Church campaign failed on the Imperial issue of the status of Free State citizens as 
British subjects and on the statistical inadequacies of its case. It was a fact that large scale 
Irish immigration was a thing of the past by the 1920s. Elliot and Gilmour were well aware of 
these facts as they had been supplied with the information in considerable detail by their own 
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and other Government officials. However, the evidence presented here suggests that both 
men were prepared to go to some lengths behind the scenes to convince the wider British 
Government of the need to impose restrictions on Irish immigration even at the risk of 
alienating opinion in the Dominions, the Irish Free State and very probably Irish American 
opinion as well. Not only that, they were determined to pursue the case despite the 
misgivings of senior civil servants in the Scottish Office who were understandably anxious 
about the possibility of throwing ‘fuel on the flame of racial strife.’269  
It would appear then the Church, despite obvious flaws in its argument, did persuade 
influential opinion in the Unionist party of its case. It was the failure of their allies in 
Government to persuade their colleagues that the issue was one which should take 
precedence over wider Imperial concerns that proved to be the stumbling block. However, it 
was only after the Cabinet endorsed the Joynson-Hicks paper in 1929 that the issue was 
finally off the agenda for Scottish Unionists. It was also only after that endorsement that a 
Unionist paper, the Glasgow Herald, produced a detailed refutation of the Church case using 
much of the material built up over the years by the Scottish Office. If the matter had been for 
the Scottish Unionist party alone to decide, there very probably would have been restrictions 
on Irish immigration into Scotland. In practical terms this would have made little difference 
as there was precious little immigration in the 1920s but the symbolic effect on the Irish 
diaspora in Scotland may well have been significant. It would at the very least have 
strengthened a sense of exclusion from Scottish society and probably raised sectarian tensions 
to a level they did not achieve in the 1920s. Perhaps Sir John Gilmour was more of an 
Orangeman than he has been portrayed and Walter Elliot less of a progressive. In any case it 
would now be the turn of the Labour Party to wrestle with this issue. 
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Chapter Five 
Aliens or Subjects 
 
Mr Boothby: (Unionist Aberdeen E) Asked the Secretary of State for Scotland 
whether the inquiries he had been making into the qu stion of Irish immigration were 
concluded and whether he proposed to take any action on the Matter 
The Secretary of State for Scotland: This question remains under consideration, and 
I am not in a position to make any further statement. Further information will be 
furnished when the report on the recent census will be published.  
Mr Boothby: Is it not a fact that this question has been under th  consideration of 
the Right Honourable Gentleman for nearly two years; and is there any chance of 
improved conditions in the west of Scotland until the volume of Irish immigration is 
controlled? 
Mr Barr (Socialist Motherwell): (amid cries of answer direct d at the Secretary of 
State). Is it not the case that it was under the consideration of the late Government for 
five years? 
Secretary of State: I am glad that my Hon Friend has put that supplementary 
question. It gives me the opportunity of replying that the present Government have not 
had this question under consideration for half the ime of the previous Government. 
(Laughter) 
The Scotsman May 20th 1931 p14 
 
I Introduction 
   It was something of a standing joke in the House of Commons that William Adamson’s270, 
(Secretary of State for Scotland in both Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Governments), stock 
answer to any question was that he would give the matter ‘due consideration’.271 Given the 
history of the issue, discussed in the previous chapter, and the political overtones concerning 
the supposed Irish immigrant support for Labour, it might be wondered that a Labour 
Government would have given any consideration at all to the question of Irish immigration in 
Scotland. The Glasgow Herald articles and the General Election result of 1929 would, on the 
surface, seemed to have buried any chance the Church of Scotland might have had of 
                                                 
270 William Adamson1(1863-1936), Miner and Trade Unionist, MP for West Fife 1910-1935. 
271 Thomas Johnston (1881-1965), Editor of F rward, Secretary of State for Scotland 1941-1945, Memories 
(Collins, London, 1952) p101. 
 118
receiving a sympathetic hearing, much less persuading the Government to legislative action. 
It will, however, be argued here that during the 1930s the Kirk, (largely unbeknown to itself), 
came closer to achieving its aims than at any time in the 1920s. This was not solely due to the 
power of the Church’s advocacy but to a combination of outside circumstances, some 
surprising Governmental allies, and, ironically enough, the election of Eamonn de Valera. It 
is a complicated story involving economics, imperial policy, protectionism, and even 
differing concepts of ‘British’ identity. While many historians have covered the often fraught 
state of Anglo-Irish relations in the 1930s, little emphasis has been paid to the substantial role 
of the Scottish Office, and Scottish politics in general.272 This is understandable as both Irish 
and English historians have tended to consider Anglo-Irish relations as precisely that, Anglo-
Irish relations. It will be maintained here that this is to miss an important dimension to the 
debate and that the issue of Irish immigration in Scotland, at the very point when the 
Church’s campaign appeared to be waning, had considerable influence not only on internal 
Scottish politics but on the wider issue of the status of self-governing Dominions and the 
development of the Commonwealth. Would, for example, th  issue of Irish immigration have 
featured quite so prominently, as will be seen, in Cabinet deliberations without the 
persistence of the Church? How did the differing ideas of ‘alien’ and ‘British subject’ 
develop in view of the changing constitutional relationships within the Commonwealth? Most 
importantly, how and why did this issue persist much longer, and arguably to more effect, 
than scholars have previously believed? Much of the archival material examined in this 
chapter has not been considered in the secondary sou ces that cover the period, and that 
which has been considered has not made the Scottish connection.  The aim of this chapter 
will be to show that not only is there a previously untold narrative, but that narrative 
challenges our understanding of some of the events of the early 1930s. 
  Certainly the issue of Irish immigration had featured in the 1929 General Election, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, but not to the ext nt that the Unionists had feared (see the 
Elliot memorandum) or perhaps as much as the Church had hoped.  Sir John Gilmour, in an 
answer to a question on the hustings at Pollockshaw, stated that the British Government was 
in negotiation with the Irish Free State for the right to repatriate Irish migrants who became a 
charge on the poor rates. This was only half true as the Irish Free State Government, as will 
become apparent, was in the business of studiously ignoring the British on the issue. He 
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further stated that if ‘the matter was not settled amicably the British Parliament would 
produce an act that would enable them to do that.’273 This was wholly untrue as Gilmour well 
knew, having attended the Cabinet discussion on the issue in March 1929. It was perhaps as 
well for him that the Unionists lost the election or he may have found himself in a somewhat 
difficult position. Nonetheless, it was not a central issue on which the Unionist fortunes in 
Scotland depended. In fact as far as Irish immigration was concerned not only were they off 
the hook, they were now free to use it as means with hich to bait their successors. The 
exchange quoted at the beginning of this chapter was far from the first or last that Boothby 
had with Adamson. Boothby was demanding to know the results of negotiations with the 
Irish Free State as early as July 23rd 1929 at the first Scottish questions after polling day.274 
(Boothby was, of course, mischief making although for one who was ostensibly no great 
lover of organised religion in any form he was remarkably persistent on the subject).275 The 
Church of Scotland had no intention of letting the matter rest even if the natural allies of the 
Church and Nation Committee had lost office. Even during the election, Dr John White’s 
Moderatorial address to the General Assembly on the 27th May (ten days after Gilmour’s ill-
advised commitment) had stressed the dangers of Irish immigration and urged the 
Government to take action on the restriction of immgration.276 Nevertheless, with the Church 
preoccupied with its reunification celebrations in 1929, the incoming Government could look 
forward to a brief respite, from this issue at least, in its many forthcoming travails. 
  At this point in the introduction to this chapter it is worthwhile to briefly examine some the 
key personalities in the 1929 Labour Government who were involved in the prolonged 
discussions on Irish immigration. It was a question hat would also bedevil the later National 
Government but many of the individuals concerned then ad the experience of the 1920s 
behind them. In 1929, whilst the Scottish Office had long, and weary, experience of the 
Church’s persistence the politicians were relatively new, in administrative and political terms, 
to the issue. Firstly, the incoming Secretary of State for Scotland was William Adamson 
(1863-1936), a Fife miner and Baptist. Although affectionately regarded by all who worked 
with him, he was not one for seeking unnecessary controversy. According to Pottinger he 
‘intended to enjoy being Secretary of State. He told his Private Secretary that, compared with 
the Conservatives, the Labour Party were still in the boys’ class when it came to exercising 
Ministerial power. But, he went on, that did not mean that the educative process which they 
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were now starting should be disagreeable.’277 Tom Johnston recalled the story of Adamson’s 
appointment by Ramsay MacDonald in which it was proposed that Adamson go to the Lords 
while Johnston handled Scottish Office business in the Commons: ‘he could be titular 
Secretary of State for Scotland, and sit in the Cabinet, and “do the ceremonial stuff” but that 
I, if I would take the under-secretaryship, could take charge of Scottish business in the House 
of Commons.’ 278 Both Adamson and Johnston were quite amenable to this arrangement 
which was only prevented at the last minute when MacDonald discovered during the 
conversation that Adamson had a son who would inherit the title. Nevertheless Adamson was 
enjoined by MacDonald to give Johnston ‘plenty of rpe’ provided he didn’t ‘hang himself 
with it.’279 
    The above anecdote, while amusing in its own right, is revealing about the personalities of 
the three individuals who had most to do with the handling of the Irish immigration issue 
during the period of the second Labour Government. If Adamson was the somewhat 
avuncular figure who dealt diplomatically with deputations and signed the papers, the 
intellectual power behind the Scottish Office throne was Johnston. Ramsay MacDonald took, 
as will be shown, a particular interest in Irish immigration throughout his period as Prime 
Minister and frequently had the matter brought before Cabinet. Every Secretary of State for 
Scotland who served MacDonald was aware of the Prime Minister’s ‘special interest in the 
matter.’ Why this should have been so is unclear but as David Marquand has it: 
 
MacDonald had an odd and, to a modern eye, a slightly unattractive steak of social 
hardness in his makeup…afraid that well-meant but ill-considered acts of philanthropy 
might demoralize those they were supposed to help. Emotionally, if not intellectually, 
the notion that men should be paid to be idle went against the grain…he was apt to pay 
more attention than he should have done to the wild stories that circulated in 
respectable circles about work shy idlers drawing ‘doles’ to which they were not 
entitled.280  
 
As a large part of the Church case made exactly that sort of accusation about the immigrant 
Irish he may well have been naturally predisposed to agree with it.  Curiously enough, in 
Marquand’s compendious biography of MacDonald, the issue of Irish immigration does not 
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feature, which is remarkable given the apparent importance that MacDonald attached to the 
issue. 
 
II Between the Kirk and a Free State 
 For the first few months, despite the now routine denunciations of the iniquity of Irish 
immigration from the re-united Church of Scotland, Jeremiads on the eclipse of Scotland by 
Andrew Dewar Gibb and a series of parliamentary questions on the issue put down, generally 
in the names of Boothby and the Duchess of Atholl, the Irish question did not loom over 
large. Understandably, as the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the onset of the economic 
catastrophe that was the Great Depression were of much greater moment. Yet the economic 
situation would in itself give a fresh impetus to the whole question of immigration on a 
Dominion wide scale. 
  On the 9th May 1930 Adamson met a deputation from the Church of Scotland and the Free 
Church on the subject of Irish immigration.  Prior t  that Adamson was given a briefing note 
on Irish Immigration. This recounted the whole saga of Church deputations to the Scottish 
Office of 24th Sept 1926 to Sir John Lamb, on the 5th November 1926 to Sir John Gilmour, 
and on the 19th July 1928 to Sir William Joynson-Hicks and Sir John Gilmour as well as the 
occasions the issue had been before Cabinet. The final points of the memo make for 
interesting reading. It was pointed out that the matter had been before the Cabinet several 
times: 
 
 the last occasion being on the 6th March 1929, (underlined in pencil), when the 
Secretary of State for  Dominion Affairs was asked to look into the position of possible 
deportation of citizens of the Irish Free State who have become a charge upon public 
funds. The present position is that the Government are awaiting the outcome of the 
Sub-Committee appointed by the Irish Free State about October 1928 to consider the 
question of reciprocal compulsory repatriation of persons who become chargeable to 
the poor rates.’281  
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As the Dominion Office had displayed a marked lack of enthusiasm to get involved in the 
issue throughout the 1920s (see Chapter Four) it can be reasonably surmised that even had 
the Unionists been returned the position would have been unchanged, especially as this was a 
Home Office responsibility. As will be seen this was exactly the stance that was taken in later 
discussions. What is significant is the mention of a sub committee appointed by the Irish Free 
State in October 1928 to consider the question of recip ocal compulsory repatriation of 
paupers. If such a committee was ever appointed, an co sidering the time it took for the 
Irish Free State to reply to the Dominions Office it seems unlikely, it too did not consider it a 
priority. What is interesting is the Dominions Office’s reluctance for this to become public 
knowledge: ‘In reply to a Parliamentary question by Mr Boothby M.P., on 19th November 
1929, the Secretary of State for Scotland stated that negotiations with the Irish Free State 
were continuing, but no mention was made of the Irish Free State Sub-Committee as the 
Dominions Office did not consider this desirable.’282 (Type underlined in memo). While the 
Government was willing to admit that negotiations were in progress, although negotiations 
were an elastic definition of the term, it was unwilling to publicly describe their nature, or 
that the Free State Government was actively considering the matter.  
     This reticence is understandable given the Dominions Office’s well-founded scepticism 
about receiving a favourable reply from the Cosgrave Government.  Enda Delaney has argued 
that ‘The attitude of the Cumann na nGaedheal administration to continued emigration 
appears indifferent. Rather than attempting to counter directly the criticisms of the party’s 
record on emigration the subject was not mentioned i  the party’s election literature for the 
1927 or 1932 General Elections. Clearly the acknowledgement of the ‘problem’ of 
emigration was not perceived as a practical vote winner, yet outlining policies that would 
‘stem the flow’, as it were, was a ploy used fairly effectively by the Fianna Fail party to 
increase its support.’283 It was, therefore, certainly not in the political interest of the Free 
State Government to have it publicly acknowledged that it was considering allowing the 
forced repatriation of Irish emigrants from Britain when it was doing its level best to keep 
emigration off the agenda. It would also have substantially weakened their arguments as to 
the benefits of the Commonwealth connection in the face of a Republican challenge by 
Fianna Fail. This was more especially so as the Cosgrave administration was promoting its 
diplomatic success at the Imperial conferences of 1926 and 1930 in achieving equal status for 
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the Dominions.284 Given this state of affairs the only wonder is that there were individuals 
within the British Government who seriously thought t at the Irish could be persuaded to, in 
effect, re-enact a provision of the 19th century Poor Laws at the behest of the Church of 
Scotland. 
   There is a gap in the archival evidence here, as Delaney points out, ‘no (Irish) government 
file relating to emigration is extant for the period from 1921 to 1939, although it must be said 
that it is quite likely that Cumann na nGaedheal ministers did not leave any potentially 
embarrassing documentation for their political opponents to peruse when Fianna Fail entered 
office in 1932.’285 This begs one of the most fascinating questions of the period. What was 
the Irish Free State Government’s, both Cumann na nG edheal and Fianna Fail, attitude to 
the whole anti-Irish campaign? As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter the Irish press 
responded to the Church of Scotland with a mixture of outrage and mockery but there seems 
little evidence that the anti-Irish campaign impinged much on Irish politicians. It is one of the 
anomalies of Irish history that a nation that made much of its Diaspora, or at least that part 
that was far away, did not respond to a direct and r cial attack on one of the largest segments 
of that Diaspora on its own doorstep. The explanatio  probably lies in the nature of the early 
Irish State and its equivocal relationship to the issue of emigration in general. Emigration was 
held to be an evil as a result of the British connection. In nationalist orthodoxy there should 
be no reason for anyone to leave a self-governing Ireland or as de Valera put it, ‘we believe 
that there can be maintained on the soil of this country, in comfort, and with a proper policy, 
a population two or three times the present population.’286 Emigration was the uncomfortable 
fact of Ireland for arguably at least the first fify years of its existence. Given this premise the 
apparent silence from Dublin becomes more understandable. For the Cosgrave Government 
there was absolutely no benefit in engaging with the Church’s debate, for one thing it would 
have drawn even more attention to the emigration issue, secondly it could have been seen to 
be taking part in a ‘sectarian’ debate in another country which would have done little to help 
the cause of their fellow countrymen in Scotland anmay well have exacerbated tensions in 
the North of Ireland. Finally, why dignify the Kirk’s case with a response which would have 
lent it legitimacy? It may well be the case that while the Irish Government was undoubtedly 
aware of the campaign they were simply not interestd, or did not take it seriously enough, to 
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pay it any marked attention. It is certainly true that there is but little mention of Scotland in 
the Documents on Irish Foreign Policy.287 
  Such concerns were, however, not those of the Church of Scotland. It had its own solutions 
to the problem as it outlined in the meeting with Adamson. The Church delegation, 
introduced by the Reverend Mr Cockburn, began by referring to the ‘previous negotiations 
between the Churches and the Government’s predecessors in regard to the possibility of 
regulating the immigration of Irish into Scotland. No tangible results have so far been 
forthcoming from these negotiations and the deputation’s object was to impress on the 
present Government that the position was becoming more serious and to urge them to take 
action.’288  The Kirk’s use of the term ‘negotiation’ is instructive here. The previous 
deputations, while urging Government action on the issue, had largely been a litany of 
complaints about the iniquities of the Irish immigrant population in Scotland. While this 
deputation was to continue in much the same vein, Cockburn’s use of ‘negotiation’ implied 
that they were there to seek some definite concession on the matter. It is also notable that the 
language of the deputation was rather more forceful than previously on perceived 
Government inaction and fell just short of accusations of outright incompetence on the 
collection of statistical information. The deputation, in the person of the Reverend Reid 
Christie, also made pointed reference to the effects of Irish immigration on one of the 
Government’s most sensitive areas, unemployment.  The implication being that the Irish 
created much of the unemployment in Scotland, despit  the Government’s best efforts to 
‘relieve unemployment in Scotland by emigrating surpl s labour to the colonies.’289 (Mr Reid 
Christie was obviously unconscious of the irony of this statement). This was followed up by a 
reference to the inassimilable nature of the Irish population and a dark hint that ‘as matters 
are now proceeding an Ulster question is being created in Scottish industrial areas’.290 The 
deputation concluded with its regular demands that measures be taken to restrict Irish 
immigration, that those who became a public charge be repatriated and that the franchise be 
restricted to those with a minimum residency qualification. They did, however, make one 
further request that was to have a significant bearing on the later debate. They suggested that 
a question on the religious denomination of respondents be added to the upcoming Census. 
This suggestion was made, somewhat disingenuously, ‘not in sectional interests but in the 
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interests of all Churches and of the State.’291 While this question was not eventually asked, a 
variant was included in an attempt to gain some clarity as to the nature of the Irish 
population.   In the event Adamson, like his predecssor, was unable to give the deputation 
any assurance on Government action but promised to rep rt the matter to the Cabinet, very 
possibly in the terms of the advice he once proffered to Johnston on dealing with difficult 
deputations; ‘If ye canna gie a man whit he wants, ye can aye gie him a kind word. It costs 
damn a’!’292 Unfortunately for Adamson this normally sage advice would prove insufficient 
on this occasion. He did send the minute of the meeting and a covering letter to MacDonald 
on the 5th June which initiated yet another Cabinet discussion and certainly the Kirk was not 
going to be satisfied with a kind word. 
 
III ‘…and statistics’ 
   In early July 1930 there was a flurry of activity, not solely confined to the Scottish Office, 
to update the statistics on Irish immigration. It would appear that the Church’s criticism had 
stung the Government into action. The issue had come before the Cabinet, answers to 
Parliamentary questions were reviewed and urgent requests were sent out by Francis Stewart, 
Adamson’s private secretary, to the various Scottish Office departments, the Board of Trade 
and the Ministry of Labour for updated figures that might shed some light on the situation. 




  As you are aware the question of Irish Immigration into Scotland has been before the 
Cabinet recently, and the Secretary of State now desires to have all the relevant 
statistics brought up to date as soon as possible with a view to their early submission to 
the Cabinet. 
  I enclose copies of the sheets which require revision by the Department of Health. As 
regards the entry “The Irish Free State was constituted in 1920 (corrected in margin in 
red 1922) the Secretary of State would like to have  note inserted explaining the 
precise consequence of this. 
  The Secretary of State also desires to have any information bearing on immigration 
into Scotland from the Irish Free State and from Northern Ireland whether direct or 
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indirect. We are in communication with the Ministry of Labour and the Board of Trade 
on this, but if the Department have any information bearing on the subject no doubt you 
will send it on with the revised figures.293 
 
Reply to Stewart from Department of Health for Scotland 10th July 1930 
…Looking particularly to the terms of the last paragraph of your letter, a discussion 
with the Registrar General was arranged as to the possibility of obtaining through the 
1931 Census, some more specific figures regarding Ir sh immigration. As a result of 
that interview Dr Dunlop agrees that it would be possible to have a column to bring out 
for those born outside Scotland, who are resident, a d not visitors, the length of their 
residence in Scotland. The Census Office could takeout, in the case of natives of 
Ireland, the year they came to Scotland, and from that could be seen the general trend 
of immigration from Ireland to Scotland. 294 
 
  Stewart, and other Scottish Officials were in fact sending several urgent letters between the 
4th and 5th of July to almost any Department that could provide relevant statistics, from ferry 
passenger numbers, to the number of unemployment books issued to Irishmen in Clydebank 
(ten to twelve in the preceding three months), to ‘Irish school attendance, pauperism, lunacy 
and crime.’295   The particular importance of the exchange above lies in the discussion with 
the Registrar General. Less than two months after th  Church deputation has requested a 
denominational question to be included in the Census, the Registrar General had agreed to 
include a specific question regarding those born outside Scotland with a view to establishing 
specifically the volume of Irish immigration to Scotland. Although this was not precisely 
what it had requested, in its way it was a significant achievement for the Kirk, although one 
in which they were largely to remain in ignorance for the time being. They had in fact 
persuaded the Government to collect an entirely news t of statistics through the medium of 
the Scottish Census with the sole purpose of measuring Irish immigration. This was more 
concrete action than they had achieved in nearly a decade’s worth of campaigning and, 
incidentally, goes some way to at least to questioning the point made by Tom Gallagher that 
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the Glasgow Herald series had had a conclusive influence on the issue.296 In the meantime, 
while an entirely new battery of statistics was being prepared for a Cabinet memorandum to 
be submitted by Adamson, the Church, unaware that i had apparently caused such activity in 
Government, followed up its presentation, in the aft rmath of the 1930 General Assembly, 
with a letter on July 11th .The underlining and capitals are reproduced as in the original:  
 
Dear Sir 
Church and Nation Committee 
I am now in a position to send you the following deliverance of last General Assembly 
on IRISH IMMIGRATION:- 
 “The General Assembly authorise the Committee to approach the Government to 
secure complete statistics of immigration into and emigration from Scotland, including 
in particular the figures relating to the Irish Free State, and to invite a declaration of 
policy for regulating immigration.” 
I trust that this serious matter will have the early ttention of the Government. 
I have the honour to be, 
Right Hon Sir 
Your obedient servant 
J Hutchinson Cockburn 
Convenor 
P.S. 
To this letter I attach the Report of my Committee for your information, and I beg to 
call your attention to it especially to passages on p373 marked by blue lines.297 
   
   The section of the report underlined in blue sets out a list of seven parliamentary questions, 
asked in the previous session, on the question of Irish immigration that had obviously not 
been answered to the Committee’s satisfaction. (Given the Committee’s remit to obtain 
statistics it is apparent that these questions were ask d to order by the Committee’s friends in 
the Commons, all of whom were Unionists). The question  ranged from the number of Irish 
Free State citizens in receipt of unemployment benefit or poor relief, the numbers of children 
of Irish parents in receipt of free school meals to the numbers of Irish citizens who were 
                                                 
296 T. Gallagher, Glasgow the Uneasy Peace,  p167. 
297 NRS, HH1/561,  Letter From J. Hutchinson Cockburn to William Adamson, July 11th 1930.  
 128
inmates of prisons, Borstals or criminal lunatic asylums.298 The Committee was scathing in 
what it viewed as the Government’s negligence in not having answers, or at least answers 
acceptable to themselves, to these questions. 
 
...the strong conviction of the Committee is that the Government ought to devise means 
of making this information available. It is surely a serious state of matters when 
confession has to be made that the Government has no means of knowing, far less 
checking, an undue influx from the Irish Free State of persons likely to become a 
burden on Scottish measures of relief. 299 
 
As far as the Committee was concerned the Government had no means of knowing the 
answers to their questions and as a matter of urgency ought to find one. In one case the 
Committee was able to answer a question, by themselve , to their own satisfaction. In the 
matter of Irish criminals in Scotland their analysis of the annual prison report came to the 
following conclusion: 
 
the Secretary of State for Scotland is careful to say that the figures giving the number of 
convictions of Irish persons include those from all Ireland, north as well as south. In 
another column of the Report, however, we have an analysis of the religions of those 





   This is to say, no less than 37.5% of the prison p pulation of Scotland consists of 
Roman Catholics. Now the total Roman Catholic population of Scotland is only 13.26 
of the whole … The Roman Catholics have therefore nearly three times their due 
proportion of criminals in Scotland, and it is acknowledged that the majority of these 
are of Irish extraction, if not actually natives of the Free State, it will be seen that there 
is good cause for alarm concerning the ype of people who are coming to us from the 
Roman Catholic parts of Ireland.300 
                                                 





   It is notable that at this point the Kirk was making a case for Roman Catholic criminality. 
This analysis as far as the Committee report was concerned was conclusive proof that, in 
view of the fact the United States had introduced a quota system on immigration, ‘Scotland is 
being used as a dumping ground for the kind of Irish emigrant who would not be accepted by 
the United States.’301 Who precisely was doing the dumping in the Kirk’s view is unclear but 
the implication was undoubtedly that Scotland was a magnet for the Irish criminal classes 
who would otherwise be furthering their careers in the United States but for that country’s 
wise restrictions on their entry. The Government was abetting this situation by their inability 
to monitor the situation and gather adequate statistics. However, once again civil service 
investigation proved that statistically the case for large scale Irish immigration into Scotland 
simply did not exist. Adamson produced a memo on Irish immigration on 21st July 1930 
which was discussed by the Cabinet. The Scottish Office memo, produced by Norman 
Duke,302 on that discussion concluded, as so many before it had done: 
 
(1) That at the present time there exists no pronounced movement of actual migration from 
the Irish Free State (nor indeed even from Northern Ireland). 
(2) That any tendency on the part of the Irish population n Scotland towards crime, 
towards pauperism or towards lunacy is not at present v ry evident. It is now less 
marked than previously. 
(3) That there is an annual incoming and outgoing of Irish agricultural workers, but 
somewhat slender grounds for the view that this is harmful to Scottish interests. 
(4) That the Roman Catholic schools in Scotland are increasing the numbers of their pupils, 
whereas the pupils at Protestant schools are decreasing. 
    On the evidence it would appear that, if there is at present an “Irish problem” in 
Scotland, that problem arises not out of any existing substantial volume of immigration 
but from the rapid multiplication of an old established Irish colony.303 
 
Where the Duke memo differs from the previous cabinet discussions is that in the final 
paragraph there is the caveat, ‘at the same time the risk of (future) immigration from Ireland 
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(on account of unemployment benefit, etc., in Scotland) occurring at any time seems to make 
it desirable that a careful watch should be kept for his.’304  
  In any event, all discussion on the issue at Cabinet level was postponed until after the 
Imperial Conference of 1930. That conference was notable for setting out the free and equal 
status of the Dominions later embodied in the Statute of Westminster in 1931. While this was 
to have considerable importance in the later discussion  on the question of Irish immigration 
the actual decisions taken did not materially affect the issue in the short term. As far as 
British immigration policy was concerned the most no able outcome of all this activity was 
the setting up, immediately prior to the conference, of a subcommittee of the Economic 
Advisory Council to consider the whole question of Empire migration. During the months of 
September and October 1930 the Scottish Office was engaged in producing a detailed 
submission on the question of Irish immigration forthe Empire Migration Committee. The 
matter was one that exercised both Johnston and Adamson and was the subject of several 
conversations between them. It is apparent from the files that Johnston in particular was 
much disturbed by Irish labour in Scotland in general and by Irish seasonal agricultural 
labour in particular. The following letter to Adamson, which was probably not intended for 
inclusion in the official Scottish Office files, gives an insight into the thinking of the time. 
Johnston’s language is more unguarded than that generally reported in Government minutes 
and for this reason deserves an extensive quotation. The underlining and emphasis are 
reproduced as in the original: 
 
  You wanted me to go over your memo on Irish immigration. I have done so. I think 
there are two or three places it could be strengtheed. 
Page 2 Para. 2 I am not sure you should not refer to the Irish classes as those of Irish 
descent and not only to those whose immediate parents were born in Ireland. 
Thus the Irish colonies are as much Irish and distinctively Irish when they are 
grandchildren as when they are children of Irish born people. I do not think the Free 
State Figures are complete. All NW Donegal immigration goes through North of 
Ireland ports. I have been over there and I am sure the Belfast and Portrush figures will 
include the immigrants who come from the North West via Letterkenny. I think that 
you should put in a par saying that the North of I figures likely include a large Free 
State population. 
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This also affects the table on page 4 
But I do most strongly urge you to consider strengthening the part of your memo 
dealing with employment of seasonal potato workers. The thing is a scandal that cries 
to heaven, while our people are unemployed. 
I enclose you – please return when finished with – a letter from the N.F.U. showing that 
one dealer alone employs from 300 – 400 Irish for 9 to 10 months in the year. 
They are only employed because of the low wage rates nd the rotten housing 
conditions, and I would see these agricultural and mi dlemen soothsayers in blazes 
before I would let the thing go on, if a restriction n the issue of unemployment cards 
would stop it. 
Imagine you and I worrying ourselves to death about relief works, and one worthy 
importing 400 Irish. 
And the departmental memo apologising for the outrage by saying our own folk have 
not the physical strength or the experience! 
So long as we have our own folk unemployed, there should be no importations unless 




 The immediate point that comes from the letter, despit  the somewhat convoluted double 
negative, is that Johnston considered the grandchildren of Irish immigrants as much Irish as 
the Irish-born. An Irish colony remained an Irish colony to the second and third generation 
which in effect endorsed the Church’s view that the Irish did not assimilate, if not necessarily 
in the same terms. The Irish ‘classes’ were still those of descent as well as origin and for 
Government purposes should be designated as such. It is also noteworthy that Johnston 
considered the numbers of Irish immigrants, particularly Free State immigrants to be 
underestimated as they were not included in the Northern Irish figures, and finally that the 
employment of seasonal agricultural labourers was a ‘sc ndal that cries to heaven while our 
people are unemployed.’ The cause for Johnston’s ire in this case was a remarkably 
complacent letter he received from the National Farmers Union on the issue in July 1930.306  
While the letter itself was concerned mainly with housing conditions of Irish seasonal 
labourers, (the conclusions of which were to be proved be tragically wrong by the 
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Kirkintilloch fire of 1937), Johnston was particularly annoyed at what appeared to be a clear 
case of the importation of outside cheap labour during a period of massive unemployment. 
What is interesting is that his concept of restricting unemployment cards and ‘no importations 
unless made licence’ bear a remarkable similarity to the ideas put forward by Elliot in March 
1929. (There is no evidence that Johnston ever discussed this issue with Elliot but they were 
close friends and had been so since University so it is not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that they may have). In any case the memo submitted by Adamson, while noting the 
difficulties in enforcing immigration control and that any such measures would be a departure 
from ‘immemorial policy’ did suggest that: 
 
… control might be exercised through legislation prohibiting for a term of years the 
employment of any person arriving in Great Britain fter a specified date who had not 
obtained a permit from the Ministry of Labour. The p rmit would specify a particular 
occupation and a particular employer, and no such permit would be issued if workmen 
capable of performing the work were available locally, or could be made available from 
other Employment Exchanges. The proposal, of course, involves the taking of power to 
remove an immigrant found to be in contravention of the scheme.307 
 
This suggestion was not that far away in spirit from the original Elliot plan which proposed 
using unemployment books as a way of restricting the employment of Irish Free State labour. 
   The amended memorandum that was finally submitted to the Empire Migration Committee 
concluded generally that the problem of Irish immigration was not particularly pronounced 
but Adamson still made the point that, ‘Nevertheless, I consider that the reciprocal 
arrangements for repatriation of paupers … should be restored.’308 It is also interesting to 
note the change in wording of the succeeding paragrph to this statement from the original 
memo to the final draft. In the original version  ‘The existence in Scotland of considerable 
State benefits, such as Health and Unemployment Insura ce, State-aided housing schemes, 
unemployment relief schemes, etc., appears to rende it not unreasonable that provisions 
should be made whereby the right to draw insurance benefits should not emerge until a 
considerable period of employment has elapsed’, whereas the words after etc. in the final 
version were amended to ‘is a matter which will require careful consideration in connection 




with the forgoing questions’.309 While this did represent a slight toning down of the 
terminology, it is clear that there were underlying concerns that state benefits could be a 
motivating factor for immigration, despite the fact there was demonstrably no sizeable 
immigration taking place. Essentially the attraction f the benefits system to indigent Irish 
had been one of the main planks of the Church’s case and on this evidence it was an 
argument to which even Labour ministers were not immune. It was not so much a fear of 
actual Irish immigration but the potential of Irish immigration. If the Irish were not currently 
arriving in numbers in order to benefit from British welfare provision they might do so in the 
future. To a Government struggling with an economic and unemployment crisis this was 
undoubtedly a frightening scenario. The question then arises, had the Church not spent the 
past ten years raising the Irish bogey would this have even been a consideration of the 
Cabinet? If not it would appear that the Kirk had in fact been successful in persuading some 
in the Labour Government of at least the basic premis  of their argument that the Irish were a 
potential economic threat. In an era of economic protectionism it was not difficult to see 
threats even where they did not exist and the Church’s arguments did have a spurious logic to 
them. If Marquand’s assessment of MacDonald’s personality is correct then the idea of 
undeserving Irish benefiting from welfare provision would certainly have caused deep 
concern, however unfounded. It also suggests that anti-Irish antipathy was not the sole 
preserve of the Unionists. 
   As the economic and political crisis worsened for the Government in 1930–31 with 
unemployment rising from 1,731,000 in March to 2,275,000 by the end of 1930, the 
Committee on Empire Migration carried on with its investigations and the Kirk returned to 
the attack. On the 4th March 1931 the Reverend MacLagan was once again writing to 
Adamson demanding yet more statistics and inviting ‘a declaration of policy for regulating 
immigration.’ 310   While another batch of statistics was duly dispatched there was 
considerable unease about providing the Church with any further information. As Adamson’s 
private secretary pointed out: ‘I understand from the Cabinet Office that the Sub Committee 
on Empire migration is likely to report fairly soon, and that the report will not be suitable, 
and it is not intended for, publication. No public reference has been made to the Sub 
Committee, and the Cabinet Office desire that no reference be made to it in any reply to the 
Rev MacLagan.’311  The reluctance of the Government to admit to the existence of the 
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Empire Migration Committee, especially to the Churc of Scotland, is understandable but the 
very fact of its existence was in no small part due to the Kirk’s persistence on the issue. 
Certainly there were wider issues than Irish migraton to Scotland considered by the 
Committee. The deportation, or repatriation, of British born citizens from Canada who 
became a public charge, or were convicted of a criminal offence, was undoubtedly one that 
rankled but given MacDonald’s interest in, and reaction to, the Committee’s report it is fair to 
say that the Irish issue was a major contributory factor in the setting up of the Committee. 
 
IV Empire Migration 
  At this point it is well to briefly examine British and Dominion policy on Empire migration 
between the wars. While there had been various schemes for Empire migration in the 
nineteenth century it had largely been a rather disjointed process. As Marjory Harper and 
Stephen Constantine have observed, ‘The notion that emigration from the UK constituted a 
damaging loss of labour and skills fast faded early in the nineteenth century as population 
numbers increased and Malthusian concerns were expressed. Consequently, in fits and starts, 
the imperial government helped colonial governments secure some of the immigrants they 
wanted from the UK’s apparently over-stocked population while in general maintaining an 
official policy of non-intervention.’312 The Great War made the concept of Empire settlement 
one of more immediate import. ‘Social imperialist policies found a new lease of life during 
the war and by 1917 had all but captured the discour es of state policy-making in key areas. 
The threat from industrial militancy and a disaffected working class, the perception of 
wartime disruption as an opportunity for radical change and the central place of imperial 
solidarity in the ideology of the British war effort all situated social imperial radicalism as an 
especially apposite response to the problems which beset the British state in the crisis mid-
war years.’313 While a first attempt at an Emigration Bill in 1918 which would have set up an 
authority which would have controlled emigration and provided financial assistance to 
approved candidates where appropriate failed, largely b cause it was seen to be too 
bureaucratic and intrusive, the immediate post war er  once again brought the necessity for 
some form of formalised Empire settlement scheme. 
  Originally the post war government had been ‘convinced that the nation would shortly 
experience an intense period of prosperity and a tremendous shortage of labour. To promote 
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emigration would therefore exacerbate the shortage, d lay prosperity and hamper 
reconstruction.’314 The brief post war economic boom seemed to confirm that analysis but by 
1920 the figures began to head ominously in the othr direction. Between April 1920 and 
November 1920 the national unemployment level rose by 6 per cent. The prospect of a large 
number of disaffected unemployed ex-servicemen in the country alarmed the Government 
sufficiently to consider soldier resettlement and Empire migration as a palliative measure to 
relieve the situation. ‘The new British commitment to Empire migration rested on the 
perception that a state aided programme could relieve unemployment in the United Kingdom, 
forestall class conflict and save state expenditure.’ 315 On the other hand the Dominion 
Governments were understandably less keen to be seen as the recipients of the United 
Kingdom’s ‘paupers’. In 1921 Dominion representatives met the Colonial Office to draw up a 
scheme that would later become the Empire Settlement Act of 1922. Essentially The British 
Government would provide money for land settlement a d rural development in the 
Dominions in the form of repayable loans as well moneys for assisted passages and out 
fitting. Despite some Treasury opposition the Empire Settlement Act was passed with little 
opposition. 
  There is no doubt, despite some high sounding rheto ic about maintaining the Anglo-Saxon 
nature of the Empire, that this was a policy of exporting the unemployment problem. It was 
certainly the rise in unemployment that gave the impetus for the act over treasury opposition. 
Equally, despite the Dominion’s involvement in drawing up the scheme there was varying 
degrees of ambivalence, Canada being a case in point.  There had been a history of Canadian 
anti-migrant feeling although in this case there is a certain irony as to the recipients of that 
antagonism given the tone of the anti-Irish campaign: 
 
While employers disliked the alleged militancy of British immigrants and their low 
tolerance of low pay and conditions. Canadian labour unions argued, conversely, that 
they undercut jobs and wages. English migrants especially found it difficult to shake off 
perceptions that they were wayward or arrogant. Occasionally they were compared 
unfavourably with Scots or Irish. Keir Hardie visitng Canada in 1907, noted the 
particular unpopularity of Londoners, for their alleged intractability and ‘inveterate 
habit of grumbling.’ In 1930 Dr Mary Percy, recently arrived from England, lamented 
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the Canadian perception that ‘England is populated by a race who lives on the dole and 
is incapable of work.’316 
 
Whatever the truth, or untruth, of that perception it is certainly the case that Canada’s more 
‘robust’ stance on the repatriation of migrants, as will be seen later, did have an effect on the 
Empire Migration Committee’s arguments on Irish immigration. With the economic crisis of 
1929 heralding an even worse unemployment crisis it is understandable that Empire 
migration was once again seen as a possible palliative, but with the Depression being a 
worldwide phenomenon there was even less of a desire on the part of the Dominions, 
struggling with their own domestic unemployment, to accept migrants from the United 
Kingdom. This in turn made the economic returns from the Empire Settlement Act even 
tighter and raised the spectre that they could be entirely negated by Irish immigration to the 
United Kingdom. This would be an area to which the Committee would give special 
attention.     
  The Committee’s report which was produced in July 1931 contained a considerable section 
devoted to Irish immigration in general and to the problems of repatriation in general. After 
analysing trends in the Irish birth rate and in passenger movements between the Free State 
and the United Kingdom the Committee came to the conclusion that the net influx in to 
Britain would be approximately 12,000 per annum. At the same time they cautioned that, 
‘There are no statistics which throw light on the extent of the influx across the land frontier, 
which includes not only those who after crossing the frontier remain in Northern Ireland, but 
also those who move on thence to Glasgow and other places in Great Britain. But it probably 
amounts to a considerable number.’317 Johnston’s influence on the Adamson Memorandum 
seems to have had its effect. This in itself would not necessarily have rung alarm bells within 
the Government, although the numbers seem to be somwhat at odds with previous statistics, 
but the following paragraph emphasised the point:  
 
The magnitude of this immigration from the Irish Free State into Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland thus materially reduces the benefits to this country of the Emigration 
resulting from the Empire Settlement Act. We realise that any restriction on the free 
entry into this country of British citizens from the Irish Free State or any other 
                                                 
316 M. Harper and K. Constantine, Migration and Empire, p29. 
317 NRS, HH1/564, Economic Advisory Committee Empire Migration Committee part III (VI), Miscellaneous 
Questions Irish Immigration into the United Kingdom.  
 137
Dominion would constitute a striking departure from the historic policy of this country 
and would require careful consideration before it was raised with the Dominion 
Governments. We feel, however, that this question merits serious consideration by His 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. We suggest that, in any case, steps 
should be taken to obtain such powers as may be necssary to secure fuller statistics, 
with a view to determining the full extent to which Irish immigration is neutralising the 
effect of the expenditure incurred by the Overseas Settlement Department.318  
 
Essentially the Committee had indirectly accepted three of the contentions raised by the 
Church deputation to Adamson the year before, that there was a need for more statistics, that 
Irish immigration materially reduced the benefit of resettling emigrants in the Dominions and 
the Colonies (Mr Reid Christie’s point) and that the Government should seriously consider 
immigration restriction even if this meant reversing historic policy. Again it is not difficult to 
see why this report was not for public consumption. It would undoubtedly have been seized 
upon by the Church of Scotland as vindication of its whole campaign, especially in view of 
the subsequent conclusions of the report, which considered the position regarding the 
deportation of citizens to the country of origin who became a public charge. The Report 
highlighted the situation in Canada where ‘persons can be, and are deported if they become a 
public charge … at any time within five years of their arrival in Canada. Even after the expiry 
of that period,  persons are deported on this and other grounds if the Dominion authorities are 
satisfied that they come within any of the classes of ‘prohibited migrant’ at the time of their 
arrival.’319 The Report went on to complain of what it saw as the inequity of the position of 
Canada, and the Dominions generally, where citizens of the United Kingdom could be, and 
were, deported back to the United Kingdom if they bcame a public charge in Canada even 
after five years residence and that the absence of similar powers in Britain was operating with 
considerable detriment to the Mother Country, the position with Ireland being the case in 
point: ‘As … pointed out above a considerable number of immigrants enter the United 
Kingdom every year from the Irish Free State. Many of these subsequently become a charge 
on the public funds, but there is no power to deport or to recover any part of the cost of their 
maintenance.’320 The Committee concluded that the present arrangements were unjustifiable 
and that the Government should consider the barring of ‘prohibited migrants’ that is to say 
                                                 




those with a criminal record, insane or who became  public charge. This latter point it was 
conceded would have been problematical but it was still suggested that the British 
Government raise it at the next Imperial Conference. The concept of what constituted a 
prohibited migrant was an issue to which the British Government would return but at this 
point it is the immediate response to the report tha is significant. 
   By July 21st  MacDonald’s office was writing to Adamson and Thomas, Secretary of State 
for the Dominions, asking them to particularly consider the paragraphs relating to Irish 
immigration as it was an issue that the Prime Minister wanted to bring before the Cabinet. 
That same July the May committee had reported, forecasting a Government deficit of 
£120,000,000 and recommending a cut in unemployment b efit of £67,000,000 (the very 
issue that would split and bring down Labour) and yet MacDonald still took the issue of Irish 
immigration seriously enough that he wanted it discus ed by the Cabinet. In reply Adamson 
sent a detailed letter in which he restated the case that large scale  immigration was not 
particularly evident and outlining the measures taken in the 1931 Census in Scotland to 
measure the numbers of persons from both Northern and Southern Ireland who had settled in 
Scotland. It would appear that Adamson did not share the Prime Minister’s anxiety on the 
subject: ‘Accordingly, while I should be glad, even in existing circumstances, to have power 
to control immigration from the Irish Free State into Scotland, I cannot claim that this is a 
matter of great urgency at the present moment; and I think that further consideration of this 
question might await the Census information.’ Even MacDonald would have to wait upon 
‘due consideration.’ Whilst Adamson’s letter does not, by and large, display any major 
concern about the Irish in Scotland, although he agr ed with the Committee that they may 
become a problem and immigration levels should be watched, he once again returned to the 
mantra of the reciprocal repatriation agreement and complained to MacDonald, that despite 
numerous approaches, nothing had been heard from the Iris  Free State on the issue:  
 
The whole subject was raised in a Dominion’s Office dispatch of February 1928, to the 
Irish Free State Government; but the Irish Free State Government appears to have 
shown no disposition to come to any decision. The matter was again raised at a 
Conference with representatives of the Irish Free State at the Dominions Office in April 
last – the Conference being held to discuss various other points on which agreement 
with the Irish Free State Government appeared desirable. The Irish Free State 
representatives said however, that they had not come prepared to discuss the question 
of the mutual repatriation of paupers, and they were only able to undertake that on their 
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return they would take up the matter with a view to a reply being sent to the Dominions 
Office Dispatch of February 1928. I have heard nothing more on the subject and I think 
that the point should be further pressed. It is of c nsiderable importance so far as 
Scotland is concerned, because statistics show clearly th t in proportion to the native 
population, Irish born persons form an undue proportion of the total numbers of 
paupers, and are responsible for an undue burden upo  Scottish poor rates. If 
arrangements for the repatriation of paupers cannot be obtained, then the case for 
considering some control of immigration will be strengthened.321 
 
   Adamson’s, or more accurately the Scottish Office’s,  description of the ‘negotiations’ with 
the Free State Government do not seem to support the idea that a committee had been set up 
by Dublin to look into the matter. If anything, sign ficant silence for three and a half years 
would imply that the Irish Government had absolutely no intention of replying to the 
Dominions Office dispatch if they could possibly avoid it. Even a face to face request at a 
conference had received no reply a year later.  On the other hand, the Scottish Office 
remained fixated on this concept as though it would somehow solve the whole issue of 
immigration. It is the political mindset that intrigues here. Mass Irish immigration in Scotland 
had been exposed as a myth on more than one occasion, it had been pretty fairly debunked in 
the press, there was no evidence that it was a either much of a vote winner or vote loser and it 
took up a great deal of departmental time and effort. Yet time and again the Scottish Office, 
no matter the political complexion of its masters, would hanker back to a golden pre-1922 era 
when they could repatriate Irish paupers and demand a return to the status quo, literally ante 
bellum. It appears that at a visceral level there was something in the Church’s arguments that 
struck with a chord with both officials and politicans in Scotland. 
  Whatever the Scottish Office’s view of the situation, J. H. Thomas322 the Dominions 
Secretary made it clear that he wished to steer clea of the whole issue as far as possible, even 
to the extent of having his private secretary reply on his behalf to the Prime Minister’s office 
rather than directly to MacDonald as did Adamson and Clynes the Home Secretary. The 
Dominions Office letter was in its way a masterly piece of disassociation. After briefly 
recounting the history of the issue insofar as it affected the current Government and pointing 
out the differing analysis of the situation Thomas made it clear that as far as the Dominions 
Office was concerned this was a matter for the Migrat on Committee, the Scottish Office and 
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the Home Office to sort out between themselves. ‘Mr Thomas has not the material, and, in 
any case, hardly feels that it is for him to attempt to reconcile these diverse opinions. 
Moreover, it would appear to be primarily for the Home Secretary to say to what extent it is 
possible to carry the recommendations of the Committee (namely that more accurate statistics 
should be obtained) into effect.’323 He did, however, point out that while it might have been 
logical to consider the Free State  in the same casas any  other “overseas Dominion” its 
physical proximity and ‘possessing so similar a social structure there must always be a certain 
fluidity of population’324 meant that Britain and the Irish Free state could not be sharply 
delineated. In his opinion the question was not one f migration but of labour supply.325  In 
one very important aspect these observations were rev aling about the ambivalent British 
Government attitude to the Irish Free State. It wasa Dominion, but not really a Dominion. Its 
citizens were, like all Dominion citizens, still British subjects, but it was next door whereas 
‘real’ Dominions were far away. In essence the realiti s of the Treaty had never really sunk in 
to certain sections of the British establishment any more than they had to the more ‘pure-
milk’ republicans in Ireland. Despite the War, the Treaty, the Imperial Conferences, the 
Statute of Westminster, Ireland was still not the quite the same thing as a Canada, an 
Australia or a New Zealand. In fact there had even b en an attempt to exclude Ireland from 
the Statute of Westminster during its passage through the Commons.326   The irony was that 
the Free State Government expended a great deal of money and effort to differentiate itself 
from the British State327 and the main thrust of its diplomatic activity had been concentrated 
on giving meaning to Patrick  McGilligan, the Minister for External Affairs, 1926 concept of 
Dominion status. 
 
Legislative functions which previously belonged to the British Parliament now belong 
to the Parliaments of the other members of the Commnwealth as well. Whatever the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom can do, the Parliament of any other of the 
Associated States can do; whatever the Parliament of any other of the Associated States 
can do, the Parliament of the United Kingdom can do, but no more.328 
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Given the more fundamental difficulties the British Government would have in the future 
with insistence on adherence to the minutiae of the Treaty,  it does appear remarkable that the 
Dominions Office seemed, in this instance, to ignore a ticles one and three of the Treaty 
which specifically set out the constitutional status of Ireland with reference to Canada. As 
Mansergh put it, ‘There was no doubt, however, on which side the future lay. Equality was 
proclaimed to be the root principle of British Commonwealth relations, Equality meant, 
negatively the ending of legal or constitutional inequalities a  between Britain and the 
Dominions and positively the opening of the high road to further advances in dominion 
nationalism.’329 Essentially all member states of the Commonwealth, from 1931 onwards, 
were, theoretically at any rate, equal in status. This may well have been the case but it does 
not seem to be a point that the Dominions Office had altogether grasped in the Irish context. 
Thomas’s most practical suggestion was an offer to chase up the Irish Government with 
regard to the reciprocal arrangements dispatch of 1928 which was considerably further than 
the Home Secretary J. R. Clynes was prepared to go.  
    In his memoirs330 John Robert Clynes (1869-1949)331 devoted a whole chapter to the ‘Irish 
Question’. It begins ‘Had there been no Irish question I should not have been born in a 
Lancashire town in the year 1869. In his early manhood my father, with thousands of others, 
was driven from the West of Ireland by acts of repression which forced him into poverty and 
compelled him to seek a living elsewhere.’332 The son of an Irish immigrant with personal 
history of supporting Ireland, Home Rule and oppositi n to the Irish War, whose 
constituency support in Manchester contained a sizeable Irish contingent, was hardly likely to 
support the restriction of Irish immigration into Britain or indeed the deportation of those 
immigrants. He was also Head of a Department that would have the responsibility, effort and 
expense of enforcing that restriction, a task for which the Home Office had already shown 
little or no enthusiasm. In this respect Clynes’ reponse was to a certain extent predictable. It 
is, however, his range of objections that are of particular interest. It is noticeable that he 
refers to ‘England’ when discussing the levels of Irish immigration: 
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the conclusions which I reached were, that the Irish born population in England  is 
decreasing, that there is now no great volume of Irish immigrants, that the balance of 
immigrants from the Irish Free State to England  (after allowing for those who emigrate 
from English ports) consists mostly of women who are no doubt mainly domestic 
servants, and the damage, such as it is, caused by Irish immigration is already done and 
the problem in England  is rather one of the natural increase of the Irish population who 
settled here some time ago.333 
 
The terminology is very similar to that used by Joynson-Hicks in his report to Cabinet in 
1929334  and that of Adamson in his memos to the Cabinet, except that Clynes specifically 
refers to England. This may have been the usual conf ation of England meaning Britain but 
this whole issue had a Scottish origin and had been r cognised as such by all parties who had 
generally gone out of their way to make that point even if they were a UK department. It 
could also be that he was referring specifically to England but it does look as though he has 
deliberately substituted the term England for Scotland in this instance. He may well have 
been making the point that this was not an English problem and by extension not a British 
one. Clynes then introduced a rather obscure legal argument as to what would constitute a 
British subject that properly belonged to the United Kingdom and then clinched his case by 
highlighting the costs and difficulties of enforcing restriction which would still be 
comparatively easy to evade: 
 
…experience has shown that the effective maintenance of a system of control over the 
passenger traffic between Great Britain and Ireland is a matter of great difficulty. The 
opportunities for evasion are almost unlimited. The cost of establishing and maintaining 
a staff to control the traffic throughout the length of the west coasts of England, Wales 
and Scotland would be very heavy and could not be justified in peacetime; nor could 
there be any guarantee that there would be no slipping ashore at unfrequented places 
from small boats which could easily cross the Irish Sea or even from fishing boats etc. 
in the course of their legitimate traffic. In addition the land frontier between Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Free State could not possibly be adequately closed; so that it 
would be necessary to treat Northern Ireland for this purpose as outside the United 
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Kingdom. Finally, any such control as would be necessary would arouse intense 
resentment among the business and travelling community.335 
 
Apart from the delightful image of Irish ‘boat people’ being smuggled ashore on the wilds of 
the Ayrshire and Galloway coasts on moonless nights by unscrupulous Free State fishermen, 
Clynes’ objections followed the classic civil service line designed to kill off unwelcome 
proposals. They were a legal minefield, they were expensive, they would require more staff, 
they would inconvenience the general public, there was no guarantee they would be effective, 
they were against immemorial traditional policy and i  this case it would require treating 
Northern Ireland as a separate country. All this effort would have to be expended on a 
problem that was not all that much of an issue in the first place. What, for the sake of brevity 
may be described as the ‘Clynes objection’ was a fair summation of the Home Office position 
for the whole of the 1930s, and survived even the appointment of Sir John Gilmour as Home 
Secretary. In fact this letter was to be one of Clynes’ last acts as Home Secretary as that 
August the Labour Government fell, to be replaced by the National Government although still 
lead by MacDonald. It is remarkable, nonetheless, that with a Government collapsing around 
them an issue such as Irish immigration still managed to intrude on the considerations of 
Cabinet Ministers.  
    While these momentous events were taking place, Thomas, probably at the prompting of 
MacDonald, had, on 20th August, written two letters to Patrick McGilligan, the Irish Minister 
for External Affairs. The first was an official dispatch reminding the Free State Government 
of the Amery dispatch of February 1928 and asking for an official reply, the second was a 
personal letter asking McGilligan to use his good offices to expedite a reply and reminding 
him that Cosgrave had written to Amery saying that e would personally take up the issue 
with a view to an early reply.336  Even this personal appeal from Thomas did not manage to 
extract a particularly swift response from McGilligan and it was not until January 1932 that 
Free State responded to the original Amery dispatch of 1928, almost four years to the day 
later. In the meantime two British Governments had come and gone and for the rest of the 
decade it would be a National, in effect a Conservative, Government in power.  
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V Ireland says No 
  McGilligan’s eventual reply was to provide little comfort for those who had invested so 
much faith in the idea of a reciprocal repatriation agreement with the Irish Free State. Patrick 
McGilligan (1889-1979) himself was not only a distinguished classicist and later law 
professor at University College Dublin; he had in hs time as Minister for External Affairs 
devoted his political career to promoting the concept of free and equal association between 
the Dominions and Britain. He had in fact been one f the major movers in the Imperial 
Conferences of 1926 and 1930 which led to the Statute of Westminster. The possessor of a 
fine legal and constitutional mind, he was much admired in the wider Commonwealth. The 
list of referees on his 1934 application for the post of law professor at UCD included General 
Herzog, Prime Minister of South Africa; Bennett, the Prime Minister of Canada as well as the 
President of University College Dublin and the Chief Justice of Ireland.337  It should, 
therefore, have come as little surprise that he was unsympathetic to any request for the type 
of arrangement being sought by the British Government r garding the forced repatriation of 
emigrants:   
 
His Majesty’s Government in the Irish Free State whilst recognising the circumstances 
which have led to this proposal cannot conceal their vi w that, though equitable in 
form, it would not differ substantially in practice from a revival of the Poor Removal 
Acts which for a long period regulated the compulsory deportation of poor persons 
from Great Britain to Ireland and in their operation gave rise to widespread resentment 
amongst the poor law authorities in this country.338 
 
McGilligan went further in gently chastising the British for their outdated views on social 
provision and the removal of paupers: ‘The (Irish) Government have resisted proposals to 
introduce a law of settlement and a power of removal, being of the opinion that such 
measures would be out of harmony with the modern conception of public social services 
freely given to all residents however recently they have migrated to a new district.’ Being 
told that their views were ‘out of harmony with the modern conception’ by a man who was 
on record as saying of Irish rural welfare that ‘peo l  may have to die in the country, and die 
                                                 
337 D. Harkness,  Patrick McGilligan: Man of Commonwealth,  p118. 
338 NRS, HH1/561, Department of External Affairs Irish Free State, January 12th 1932, Dispatch No.17 
McGilligan to Thomas archived in Scottish Office Irish Immigration Files.  
 145
through starvation’339 must have been difficult to swallow. Having further pointed out that 
Ireland had nowhere to house any of the removed poor, the former workhouses having been 
converted into hospitals or homes for the aged, he concluded that: 
  
The growth of humane ideas and the recognition of the wasteful expenditure and the 
hardship which arose from time to time in their in their operation were steadily bringing 
the practice of compulsory removal in desuetude. …An arrangement to regulate 
removals would, therefore seem a step out of keeping with the trend of legislation. In 
Great Britain its effect would be to perpetuate a pr ctice that appears to be dying out 
and exists only in connection with the Poor Law Servic . In the Irish Free State its 
effect would be to set up for the first time a system of deporting poor persons to Britain 
and to revive the poor removal acts. 340 
 
McGilligan did allow that the Free State would be happy to accept those who opted for 
voluntary repatriation but this was as far as the Irish Government was willing to go. It is 
interesting that nowhere in the letter did he allude to any sub-committee having been set up to 
consider the issue. It hardly seems likely that he would have required its services. Equally 
there was nothing in the letter that any of his Irih opponents could object to, and his rejection 
of the British request was couched in terms that allowed him to maintain the social and moral 
high ground. 
   The most vehement reaction came from the Scottish Office, particularly from John Jeffrey 
at the Department of Health. As an official, Jeffrey had been consistently involved with Irish 
issue and had in fact been present with Sir John Lamb t the first deputation of the Church of 
Scotland in September 1926. Throughout his involvement he had never demonstrated much 
sympathy for the Church’s case but the terms of the McGilligan letter seems to have touched 
a raw nerve. In March 1932 he produced an almost line by line refutation of McGilligan’s 
case.  While he was not particularly surprised thate proposal had been rejected given the 
fact it would certainly have impacted far more on Ireland than on Scotland, it was the terms 
of the rejection to which he took exception: 
 
Nevertheless the fact remains the Scottish Authorities n addition to carrying the burden 
of relieving their own poor are saddled with the costs of maintaining a considerable 
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number of Southern Irish poor. Removal machinery is operative as between Scotland, 
England and Northern Ireland and Scottish Authorities are at a disadvantage in that they 
are now precluded from returning to Southern Ireland cases that are a burden on them. 
It can be fairly claimed that, so long as folks from the Irish Free State continue to move 
to Scotland, tending to congest an already overcrowded labour market, the Free State 
should at least raise no difficulty when it comes to supporting some of the social 
failures. 
  It is submitted that the Free State while entitled to cherish conceptions as to “public 
social services”, referred to in Mr McGilligan’s lett r in so far as they affect only the 
Free State’s pocket, are hardly within their rights in urging these conceptions as a 
reason for refusing to relieve Scotland of burdens they themselves should assume. 
  Irishmen from the Free State use Scotland as a field or employment but their 
Government refuse to take back a small proportion of the “misfits”.341 
 
Jeffrey then went on to draw a parallel with Scotland and the position taken by Canada and 
the United States who were by this point repatriating substantial numbers of immigrants: 
 
The Dominion of Canada is willing to admit workers but she asks to be relieved of the 
failures. Scotland’s position is parallel, except that she claims to be relieved, not of all 
failures but only of a relatively limited class – broadly speaking, those who become 
chargeable on the ordinary poor roll. In return sheis prepared to take back Scottish 
cases being afforded poor relief in the Free State.342 
 
 It is striking that Jeffery was using expressions like social failures and misfits. It would also 
appear that Scotland was being particularly generous in only being asked to be relieved of a 
‘limited class’ of failures. These are remarkably strong terms for an official, moreover one 
who had not previously displayed any notable enthusiasm for the restriction of Irish 
immigration. It also displays a rather intolerant attitude to those on poor relief generally. 
Even in the midst of one of the gravest worldwide economic crises, there still remained a 
nineteenth century liberal tendency to blame the poor f r their poverty. Jeffrey’s observations 
on the McGilligan letter were a spirited defence of the Poor Law provisions and a complaint 
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about the ‘inequity’ of allowing removals to Northern Ireland but not to the Free State, the 
constitutional difference between the two notwithstanding. It would simply be ‘a restoration 
of the powers prior to the partition of Ireland.’343 This was precisely something that no Irish 
Government was ever going to concede, and highlights the rather limited understanding in 
some circles, of Ireland’s post-Treaty, and certainly post-1931, position. Jeffrey concluded 
with curious justification ‘That the regulation of removals would seem a step out of keeping 
with the trend of legislation is a suggestion that is not entirely borne out. … Whatever may be 
urged against it, the fact remains that it has persist d for 400 years and that it still remains the 
law here.’344 In Scottish colloquial terms this might be described as the ‘Aye been’ defence. 
The supposed antiquity of the principles of Scottish Poor Law provision trumped any 
‘modern conception of public social services.’  In Jeffrey’s defence, however, it was perhaps 
stretching a point for the Free State’s concept of social provision to be described quite as 
liberal and progressive as McGilligan made out. 
    McGilligan had, however, made his point as far as the Dominions Office and the UK 
Ministry of Health were concerned, both of whom now considered the matter closed, 
especially in view of the fact that de Valera was now in charge. Despite this implication the 
Scottish Office refused to relinquish their position and urged that the British Government 
reserve the right to reopen the question in the future. The Liberal Sir Archibald Sinclair was 
now Secretary of State for Scotland and it appeared that he too was not disposed to let the 
matter rest and directed Sir John Lamb to write to the Dominions Office informing them that 
given the ‘extent and nature of the problem in Scotland he feels bound to reserve the right to 
re-open the subject again, if, as a matter of general policy, it is deemed inexpedient to press at 
the present time for reconsideration of the decision of the Irish Free State Government.’345 
Interestingly, Sinclair suggested that as the matter of the repatriation of migrants was a 
Dominion wide concern that it might be brought up at the Ottawa conference that August, a 
suggestion that was rejected by the Dominions Office.  After Sinclair had received replies 
from the Dominions and Home Office he wrote personally to Ramsay MacDonald. The 
exchange highlights MacDonald’s particular interest in the subject: 
 
Archibald Sinclair to Ramsay MacDonald 24th March 1932  
Dear Prime Minister 
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As you are aware, the Dominions Office sent a dispatch to the Irish Free State 
Government on the 16th February, 1928, containing proposals for the conclusion of 
arrangements for the compulsory repatriation of persons of Irish Free State origin in the 
United Kingdom and persons of United Kingdom origin in the Irish Free State who 
become chargeable to the poor rate relief before they acquire a status of irremovability. 
The Irish Free State Government’s reply of 21st January, 1932, to this dispatch was 
communicated to me by the Dominions Office on the 11th ultimo and in view of your 
special interest in the question of Irish immigration, I think you will be interested to see 
the enclosed copy of the reply which I have sent to the Dominions Office. 
I shall communicate further with you on this matter g nerally when the Scottish Census 
figures, which will show the extent of Irish immigration into Scotland during the past 
few years, are available 
 
Ramsay MacDonald to Sir Archibald Sinclair 25th March 1932 
My Dear Sinclair 
I am very glad indeed that this matter of Irish immigrants is being taken up. It is 
becoming a perfect scandal, and even if the Irish Government showed a greater spirit of 
unity than it does, the question ought not to be allowed to arise. 
With kindest regards  
I am 
Yours very sincerely 
J Ramsay MacDonald (signed original)346 
 
VI Civis Britannicus sum? 
  On the 8th March 1932 the Home Office produced a lengthy, complex and legalistic 
memorandum for what would later be called the Irish Situation Committee but at the time 
was referred to as the Cabinet Committee on the Question of the Irish Free State Land 
Purchases Annuities. This memorandum set out to examine the legal position of any 
measures to be taken against the Irish Free State in he event of its seceding from the 
Commonwealth or what would constitute secession from the Commonwealth without a 
formal declaration. In other words with what actions could the British Government 
realistically threaten de Valera, although the legal advisors at the Home office did not put it 
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in quite those terms? ‘It is … assumed that HMG do not contemplate that as a preliminary to 
any measures that may be taken there should be anything in the nature of any formal 
recognition of the secession, but may wish to consider what is the position which would 
automatically arise as a result of the action of the new Irish Government, with a view to 
warning them of the practical consequences of their act on.’347 The interesting feature of the 
whole Land Annuities dispute or ‘Economic War’ as it came to be described in some circles 
was that it was fundamentally an argument about the concepts of identity British or Irish, 
alien or subject. In a perverse way, and certainly not in a manner designed to give any 
comfort to de Valera, the Church of Scotland had grasped one fundamental principle more 
readily than succeeding British Governments. After 1921 the idea that citizens of the Free 
State were British subjects was an increasingly threadbare legal fiction. It was a fiction, 
however, that British Governments would go to almost any lengths to maintain:  
 
Unless and until the fact of secession is established by some formal declaration, the 
question whether or not there has been a secession will depend on the true legal 
inference to be drawn from the state of affairs at any moment. Circumstances might 
arise in which this question might come before the courts to be decided; but so long as 
it remains unsettled it would be hazardous to act on the assumption that a secession has 
occurred.348 
   
  Having started from the premise that a secession had not actually occurred until de Valera 
declared a Republic, or, conversely, the British Government thought that a secession had 
taken place, the memorandum went on to set out the legal position of Irish citizens. The 
memorandum stated, reasonably enough, that in any seces ion Irish citizens would cease to 
be British subjects and owe allegiance to the new state. Free State passport holders would be 
considered citizens of the new State and it could be pointed out to de Valera that Britain 
would in future require anyone coming from the Free State to be in possession of a passport. 
But it is at this point that the Home Office, or their legal advisors, began to discover legal 
difficulties with the definition of a British subject. 
 
                                                 
347 NRS, HH1/568, Cabinet Committee on the Question of the Irish Free State Land Purchase Annuities 
Memorandum by the Home Secretary,  March 8th 1932. 
348 NRS, HH1/568. 
 150
For the purpose of applying in the United Kingdom any restrictions upon them as 
aliens, doubtful cases would obviously arise until the conditions determining who are 
the persons who have changed their allegiance as a re ult of the secession have been 
settled. It follows that until the conditions have b en settled, the application in the 
United Kingdom to persons belonging to the Free State of any law relating to aliens 
would give rise to serious difficulties. So long as it remained uncertain whether a 
particular person had ceased to be a British subject, his treatment as an alien would be 
open to challenge in the courts and an adverse decision would have embarrassing 
consequences. Moreover, one of the most important powers in regard to aliens - that of 
deportation - could not be effectively exercised until the relationship of the Free State 
to this country is definitely recognised to be that of a foreign state, so the ordinary rule 
of international law that a state is bound to receive back its nationals could be invoked 
against the new state.349 
   
    Being a complicated subject it would take some ti e for the British Government to work 
out exactly who was and who was not a British subject. This was, in the Home Office’s 
opinion, not necessarily a bad thing, as a period of time would have to elapse between any 
threat being made to the Free State and the actual implementation of the policy. During which 
time there might be a ‘change of policy and feeling i  the Free State.’350 The policy advice 
was to hold on in the hope that Cumann na nGaedheal would be re-elected. This was not an 
entirely unfounded hope as de Valera’s election victory in 1932 had not given him an overall 
majority. This situation was considerably altered by the snap General election of January 
1933 in which Fianna Fail won exactly half of the Dail seats and could count on the support 
of a further eight labour members.351 But, as Harkness states: ‘in 1932 the political situat on 
in Dublin was far from clear and a return to Office by Mr Cosgrave was possible, particularly 
if ill-considered action by the British Government did not strengthen Mr de Valera’s hand.352  
   In the meantime any warnings that might be given to de Valera were on the lines that 
Ireland would lose Dominion preference with regard to trade, Free State nationals would 
require passports to enter the United Kingdom and would be treated as aliens in terms of 
employment, the franchise, eligibility for the civil service and liable to deportation. Thus far 
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the advice, despite the dubious Home Office opinion that secession from the Commonwealth 
would set up a ‘new’ state, appeared relatively straight forward. Had it rested its case at this 
point the constitutional position may have been clarified to the benefit of all sides. However, 
a further complication was introduced: ‘It is now pro osed to consider whether any, and if so 
what, action might be taken by the HMG on the basis that the Irish Free State, while formally 
retaining membership of the Commonwealth, has, neverthel ss, by breaking the Treaty (e.g. 
by abrogation of the oath of allegiance) forfeited all claim to the privileges and advantages of 
its membership of the Commonwealth so far as its relations with the United Kingdom.’353  At 
this point the traditional Home Office reluctance to enforce any form of restriction on Irish 
immigration again came to the fore in a more detaild and legalistic form of the ‘Clynes 
objection.’ First of all, if the Irish abrogated the Treaty by abolishing the Oath of Allegiance 
would that necessarily mean that they had seceded from the Commonwealth? If Ireland was 
not legally or diplomatically a foreign state then their citizens were still British subjects and it 
would require possibly contentious legislation to pr vide for immigration restriction.     
  Again the objection was raised as to what would constitute a British subject. How could 
these sanctions be applied to what were British subjects, even if they were applied to those 
born in the Free State? ‘one of the main difficulties to be considered would be the definition 
of the class of persons against whom the measures were to be directed. Amongst that class it 
would not presumably be thought desirable or practic ble to include the Southern Irish 
Loyalists.’354 Why the Southern Loyalists should be considered a special case was not made 
clear in the Home Office memorandum but it may be that heir inclusion was an attempt to 
cover every emotional, legal and practical base possible. Again, as had been pointed out in 
the Clynes’ letter the Home Office emphasised that e whole thing would be expensive, 
impossible to enforce, and inconvenience the British public more than the Irish. Even if 
legislation could be passed Ireland as a member of the Commonwealth would not, under 
international law, be obliged to accept any of its nationals that were deported   The clinching 
argument was the appeal to Empire unity and the amour pr pre of the Mother Country: 
 
Apart from these practical difficulties, any measures differentiating between various 
classes of British subjects would mean a complete change of the policy, which has 
hitherto been maintained in this country, that a British subject irrespective of his origin 
has a legal right to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. A constitutional principle 
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of the highest importance is thus involved. The readiness of the Mother Country to 
receive all British subjects is an extremely valuabe bond of Empire and any change of 
policy in this respect would be likely to have far-reaching and perhaps unforeseen 
consequences.355 
  
   It may have sounded very Palmerstonian, but in actual fact many of the Home Office’s 
arguments were extremely weak - for example, the idea that Ireland, as a member of the 
Commonwealth was not obliged under international law to accept back those of its citizens 
who were deported by another Commonwealth country. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
South Africa deported other Commonwealth citizens back to their country of origin on a 
regular basis and had the United Kingdom incorporated such legislation then the Irish 
position would have been no different. It is not so much the technical rights and wrongs of 
the Home Office’s position that is important to this discussion. It is the tenor of those 
arguments. Up until this point in the whole debate on Irish immigration, those opposed to 
restriction had been able to fall back on the ‘British subject’ argument that had largely been 
accepted as the overriding principle. The addition of de Valera to the equation changed the 
parameters of the debate.  For the first time the British Government was confronted with 
providing a definition of what constituted a British ubject. At the same time it was faced 
with the prospect of a Commonwealth country either seceding or redefining its membership 
of the Commonwealth without the inclusion of an oath of loyalty to the Crown, the oath 
having been the red line issue in the Treaty negotiati ns just over ten years earlier. The 
crucial importance of both the Clynes’ letter and the 1932 Cabinet memo is that the British 
Government had to consider the very real possibility of no longer being able to define the 
Irish Free State as British and to seriously contemplate whether it should, or indeed could, 
impose restrictions on Free State nationals both inside and outside its borders. It was a point 
that did not escape other observers. In an editorial, the Scotsman, while lambasting de Valera 
for seeking to abolish the oath of allegiance, nevertheless ended its denunciation with the  
observation that ‘So far as Scotland is concerned separation from the Free State would not be 
unwelcome considering that it would provide this country with the power of checking Irish 
immigration.’356        
    Despite the Home Office’s concerns, as early as the fourth meeting of the Irish Situation 
Committee in May, the Cabinet had been informed that e Ministry of Labour ‘were 
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disposed to regard favourably any scheme to place special restrictions on persons coming to 
this country from the Irish Free State to seek employment.’ As such the Ministry was 
requested to provide a memorandum on its views on the issue. 357 The Ministry of Labour’s 
conclusions were in some ways quite startling and in others quite conventional. It did not 
think that restricting Irish immigration would make a huge difference to the unemployment 
position but it would nonetheless ‘afford a small but desirable relief.’ On the other hand were 
the Government to ‘repatriate all persons in this country born in the Irish Free State there 
might be some temporary dislocation in the case of mployers, particularly in Liverpool and 
Glasgow, with a high percentage of Free State labour, but there is no doubt that under present 
conditions the total number of workers born in the Irish Free State with the possible 
exception of those engaged in private domestic service, could be replaced rapidly and without 
much difficulty by workers born in Great Britain.’358 In the Ministry’s opinion the removal of 
its estimated 350,000 Irish-born labour in Britain would not be a major inconvenience. It did 
not, however, explain how exactly this was to be accomplished, short of herding every Irish- 
born emigrant in Britain on to a succession of one-way ferries. 
   It is clear that moves to change the status of Irish immigrants had its attractions for those in 
Government, at the very least as a sabre to rattle. While the subject was not officially brought 
up at the Empire Economic Conference in the August of 1932 it did not stop Thomas raising 
the subject in private in conversation with Sean T O’Ceallaigh:359 
 
Thomas did say that if we decided to leave the Commnwealth now it would be 
regarded by Britain as a hostile act…He talked of the likelihood of their expatriating 
350,000  or more Irish born people in England and Scotland. He also talked of their 
cutting off hundreds of thousands of our people who are now drawing unemployment 
relief in England. Likewise he mentioned in or about 10,000 Irish born people 
employed in the British civil service, who, it was suggested, would be returned to 
Ireland. He was reminded that this was a two edged weapon but he said he hoped things 
would not reach such a stage.360 
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It does not seem from the general tenor of O’Ceallaigh’s letter to de Valera reporting this 
conversation that he was inclined to take this threat overly seriously. It is, however, obvious 
from Thomas’s wording that the Cabinet discussions had run along those lines. It is likely 
that he had been agreed to make this observation to O’Ceallaigh in precisely these terms.    
Throughout the following year the diplomatic tussle b tween Britain and the Free State 
continued, the British holding fast to the terms of the Treaty and de Valera equally 
determined to abolish the oath of allegiance. 
   In Scotland the results of the 1931 census had at last been analysed and after ten years of 
claim and counter-claim, civil service investigations and inter-departmental wrangling there 
was now some definitive data to be examined. Jeffrey p oduced a summary of the Registrar 
General’s findings.  The immediate conclusion was that he Irish-born population had been 
steadily declining ever since 1861 and by 1931 comprised 2.57 per cent of the total Scottish 
population. Actual annual immigration in the 1920s had averaged around 2,000 (a 
considerably lower figure than the 9,000 constantly ci ed by the Church) and even then ‘it has 
to be borne in mind, … that this inward movement during 1921-31 was probably more than 
offset by the numbers of Irish-born included in the excessive emigration from Scotland 
during that period.’361  Despite this the Department of Health was still concerned at the level 
of immigration: ‘Under normal conditions an annual accession of about 2,000 immigrants 
from Ireland would be immaterial but with trade and i ustry heavily depressed, as it has 
been during the past ten years, even that number must have had an effect in aggravating an 
otherwise difficult situation.’362 The actual numbers involved were in fact not that great. In 
1931 the number of male working-age Irish immigrants i  Scotland (including those from 
Northern Ireland) of less than ten years residence amounted to 5,461. Of these 4,895 were 
listed as having an occupation although a large proportion were (27 per cent) were classified 
as unskilled or labourers while the unemployment rate for male migrants ran at 1,059 or 22 
per cent.363 As most of these were concentrated in the West of Scotland, a 22 per cent 
unemployment rate was running close to the average for the time. When the numbers were 
actually broken down they were considerably less than the flood that the Church and others 
had been describing. What is interesting is the Scottish Office reaction to these figures: 
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Although in itself the number of immigrants is not large it is sufficient to make a 
material difference in the economic position of these areas. To the extent to which the 
immigrants have obtained employment, they have keptothers, probably Scotsmen, out 
of work and to the extent to which the immigrants are themselves out of work they have 
probably added to the expenditure on public assistance.364 
 
Had the authoritative equivalent of these figures ben available at any time in the preceding 
decade they would have undermined the Kirk campaign even more effectively than the 
Glasgow Herald articles. In which case it would be natural to suppose  that the 1931 census 
sounded the death knell, in political terms, for the anti-Irish campaign There was, however, 
still some mileage left in it and this would come from the Scottish Office itself. 
 
VII A Last Appeal 
   In reply to Home Office enquiries concerning theattitude of the Scottish Office attitude to 
the question of Irish immigration, the issue once again coming before the Cabinet, Norman 
Duke replied that the census information largely bore ut the contention in the Adamson 
letter that the problem of immigration per se was not particularly pronounced and that  the 
real difficulty was the multiplication of the Irish descended ‘colony’: ‘The main problem 
seems therefore to lie in the birth rate of Irish persons – and their descendants – who have 
already settled in Scotland. The complete stoppage of Irish immigration would not solve this 
problem.’365 In almost every official discussion on Irish immigration, even if the actual 
numbers entering Scotland were not considered a concern, there seems to have been a 
universal consensus that the Irish and their descendants were still a problem. This does point 
to an institutional prejudice against the Irish in general, understandable perhaps given the 
context of the times and the mores of a late imperial civil service, but with the possible 
exception of Clynes there seem to have been few in official circles who could be considered 
as champions or defenders of the Irish. Duke went on to make the further point that although 
the numbers of Irish immigrants was comparatively small any proposal to restrict 
immigration or provide for the deportation of ‘undesirable Irishmen’ would be an 
improvement on the present situation: 
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In times like the present we cannot afford to shelve this aspect of the question, merely 
because the volume of Irish immigration is not now so large as it has been in the past. 
Again, statistics show that the population of Irish extraction is less orderly than the 
native population, and is responsible for more crime and heavier proportionate charges 
on the poor law and other public funds. It is therefor  in the public interest that any 
possible steps should be taken to limit the increase in the Irish element.366 
 
This comment from a senior Scottish Office official is of considerable importance. It 
demonstrates a hardening of the attitudes inside the Scottish Office towards the Irish 
population in Scotland. Restricting the ‘Irish element’ was now in the public interest. It was a 
sentiment that would have gladdened the hearts of the General Assembly had they but known 
of it. They would have been delighted had they seen th  draft memorandum for the Cabinet 
produced for Sir Godfrey Collins367, the Liberal successor to Sinclair. This memorandum, 
even though it did not lead to actual Government action, is as important a document produced 
inside the Scottish Office as any during the whole saga of the anti-Irish campaign. For the 
first time a Secretary of State urged to Cabinet, not only a policy of restriction, but of 
deportation of Irish immigrants. 
   The memorandum itself set out the case that had been presented to succeeding Secretaries 
of State by the Churches concerning the Irish inability to assimilate, their lack of 
‘independence’ and consequent drain on public funds, their criminality and general 
undesirability. It also outlined the Churches’ suggested solutions including restriction, 
repatriation for those who became a public charge, proof of employment and even an 
approach to the Vatican to suspend the Ne Temere decree in Scotland although the latter 
point did not make the final draft of the Memorandum. In addition, it rehearsed the arguments 
of the Empire Migration Committee and the abortive efforts made to reach a reciprocal 
repatriation arrangement with the Free State.  It included the latest census statistics and while 
Collins found these ‘reassuring’ he still felt ‘it is necessary to take other factors into account 
in considering what action would be justified to meet the representations of the Scottish 
Churches and other bodies who are dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs in Scotland, 
and to give effect to the recommendations of the Empire Migration Committee.’368 Then, 
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using the census statistics, he outlined the case in almost exactly the same terms as the 
Church. The Irish did not intermarry and therefore did not assimilate, they had prolific 
numbers of descendants, they had a tendency to pauperism, criminality and lunacy, and most 
interestingly of all ‘The frequent and sometimes serious outbreaks of sectarian disorder 
caused by the existence of these “colonies” in the midst of Protestant communities, which 
impose a heavy burden on the police forces of certain districts, and lead to abnormal 
expenditure for the purpose of preserving law and order.’ Collins was writing during the rise 
of the Scottish Protestant League and Protestant Action and sectarian disorder was an issue he 
would have to deal with in the very near future. Having made these points Collins concluded 
with a demand for action: 
 
On a review of all circumstances I am strongly of the opinion that the time has now 
come when the Government would be fully justified in taking powers already taken by 
many of the Dominions in respect of their own terrio y. 
(i) to prohibit the admission to the United Kingdom of British Subjects from any of the 
Dominions, including the Irish Free State, in cases where the persons have criminal 
records or are insane 
(ii) to deport from the United Kingdom to the territo y of the Dominions in which they 
were born or with which they have the closest connection persons who become a 
charge on the public funds or commit offences within a specified period (say 5 years) 
after their arrival in the United Kingdom or are discovered to have been prohibited 
immigrants at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom. 
  And I desire to recommend that the Cabinet should a thorise the necessary steps to be 
taken to give effect to these proposals.369 
 
  Almost ten years after the Church’s original Irish Menace report the Scottish Secretary was 
presenting the Cabinet with almost exactly the same demands for almost exactly the same 
reasons. Collins also requested, if it were feasible, that that there should be a prohibition on 
the employment of anyone entering Britain without a permit from the Ministry of Labour. 
Such permits would only be granted where  no suitably qualified labour was available locally, 
although he recognised that this may have raised issues with Dominions. One hesitates to use 
the term ‘moral victory’ in this case but it is without doubt that Church had wrought better 




than they knew. Certainly there is little in the memorandum with which the Church would 
have disagreed and the evidence suggests that by the early 1930s their arguments were 
receiving a more sympathetic hearing than has been previously acknowledged by scholars of 
the period. 
  In the event, of course, the Cabinet came down on the side of the Home Office arguments 
but not without serious consideration. In the Novemb r of that year the Irish Situation 
Committee prepared a draft for transmission to Dublin which contained a warning that the 
status of Irish nationals would be affected by de Valera’s alteration of the Irish Constitution. 
 
 On ceasing to be British subjects they would become subject as aliens to the provisions 
of the Aliens Restriction Act by which they could not enter or remain in this country 
without special sanction, registration with the police, restriction of employment and 
liability to deportation as provided by that Act. They would become ineligible for 
employment in the Public Services of the Crown either in this country or in the 
colonies, and they would no longer be entitled to the benefit of the protection or 
facilities offered by the British Diplomatic and Consular Services. They would also be 
ineligible for the franchise.370 
 
This paragraph was deleted from the final dispatch but it does illustrate how close the British 
Government came to acceding to the restriction of Irish immigration. 
 
VIII Conclusion 
 It is not the purpose here to chart the eventual course of the negotiations with Irish Free State 
throughout the 1930s, save to point out that Scottish concerns were raised at the Irish 
Situation Committee meetings throughout the period an  MacDonald himself was still 
making a case for repatriation as late as 1936 when he was Lord President of the Council.371  
Ironically enough, the issue was settled through the diplomacy of MacDonald’s son Malcolm, 
as Secretary of State for the Dominions, although his relinquishing control of the Irish naval 
bases was to be a sore point with Churchill throught the war. The purpose of this chapter 
has been to highlight a neglected area of the controversy and to make the point that far from 
being a dead issue after 1929 the whole subject of Irish immigration, and indeed the position 
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of the Irish in Scotland, received a new lease of life. The Collins memorandum may have 
been the last meaningful occasion where the Scottish Office attempted to influence the debate 
and despite their lack of success it is in the terms in which they couched that debate that is 
important. In the end the need for a concept of Empire unity, however meaningless that had 





   






















The Committee for Kirk Security: ‘Church Interests’ 1930-1938 
 
It is not enough, Burke has said, to have right opinions; we must make right opinions prevail 
John D. Rose, Rector Emeritus, Kirkcaldy High School 1934372 
 
The General Assembly view with deep concern the evidence that Roman Catholic 
immigration from Ireland continues to displace and disadvantage Scottish labour and appeal 
to members of the Church and to the Scottish people gen rally to pay due regard in offering 
private and public employment, domestic, industrial and commercial to the rights of their 
own countrymen. The Assembly express the hope that occ sion shall no longer be given for 
the remonstrances which have been   made in Scottish ci es and industrial areas against the 
practice of preferring Irish labour where Scottish labour is already available.  
Paragraph 5 of the Deliverance of the Church Interes s Committee to the General Assembly 
of the Church of Scotland May 1935373 
 
It was a poor sort of religion that moved one to abuse and ridicule another religion than his 
own. The only way to deal with Roman error was patient quiet teaching of their own people. 
They must speak the truth but let them speak it in love. 
Dr J. Cromarty Smith, Church Interests debate, General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
Thursday May 30th 1935 374 
 
I Introduction 
   The history of the brief and inglorious career of the Church Interests Committee of the 
Church of Scotland is in some ways an apt metaphor for the whole anti-Irish campaign. It 
appeared, as a separate entity, out of the Church and Nation Committee in 1931 and 
disappeared back into it in 1938. In the intervening years it accomplished very little other 
than to keep an overtly sectarian agenda before the General Assembly and as a useful forum 
in which some, but by no means all, ministers could vent their frustrations about the 1918 
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Education Act in particular, and on all things ‘Roman’ in general. This does not mean, as 
Callum Brown has it, that ‘the Church sought to appear responsive to the feelings of its 
constituency without fanning the flames of bigotry. A committee of the assembly merely 
went through the motions for the remainder of the int r-war period, making an annual appeal 
to the Secretary of State for the ending of immigrat on.’375 The preceding chapters have 
confirmed the Church was not merely ‘going through the motions.’376 It is possible to make a 
case that the Church Interests Committee, through their sheer ineffectuality, were going 
through the motions but it will be argued in this chapter that there was a deeper cause 
underlying their activities and it would be a mistake to dismiss them out of hand. Especially 
so as one of its members, Professor Burleigh, was to rise to considerable prominence in the 
post-war Church, and the slow death of the Committee tells us much, not just about the inter-
war church but about inter-war Scotland itself. It should be stated at the outset that some of 
the actions of this committee appear rather remarkable for a group of clerics. Edwin Muir 
may have been exaggerating when he compared Bolshevism and Presbyterianism, ‘in content 
these two creeds are quite dissimilar, but in logical structure they are quite alike,’377 but in the 
case of the Church Interests Committee he perhaps hd a point. 
     The title of this chapter is the Committee forKirk Security, and it is a reasonable 
description. Its members undoubtedly believed that their remit was to monitor those 
perceived hostile to the reformed religion, in this case the Roman Catholic Church, and to 
propose counter measures. The General Assembly set it up in the following terms: 
 
The General Assembly approve the report on the preservation of our Protestant heritage 
and resolve to set up a committee to be called the Committee on Church Interests, 
initially of sixteen members for the purpose of maint ning the position of the Church 
of Scotland as representative of the Church Catholic in this realm and for the purposes 
of reviewing tendencies and activities hostile to the maintenance of the Church’s 
inheritance in the historic Reformation of religion in Scotland and in other lands and in 
connection therewith of compiling information and furnishing advice to the advantage 
of the Church and of its ministers and members and agencies. The General Assembly 
instruct the Nomination Committee to propose sixteen members for this Committee, 
after consultation with the representatives of the Committee on Church and Nation; it 
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being understood that the Committee so appointed shall have the power to co-opt 
additional members from time to as may be required.378 
 
Apart from the clerical terminology the above is a reasonably good description of the 
functions of an intelligence service. From what exactly was this security service to protect the 
Church? Professor W.A. Curtis 379 of Edinburgh University, later to be the first conve or of 
the Committee, in seconding the deliverance set out he challenges to the Church of Scotland 
as he, and presumably the rest of the Church and Nation Committee, saw them. He could not 
be accused of understatement: 
 
He did not conceal the fact that this proposal meant a grave and solemn step…there was 
a challenge to their Church that it would be unworthy to ignore. Let no one imagine that 
there was no danger or urge that the dignified thing was to turn a deaf ear or a blind 
eye. Let them permit him to name some of the indications which their Committee had 
been considering as a result of the changes that had occurred. The influx of an Irish 
population had already engaged the attention of the C urch. Prayers were offered 
Sunday by Sunday to regain Scotland to Rome. Convents and monasteries had sprung 
up. Money was poured out. In this city a Franciscan Church had been established near 
the University. Two Dominican friars in the robe and habit of the order which was 
forever associated with the inquisition had conducted a mission in the hall of the 
University Union two successive winters. Jesuit centres existed in their cities, 
representing an order not in good odour at the moment in Europe, which had again and 
again for sufficient reasons been expelled from countries by kings and 
governments…The finances of the Roman Catholic Church were used in propaganda 
through books published by the Catholic Truth Society….Properties purchased, 
processions, pilgrimages and demonstrations – these things reminded them of 
challenges that confronted the Church. He was offering no counsels of panic, but they 
must know the forces arrayed against them. They had to furnish literature, advice and 
information and train young men and marshal their tr mendous resources. He had no 
doubt as to their standing with their hostile ecclesiastical neighbours, but was it not 
time their ministers and people should be given the facts and that the information they 
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needed should come from people they trusted?...He ventured to say that in years to 
come they would be found in the front line of defenc  and advance, throughout the 
world, vindicating with their allies the principles and ideals which the Reformation 
rescued and for the service of God and Mankind (applause).380 
   
   From this it would seem that the Church of Scotland stood in its greatest danger since the 
Reformation. The ‘robes and habits’ of the Inquisition had been seen in the University Union 
and the Jesuits were in the cities. The professor was not offering ‘counsels of panic’ but 
hostile forces were arrayed against the Church. It is easy, by more secular standards, to find 
Curtis’ rather bombastic and verbose speeches in the General Assembly either distasteful or 
risible or both. Perhaps that is why in the secondary literature of the period the Church 
Interests Committee is generally mentioned, if at all, in passing. It will be argued here that 
this would be a mistake. As this chapter will concentrate on its activities it should be pointed 
out that this Committee provided the mood music that w s heard outside of debates on the 
Mound. It can be seen from the above extract that Curtis employed a quasi-military 
terminology. ‘Hostile neighbours’ had to be confronted in the ‘front line of defence and 
advance’.  What the inception of the Committee marked was a change from the emphasis of 
John White’s racial campaign against the Irish to amore overtly hostile attitude to the Roman 
Catholic Church. This may well have lain at the heart of the original campaign but the veneer 
of non-sectarian bias had worn away. If the Church had been careful in its previous public 
utterances to make the point that its issue was with Irish immigration and not Catholicism per 
se, the Church Interests Committee felt under no such obligation. The Church of Rome was 
the enemy. In order to understand how and why this c ange of emphasis came about it is 
necessary to briefly examine the position of the Churc  of Scotland in 1930. 
                                  
II A Second Wind 
  After the General Election of 1929 which returned a Labour Government and following the 
Glasgow Herald’s fairly comprehensive public demolition of its case it would be logical to 
assume that the Kirk would have had more pressing concerns than the seemingly fruitless 
pursuit  of the restriction of Irish immigration. It could be argued that the Church was simply 
being ‘thrawn’ in its persistence in a lost cause or that the ‘Irish menace’ had become by 
sheer repetition something of an article of faith in itself. It is certainly the case that the re-
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unification of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church in 1929 had given the new 
body a surge in self-confidence and belief that it had a renewed mission as the social, and to 
some extent political, arbiter in Scotland. On the other hand the leading lights of the Church 
were a sophisticated and, in many cases, politically well-connected group. They had had to be 
to push through Parliament the legislation necessary for reunion to take place As has been 
pointed out in Chapter Two Dr John White himself was ‘  whole-hearted Unionist.’381  Why 
should such men have thought, after nearly a decade’s worth of effort, that they were any 
more likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from a newly elected Labour government? A 
Government supported by many M.P.s whose election the Church had roundly denounced in 
the past as being the product of an Irish Catholic b ock vote in the West of Scotland?  
Certainly they could carry on their campaign as a means of embarrassing the new 
Government over the issue but surely it defied political logic to imagine that they could 
persuade a Labour Government to take the issue seriou ly when it appeared that they had 
manifestly failed to persuade the previous incumbents. However, there was an internal Kirk 
logic to the continuation of the campaign. As has been pointed out in the previous chapter the 
Church was largely unaware of the behind the scenes politics concerning the issue in the 
early 1930s and so continued this as an increasingly ternal debate. Had they known of, for 
example, the Empire Migration Committee’s conclusion  it may well have entirely changed 
the dynamic of the debate.  
   In order to understand the progress of what might be termed the Church’s second campaign, 
it will be necessary to make a brief digression into the history of Church re-unification. Both 
the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church (and indeed the Free Church) had been 
united in their anti-Irish campaign and had even participated in joint deputations to 
Government on the issue. In a nation of inveterate h ir splitters, and where no hair is split 
more finely than on matters of religion, the Presbyterian Churches could at least agree on the 
iniquities of the Church of Rome. This common cause was one with which the reunified 
Church could pursue with a renewed self confidence i  its mission. It also began with a 
profound sense of unease about the nature of the country. It fundamentally believed that it 
had a right to leadership but some of her more prominent adherents recognised that the 
Scotland of 1930 was not the Scotland of 1914. As John Buchan put it: 
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 The difficulties are great, but I believe they can be overcome; the losses are grievous 
but they can be made good. Scotland has always had one gift above others, the power 
of adapting herself to altered circumstances…She has to accept changes but to make 
sure that in the process of change she does not sacrifice those qualities and institutions 
which have built up her historic character…but a leader is needed if she is to keep what 
she cherishes in the older Scotland, and at the sam time adapt herself courageously to 
the demands of the new. And her natural leader, nowas in the past, is that Church 
which is her most idiomatic possession,382 
 
It was a confusing philosophy of stepping boldly into the future while holding steadfastly  to 
the past. Buchan’s History of the Church of Scotland, written in conjunction with Principal 
George Adam Smith,383 was produced, as it has it in the preface, ‘at the request of the leaders 
of The Church of Scotland who desired to have in some popular form a memorial of the great 
events of last year.’384  
   It was not the only work produced in the early thirties. The quotation at the beginning of 
this chapter from John D. Rose comes from his history Scotland’s True Glory: The Story of 
the Church of Scotland from the earliest Times to the Present Day. In his preface he states 
that 
 
 No nation possesses a Church which has played so great and decisive a part in national 
history as the Church of Scotland, and no Church has a more interesting and inspiring 
history…It has worked out in blood and tears the true elationship which should exist 
between church and state, and in the process has raised  formerly insignificant, and 
lawless, and barbarous nation to the high place it now holds among the nations of the 
world.385  
 
It may appear a somewhat hyperbolic statement but it is a sentiment with which many in the 
Church in Scotland would have agreed. The problem for the Church by the late 1920s and 
early 1930s was that of transferring this concept of i self into a tangible and concrete reality. 
The Church’s position in Scots society seemed to be, and arguably was, under threat and 
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from forces that the Church itself did not truly comprehend. The Church, that was still in the 
process of self-congratulation over the achievement of reunion, was nevertheless troubled by 
many aspects of the twentieth century with which it found difficult to compete. Popular 
diversions like music, football and the cinema seemd to undermine Presbyterian traditions 
and attendance. The Sabbath itself, in the major towns at least, seemed under threat. What the 
Kirk had previously taken for granted, it now needed to defend. In that defence it could not 
necessarily assume that it had the loyalty and adherenc  of the majority of the population.   
    A world view like that of Rose in which the Church of Scotland was so evidently a force 
for good could not understand those who viewed with indifference the Kirk’s pretensions. It 
explains in some ways the Church’s persistence in its hostility to the Catholic Irish into the 
1930s. It has been one of the arguments here that the Irish War of Independence gave the 
initial impetus to that hostility but that alone would not account for the longevity of the 
campaign. It could be argued, that, for some ministers at least, it continued out of sheer 
sectarian prejudice but that would be to miss the fundamental point. The Catholic Irish were 
more than just an alien incursion, they were a visible manifestation that Scotland was no 
longer the heterogeneous Presbyterian nation that the Kirk had raised out of ‘insignificance, 
lawlessness and barbarism.’ It then followed that te Irish were a threat to all that the Church 
had achieved. If that was true then it became a spiritual, and national duty to defend Scotland 
from the Irish. In more ecumenical times this may not appear a tenable position, and even in 
the 1930s there were those, as will be discussed below, who challenged it. It did, however, 
have a theological and political logic that appealed to many, particularly in the General 
Assembly. As memories of the Great War began to fade nd new threats appeared on the 
horizon, reunification should have given the Church confidence in its prospects for the future. 
To a certain extent this was true as can be seen by the quote from John Buchan above. But 
still the 1920s had not been a happy decade for the Church any more than it had been for the 
wider nation. The experiences of the slump, the General Strike and seemingly intractable 
unemployment combined with Scotland’s increasingly uncompetitive export-led industries, 
all contributed to a deep sense of insecurity. The Kirk convinced itself that it had diagnosed 
Scotland’s malaise, the Irish, and it followed that the cure was the exclusion of the Irish. As 
economic and social conditions grew markedly worse in the 1930s then so did the urgency 
that this cure be applied.   
Re-unification of the United Free Church and the Churc  of Scotland had been a fairly 
long and sometimes tortuous process.  It is not intended here to enter into great detail about 
the legislative and theological hurdles the Churches ad to overcome, particularly between 
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1904, when the first concrete moves were made to heal t  disruption of 1843, to the final 
reunification of 1929. It is however useful to understand the mindset of the members of both 
churches.  As Buchan and Smith put it ‘One church had been formally pledged by annual 
resolutions for nearly half a century to disestablishment and disendowment as a policy not 
only of expediency but of justice, while the other clung to the historic association with the 
state.’386  They further quoted Lord Sands: 
 
The differences which to a stranger seem most obscure are often the most difficult to 
reconcile. When two denominations are separated by some difference clear and 
palpable, there may be no need to justify separation…But when the difference is not of 
this character, it is felt that separation needs to be justified in the eyes of the world and 
this leads to the attachment of immense importance to the ground of quarrel and the 
most tenacious and meticulous adherence to the one p sition or the other.387 
 
This, apart from being a neat and judicial definition of pedantry, raises an interesting 
although unintentional point in the Churches joint anti-Irish campaign. If Church re-
unification was held back, as it certainly was, by nit-picking arguments over what divided 
them, then it would undoubtedly have been useful to have an issue around which they could 
agree. As has been argued above both churches couldunite around hostility to the Irish 
Catholic minority. It does raise the question as to whether the comparative religious harmony 
between Protestant and Catholic that existed prior to the Great War was deliberately 
sacrificed as a price for Presbyterian reunification. Equally, the persistence of the campaign 
into the 1930s may have been the means of reinforcig unification after 1929. Rose, writing 
in 1934 referring to the difficulties facing the new church stated that ‘over 1,000,000 people 
of Protestant descent had lost touch with the Church and were living in practical heathenism. 
The forces of secularism and materialism were becoming a menace to society and a 
reorganisation of the Christian forces was absolutely necessary if the problem of 
Christianising Scotland was to be solved. This reorganisation could not take place as long as 
the two churches remained separate.’388 He later expanded on this theme in relation to the 
Catholic Church: 
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A fresh difficulty is the growth and claims of the Romanist Church in Scotland 
during the last century, owing to the great immigration of Irish into the industrial west. 
It numbers 645,000 members, and by their lower standards of living and conduct they 
have become a danger to Scottish national life and character. They do not mix with the 
native Scots, but their priests keep them alien and aloof, and use their united votes as a 
means to extort advantages from all political parties. They are a large cause of 
unemployment to Scottish workmen, break the national tradition of Sunday observance 
and boast openly of the coming conquest of Scotland by Romanism. It is inconceivable 
that freedom loving Scotland will ever submit to the dictation of an Italian priest which 
it shook off four centuries ago, but unless the Churc  pays more attention to instructing 
the people regarding the unscriptural doctrines and arrogant claims of Rome a serious 
position will arise. Here again it takes too much for granted.389 
 
These sentiments were fairly standard regarding the Irish but Rose was also making the 
case that one of the purposes of reunification was to tackle not just heathenism and 
secularism but Romanism. This was not necessarily a universal view. J R Fleming, General 
Secretary of the Presbyterian Alliance,390 in his History of the Church in Scotland written in 
1933 and dedicated to the reunited Church, was inclined to be a little more charitable 
although he too was no friend of the Irish: ‘So long as Roman Catholics in Scotland were of 
native growth, clinging to their home and soil and merging peaceably with the general 
population, racial bitterness was absent…and one lam nts that the new situation caused by 
the introduction of an alien and unmixable element has altered things for the worse.’391 By 
this point Fleming did not see that ‘any agitation f r the disenfranchisement or repatriation of 
Irish immigrants will be successful’392 but he did believe that there were still grounds for a 
Commission of Inquiry ‘to safeguard the future and prevent the ideals, traditions and spiritual 
foundations of the Scottish Race being undermined by hostile forces.’393 Despite the almost 
routine denunciation of the Irish, Fleming did go on t  give a tribute, if a slightly backhanded 
one, to the efforts of the Catholic clergy: 
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Neither Faith nor Morals has flourished amidst the squalid industrial surroundings 
where the congested Scots-Irish population is mostly to be found. An ungrudging 
tribute is due to the devoted clergy who have sought to keep these alive in a difficult 
community… Giant Pagan, in his modern guise of secularising materi lism is an 
enemy more to be dreaded than Giant Pope, deprived of his persecuting weapons, 
striving at least to secure the allegiance of his followers to a large part of Christian 
truth and duty (my italics). Even the unreformed Church in Scotland, so far as she cares 
for her own, and voices a venerable testimony, deserv  more recognition and 
toleration than she is prepared to give. The original core still retains somewhat of a 
national character and outlook, and one may hope that the recent accretion will in time 
become a worthy addition to a common religious citizenship.394 
 
While this was hardly a ringing endorsement for an ecumenical approach by the Church of 
Scotland it is important as it demonstrates that some senior church members were beginning, 
slowly, to reconsider their uncompromising attitude to the question of the Catholic Irish in 
Scotland. Nonetheless, Fleming’s realism on the likely success of agitation for 
disenfranchisement or repatriation does not appear to have been shared by other influential 
churchmen in the first flush of reunification. 
Certainly John White thought that there was still a battle that could be won. In January 
1930 at a meeting of the Glasgow Elders and Office Bearers Union he stated that in his 
opinion ‘Rome now menaced Scotland as at no other time since the Reformation’ and that it 
was ‘only a question of time until the Roman Catholic e ement predominated in the West of 
Scotland.’395 In this speech he made a direct attack on the Roman C tholic Church in 
Scotland expressing the view that it was ‘becoming ag ressive in its attitude to the faith of 
their Church and was indeed engaged in propaganda.’ This further hardening of attitude 
ended on a more ominous note: ‘Hitherto they had remained tolerant but it was not easy to 
remain silent when their faith was described as an unmitigated hoax. They had cause 
therefore, in the face of reactionary propaganda, to emphasise afresh the Reformed and 
Protestant character of the Church and to show clearly that this and not medievalism 
represented the true Church of Christ and that the spr ad of Romanism would retard Christian 
progress and enlightenment.’396 He followed this up with a speech in Dumbarton on February 
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25th on much the same lines, and while he was positive that ‘The Reformed faith and the 
Presbyterian government of the Church of Scotland were too strong in the hearts of true 
Scotsman… the fact remained that the Roman Catholics were patiently working to secure a 
grip on the other departments of the nation’s life.’ 397 The Church of Scotland could not 
remain silent or inactive on this apparent onslaught a ainst their faith - ‘The Church of Rome 
never proved anything. They relied on the wearing down of points by constant persistence 
and unproved assertions.’398 This was a more pointed attack on the Catholic Church and 
indicated a greater willingness to focus the whole case as a matter of religious rather than 
simply racial conflict.  
At the General Assembly in May of that year the Rever nd Hutchison Cockburn, 
presenting the Church and Nation report, once again returned to the familiar attack on the 
Irish and their alleged habits. The criticisms against the Government in this report have been  
addressed in the previous chapters but one or two points in his speech are worth repeating. 
There was a call for the restriction of immigration, the franchise and repatriation of those who 
committed crime or became a public charge, (all to general applause). Interestingly, he 
mentioned the Free State Committee, ‘The answer given the other day from an authoritative 
quarter was that the governing body in the Irish Free State appointed a committee to 
investigate this matter in 1928 but they were evidently still investigating it for no report had 
come to hand.’399  There is no indication where he came by this particular piece of 
information especially, as has been pointed out in the proceeding chapter, the Government 
were keen that knowledge of the existence of this committee (if exist it actually did) did not 
become public. Of course there had been oblique mentions during the election campaign by 
Gilmour but it would be instructive to know the identity of Hutchinson Cockburn’s 
‘authoritative source.’ Cockburn’s speech on the whole was an attack on the Government 
over the issue ‘demanding’ immigration laws ‘comparable to those in operation about all the 
British Dominions and a declaration of policy on the issue.’400 He also read out a letter 
alleging that a steamer had recently arrived in Greenock from Cork ‘with hundreds of young 
Irishmen on board who had been guaranteed employment in a new works outside Glasgow.’ 
When an elder from Glasgow, J.B. Galloway, expressed th  opinion that this story was 
‘grossly inaccurate’ Cockburn informed him that he had had it confirmed by telegram, he did 
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not say by whom. What is particularly striking about the debate of that year is the addendum 
to the deliverance moved by Mr Mathew Babington, minister of Glamis. 
Babington was unimpressed with the Committee’s approach to the issue of Irish 
immigration and held out little hope that any Government would legislate to prevent or 
regulate Irish immigration. As far as he was concered the appeal should be directed to the 
employers of Scottish labour: 
 
 He would like the Committee to ask all their principal industrial concerns how many 
Irish people they employed. Let them apply to the Corporations of Edinburgh and 
Glasgow and to the great railway and industrial concer s and ask them how many of 
their foremen and gaffers were Irishmen, and whether ir foremen and gaffers 
preferred their own countrymen. …So long as Scottish employers of labour were 
willing to employ, and offered employment to Irish people, they could not prevent them 
coming in….What they wanted was the regulation of the supply of labour, and the 
appeal was, not to the Government but to the loyalty nd patriotism of the Scottish 
employers of labour (applause) he moved that the following be added…The General 
Assembly instruct its Committee to appeal to Scottish employers of labour to employ 
Scottish labour where such is available.401   
 
Babington was seconded by A Stanley Middleton of Edinburgh, who illustrated his 
arguments by citing instances where ‘numbers of Irishmen were being called over from 
Ireland by telegram to take up work in under public odies in the West of Scotland where 
Scotsmen had been refused work.’402 He also gave an instance where an Irish housekeeper 
had been appointed and within months all the indigenous domestic staff in the household had 
been replaced with natives of Ireland. It is a remarkable feature of these debates that so much 
unsubstantiated anecdote was treated as accurate by so many in the Church of Scotland.  
What is of particular interest is Hutchinson Cockburn’s response to addendum which he 
accepted ‘gladly’ as ‘that was the line on which they had been moving for the last seven or 
eight years.’403 
 This debate raises some fundamental questions about the nature of sectarian employment 
practice in Scotland in the inter war period. First of all the General Assembly in 1930 by 





adopting this deliverance and the addendum was issuing a specific instruction for the 
Committee to directly urge Scottish employers to institute a hiring policy that would exclude 
‘Irish’ workers, in effect to put up the ‘No Irish need apply’ sign figuratively if not literally. 
Although it has to be pointed out that if such sign were commonplace then it is probable that 
the Church would not have been so exercised on the issue.404 It is noteworthy that in the 
history of the period the general assumption has been that it was the Irish who were 
disadvantaged and yet the General Assembly spent a considerable amount of time arguing the 
direct opposite. The second point is that there has not been found, as yet, any documentary 
evidence that either the Kirk or the Government made  direct approach to major industrial 
concerns regarding their ethnic or religious employment practices. Neither does there appear 
to be any evidence of a response by Scottish employers, either individually or collectively, to 
such an appeal. This in turn raises the crucial question was there a general policy on the non-
recruitment of ‘Irish’, in effect Roman Catholic, labour? Given the fact that throughout the 
1920s and 1930s the Kirk was repeatedly urging Scottish employers to do their patriotic duty 
and employ only Scotsman where possible suggests not. The quotation at the beginning of 
this chapter from the Church Interests Committee illustrates the point 
 The lack of documentary evidence to either prove or disprove this point is one of the more 
tantalising aspects of the period. Hutchinson Cockburn informed the Assembly that that was 
the line they had been moving towards for a number of years, and while there is copious 
correspondence in the Government files on Irish immigration, and the issue of Irish 
employment in public works schemes had been taken up with the Scottish Office and 
Ministry of Labour, it does not seem that that there was any comparable effort made with the 
private sector. On such a fundamental issue one is reluctant to speculate, it may well be that 
such correspondence has simply not survived, or that a specific study on this particular issue 
has yet to be undertaken. Research in the papers of the industrialist Sir James Lithgow,405 
(1883 – 1952) who was particularly active in the Churc , have not revealed any 
correspondence on the matter. However, as Anthony Slaven points out, ‘Another 
characteristic of these men of business was their close identification with their local 
communities, their civic and philanthropic roles….The local churches were particularly well 
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endowed by our men since many were active in church affairs as elders over many years.’406 
It is highly likely that many of these men were in fact present at General Assemblies where 
these exhortations were made and perhaps personal ct ct was more the order of the day. It 
still begs the question why the Kirk felt it necessary to make these public appeals to 
employers if they were already operating a selectiv employment policy? Hutchinson 
Cockburn did make the point that he had asked the gov rnment whether they would make it a 
condition of grant for public works schemes that employment be limited to those born in the 
United Kingdom. The Secretary of State had replied: ‘I do not consider it would be 
practicable to make this a condition of grant but it is open to local authorities to lay down 
conditions with regard to classes of unemployed men th y are prepared to receive from the 
Employment Exchanges for relief work.’407  Hutchinson Cockburn trusted that ‘all Town 
Councils and public bodies would take notice of the fact.’408 It was a broad hint if nothing 
else. 
 
III A Committee of Vigilance 
The Church Interests Committee began its work slowly but it did not lack ambition. At the 
first meeting the Committee set out its aims: 
 
(1) To accumulate stores of exact knowledge to be used in statistical information and 
literature. 
(2) To link up the Church with the other churches and agencies throughout the world e.g. 
The Protestant League 
(3) To issue a questionnaire to all ministers 
(4) To prepare a memorandum on the Roman Catholic Church and Scottish Education 
(5) To examine Roman Catholic Manuals of English and Scottish History and the 
publications of the Catholic Truth Society 
(6) To prepare volumes composite on Papal Infallibility, Church and State and similar big 
questions409 
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In the first year of its existence it produced a questionnaire to be sent to every minister in 
Scotland, although lack of funds delayed its transmis ion until September 1933 when an 
unnamed donor came to the rescue.410 Regrettably the actual questionnaire itself is no longer 
extant but it is possible from the Committee’s reports to the Assembly to reconstruct the 
sense of the questions asked. Essentially ministers w e being asked to report back on the 
numbers of Roman Catholics in their parishes, their activities, what properties or lands were 
being purchased, what was the state of inter-communal relations and what steps individual 
ministers were taking to combat Romanist propaganda and errors. The ministry as a whole 
were to be used as an intelligence gathering service on the actions of the Roman Catholic 
Church and they were to report back to the Committee on Church Interests who would then 
analyse the material provided and make recommendations to the Assembly for counter 
measures. Curtis set out the proposed plan to the Ass mbly:  
 
They were not a company of mere alarmists, but a committee of vigilance…They 
resolved to keep watch themselves and to stimulate w chfulness in others throughout 
the land. Forewarned was forearmed and they were doing what was an obvious duty to 
all that they counted dear and sacred in Scottish life and religion. As they were acting 
on behalf of all, they called on all…to lend support to their efforts… Whether the 
danger threatened from outside or confronted them within the Church in tendencies 
disloyal to the genius of their faith and worship they had to consider where they would 
lead their people and what injury they might work upon the historic spring of their 
religious character.411 
  
It was apparently not just the Roman Catholics who ere dangerous but a disloyal element 
within, presumably those in the Church who did not share Professor Curtis’ appreciation of 
the situation. The language of Curtis’ speech, for one who was not a ‘mere alarmist,’ was 
designed to alarm. The Reformation was in danger and the faithful needed to be vigilant and 
report to a Committee set up specifically to protect them. Substitute revolution for 
reformation and Muir’s point, quoted above, is well made. Apart from the rather idiosyncratic 
suggestion that the Church of Scotland consider setting up public schools on the English 
model to attract the well-to-do, the Committee’s action plan consisted of compiling statistics 
of the growth of Roman Catholicism in Scotland, differentiating between the Scottish and 
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immigrant population. They would also ‘review the manifold forms of Roman Catholic 
propaganda’ in their country.’ In effect this meant reading the entire output of the Catholic 
Truth Society as ‘He thought they ought to know what t eir Roman Catholic fellow citizens 
were taught about their own faith as well as about their heretical and unbelieving selves’412. 
This would be carried out by ‘Church History Professors’, in other words by Professor 
Burleigh. The Catholic propaganda machine was one which Curtis admired and feared at the 
same time, ‘They were emissaries of suggestion…. Gifted writers like Mr Chesterton and Mr 
Belloc wrote as men with a mission and by fair means or foul aimed at revolutionising history 
as they had known it’.413   Finally he raised the questionnaire that the Committee intended to 
send out to every parish although he would give no details of its actual content, the General 
Assembly not, according to Curtis, being the time or the place for such information, and 
expressed the hope that all ministers would take the time to respond. He ended on a fine 
rhetorical flourish: 
 
Knowing the facts … they would know the needs and kowing the needs they would 
do their best to advise the Church how to meet them. Their people required guidance; 
their people deserved guidance. They were uneasy whereas they used to feel secure. 
They felt that an invidious menace was spreading through the land. They were not 
content with vague reassurances. They were sure that the way to meet the Roman threat 
was not to imitate Rome’s fashions and ideas or to compromise with her system to 
stage manage worship or coerce obedience in rival to her methods. 
…How many hundreds of millions of her adherents didshe not owe to simple 
persecution? What instruments had she not stooped to mploy in Christ’s name in order 
to preserve her unity and her sovereignty? ...To despis  her was folly. To ignore her 
was irresponsible. To follow her…was to destroy thems lves. Calmly and patiently 
…they were called to guard their heritage in religion as their most sacred trust.414   
 
Curtis, having chilled the blood of the General Assembly, was immediately followed by 
Hutchinson Cockburn, seconding, who reinforced the point in case there were any present 
who might be considering such sentiments as somewhat intolerant for a Christian Assembly. 
The Roman Catholic propaganda in his opinion was doing active harm, ‘It appealed to 





passion and ignorant prejudice. They owed it to themselves that their appeal should be well 
founded and reasonable. The slackness of mind which was called tolerance was sheer 
intellectual laziness and moral cowardice. The Roman C tholic Church played up to it and 
yet none were so intolerant…If Scotland by slackness or indifference ever became Roman 
Catholic it would serve her right and the punishment would not be undeserved.’415 On 
occasion it is best to let the protagonists speak for themselves. The report was 
overwhelmingly approved. 
   It is clear from the speeches the approach that some in the Kirk were adopting. This was 
now a direct attack on the Roman Catholic Church alt ough the distinction was still made 
between Irish and home-grown Catholics. The Church of Rome was a direct threat to the 
Church of Scotland and by extension Protestants everywh re. Despite the Church facing such 
a dire situation the Church Interests Committee managed to achieve almost nothing at all in 
the following year, in fact there was no Committee m eting between 17th March 1932 and 
30th March 1933.  Professors Curtis and Burleigh did visit the Stockholm Assembly of the 
World Alliance for the Protection and Furtherance of Protestantism ‘but having regard to the 
changed conditions on the continent it was agreed that, while contact should be maintained 
actual affiliation should not pressed until the situation became clearer.’416 Hutchinson 
Cockburn produced a pamphlet in 1933 entitled The Protestant Outlook in Scotland which 
was largely a rehash of past Church and Nation Committee reports although he did allude in 
it to the forthcoming questionnaire of the Church Interests Committee.417 He did, however, 
emphasize in the preface that some of his best friends were Catholic.418  The Committee 
report to the General Assembly of 1933 was in fact so hin that it prompted one minister, Dr 
Neil Meldrum of Aberdeen, to enquire when the Committee ‘were going to get a move 
on?’419 He need not have worried, the Committee came back in 1934 and this time armed 
with the preliminary results of the Questionnaire. 
  The Committee report of 1934 and Deliverance of 30th May 1934, while not including the 
actual questions asked, does provide the information that the Questionnaire itself was six 
pages long, consisted of twenty-two questions in five sections. This provides good reason 
why by, 1934, one third of parishes had not responded and the Assembly was asked to urge 
defaulters to complete the form. The report described the response as ‘gratifying …But it is to 
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be regretted that not every parish has as yet sent a reply. Some of these in which the questions 
raised must be acute are still in default.’ However, r ading between the lines of Curtis and 
Burleigh’s speeches of that year it seemed that there were those in the ministry that 
responded who were not quite so ready to fall in with the Committee’s agenda. Curtis stated 
that ‘Only in one or two instances did they receive replies which resented the Committee’s 
action, though under the authority of the General Assembly, as stirring up trouble and as an 
attack on the Roman Catholic Church.’420   He also felt it necessary to defend the 
questionnaire on the grounds that there was ‘widespread apprehension; and a growing 
determination to resist encroachment: and they desired to ascertain how far these fears were 
well grounded and at what points resistance was called for.’421  The fact that Curtis felt the 
need to justify the Committee’s actions does imply that the returns he had received did not, at 
the very least, display the sort of unanimity he was expecting, particularly if one considers 
Burleigh’s seconding speech. In it Burleigh rejoiced that ‘so many returns had come to hand 
from parishes which had nothing to report save the complete absence of Roman Catholicism. 
In every way that was gratifying.’422 He was not quite so gratified that some ministers 
appeared less than impressed with the whole exercise:  
 
It was true that there were those who deprecated th stirring up of old, and as they 
hoped dying controversies and who had seen in the questionnaire the sign of unworthy 
fanaticism. It was interesting to see that counsels of moderation often came from those 
Highland parishes where Romanism was strong, if not predominant and where the two 
faiths dwelt together in amity untroubled by racial and national feuds. Yet even from 
industrial cities occasional voices were raised telling them of friendship and co-
operation in some directions at least. The Assembly, however, would not be surprised if 
a complete scrutiny of the returns should reveal the fact that a chasm still yawned 
between the two faiths.423 
 
It would seem that the negative reaction to the questionnaire was more widespread than 
Burleigh, and certainly Curtis, were prepared to admit. Unfortunately neither the 
Committee’s report nor the surviving minutes give a st tistical breakdown of the responses. 
Judging by the rhetoric employed it is a reasonable hypothesis that the questionnaire itself 
                                                 





may have been designed, deliberately or unconsciously, to elicit the responses that the 
Committee expected. The fact that both Burleigh andCurtis were forced to admit to the 
Assembly that there were dissenting voices raised suggests that a significant section of the 
Church was not in sympathy.  
  There were, however, those who thought that the Committee was not going far enough. The 
Reverend F.E. Watson of Bellshill attempted to introduce an addendum asking the 
Committee, with the authority of the General Assembly, to secure the repeal of the 1918 
Education Act. Watson was something of an enthusiast on this issue. As Tom Gallagher 
describes him, ‘he was still imbued with the zeal of the convert, having been a Wesleyan 
minister for sixteen years before being admitted to the Church of Scotland in 1930. He was 
also himself a relative newcomer to Scotland, having spent his first forty-five years in the 
North of England.’424 It is interesting to note in Curtis’ response to rejecting this addendum 
he did not do so because he was out of sympathy with the sentiments expressed, but rather ‘to 
talk of repeal was to court a rebuff and was out of the question. Such sweeping demands were 
a hindrance to their cause…sufficient harm had been do e to the Protestant cause by 
impulsive and ill-considered demands.’425 This may well have been a tacit recognition that 
constant insistence of the Church for legislative action since 1923 was beginning to prove 
counterproductive, or simply that even Curtis recognised there was little chance of that 
particular ‘demand’ ever passing Parliament. 
   The actual report of 1934 gives an interesting sap hot of inter-faith relations in the period, 
but not altogether one that the Committee was perhas expecting. For example, from the 
replies received from ministers on the propagandist activities of the Roman Catholic Church 
nowhere was it reported the propagandist literature was in circulation and apparently the most 
that could be described as an activity took the form f  ‘social evenings, dances and whist 
drives, especially on Sundays.’426 Whilst this may have offended the more strictly sabbatarian 
feelings of some in the clergy the report conceded that there was little evidence of 
proselytising by Roman Catholic priests. Even the Ne Temere Decree427 and the danger of 
mixed marriages, which had so exercised the Reverend Duncan Cameron in the 1920s 
seemed not to be having any effect and there were no ports of substantial losses to Rome. It 
would seem that if anything mixed marriages resulted not in a loss to Rome but the severing 
of all church connection. Nevertheless, ‘The mixed marriage is universally held to be a great 
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evil even where it does not lead to domestic dispeace (sic) or unhappiness.’428 Perhaps it was 
this belief that resulted in the loss, by both chures, of family connections. 
     It is a feature of the reports produced by this committee that there was frequent use of 
terms like ‘there is a widespread impression’ without any quantitative evidence given to 
support its assertions. Given that the Kirk was so tatistically obsessed it is remarkable that in 
a report, which in itself was supposed to be a statistical exercise, the actual figures are notable 
only by their absence. It does mean that some of the information must be regarded with 
caution.  On some issues, however, the report probably gives a reasonably accurate reflection 
of opinion within the Church at the time. On the issue of the 1918 Education Act, the report 
states: ‘it is clear that there is in the minds of our ministers a widespread misgiving and even 
resentment, regarding the effect of the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918.’429   The real 
resentment appears to have been for basic economic reasons. In taking over the Roman 
Catholic Schools by the state it was felt that the Roman Catholic Church had been in receipt 
of a massive financial windfall courtesy of the public purse. No such windfall had come in 
the direction of the Presbyterian Churches after th Education Act of 1872. Minor issues such 
as the Roman Catholic Church being allowed to use their school premises in the evenings for 
free while ministers in some instances had to pay for a use of a hall in what had been their 
own schools prior to 1872, was, according to the Committee a source of irritation.  The 
Committee’s recommendation was that ‘whether there ought not to be instituted a careful and 
dispassionate survey of the whole situation with a view to ascertaining whether the Act of 
1918 can be regarded as a permanent settlement, and, if not in what direction amendment 
should be sought.’430 From this it can be seen another reason why Curtis wa  reluctant to 
accept Watson’s addendum. The Committee wanted to refine their approach on this issue 
although how ‘careful and dispassionate’ the survey th y actually produced in 1935 will be 
discussed below. 
   On other issues regarding the relations between Catholics and Protestants any increase in 
Roman Catholic activity, especially with regard to the purchase of property and setting up of 
institutions, was regarded with suspicion, especially s the funds for these were widely 
regarded to have come from the public purse as a direct result of the Education Act. Again 
the Committee relied on unsubstantiated assertion rathe  than on specifics, ‘many cases have 
occurred where Church of Scotland congregations strongly resent the policy on the part of the 
                                                 




Roman Catholic Church of thrusting itself into the art of the Protestant community.’431 If 
the Committee were vague on this issue they were even vaguer on, as they put it, ‘the 
replacement of Protestant by Roman Catholic labour.’ 432 It is important to note here that the 
term Roman Catholic was used and not Irish. Up until this point the argument had always 
been, ostensibly at any rate, that Irish labour wassupplanting Scottish labour and here it was 
Roman Catholic supplanting Protestant. It is an important distinction and does mark the 
introduction of a specifically religious element ino the debate. Undoubtedly it had been at 
the heart of the entire controversy but this change in terminology points to a public, if 
possibly unconscious, admission of the fact. The conflation of the terms Irish and Catholic, 
which the Kirk had been at such pains to avoid, wasnow made overt in the Committee’s 
report. Even so the Committee could bring precious little evidence to support their case as 
they acknowledged themselves: 
 
 It is naturally difficult to bring forward specific instances of such replacement, but in 
many areas there is very considerable suspicion in regard to this matter…and in the 
industrial districts it is the subject of general comment that where there are Roman 
Catholic foremen distinct preference is given to their co-religionists….Here is a matter 
calling for investigation, if only because the suspicion of unfair treatment accorded to 
native workmen is giving rise to bitter feeling.433 
 
The Committee did concede that as far as relationshps between the adherents of the 
respective faiths they were generally ‘amicable’ and that between ministers and priests it 
varied ‘from complete aloofness to friendliness and co-operation especially on Education 
Committees.’434   Rather than welcoming this development the committee noted that a 
‘tendency is also to be noticed in some quarters to defer, in the name of toleration and charity 
to the Roman Catholic Church, a tendency which is being exploited to the full by that 
Church.’435  
   How was all this to be combated? The Committee had asked ministers what measures they 
took to counteract ‘Roman Catholic propaganda’ and what help might be given to their 
efforts. By and large, it appears that most ministers preached special sermons and gave 







instruction in their bible classes, as this was the job of a Church of Scotland minister it does 
not appear that many thought there was a special requirement to be constantly combating 
Rome, although some new literature on the principles of the reformed faith would be 
welcomed. The responses did point out that, ‘Great care must be taken to avoid what is 
commonly recognised as a grave danger – viz. adding gratuitously to the tale of bitterness and 
enmity which already exists and which some of the methods being employed to defend the 
Reformed Faith inevitably augment.’436 This wise advice was not followed by the Committee 
in its report of the following year but it does show that the Church was beginning, slowly, to 
take note of what was happening outside of its debates on the Mound even if the Committee 
itself thought that its actions were entirely fair nd reasonable, despite the rhetoric on the 
dangers of toleration.  
    What the report and debate of 1934 constitutes, and why so much space has been devoted 
to it here, is the first attempt to canvass opinion within the reunited Church of Scotland 
specifically on the issue of its relations with the Roman Catholic Church. It was not an 
exercise in comparable scale to the first and second Statistical Accounts of Scotland, and 
certainly, for a report compiled by academics, the standards of evidence employed were less 
than rigorous. However, that is not to say that it should be overlooked or that the information 
contained within it is entirely worthless. It does demonstrate there were those in the Church 
who were not altogether happy with the line being taken and that hints, if no more than hints, 
of unease about the whole anti-Irish, and by this stage overtly anti-Roman Catholic line were 
beginning to emerge. It would also appear that on the ground co-operation rather than mutual 
hostility was the usual relationship between priest and minister. The report also provided no 
conclusive proof that Scottish employers were favouring Irish or Roman Catholic labour over 
the indigenous, and conversely, that the opposite was true. Surely any employer who was 
willing to publicly express a ‘patriotic’ policy of employing Scots first, or Scottish jobs for 
Scottish workers, would have earned the public approbation of the Committee and General 
Assembly. Instead the evidence seems to suggest frustration on the part of the Church that 
they were unwilling to do so. The report was accepted with no dissenting voice at the General 
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IV St. John XVII, 21 
   S. J. Brown states that ‘By the mid-1930s, however, interest in the Church Interests 
Committee was waning.’437 This is partly correct but the events of the years 1935 and 1936 
undoubtedly had an accelerating effect on this process. In the immediate aftermath of the 
debate the Reverend Alexander Cameron of the Protestan  Institute wrote to the Scotsman 
claiming that the concluding words of Professor Curtis had ‘thrilled the Assembly with their 
persuasive tone of warning and appeal’438  although he had conceded that the debate ‘fell to 
be discussed in a thin house after the luncheon hour.’439 The fact remains that there had been 
no overt challenge to the Committee’s activities in the General Assembly. The Committee’s 
own minutes are particularly thin for the entire period but it does not appear that they 
believed that they faced any great challenge to their work, although there were some  
glimmers of problems to come, mainly in their inability to hold on to a Convenor for any 
length of time and, even as early as 1933, there was a proposal to subsume the Committee 
back into the Church and Nation Committee.440  The Committee had been given the specific 
remit from the General Assembly, ‘in view of the widespread misgiving and resentment 
regarding the socially unjust provisions’441 of the Education Act, to institute its ‘careful and 
dispassionate survey’ as to how the Act could be repealed or amended. It became the 
Committee’s last significant contribution but at the time there was no indication that this was 
to be the case.  
   The report set out the five main grievances of the Committee, and by and large it is 
reasonable to consider them the grievances of at leas a substantial proportion of the Church. 
Essentially it was felt that the Act had not created a truly national education system, that it 
institutionalised segregation on religious grounds, was a means of state subsidisation of 
Roman Catholic teaching and in the process had enriched that church enabling it to develop 
its buildings and improve its position in Scotland and, finally, that it had legally enshrined 
religious instruction in these schools without a similar provision for non-Roman Catholic 
schools. It would appear that it was the perceived injustice of alleged state subsidy that 
rankled most. These were not new grievances then or indeed now but this time the Committee 
set out a list of remedies, including ‘A national system of education embracing children 
irrespective of their religious belief.’ This on the surface would appear as a reasonable  
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request but was in effect a call for the abolition of state-funded Roman Catholic education, or 
a return to the status quo ante. They further demanded that no more denominational schools 
be built or taken over by public authorities, religious tests for teachers be abolished and that 
members of religious orders be forbidden from teaching in state schools and finally that 
periods be set apart for religious instruction either by staff ‘or by officially recognised 
representatives of the Churches.’442 The Reverend Watson need not have worried; his 1934 
addendum had carried after all even if the wording in this case was slightly more subtle. 
   The perceived economic advantage pertaining to the Roman Catholic Church   from the 
provisions of the 1918 Act fed into the sense of grievance of the Committee. According to the 
information claimed to be provided by the questionnaire ‘in many places in Scotland a steady 
policy is being pursued of purchasing land, houses, churches, cinemas, &c which are devoted 
to the interests of propaganda. A purpose would seem to be indicated of building up a 
“skeleton” organisation embracing the whole country…’ 443 The report listed in support of its 
case examples of disused Protestant churches being ought up and converted into Catholic 
use, notably the old United Presbyterian Church in the Cowgate in Edinburgh converted into 
St. Patrick’s. Other instances, included a former ‘Palais de Danse’ in Paisley being acquired 
by the Roman Catholic Young Men’s Guild and transformed into a meeting hall. The 
objection in this instance was that it was located ‘almost opposite the South Church’.444 
    After cataloguing the publicly financed spiritual and physical takeover of Scotland the 
report returned to the issue of the alleged unfair advantages Roman Catholic labour enjoyed 
in Scotland. The second quotation from the deliverance cited at the beginning of this chapter 
highlights the Committee’s impatience with Scottish employers on the issue. In the report 
itself, it once again relied on unsubstantiated rumo r to make its case:  ‘In many cases it is 
commonly said that no Protestant has the least chance of employment in certain undertakings 
so long as there are Roman Catholic unemployed.’445 Again there was the overt use of the 
terms Catholic and Protestant rather than Scottish or Irish. The Committee then went on to 
issue a stern warning as to what it considered would be the consequences of this dereliction 
of duty on the part of Scottish employers: 
 
What is abundantly plain is that there is a rising tide of indignation, the exploitation of 
which is likely to lead to most unfortunate and undesirable intrusion of sectarian 






animosity into public life, of which a beginning has lready been made. The only 
remedy would seem to be a greater care on the part of Scottish employers of labour for 
the interests of their own fellow countrymen.446   
 
It was, in its way, a prescient warning, although not for the reasons the Committee asserted. 
But it was obvious that the activities of the demagogues Ratcliffe and Cormack were 
beginning to impinge on the minds of the Kirk. This warning from the Committee is one of 
the more remarkable, in a campaign that had more than its fair share of remarkable, even 
outlandish statements.  What was abundantly plain ws that the Church, in various guises, the 
latest being the Church Interests Committee, had spent the last thirteen years attempting to 
create ‘a rising tide of indignation’ and exploit it for its own purposes and if any one 
organisation had a major responsibility for an ‘unfortunate and undesirable intrusion of 
sectarian animosity into public life’ it was the Church of Scotland itself. Now, in the 
somewhat convoluted logic of the Committee, any sectarian unpleasantness that ensued 
would be the responsibility of Scottish employers for not enforcing a sectarian employment 
policy in favour of Protestant workers as demanded by the Church of Scotland. 
   The fact of the matter was that the promoters of the anti-Irish, now anti-Roman, campaign 
had been pursuing this less than rigorous approach in the General Assembly for years without 
any detailed examination of their case. On this occasion they were not to be quite so 
fortunate. Gallagher has pointed out that there were church opponents of the anti-Irish line.447 
However, Dr J. Cromarty Smith,448 minister of Coatbridge, was the first to stand up in the 
General Assembly and state that, methodologically speaking, the Committee had no clothes, 
and that further it ‘appeared to be animated by a spirit of intolerance.’449 It was a masterly 
forensic demolition of the Committee’s report and raison d’être. As such it deserves far more 
attention than historians, with the possible exception of Stewart Brown, have given it. In the 
process of dissecting the report Cromarty Smith did not mince his words: ‘The report of the 
Committee appeared to him to have many statements purporting to be fact but was singularly 
devoid of evidence in support of the statements so much so that the report as it stood was a 
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document which it was difficult to deal with, and impossible to take seriously.’450 Having 
begun in this forceful manner he proceeded to refute practically every point made in the 
Committee report concerning the numbers of teachers in eligious orders, the numbers of 
Irish student teachers in Scotland and even the terms on which they were admitted to the 
Catholic teacher training colleges at Notre Dame and Craiglockhart. It was obvious that he 
had been well briefed, or, unlike the Committee, had thoroughly researched his subject: 
 
...in no single case did the report condescend on figures. How utterly unreliable some of 
the vague statements were might be gathered from the following...”Quite a number of 
the students come from Ireland, as the output of qualified Scottish students is not 
sufficient to staff all the transferred schools”. What were the facts? He had in his 
possession there a statement of the National Committee for the Training of Teachers 
signed by the Executive Officer of the Committee. The output of students at 
Craiglockhart and Notre Dame not sufficient! The case was the precise opposite. The 
officer told him that there were too many students and that there was, he would quote 
the precise words “definite unemployment among the s udents.”451 
 
He took issue with the claim that many of the students were Irish, giving figures on the actual 
enrolment and pointing out that Irish students not only paid their own way but gave a written 
undertaking not to seek or accept employment in state supported Catholic schools in 
Scotland. He then proceeded to point out that if the Catholics had secured a ‘proper religious 
atmosphere in their schools’ they were absolutely right and that they ‘knew their business and 
he feared that in matters educational they did not know theirs....The Committee was 
instructed to consider in what way the Act of 1918 might be amended. They found in the 
result of their lucubrations (sic) four recommendations. He did not know which of the four 
was the most fantastic or ridiculous.’452 Having made more trenchant criticisms of the report 
Dr Cromarty Smith sought the heart of the matter: 
 
He deplored and despised the too common methods of anti-Roman propaganda -- the so 
called demonstrations gathered by dint of beating the Protestant drum, appealing to the 
passions and fanaticism of the groundlings, meetings  which the superstitions of the 





more ignorant Romanists – and they did have their superstitions – were held up to 
ridicule - such methods did not a particle of harm to Rome, but inflicted infinite harm 
on all spiritual religion.453   
   
  He concluded with the quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter. Cromarty Smith was 
then ably supported by the Reverend Dickie from Rothesay who prophetically pointed out 
that there was much more to fear from rampant natiolism and paganism on the Rhine than 
there was to be feared from Rome. Their amendment to the deliverance, however, was 
overwhelmingly defeated. The significance of both speeches is that for once the gaping holes 
in the arguments had been exposed for all to see. If the majority of the General Assembly 
opted for the quiet life in approving the Deliverance and, by implication the report, they were 
to be rudely disabused by the events of next few months in Edinburgh when John Cormack 
brought Protestant mobs out, not only onto the streets of Edinburgh but onto the streets of one 
of its most salubrious suburbs. The Cormack phenomen is discussed in the following 
chapter but it undoubtedly had an effect on the deliberations of the Assembly the following 
year. 
  At the General Assembly of 1936 the outgoing Moderator Dr Marshall Lang (1868-1954) 
preached his final sermon as Moderator. He took for his text St John XVII, 21 ‘That they all 
may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the 
world may believe that thou hast sent me.’454 It was a plea for Christian unity in an 
increasingly troubled world but it was also a veiled r buke to the Kirk itself and a public 
acknowledgement that perhaps the Church’s preoccupations had not been where they should: 
 
…the subject of Christian unity must be considered in these days as one of supreme and 
vital importance to the world. Need I emphasise its importance, need I emphasise its 
importance? No matter how complacently we ourselves may live from day to day in our 
several compartments of domestic, social and even religious life the world is full of 
discord and trouble, and from that trouble and discord we cannot wholly disassociate 
ourselves from some part in that trouble, either by our own negligence or by our 
practice can we wholly excuse ourselves.455 
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It was a belated, and indirect, recognition that perhaps the Church had been turning a blind 
eye to the consequences of its own actions and that in an increasingly dangerous world the 
rather petty obsessions of doctrinal difference were of considerably less importance than the 
very real threats facing humanity. In fact to continue on this path was to run contrary to the 
spirit of Christ: 
 
…the Body of Christ through which His Spirit works is broken into units with each 
claiming a special portion of his Spirit but keeping the portion it claims from the other 
parts. Not until we become ashamed of this rending of the Body of Christ…not until we 
repent and seek to become one in some measure as he is on  with God, not in short 
until we achieve a real working unity within Christendom will the Church be other than 
it is – a more or less parochial concern….Meanwhile from this historical and hospitable 
pulpit I venture to appeal for the open heart and the open mind that banning all pride in 
our separate ‘isms’ whether Presbyterian, Anglican or Episcopalian – or even Roman – 
and sinking all prejudice of one branch of the Churc  towards another, we may 
zealously and unweariedly (sic) strive for that corporate unity which is in accordance 
with the mind of Christ.456     
 
  This is possibly one of the most important sermons preached by a Moderator in the inter-
war period because it effectively signalled the real end of the anti-Irish campaign. It did not 
mean the end of calls to halt immigration or the expr ssion of inflammatory opinions in the 
General Assembly but it marks the sea change in which majority opinion had turned. The 
difference in language of Dr Lang and Professor Curtis is self-evident but it was also a radical 
departure from the view expressed at that the previous General Assembly. For an outgoing 
Moderator to essentially repudiate, in so many words, Assembly policy of the last thirteen 
years and to appeal for the setting aside of sectarian difference in the cause of wider Christian 
unity implies that something fundamental had occurred.  This intervention by Lang is 
significant in another way. The son of a former Moderator, Church innovator and Principal of 
Aberdeen University, Dr John Marshall Lang (1834-1909), he had a direct connection to the 
more socially engaged pre-war Church (see Chapter Two). John Marshall Lang was 
responsible for introducing innovations such as standing for hymns and the introduction of 
pipe organs. Considered in his day something of a Scoto-Catholic Lang senior’s own closing 
                                                 
456 Ibid 
 188
address as Moderator in 1893 had stressed that economic insufficiency and not immorality 
was the main cause of poverty.457 Through his brother, Cosmo Gordon Lang (1864-1945) 
Archbishop of Canterbury, he also had a connection with Anglo-Catholicism and was a 
pioneer in the ecumenical movement.458  This sermon marked something of a spiritual and 
political shift in attitude of the Church. Not so much as a turn to the left but more of a 
rediscovery of its pre-war self. There are two furthe  ironies, John Marshall Lang served the 
Barony parish as Minister for over twenty years, the same parish as Dr John White. Cosmo 
Lang’s part in bringing about the Abdication of Edward VIII allowed de Valera to rewrite the 
Irish constitution. 
   It was not only in the words of Dr Lang that the change in tone at the Assembly of 1936 
was so marked. In some ways it reflected a sea change in the Church that had been coming 
for some time even if it was not as readily apparent under the White ascendancy.  In the mid-
1930s a younger element in the ministry had begun to challenge the basic tenets of the White 
view. Between 1933 and 1937 there had been long acrimonious debates on the issue of 
pacifism. In the Assembly of 1934:  
 
White delivered an impassioned speech against the pacifists, in which he appealed to 
the sacrifices of the First World War and denounced the pacifists for suggesting that 
they had reached a higher moral plane than those who had died in the war. It might be 
necessary, he proclaimed for a Christian country to go to war in order to defend itself, 
to assist a persecuted people, or ‘in fulfilment of its own destiny’. White’s speech was 
received with ‘thunders of applause’ and in the division the pacifists received less than 
fifty votes in a crowded house.459 
   
  White may still have commanded the Assembly but rising stars within the Church like 
George MacLeod (1895-1991) who had himself served with distinction in the war saw their 
pacifism as keeping faith with those who had died. There were new ideas, creeping slowly 
but inexorably, into White’s Church from the mid-thir ies onward. By 1934 MacLeod, whose 
family connections in the Church and rather dashing appearance, as well as distinguished war 
record, which had made him something of the darling of the middle-class congregation at St 
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Cuthbert’s, in  Edinburgh’s West End, had been serving for some years as minister of Govan 
Parish Church. The deprivation he encountered there d eply affected his thinking. He turned 
to the Celtic tradition for a new direction for the Church of Scotland. In a speech to a 
symposium entitled “Scotland in search of her youth’ he outlined the direction of his thought: 
 
Merely to sketch the trend and purpose of the puritan tradition is to reveal the distance 
that almost unconsciously we have moved in these days from the ground where once 
we stood. For reasons that would take a book to encmpass we have, in recent decades, 
been engaged in that manoeuvre which in every other warfare spells almost certain 
defeat – changing position at the dictates of circumstance, without consciously 
choosing our next alignment. Had the Church of Scotland resolutely maintained her 
Puritan tradition she might have had a great purpose t  perform today; had she 
alternately planned her line of movement more decisively she might have performed an 
even greater. Her deepest distresses are due to the fac  that she has done neither.460    
 
For MacLeod the answer was to return to the practices of the ancient Columban Celtic 
Church which he argued was the intention of Knox and the original reformers. In essence, as 
Ron Ferguson points out, reintroducing Catholic practices into the Kirk on the grounds that 
they were actually Celtic and thus Protestant. It was ‘magnificent, sweeping, polemic, bound 
to infuriate. And it did.’461 It would also lead to accusations of ‘romanisation’ that would 
follow him for the rest of his life462. The analysis may have been on rather dubious historical 
ground but this return to the Celtic appealed to the romantic in MacLeod. There was also a 
practical side.  The 1930s were a battle of ideas, Marxism, fascism, capitalism all within the 
economic turmoil of that decade. For MacLeod the Churc  was not living out the Gospel in a 
way that appealed to ordinary people. Issues like unemployment and poverty were issues for 
the Church. While there is not the space here to go into detail of the founding of the Iona 
Community in 1938 it is interesting to note that MacLeod did secure White’s support for the 
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project and that MacLeod had also been and an enthusiastic supporter of White’s Church 
extension campaign. The two men, however, were from fundamentally different strands of 
the Church and the ethos of Iona was in some ways the antithesis of White’s idea of the 
Christian commonwealth. 
  Apart from MacLeod there were others who were beginning to make their mark on the 
Church in this period and would have profound influence in the future. Perhaps the most 
significant of these was the Baillie brothers. John Baillie (1886-1960) and Donald Baillie 
(1887-1954). These two were ‘the leading Scottish theologians of the mid-twentieth century 
whose significance extended far beyond their native country.’463 Sons of a Free Church 
minister in Gairloch their early careers had followed a similar path. Both studied philosophy 
at Edinburgh University and later trained for the ministry at New College and becoming 
assistant ministers in Edinburgh. After the war their paths diverged, John pursuing a 
distinguished academic career in the United States nd Canada where he had been closely 
involved in the ecumenical movement while Donald remained in the ministry in Scotland 
until 1934, as result of his rising reputation as a cholar, he took up the Chair of Systematic 
Theology at St Mary’s College, St Andrews. In the same year john returned to Scotland to 
become the Chair of Divinity at Edinburgh. Having been out of the country for nearly fifteen 
years John Baillie had little connection with the Church’s policies. ‘Although no social 
radical, he had been extremely unhappy with the conservatism of the of the Church’s social 
teachings...and had felt a need “to turn to Christian socialism to offset the emphasis on 
quietism.” 464   
    The social attitudes of the Baillie brothers had been formed by the increasing social 
concerns of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As A.C. Cheyne has illustrated: 
 
‘A concern for social justice lay very near to the core of his understanding of the 
Christian faith.’ With these words (to be found in the biographical essay which he 
prefixed to Donald’s posthumously published The Theology of the Sacraments) John 
introduced the most explicit account anywhere availble of his brother’s attitude to 
social questions, He continued as follows: ‘He was zealous not only for religious but 
for political and especially economic freedom; zealous also for equality, not in a 
doctrinaire understanding of it but in the sense of the removal of many unjustified 
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inequalities with which he felt our society to have b en traditionally burdened. He was 
thus inclined rather strongly to the left in his political convictions...’ 
...there is little doubt that the biographer shared the view he was describing.465 
 
  These were attitudes that had been largely quiescent in the Church of Scotland since the war 
but by the late 1930s, with war looming, the Church gradually rediscovered its social 
conscience. The Baillies epitomised the new, or perhaps more accurately, rediscovered social 
thinking in the Church. The rising reputation of John Baillie led to his appointment in May 
1940 as the convenor of the Church’s special Commission for the Interpretation of God’s 
Will in the Present Crisis. While strictly speaking the ‘Baillie Commission’ itself lies outside 
the scope and timeframe of this thesis it is useful to make some comment on it here to 
illustrate the change that was beginning to stir in the General Assembly of 1936. The 
Commission undertook to examine a wide range of issue  but the following quotation from 
its 1942 report demonstrates how far progressive Church thinking had changed from White’s 
conservative Christian commonwealth. 
 
Christians have often failed to distinguish adequately between the religious and 
political spheres, and have thus misled the Church into making pronouncements on 
questions which it only imperfectly understood. But we hold it as certain that the 
greater harm has come about through the opposite error – through the indifference of 
Christians to the maladjustments of that civil ordering of society in which they like 
others have a part, and the consequent failure of the Church to bring its own light to 
bear upon the problems so created. If it were merely that Christians were so exclusively 
absorbed in heavenly things as to be indifferent to the earthly ills of themselves and 
their neighbours, that alone would spell a serious fal ification of the true Christian 
temper; but it is to be feared that many of us must plead guilty to the even more 
damaging charge of complacently accepting the amenities, and availing ourselves of the 
privileges of a social order which happened to offer these things to ourselves while 
denying them to others...We long for a revival of spiritual religion, but there are many 
who suspect the spirituality to which we call them of making too ready a compliance 
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with a social order that for them means only hunger, slum conditions, unemployment, 
or sweated labour.466 
 
It was a far cry from the General Assembly of 1926 that had given Baldwin so rapturous a 
welcome after the General Strike.  In this report, as S. J. Brown has argued ‘the Commission 
...decisively reversed the positions held by White and the older leadership that the Church 
should not speak out on economic and political issue  and that it should support a racial 
nationalism... it was the duty of the Church to inform itself on political and social issues...The 
Church must also set itself against racism and racial nationalism, as contrary to the Christian 
ideal of world brotherhood.’467 In 1936 the Baillie commission was still in the future but even 
some of the ‘old guard’ were beginning to tone down the stridency of the previous year and 
recognise that there were other voices within the Curch and that these were beginning to 
question the orthodoxies of the 1920s and early 1930s.  
  In 1936 the Reverend Maclagan, by now Convenor of the Church Interests Committee and a 
veteran of the anti-Irish campaign almost from its inception, made, what was for him, a 
conciliatory speech in which he conceded that the Committee’s functions should be amended 
from what was originally conceived and that it might perform a useful role in preserving the 
unity of their own church: 
 
In their own Church they had parties leaning to oneside and parties leaning to the 
other…. It seemed to him if the Assembly had a Committee where both schools of 
thought could be represented, where both aspects of the truth could be presented to the 
Assembly it might with official sanction of the Assembly, present a unified policy 
acceptable to the whole Church. The primary intention, however, was to maintain their 
Catholic inheritance and their Protestant inheritance. The policy of the Committee was 
largely a positive constructive one. He did not suppose the Assembly would like the 
Committee to enter into acrimonious discussions with people of other religious 
beliefs.468  
   
  MacLagan supposed rightly. The responsibility for c nsideration of the 1918 Education Act 
was transferred to the Education Committee and it was clear that in the intervening period a 
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considerable change of heart had come over many in the Church, not necessarily Maclagan 
himself but he was still able to state that ‘negotiations were going on for an amicable 
settlement of what was really a very difficult situa ion…he thought that Assembly would 
agree that it would be infinitely be better and happier for the Church and for the purposes of 
education that a spirit of amity and agreement should be developed and furthered.’469 From 
whence had come all this amity and cooperation?  Perhaps the clue can be found in the 
closing words of MacLagan’s speech: ‘He thought it was for the good of the Christendom 
that they, as successors of those who laid the foundation of that great Church, should do what 
they could to keep the foundations strong and to keep their fair name clean.’470 It was not to 
the satisfaction of all of course: the Reverend Watson was of the opinion that the previous 
year’s report had been heroic but the Committee had now lapsed but he was now in the 
minority.  It is quite possible that the events of 1935-1936, described in the following chapter, 
had brought about a serious change of heart. Theories f racial superiority and robust defence 
of the Church Reformed were designed to bring the flock back to the Church, not bring stone-
throwing mobs into the Edinburgh suburbs. The consequences of their own actions had been 
brought home to them. Despite the fact that the Cormack disturbances were largely sound and 
fury they had had the potential to have been considerably worse. Oddly enough in the very 
last Church Interest Committee minutes at the meeting of 19th November 1936  there was a 
brief ‘mention of an article  in the Madrid clerical newspaper ‘Debati’ which gave an account 
of the recent ‘anti-Romanist troubles in Edinburgh’ 16th July 1935’471 which in some ways is 
a fitting epitaph. 
 
V Conclusion 
   By 1937 the Church Interests Committee was effectiv ly killed off and its functions, such 
as they were by that point, subsumed into the Church and Nation Committee. It did not mean 
that that was entirely the end of calls for the restriction of Irish immigration, even a bitter 
leader in the Scotsman of May 2nd 1939 called for it although that was more to do with Irish 
neutrality and resistance to conscription than anythi g the Church had had to say on the issue. 
The Committee itself faded away and would no longer trouble the deliberations of the 
General Assembly. This, however, does not detract from its importance. It began, as 
described at the beginning of this chapter, as the overseer and defender of the Protestant faith 
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from all enemies, foreign and domestic, a Committee of Kirk Security indeed. It may be 
asked why it is necessary to give a detailed analysis of its activities when its’ influence in the 
end was so minimal.   The answer lies not so much in what the Committee says about itself as 
what it says about the Church at the time and Scotland in general. 
   Firstly, it has been asserted by Callum Brown that it was merely going through the motions 
in order to keep its congregations happy.472 Tom Gallagher has argued that ‘the protagonists 
were a small but vocal minority of ministers who had a larger element of the faithful behind 
them. Most ministers were probably careful to keep out of the firing line and preferred not to 
get involved’473 and Steve Bruce has suggested with specific referenc  to the 1923 Menace 
report that ‘It is obvious from the actions of the Church of Scotland ministers in positions of 
power…that the overt racialism of the authors of the Menace was restricted to only a small 
group, and more than that, a small group confined to certain parts of Scotland.’474 On the 
other hand S. J. Brown has made the point that: 
  
The campaign represented a new departure for Scottish Presbyterianism. It was 
concerned not with converting Catholics to Protestantism, but rather with isolating, 
marginalising and even driving out of the country an ethnic minority that was viewed as 
belonging to an alien and ‘inferior’ race, and whose presence was blamed for many of 
the social and economic problems afflicting Scotland.475 
 
There are elements in each of these arguments that can be considered by a study of the 
Church Interests Committee. 
               The rationale behind the Committee was that a special body was required to defend 
Protestantism and that a subcommittee of Church and Nation was insufficient. This implies 
one of two things, either the Church and Nation Committee had tired of the whole campaign 
and its members wanted to transfer the whole issue over to the enthusiasts, or that it was felt 
that Protestantism was genuinely under threat and a dedicated body was necessary to 
examine its defences. On balance, considering the recent re-unification of the Church and the 
immense prestige of John White at the time, the latter is probably the more likely 
explanation. Protestantism re-united needed a champion not only to define what it was for 
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but what it was against. What was the re-united Church’s place in Scotland and who or what 
were its foes? 
  The Committee’s questionnaire attempted to answer these questions. While it was not, as 
pointed out above, in any way comparable to a statistical account of Scotland, it is still 
possible to glean a little about the prevailing attitudes, and in the absence of any comparable 
study for the period it makes the examination of the Committee’s work a worthwhile 
exercise. In fact the questionnaire does go some way to nswering the crucial question of how 
far was the anti-Irish/Roman obsession shared by the rest of the Church. The answer is not as 
far as that Committee thought, or perhaps hoped, but also extended further than Bruce, 
Callum Brown or Gallagher have argued. It does not appear that ministers thought that they 
were in a day-to- day battle with Rome or it would not have taken more than a third of them 
over a year to bother to reply to the Committee and this from areas in which the Committee 
thought the problem would be at its most acute. On the other hand there is no escaping the 
fact that the 1918 Education Act rankled with the clergy, but that did not mean there was an 
overwhelming desire to abolish it so much as to amend it. It was the perceived unfairness of 
the financial privileges accorded to the Roman Catholic Church mixed with a little, not 
unnatural, envy that they had not negotiated a similar deal for themselves when they had the 
chance that caused the ill-feeling. This does not mean that the Church Interests Committee 
members were considered fanatical zealots by a substantial number of the ministers. As far as 
it is possible to judge from the reports of the debat s, the contributions were generally well 
received and overwhelmingly supported. Gallagher may well have a point that many were 
opting for the quiet life but if so what does that s y about the Kirk at the time. Hutchinson 
Cockburn had denounced the ‘slackness of mind which is called tolerance’ as ‘sheer 
intellectual laziness and moral cowardice.’ Apart from the positively Orwellian tone of the 
phrase he did have a point, although not in the sense that he would have understood it. If the 
majority, or even a substantial minority, were opting to keep below the parapet then tolerating 
the Committee’s intolerance was indeed ‘sheer intellectual laziness and moral cowardice.’ It 
must have occurred to more than Cromarty Smith and Dickie that the Committee reports were 
intellectually weak and were attempts to retrospectiv ly justify a prejudice as a hypothesis. 
Yet it took a minister who, by his own admission had spent forty-seven years ministering in 
parishes with a large Roman Catholic presence, to stand up in the General Assembly to point 
this out. 
     In one other respect the Church Interests Committee is an invaluable source of material, if 
only by interpretation.  There was the constant emphasis on the alleged disadvantage of 
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Scottish, and in this case, Protestant labour, in relation to Irish, in this case Roman Catholic, 
labour. The fact that the Committee specifically used the religious definition rather than the 
racial is of particular importance. This was no longer the racial campaign of the 1920s, this 
was an unashamed appeal for preferential treatment on the grounds of religious affiliation. It 
was indeed still anti-Irish but there was less of an overt attempt to separate the terms Irish and 
Catholic. The constant reiteration of the issue implies that the Committee did not consider 
Scottish employers were doing enough to protect ‘Protestant’ labour whereas to a Catholic 
audience hearing such appeals from the Church of Scotland it would be natural to assume that 
these appeals were being heeded and acted upon. In which case every unsuccessful 
application for a job, on both sides, could be put down to religious prejudice. Viewed from 
the outside the statements of the Committee could look very much like institutional bigotry, 
viewed from the Committee’s perspective it was the protection of indigenous labour from 
unfair competition. In the end it was a combination of the sheer intellectual paucity of their 
case, more important developments in Europe, the influe ce a younger and more questioning 
element in the Church and, crucially, the actual public manifestation of sectarian strife on the 





















Sectarianism in Suburbia: The John Cormack Phenomenon 
 
‘I might be bored in Parliament,’ he reflected, ‘but I should love the rough and 
tumble of an election. I only once took part in one, and I discovered surprising 
gifts as a demagogue and made a speech in our little town that is still talked 
about. The chief row was about Irish Home Rule, and I thought I’d better have a 
whack at the Pope. Has it ever struck you Dick, that ecclesiastical language has a 
most sinister sound? I knew some of the words, thoug  not their meaning, but I 
knew that my audience would be just as ignorant. So I had a magnificent 
peroration, “Will you men of Kilclavers,” I asked, “endure to see a chasuble set 
up in your market-place? Will you have your daughters sold into simony? Will 
you have celibacy practised in the public streets?” Gad, I had them all on their 
feet bellowing “Never!”’  
John Buchan The Three Hostages 1924476 
 
 
Morningside Road circa 1930 
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I Introduction 
           This chapter deals exclusively with the ev nts in Edinburgh during the summer of 1935. It 
may be questioned why the occurrences of a few months of one year in the capital should 
merit a separate chapter in a study of Church and State and the anti-Irish campaign. John 
Cormack (1894-1978) and his Protestant Action Society had no affiliation with the Church of 
Scotland and, by and large, PAS activities were dircted against any and all Catholics of 
whatever nationality, not only the Irish. There is no evidence that Cormack had any 
encouragement in his anti-Catholic meetings and demonstrations from any official Church of 
Scotland body. However, the activities Protestant Action on the streets have had a profound 
effect on the understanding of sectarianism in Scotland and may, in their own way have been 
responsible for the demise of the Church campaign.  The actual disturbances have been 
variously described by Tom Devine as ‘the most violent anti-Catholic riots seen in Scotland 
this century,’477 and by Michael Rosie as ‘one rowdy demonstration in the leafy suburb of 
Morningside.’478 Whichever interpretation is preferred it is certainly the case that a whole 
mythology surrounding the period has grown up in succeeding years. Possibly this is because 
the sectarian disturbances took place in Edinburgh not noted, then or now, as a hotbed of 
religious tribalism, and that the most serious outbreak of violence occurred in Morningside, 
the epitome of suburban respectability. 
           However, it will be argued here that much of what has been written about the Edinburgh 
‘riots’ has been coloured by one account in particular, that of Tom Gallagher;479 and that 
account itself was heavily influenced by the press reports of the time and the reaction of 
Archbishop MacDonald in the immediate aftermath. It will also be argued that it is time to re-
examine the evidence concerning the activities of John Cormack and the Protestant Action 
Society from the standpoint of those who had to deal with him and his supporters, the legal, 
civil and police authorities. It is a feature of the study of Protestant- Catholic relations in 
Scotland that, in the words of Aldous Huxley, ‘an uexciting truth may be eclipsed by a 
thrilling lie’.  The bureaucrat, the magistrate and the policeman do not usually have much of a 
‘heroic’ function in this kind of history other than to provide authority figures whose purpose 
is to do down one side or the other. It is not intended here to ascribe a heroic function to any 
of the actors in these events but to intrude an unexciting truth into some of the more thrilling 
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‘exaggerations.’ For this reason there will be considerable attention paid to the course of the 
disorders and to piece together as accurately as pos ible what actually happened and how 
Cormack was privately viewed by the Scottish Office, the City Council and the police. 
Communist Party member Fred Douglas produced a pamphlet in 1937 entitled The Protestant 
Movement X-Rayed in which he accused the authorities of allowing sectarian strife to 
‘prosper by police licence’ and that the Edinburgh Council were complicit in allowing 
Cormack to proceed with his activities as a welcome div rsion from working class solidarity: 
‘the responsibility of our reactionary civic heads for tolerance and encouragement towards 
religious strife is a heavy one.’480 The accusation was an unjust one, though perhaps 
understandable given the author’s political persuasion, but it is of a piece with much that has 
been written about the period. What it is intended to be shown here is not that there were two 
sides to this particular controversy, but a third one as well and that that ‘third side’ has been 
ignored to the detriment of our understanding of the period. 
At this point, as much of what follows takes some issue with the analysis, it is well to set 
out the Gallagher thesis. It should be said at the outset that Edinburgh Divided is still the 
most authoritative account of the period and the pioneering work but as Michael Rosie points 
out ‘all pioneers …need to be followed by others filling in gaps and redrawing the 
contours.’481 Indeed Rosie’s chapter in New Perspectives on the Irish in Scotland goes a 
considerable distance in doing just that. Nevertheless, it is to the Gallagher account that 
scholars must turn first for an understanding of what e describes as the ‘Hot Summer of 
1935’.482   There are three main contentions in Gallagher’s analysis of the Cormack 
phenomenon firstly that: ‘He ( Cormack) was a vital c talyst who demonstrated that even in 
the absence of deep and readily understood divisions, a city or community can almost be torn 
apart by the sudden emergence of a charismatic individual who can move people to deeds 
which they would not normally contemplate;’483 secondly that after the Morningside ‘riot’: 
‘Isolated and  almost friendless, with Protestant Ac ion dominating the streets, Cormack’s 
threat to Edinburgh Catholics seemed only too real as the “hot summer” of 1935 drew to a 
close;’484 finally, and most contentiously: ‘The fact that nomajor Edinburgh institution such 
as the Kirk, the police, or the press took a major stand against Cormack or consistently sought 
to deflect public opinion away from him is something else that causes apprehension even at a 
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distance of fifty years.’485  Taking all three of these points together it is ea y to come away 
with the impression that Edinburgh in 1935 was ruled by a street demagogue with an angry 
citizenry at his back, where a persecuted Catholic minority fearfully awaited the pogrom 
while a complacent, if not complicit, establishment looked the other way. While there is an 
element of truth in this analysis it will be a major function of this chapter to show that there is 
also considerable evidence to the contrary. It is conceivable that the actions of the Protestant 
Action Society on the streets of Edinburgh may finally have brought home to the Scottish 
establishment the reality of sectarianism in Scottish society. It may well have contributed to 
ending the Church of Scotland’s obsessive campaigns on Irish immigration and the 1918 
Education Act. These may have been beneficial results of the law of unintended 
consequences. However, the fact remains that the majority response to John Cormack was 
one of appalled contempt and there is little or no evidence that he received any official or 
unofficial encouragement for his activities.  
To be fair to Gallagher this subject is one in which it is sometimes difficult for Scottish 
historians to be completely detached. As he readily admits in his preface  ‘I grew up a 
Catholic in a working class area of Glasgow, which some readers may consider a double 
disqualification for writing such a book about Edinburgh.’486 Certainly he does a good job of 
academic detachment but there is, in his methodology, certain critical gaps that affect the 
overall thesis. The scholarship is in many ways ground-breaking and his use of oral history, 
particularly with past members of the Protestant Action Society, is invaluable but it may be 
that it is the very use of oral history that adversely affects the analysis. His interviews are, 
rightly enough, with PAS members, Edinburgh Catholics and old labour stalwarts like Jack 
Kane but he nowhere seems to have thought it necessary or even desirable to interview 
former Moderate Councillors, any surviving members of the civil service or indeed any 
policemen. Equally, in the use of the documentary evidence, his account of the street 
disturbances is largely dependent on press accounts when there is a considerable body of 
evidence in the official file (NRS HH1/777) which contradicts some of the more lurid 
reporting of the time. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, he appears to be more 
impressed with the version of events given by Archbis op MacDonald than those of 
contemporary commentators to the extent of including the Archbishop’s statement to the 
press as a separate appendix to his book. It is not of course Gallagher’s fault that his account 
has been taken at face value by some scholars but it is remarkable that comparatively few 
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have sought to re-examine the primary sources. What follows here is an attempt to re-
evaluate those sources. 
 
II Edinburgh in 1935 
    In order to understand John Cormack and his Protestant Action Society it is necessary to 
understand Edinburgh. A feature of Edinburgh of the 1930s as compared with the present day 
is that there was still a large working class living and working in the city centre. Since World 
War II much of this community has been relocated to housing schemes, largely built on the 
periphery. This was a process begun in the 1930s with schemes built in areas like Stenhouse 
in the west, which was as far as the tram would go at the time. As many of the city’s 
inhabitants moved out, only the very poorest remained behind in the slums of the old town 
and a disproportionate number of these were the descendants of Irish Catholic immigrants. As 
Gallagher points out: 
The community was overwhelmingly working class. In a city where strong social 
distinctions existed, not only between the less well-off and the rich, but within the 
working class and the different gradations making up the middle and upper classes, 
they were predominantly unskilled labourers….Though relatively small in total 
numbers, Catholics were not scattered throughout the city but located in streets and 
lanes running off the High Street and the Canongate…They were tightly packed in 
tenements or lodging houses in Blackfriars Street, St Mary’s Street, the Grassmarket 
and the Cowgate…There were four main Catholic parishes, stretching from St 
Cuthbert’s in Slateford through to the Sacred Heart in the Lawnmarket…then St 
Patrick’s in the Cowgate…down to St Mary, Star of the Sea, in Leith.487 
  What was left of the medieval old town had been co verted into overcrowded tenements and 
lodging houses. There had been efforts at slum clearance in the nineteenth century, with the 
creation of Cockburn, Jeffrey and notably Chambers Streets, but even in the 1930s the 
provision of new social housing was a desperately slow process. The Irish immigrant 
community, being later arrivals, found themselves, as in so many other instances, at the back 
of this particular queue.  
  Another factor to bear in mind is that Edinburgh was dull. Even though Edinburgh, in 
comparison to other cities in Scotland, was not as badly affected by the depression, there was 
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still significant unemployment in certain areas and  sizeable proportion of its population in 
enforced idleness. The opportunities for diversion in Edinburgh in the 1930s, where not only 
was the cinema forbidden on a Sunday but citizens would not so much as hang out their 
laundry on that day, were severely limited. In his day Cormack was public entertainment in 
Edinburgh. This is not to say that Protestant Action was simply an extreme form of street 
theatre, but it is well to remember that  large sections of the crowds that Cormack brought 
onto the streets, or attended his meetings in the Usher and Oddfellows’ Halls, were composed 
of the curious and thrill seeking, as well as the trouble making.  However, in a drab dull city, 
in a drab dull time he represented excitement and the possibility of something out of the 
ordinary. It is interesting to note that a large section of Cormack’s admirers were female; this 
is not perhaps a comment on his sex appeal, but more that he provided an outlet for a section 
of society whose options were, certainly for working-class women, severely limited. 
    If in 1935 the Catholic community in Edinburgh formed a disproportionate number of 
those on the lowest economic rung, living in some of the poorest housing conditions in the 
city, it did not mean that they were regarded as a threat either by the Edinburgh bourgeoisie 
or their working class neighbours. Inter-marriage may have been frowned upon, but it was 
frowned upon by both sides. Edinburgh never had a gang culture to the same extent as 
Glasgow, but that does not mean that territorial disputes did not break out or that brawls were 
unheard of, but at the beginning of the year it would have been difficult to find anyone in 
Edinburgh who seriously believed that major civil disturbance was about to break out in the 
streets. This is not to say that the events came out of a clear blue sky. Cormack since his 
election to the City Council had been making great pl y with his accusations that the Council 
had a policy that favoured the employment of Roman C tholics.  
    The mere fact that the Council found itself having to officially deny some of Cormack’s 
wilder allegations gives some idea of the effect that is propaganda was  having in 1935, 
especially as it was aimed at the poorer sections of society and their main concerns, namely 
employment and housing. Still at this stage there was still no inkling of the trouble to come. 
However, on 4th March the Catholic Church announced that it would be holding a 
Eucharistic Congress in Edinburgh, the first since the Reformation.   
It was doubtful at the time, that one in ten Protestants in Scotland knew what a Eucharistic 
Congress was. Catholic ceremonies had been taking place in Edinburgh and throughout 
Scotland with little or no public comment.  In fact the only indications of disapproval came 
from the Reformation Society on March 20th. At their annual meeting the Chairman, the Rev. 
Dr Alexander Stewart, put the society’s view that: 
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 A few days ago it was stated in the press that it was proposed to hold a 
Eucharistic Congress in the city on some future dat. This proposal might be only 
in the nature of a bluff or as a feeler to gauge th reaction of the people of 
Scotland to such an undertaking. If the necessary authority were granted for such 
a ceremony, would there not be grave danger of serious public disorder, as it was 
not likely that the people of Edinburgh, the city of J hn Knox, would tolerate a 
spectacle so repugnant to the deepest convictions of all true Protestants. 488 
 
All this was in the future.  The really unique thing about the year 1935 was the 
concatenation of circumstances that allowed Cormack the opportunity to get Protestant 
Action out of the meeting hall and onto the street. The immediate cause of disorder came 
with the decision to grant a civic reception to theCatholic Young Men’s Society which was 
holding its annual conference in the city. As Gallagher points out: ‘It was not unusual for 
civic authorities to honour or acknowledge religious organisations in this way, even if they 
were controversial…In 1933, the Edinburgh council had onoured another Catholic gathering 
in similar fashion.’489 By now Cormack, boosted by the success of Protestant Action in 
winning a council by election in central Leith on April 2nd and joined on the council by his 
colleague James Marr, felt he was in a position to test his powers. At a meeting at the Usher 
Hall on April 17th attended by 3000 people the following resolution was passed: 
 
This great meeting of Protestants…respectfully requests the authorities 
concerned that they take steps to cancel the civic reception which has been 
granted to the Catholic Young Men’s Society. 
We ask this on two grounds – firstly this body of peo le are disloyal to our 
Protestant King and Queen; secondly, this body of people have proved 
themselves to be a danger wherever they have received the ordinary advantages 
of a British citizen. 
In view of the aforementioned facts there is every possibility that if this 
reception is carried through, serious disorder may take place, causing danger to 
life and limb of our Protestant citizens, combined with damage to property. We, 
as Protestants, do not wish this to happen but neverthel ss we are determined 
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despite the cost, to keep this city Protestant, having nothing to do with Popery or 
papists.490  
  
This was a direct challenge to the city authorities and sailing perilously close to an 
incitement to violence. It was not the sort of langua e the city was used to and prompted 
condemnation from both the Lord Provost Sir W. J. Thomson and the voice of the Edinburgh 
establishment, the Scotsman: 
 
My reply – as Lord Provost of the City – is this: - If Councillor Cormack or 
any of his adherents or followers causes, or seeks to cause, any disturbance on 
this occasion the whole powers at the disposal of the authorities will be utilised to 
quell the trouble and to bring to justice all those who take any part whatever in it, 
directly or indirectly. After having arrived at decisions by constitutional means 
the authorities will not be intimidated by any section of the community which 
may set out to break law and destroy order491 
 
On the same day the Scotsman published a leader which took Cormack and Protestant 
Action in general severely to task. It is a long article but it is worth quoting extensively from 
it as it goes to the heart of the argument that the press made no major stand against Cormack. 
Essentially the Scotsman pointed out that civic receptions, for groups holding national 
conferences in the city, were a normal civic courtesy no matter what creed or religion they 
represented and expressed its resentment that Protestant Action should see fit to challenge the 
Lord Provost’s committee. It saved it harshest criticisms for Cormack himself although he is 
not mentioned by name in the article:  
 
…the Protestant Action Society has unfortunately coupled its protest with 
something in the nature of an incitement to violence. At a recent meeting at the 
Usher Hall…speeches were delivered and resolutions pas ed which were to say 
the least deplorable. One of the resolutions carried through stated that if the 
reception was carried through ‘serious disorder might take place causing danger 
to life and limb…This was bad enough but the statements attributed to one of the 
speakers were worse. He is reported to have said tht ‘the time had come’ that it 
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was ‘one thing or the other – Protestantism or Popery’ and that he was afraid to 
think ‘of what was going to be’ on April 27th. Later warming to his subject, he 
exclaimed – ‘We will have to fight this. There may be bloodshed. Are you afraid 
of it?’ And there was we are told an answering cry of ‘Noes’. Finally, if he is 
reported correctly he declared that Edinburgh which in his lifetime had never 
known ‘a real smash up’ was going to know it if thecivic reception went on.   
Upon this heated atmosphere the Lord Provost now enters with a cooling 
reminder of the consequences of fomenting disorder… His words are a warning 
to which all good citizens will take heed and we hope that in this we may include 
the leaders, followers and adherents of the Protestant Action Society. The general 
public who are not interested directly in the quarrel should, in their own interests, 
keep aloof from the scene of the threatened trouble and we would earnestly enjoin 
upon all partisans whether of the Protestant or Catholic camp to do the same. The 
sectarian spirit is a heady thing and some people seem to have lost their moral 
and mental balance over this subject…Every honest minded British citizen 
deplores Jew baiting in Nazi Germany, we want no baiting of Roman Catholics 
here….There is enough ill will in the world, and even in our own country without 
adding the fires of religious fanaticism to it.492 
 
Cormack himself knew precisely who the paper was aiming at and wrote to the editor the 
following day attempting blame any resulting violenc  from his protests on the Catholic 
Church, As can be seen by the editor’s addendum to the letter it was not an argument that 
received much sympathy. 
 
Sir Your leader in to-days issue practically places the onus on myself for 
inciting to disorder. If my language gave that impression, I had reason for it, the 
said reason being an article in the Catholic Times of April 12. The article refers to 
a motion put forward to the Town Council by myself and Councillor Marr and 
states – The disgusting intolerance of the motion should ensure its rejection but 
we are becoming tired of these tyrannous attacks on our brethren in Scotland and 
we remind all concerned that they are trying to start a game at which two can 
play, and that once started will end in civil commotion such as rent and 
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dishonoured Liverpool to such a degree that a Royal Inquiry had to be held. We 
do not intend to take such treatment lying down. 
Incitement to violence is contained in the above. We are only going to be 
prepared. 
(We read Mr Cormack’s letter as implying that he and his party will not seek 
trouble or begin it. In that case he will, we presume recall the advice which he 
gave in the Usher Hall recently when he was reported to have asked ‘all those 
who were present and those they represented to go into the streets on Saturday 
week even if nothing but to cry No Popery. They could leave the other part of the 
business’, Mr Cormack added suggestively, ‘to the young people.’ Editor)493 
 
The Scotsman was to be disappointed in one of its earnest wishes t at the good people of 
Edinburgh would ‘keep aloof from the scene of threatened trouble.’ Indeed their own reports 
and those in other sections of the press, as well as the Lord Provost’s statement, practically 
guaranteed that a sizeable crowd would turn out for the occasion. Giving so much 
prominence to Cormack was free publicity, and the pros ect of tumult on the High Street to 
be witnessed for free on a Saturday night proved irresistible to many of the citizenry. In the 
event a large crowd assembled outside the City Chambers on the evening of Saturday 27th 
April. At this point it is useful to examine differnces in the press reports. Gallagher states 
that the Lord Provost’s intention to take stern measures was no bluff: ‘Not only was all police 
leave cancelled and the special constabulary mobilised, but a detachment of Gordon 
Highlanders, stationed at Edinburgh Castle, was placed in readiness and the mobile section of 
the Royal Army Service Corps at Leith Fort was also mobilised.’ (For the information on the 
mobilisation of troops the citation is the Protestant Times.)494 He then goes on to cite the 
Edinburgh Evening News 
 
At seven o’clock the High Street presented an amazing scene…the High Street 
entrance…was guarded by policemen standing shoulder to shoulder. In the High 
Street, the crowds at either end were held back by mounted men and a large 
number of foot police, and the streets were closed to pedestrians except those 
attending the function … 
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A large saloon car conveying the Archbishop …and another church dignitary 
approached Cockburn Street entrance. The crowd surged forward and one young 
man jumped on the running board. He was immediately pulled off by 
policemen…earlier, the arrival of Councillors Cormack and Marr was greeted 
with thunderous cheering. When Councillor Marr came through the crowd, the 
noise was such that it frightened several of the horses of the mounted police, and, 
in one case, a policeman had great difficulty in cotr lling his horse which was 
rearing wildly.495  
 
The Scotsman on the same day published its version of events. The Scotsman and the 
Evening News did not operate in mutually exclusive markets and many Edinburgh citizens 
took both papers but it is fair to say that the News appealed to a more popular audience while 
the Scotsman was very much the voice of the Edinburgh establishment. The style is 
somewhat less breathless and the accounts do not differ significantly about major events but 
the tone of the Scotsman report is instructive. It is also interesting that it flatly contradicts the 
story that troops had been kept in reserve.  
 
Extraordinary street scenes were witnessed in Edinburgh on Saturday night. 
The sectarian spirit and mere curiosity combined to draw large crowds in the 
vicinity of the City Chambers where a civic reception to delegates attending the 
annual conference of the Catholic Young Men’s Society, but thanks to the good 
sense of many of the onlookers and the commendable t ct shown by the police 
the tension passed without any serious developments. Protestants had been openly 
urged by the Protestant Action Society to turn out in their thousands…the 
response was sufficient to create difficulties in the maintenance of order but the 
crowds were so discretely handled that little more than congestion and noisy 
demonstration occurred… Many of the sympathisers with the Protestant “action” 
movement had, it is understood come from Glasgow, Prestonpans, Broxburn and 
other districts. Two or three young men were detaind by the police. One is 
alleged to have jumped onto the running board of a car in Cockburn Street in 
which two or three of the guests proceeding to the rec ption were seated… 
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During the evening a disturbance broke out in the Cowgate …for a time the 
situation looked serious. Bottles, stones and a hammer were among the weapons 
that came into play, but prompt action was taken by the police and the trouble 
blew over quickly.  
A rumour was current that troops in the city had been held in readiness but 
Chief Constable Ross who was in charge of the police arrangement stated there 
was no truth whatever in the story. As a matter of fact the police had the situation 
well in hand though out the evening. It is many a dy since Edinburgh 
experienced acute sectarian trouble. Chief Constable Ross, who is retiring shortly, 
after 35 years’ service in the city, has never been called upon to quell any serious 
faction fighting in the city.496  
  
   The rather extensive quotations from the press used here give some idea of the different 
interpretations that were put upon the disturbances both in 1935 and later. The Scotsman 
seemed determined to play down the event and was staunchly on the side of the police. In 
truth it appears that Protestant Action’s first major foray into the street was more sound and 
fury than anything else. Certainly the reports of the military being on standby appear to have 
been exaggerated and on balance the Chief Constable’  statement that ‘there was no truth 
whatever in the story’ would appear to be accurate.  
Archbishop MacDonald  himself made light of the occurrence when introducing Bishop 
Daniel Mageean of Down and Connor at a meeting in the Usher Hall the following day; ‘the 
Chairman said that the members of the city appeared to have endeavoured to give the speaker 
the kind of welcome generally associated with Belfast (laughter). They could, however, 
assure him that the members who had been so very vocal the previous night certainly did not 
represent the best class of Edinburgh (applause).’497 The Catholic press were a little less 
forgiving but even the Clydesdale Catholic Herald considered the demonstrators as 
unrepresentative of the City. 
    
   The Lord Provost of Edinburgh...made it clear in a letter to the press that the 
civic forces would be mobilised to check the agitation and prevent personal 
injury, and it was clear to the onlooker that the better class of citizenry bitterly 
resented the proposed anti-Catholic demonstration. 
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  But a demonstration of an alarming nature did take place. One Sunday paper 
reported that the military stood by in readiness for p ssible rioting, another that 
his Grace Archbishop MacDonald “ran the gauntlet”. No military reinforcements 
were marshalled in the background, but the car in which his Grace drove to the 
City Chambers was heralded by menacing and slanderous h oligans and only the 
close vigilance and protection of the police ensured its safe journey, as was the 
case with nearly all limousines and taxi cabs carrying the delegates. 
  The publicity given in advance to proposed “Protestant” protest brought several 
thousand people attracted by curiosity to the vicinity of the City Chambers on 
Saturday evening and the High Street, Princes Street and the Mound were for 
several hours densely crowded. Traffic was disorganised despite the efforts of 
mounted and foot police. Catholic churches and institutions were guarded by 
police and detectives. 
  For the most part, the taunts and blustering threa s were treated with the measure 
of attention they deserved.498   
 
Whatever the case, Cormack had not had his real ‘smash up’ but he had attracted people 
onto the streets in numbers, even if the majority were no more than the idly curious, and his 
movement had been given momentum and it needed to keep that momentum going. It is a 
feature of all protest groups that they need to keep in the public eye to exist. Protestant 
Action’s meetings at the various venues around the city were packed and many were coming 
to hear Cormack on the Mound and in Leith. He also u ed the platform of being on the Town 
Council to keep himself at the forefront of local news. Cormack, whatever else he was, was a 
superb self-publicist, but to keep up the enthusiasm of his supporters he still needed the 
public spectacles. His next opportunity came with the decision of the Town Council to award 
the Freedom of the City to the Maharajah of Patiala, John Buchan and the Australian Premier 
Joseph Lyons at a ceremony to be held on 10th June at the Usher Hall. 
The conferring of the Freedom of the City on the prmier of a Commonwealth country 
would normally have been un-contentious, apart from the fact that Lyons was a Catholic. The 
public honouring of a Catholic was both an anathema and a golden opportunity for Cormack. 
His initial attempts in the Council to have Lyons name struck off the list on honourees failed. 
This gave him the chance to steal the limelight at a major public ceremony in the City and 
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demonstrate once more his ability to bring crowds onto the street within a few weeks of the 
High Street demonstration. In the event this protest amounted to very little more than what 
the Scotsman described as an ‘unseemly disturbance.’ Certainly Cormack and a few of his 
supporters managed to briefly disrupt the proceedings with cries of   ‘No Popery’ and ‘Down 
with the papes’ swiftly drowned by organ playing. It was not a particularly effective protest 
and as the Scotsman reported  ‘…High Constables or official police were after a few minutes 
able to conduct all those who had attended simply to protest out of the hall, and quietness 
having been secured, the Lord Provost proceeded.’ 499  
Outside the hall a crowd of about two thousand gathered to support Cormack although on 
this occasion the scenes were somewhat different to that at the City Chambers. As the 
Scotsman reported it contained a large element of farce. A crowd of about two thousand in 
which, it was noted that women largely outnumbered men, had assembled in Lothian road 
and kept up a chant of ‘no Popery’ until, in the words of the journalist, it became 
monotonous. Having little else to fill their time the crowd vented its anger on the 
unfortunately dressed: 
 
Ladies dressed in green and even men wearing green hats were singled out by 
the crowd as objects for “booing”. Nor did people who drew up to the hall in 
green cars escape attention. This demonstration of “booing” had its humorous 
side. Stalwarts of the Church of Scotland, who were unrecognised by the crowd, 
or were mistakenly assumed to be adherents of another faith, were subjected to 
“boos”. These ministers merely smiled and passed into the hall…500 
 
After Cormack had been expelled from the Usher Hall he attempted to address his 
followers but was dissuaded by the police and his supporters contented themselves with 
carrying him shoulder high to the West End. It had not been a particularly effective protest 
although it undoubtedly severely embarrassed the Lord Provost and the city dignitaries who 
were unaccustomed to this sort of behaviour. Nonethel ss, it kept PAS and Cormack on the 
front pages and it was drawing attention outside of Edinburgh. There was still the 
forthcoming Eucharistic Congress which would give Cormack his greatest opportunity to 
bring his brand of Protestantism out onto the streets in greater numbers. 
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III The Scottish Office 
The protest against Lyons may have been faintly ridiculous but behind the scenes 
Cormack’s activities were beginning to cause some concern in official circles. On the 13th of 
May Sir Godfrey Collins, the Secretary of State for Scotland, was asked a Parliamentary 
Question from Dr O’Donovan M.P about the events at the City Chambers and whether steps 
were being taken to prevent a recurrence. At this po nt Collins was reasonably sanguine about 
the situation:  
 
Sir Godfrey Collins- I have obtained particulars of the meeting held in Edinburgh 
on 17th April under the auspices of the Protestant Action Society and of the 
demonstration held on the evening of 27th April when a civic reception was 
accorded by the Corporation of Edinburgh to the Catholic Young Men’s Society. 
I understand that special police precautions were tak n on the evening of the 27th 
April, and that although a few incidents occurred, some of which resulted in 
arrests being made, there was no serious disorder. Th  police who are responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order, will, I am satisfied, take steps to prevent 
any disturbances in future.501 
 
The publicity given to this reply prompted Cormack to write personally to Sir Godfrey. It 
is worth quoting in full as it gives an insight into Cormack’s mind-set at the time and his 
intentions towards the Eucharistic Congress. It hasto be noted that the spelling and 
punctuation are idiosyncratic and are reproduced here without any amendment. 
 
Letter from Protestant Action 14th May 1935 
  Dear Sir 
  The answer which you gave to Dr O’Donovan M.P. in the House of Commons, 
in connection with the recent Protestant Demonstration in Edinburgh, was 
reported in the “Daily Express”, I noted it, and hasten to assure You, Sir, that 
when, and where the popish Authorities openly propagate their blasphemous 
doctrine, we, the Protestants of Edinburgh will turn out in Protest, despite the 
assurance you gave the House to the contrary. We are Protestant “Actionists” not 
jelly fish. If the papists are allowed to hold a Eucharistic Congress in June, 30, or 
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40 thousand, Protestants will know the reason why. I am quoting here-with from 
popish Papers, the Universe and the Catholic Herald, to prove to you the DECEIT 
of the popish Authorities here in Scotland. In a letter, dated, Cathedral House, 
York Place, Edinburgh, May 4th, Mgr., McGettigan, writes the Congress, is not to 
be, and was never intended to be an international congress, nor even a national 
one.” “The Congress is for the Catholics of Edinburgh.” I read in the Universe, 
dated, May 10th, this Special arrangements are being made in all districts of the 
East of Scotland, for Catholics to take part in the Congress which is the first of its 
kind ever held in the country. Many will want to take part in the ceremonies from 
Glasgow and the West” Is this for Edinburgh Catholics only? In the light of the 
fore-going? 
I trust You Sir, will realise, there is something “fishy” about the so-called 
Congress. We must Demonstrate and Protest. 
I remain, 
Always a 100% Protestant  
John Cormack (Councillor)502 
 
At least the Scottish Office would not now be able to say that it was unaware of Cormack’s 
intentions. It took the letter seriously enough to write to the Chief Constable of Edinburgh, 
Roderick Ross, for his comments who replied confidetly that he was certain that he could 
‘deal with any situation which may arise.’503 
 Despite this reassurance Collins and his officials were receiving more representations on 
the subject of Cormack. Alfred Denville, theatrical impresario and Conservative MP for 
Newcastle, received the following communication from James Conan, a journalist on the 
Edinburgh Catholic Herald which he duly passed on to the Scottish Office asking if any 
action could be taken. This correspondence is important as it shows how the Government’s 
position was overtaken by events and there is evidence of a certain amount of complacency in 
official circles. Conan’s cutting came from the Evening News of the 20th May reporting 
Cormack’s threat to invade the grounds of Canaan Lane where the Eucharistic Congress was 
due to be held.  
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Dear Mr Denville 
  I would esteem it a favour if you would read the enclosed cutting. I am afraid 
the police here are too lenient with this man who is causing a lot of trouble 
especially in public works etc. You might consider it having it passed on. It is 
really something to be attended to at once. You maynot know me but your son 
will when you tell him Conlan of the Catholic Herald wrote you. Of course this is 
a private affair and not for the papers I am writing you. Of course I will tell the 
clergy I wrote you. Go all out with this even if to the Home Office. 
Yours sincerely  
James Conlan504 
 
Denville wrote three times to Sir Godfrey Collins on 20th 24th and 31st May asking what could 
be done. An official reply was drafted but not sent, much to the relief of the officials involved 
in the light of subsequent events. 
 
   You wrote to me on 22nd inst enclosing letters and cuttings received from Mr 
James Conlan 13, Roseneath Street, Edinburgh regardin  statements made by 
Councillor Cormack about the Eucharistic Congress to be held in Edinburgh this 
month and about the conferring of the freedom of the City of Edinburgh upon the 
Australian Premier, and on the 24 inst you sent me another letter from the same 
correspondent enclosing a newspaper cutting concerni g the arrest of a man on a 
charge of murder. 
   The subject of possible sectarian disorder is a matter on which the Chief 
Constable has recently been communicated with, and he has indicated that the 
police are in a position to deal adequately and firmly with any situation that may 
arise. The maintenance of law and order in Edinburgh is, as you are probably 
aware, is a matter for the police, subject to the general supervision of the 
magistrates... 
 The enclosures to your letters are herewith returnd.505 
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505 NRS, HH1/777, Hand written draft of reply for Mr A.Denville M.P not sent. 
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Mr Cheale 
 You will remember that following the receipt of (Denville letters)you gave 
instructions that the letter prepared in reply … should be held up to see what  
happened at the conferring of the freedom of the City on Mr Lyon, the Australian 
Premier. 
  The freedom was conferred on 10th June and since that date the file has been 
unfortunately overlooked. I think, however that in view of what happened at the 
Eucharistic Congress on the 24th instant it is just as well that we did not write Mr
Denville as in your draft attached. Before the actul events the CC assured us that 
the police were in a position to cope with any situation which might arise. We 
know now that they were unable to prevent disorder. It may be that to do so might 
have been humanly impossible but the fact remains that the CC was unable to 
prevent an outbreak of trouble. 
  In the circumstances it is for consideration whether we should ask the CC for a 
report on the occurrences and whether a written or final reply should go to Mr 
Denville. Also whether Mr Denville’s letters require a reply at all and whether it 
would be expedient to send one.506 
 
As the enclosures are still within the file it is reasonable to suppose that Mr Denville never 
did receive his reply.  
     For three months Cormack had succeeded in raising the tensions in the city in the lead up 
to the Eucharistic Congress. He had demonstrated his ability to bring out the crowds and ugly 
scenes had taken place outside Catholic Churches. H was the news topic of the hour in 
Edinburgh but, as can be seen from the above correspondence, there was still uncertainty as 
to what form his protest would take. Before going on t  discuss the events of June 1935 it 
should be pointed out that these fall into two separate categories, the riot itself and the 
aftermath. Piecing together the actual events based solely on the press reports can give a 
distorted picture and so the account that follows will also concentrate on the Procurator Fiscal 
of Edinburgh’s report to the Lord Advocate of the 2nd August.  O.ne of the main gaps we 
have in the period is the actual reaction of Sir Godfrey Collins. Regrettably Collins did not 
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keep personal papers covering this period507 and Pottinger’s biography of the Secretaries of 
State for Scotland makes no reference to what was the single largest incidence of civil 
disturbance during Collins’ tenure as Secretary of State.508 The available official sources are 
then dependent on the Scottish Office file relating o the period. It is for this reason that the 
Fiscal’s report becomes critical in determining as accurately as possible the sequence of 
violence as it occurred over the period of the Eucharistic Conference.  This report does not 
appear in any of the secondary sources for the period, although it was available in the sources 
quoted by Gallagher, and this is the first attempt to establish the course of events using this 
source. It will contrast this report with Archbishop MacDonald’s account given in a letter to 
Sir Godfrey Collins of June 28th.                                              
 
                                                
IV The Riots 
  The Eucharistic Congress held in Edinburgh in 1935 would probably have passed unnoticed 
by the City’s Protestant inhabitants but for Cormack. It is doubtful that many non-Catholics 
knew what was involved although there had been a sizeable Eucharistic Congress held in 
Dublin in 1932 attended by worldwide Catholic clergy and including a papal benediction 
broadcast on Irish radio. It was certainly an occasion used for propaganda purposes by the 
nascent Irish Free State509 and it may have been this that prompted the opposition of the 
Reformation Society outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Certainly the outdoor nature of 
Eucharistic Congresses may have been considered provocative but in this case it was to be a 
considerably more modest affair and the adoration of the sacrament was to take place in the 
grounds of the Priory owned by the Catholic Church in Morningside. In the case of Cormack 
it was undoubtedly sufficient that the ceremony was C tholic even if it was to take place out 
of sight of the easily offended. Steve Bruce in No Pope of Rome states that the Catholic 
Church’s plan was for thirty thousand Catholics to ‘c llect in Canaan Lane Park, celebrate 
mass and then march in procession along Princes Street.’510  Had this been the case it 
probably would have been provocative for the times but there exists no evidence that such a 
programme was ever contemplated. As there is no park in Canaan Lane and Bruce places the 
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510 S. Bruce, No Pope of Rome, (Mainstream, Edinburgh, 1985), p89. 
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riot in 1936 it is possible that he has confused the events. In fact Bruce’s account of the 
‘Morningside riot’ is indicative of how distorted the picture has become: ‘On the day, 
between thirty-five and forty thousand Protestants encircled the park. Again there was 
violence with the police charging the protestors and Action members retaliating with their 
newly acquired knowledge of anti-horse drill. The technique they had developed in earlier 
encounters involved pulling the riders foot out of one stirrup and then jabbing the horse with 
a sharp instrument, causing it to bolt and dislodge its rider. The demonstration was a success; 
the procession was cancelled.’511 As will be shown there is absolutely no evidence of any of 
what he describes ever taking place and regrettably he does not cite the sources for this 
information. 
  Accounts of the 23rd, 24th and 25th June 1935 are confusing and conflicting. Even the press 
reports of the time disagree with each other as do hist rical ones. For instance,   Gallagher in 
his account of the disorders states that ‘A suitable opportunity for venting hate did not present 
itself until Monday evening, June 24th.’ This is not the case as was pointed out both in 
Archbishop MacDonald’s letter to Sir Godfrey Collins and in the report of the Procurator 
Fiscal  
 
On the evening of Sunday 23rd ulto on the occasion of a meeting of men in 
Waverley Market, everything passed off quietly till the men were returning home. 
As the buses conveying them passed along Princes Str et, however, they were 
met by a crowd coming from a meeting in the Usher Hall organised by the 
Protestant Action Society. This crowd held up the traffic and treated the 
occupants not only of private buses, but also of thse on their ordinary journeys, 
to a torrent of abusive epithets and threats – and pedestrians were assaulted not 
only on the street but in the station. One instance will suffice. A Priest proceeding 
westwards was thrown from the pavement to the street, jostled and struck several 
times while on the roadway, and only escaped further injury by boarding a bus 
travelling in the opposite direction and the Conductress slamming the door behind 
him. 512 
 
The Procurator Fiscal’s account tallies largely with the Archbishop’s in this case although 
there is no mention of a priest being attacked or of his fleeing on a bus with aid of a helpful 
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conductress. Indeed there are several discrepancies i  the reports of the ‘riots’ between the 
Archbishop and the Procurator Fiscal. In the aftermath of the riots both collected evidence 
although those still in the Catholic archives show that MacDonald was keen to find instances 
of outrages perpetrated on priests, nuns and individual Catholics. This was natural enough in 
the circumstances but it should make the historian at the very least careful with the material. 
The evidence collected by the Procurator was, as can be gathered from the language, largely 
provided by policemen and again some caution should be exercised. The police did have an 
interest that they should be seen to have had the situation well in hand. On balance though it 
would seem that Procurator’s report is the more accurate as it was his responsibility to 
prosecute the disturbers of the peace and as will be shown he took that responsibility 
seriously. 513 
  The following night saw scenes of considerably more violence as a meeting of women was 
held, again at the Waverly Market, at the east end of Princes Street. On this occasion a large 
hostile crowd had gathered. In Archbishop MacDonald’s account the crowd actively attacked 
the participants: 
 
Pedestrians were jostled and stones were thrown at leas one car conveying 
Clergymen to the meeting, while others, (including my own) were surrounded 
and efforts made to effect an entrance. When this wa frustrated the crowd 
covered the cars in spittle and used the most vile language towards their 
occupants. I am informed on good authority that a number of those who attacked 
our cars were armed with loaded sticks. 514 
 
Whereas the Procurator Fiscal stated: 
 
…large numbers of the supporters of the Protestant Action Society gathered in the 
vicinity of Waverly Bridge. These certainly shouted abusive epithets at persons 
proceeding to the meeting. Beyond this, however there was no attempt at 
interfering with the participants.515 
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It was nonetheless a fact that nine persons were arrested, seven of whom were later fined the 
substantial sum of £10 or one month’s imprisonment in he Sheriff Court. It was to be 
something of a feature of the Court’s handling of individuals brought before it on charges 
related to sectarian violence that exemplary sentences were handed out, with even Douglas 
conceding that ‘some of the dupes have been harshly dealt with.’516 It would certainly not 
appear to be the case that Cormack’s supporters were given any leniency. The Waverly 
Market disturbance appears to have looked worse than i  actually was but it was sufficiently 
alarming for the police to take extraordinary measure  for the conclusion of the Congress the 
following evening. 
   It is well to pause here and consider composition of the Edinburgh police force in 1935.  
The  total strength of the regular Edinburgh police in 1935 was 798 comprising one Chief 
Constable, one Assistant Chief Constable, six Superintendents, 29 Inspectors, 87 Sergeants, 
647 Constables, two Female Investigating Officers, the remainder being administrative and 
medical staff. In addition the Chief Constable could theoretically call on the services of 901 
special constables, (although there was a recognitin that not all of these were able bodied 
and in 1936 the specials were reorganised into a uniformed  unit 300 strong of those aged 
between 25-50 and a further reserve unit of 500 of th se under the age of 60).517 
Unfortunately, the Chief Constable’s reports do notbreak down the figures between the 
motor, foot and especially mounted sections. It is reasonable to assume that the official 
mounted section was comparatively small given the expense of maintaining it and the limited 
need. What is certain is that there was a substantial Special Mounted Unit under the 
command of Colonel J M B Scott OBE TD. It held regular monthly drills and at its sixth 
annual inspection carried out at Redford Barracks on 28th May 1936 28 members of this unit 
were awarded the Special Constabulary Long Service Medal.518 At the very least then the 
Chief Constable had at his disposal a mounted unit of approximately thirty and probably 
more. The actual numbers deployed at Canaan Lane are, unfortunately, not available and so it 
is a matter of conjecture how many police were on the streets that night. However, given the 
logistical and geographical difficulties involved the numbers must have comprised the larger 
part of the Chief Constable’s available resources. 
It is  useful to examine a map of the Morningside district  and using the information in the 
accounts, and what is known about the composition of the Edinburgh police, to attempt to 
                                                 
516 Fred Douglas, The Protestant Movement X Rayed, the Edinburgh Communist Party, 1937 in T. Gallagher 
Edinburgh Divided, p103. 
517 Edinburgh City Archives, Chief Constable of Edinburgh’s Annual Report 1936, p25.  
518 Ibid 
 219
reconstruct the ‘battlefield’ and the events of the ev ning of the 25th June 1925.  Morningside 
has not changed significantly since 1935 and the streets and houses are still largely of their 
original Victorian and Edwardian construction and layout. The Priory itself now belongs to 
the NHS and a Roman Catholic Primary school occupies art of the grounds but otherwise 
the area is unchanged. The geography of Morningside plays an important part in assessing the 
accuracy, or otherwise, of some of the accounts and in evaluating which version of events is 
likely to be closer to the truth than others. The roads immediately surrounding the Priory, 
Canaan Lane, Newbattle Terrace and Grange Loan, as can be seen from the photographs, are 
particularly narrow and must have made difficult access for buses bringing participants of the 
Congress. This was a significant factor in the later course of events. 
 
 
Figure 1. Grange Loan looking east. Pilgrim buses parked here 
 
 The main approach to Canaan Lane is from Morningside Road to the west of the Priory and 
all accounts agree that this is where the main body of the protesters were gathered. The 
Procurator Fiscal reported that on the evening of 25th while most of the participants of the 
Congress arrived on foot: ‘Many, however, from outlying parishes came by bus. The arrival 
of these was carried out without hitch, and when the ceremony commenced it was estimated 
that over 10,000 people were present within the priory grounds. Motor buses to the number of 
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170 were parked in police care in Grange Loan’.519 This immediately contradicts the 
Gallagher version of the beginning of the Congress; ‘Buses conveying pilgrims … were met 
by hostile demonstrators shouting, throwing stones, and spitting at the vehicles as they passed 
into the Priory…Molly Regan remembers one old Irishwoman in her bus who said, “And 
sure, aren’t they giving us a grand welcome.” “Nobody made any attempt to answer that this 
was no friendly reception.” 
   Gallagher’s story is an entertaining one but given the logistics of getting motor buses to the 
Priory it is extremely unlikely that it ever happened. For one thing, as will be shown below, 
access to the Priory from Morningside Road, the locati n of the bulk of Cormack’s 
supporters, was blocked off by the police. The Fiscal further states that the pilgrims’ 170 
buses were parked in Grange Loan. As the photograph of Grange Loan demonstrates this is a 
particularly narrow stretch of road. At the conclusion of the Congress the buses were routed 
through Whitehouse Loan and Pitsligo Road which would have necessitated that all the buses 
parked in Grange Loan to have been facing west. As it is physically impossible for a bus, 
even in the 1930s, to perform a U-turn in Grange Loan and the 170 buses would have 
stretched beyond Kilgraston Road then the only possible route to the Priory would have taken 
them a considerable distance out of the way of the PAS protestors. It would seem that the 
Fiscal’s assertion that this part of the exercise was ‘carried out without a hitch’ is the more 
accurate and that the recollection of Molly Regan apocryphal.  
  (The Bartholomew Plan of Morningside in 1933, on the following page, covers the main 
areas of the disturbances and the photographs illustrate the exit routes used by pilgrim buses 
from the Priory).  
                                                 







Figure 2 Whitehouse Loan exit route one for buses 
 
 






Figure 4 Pitsligo Road exit route two. 
 
At 7pm Cormack made his first attempt to approach the Priory. He, along with 40 
followers, approached Woodburn Terrace through NileGrove and was informed that the area 
was closed to through traffic. After establishing that this was under the orders of the District 
Inspector, Cormack and his supporters retreated to Morningside Road where the bulk of the 
PAS protestors had asse4mbled. At 7.30, by this time leading a considerable crowd, Cormack 
was confronted by mounted police at Nile Grove and was forced to redirect his followers to 
Morningside Road so at this time the bulk of the protestors were at the bottom of 
Morningside Road in the vicinity of the station. Atthis point it is possible to appreciate the 
difficulties of the police considering the area they had to cover. As the Scotsman’s report put 
it, ‘for three or four hours Morningside Road was thronged from the Station to Bruntsfield 
Place. This meant that the police had to control a crowd which stretched for about three 
quarters of a mile in addition to watching various points in other districts where sympathisers 
with the Protestant Action organisation had gathered.’ 520 If the Procurator’s estimate of 
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20,000 is correct this must have been a formidable exercise in crowd control for a force with 
no more experience than policing Saturday afternoon f tball matches. 
 
 
Figure 5 Nile Grove: Cormack stopped by mounted police here. 
 
By nine o’clock the buses were being loaded and leaving via Pitsligo Road and 
Whitehouse Loan. As can be seen from the map both these routes lead out into Bruntsfield 
and several buses were stoned in the vicinity of Barclay Place which means that elements in 
the crowd now stretched a considerable distance. It is remarkable that the numbers attacked 
were as small as they were. This does tend to lend support to the argument that the actual 
trouble-making element was relatively small. Had all the crowd, or even a substantial number 
been involved it is difficult to see how a convoy of 170 buses could have escaped largely 
unscathed, despite the best efforts of the police. At ten o’clock batons were drawn at the 
junction of Colinton Road and Bruntsfield Place  in what seems to have been the most serious 
outbreak of trouble and a direct attack on the police. The Scotsman’s account describes a 
baton charge although this is not altogether confirmed from that of the Procurator Fiscal. 
It appears from the accounts that a large and hostile crowd had gathered the length of 
Morningside Road and into Bruntsfield. However, given the difficulties of policing the area it 
would appear that Edinburgh force did a commendably professional job, as the Archbishop 
later admitted. Is it accurate to describe the affair as a riot? In Edinburgh terms the answer 
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probably has to be yes, though in terms of what other cities might describe as a riot, it was a 
protest with sporadic outbreaks of violence swiftly contained. However, it was a 
psychological shock, but it was in the aftermath that the true effects were felt. It is in the 
reactions to the riot, rather than in the seriousnes  or otherwise of what actually occurred, that 
provides the lasting controversy. 
 
V The Reaction 
The initial responses to Cormack and Protestant Action’s behaviour were, naturally, hostile 
in the Catholic Press but it was not limited to that outlet alone as the Clydesdale Catholic 
Herald acknowledged on the 6th July. It reprinted in full the leading article of the Edinburgh 
Bulletin: 
                                             
                                            Sectarian Folly 
    The demonstrations against the Roman Catholic Eu haristic Congress in St 
Andrews Priory, together with the recent protestations made at a freedom 
ceremony in Edinburgh have re-established the Capital in its old time reputation 
as a city of religious intolerance. The temper if not the intelligence and high 
moral purpose of John Knox still lives. But John Knox belonged to the sixteenth 
century and we are now in the twentieth. The enthusiasts might be asked to keep 
an eye on that fact. 
  …there can be no doubt that the action of agitators in Edinburgh and the 
persecution of unoffending Roman Catholic citizens must have alienated the 
sympathy of many rational minded people. Such outburs s as the Capital has 
witnessed could not have been conceived in missionary zeal. There was nothing 
exalted and nothing inspiring in their origin or evidence. They bore witness rather 
to unchristian qualities of malice and ill will and brought upon the whole 
Presbyterian community an incriminating sense of shame. 
  Of what avail is it to send missionaries to foreign fields and leave hordes of 
misrepresentatives at home forcing such disservice upon us? 
  It is for the Church to take in hand these over emphatic and narrow, prejudiced 
upholders of Protestantism, and turn them away from n tions of propaganda that 
are despised even among football crowds when Tynecastl  clashes with Parkhead 
in a cup tie. And in the meantime it is vital that the Church should in some 
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prominent way make itself known as entirely contemptuous of scenes enacted in 
Edinburgh this week.521 
 
This call for the Church of Scotland to take a hand in putting Protestant Action in its place 
may well have struck a chord with some of the Minister  who had attended the General 
Assembly only the previous month. It would seem to have done so in it at least one case as 
the Catholic Herald illustrated. In its own editorial it was not sparing in its opinion of 
Protestant Action but what is of note is its appreciation of the Bulletin, a letter by a Protestant 
clergyman in the Scotsman and in indeed of the authorities and the police: 
 
… that action aroused the lowest form of bestial hate in the tatterdemalions of 
Edinburgh who acclaimed their superiority to “Popery” by howling foul 
blasphemy, attacking women, isolated groups of Catholic men, and even Catholic 
Priests. In this issue we publish the comments of a leading daily newspaper and a 
Protestant clergyman. They are not kind in their attitude towards Edinburgh’s 
bigots. 
   Nor are the authorities. 
  Edinburgh’s police were admirable in the manner i which they carried out their 
duties. But if confidence in full civic protection for the law abiding citizens is to 
be restored, it is to be hoped that the hooligan elem nt, which rears its head when 
anyone or anything is to be attacked or fouled, will on such occasions be firmly 
dealt with.522 
                                                  
  There was some foreign press coverage of the riot including an editorial in the 
Osservatore Romano, and an article in the Times was to incur the wrath of Archbishop 
MacDonald.  However, the Catholic Herald describing the Osservatore article as ‘scathing’ 
did not reprint it in full, perhaps because the author, Count della Torre did his own argument 
no great service as was pointed out in a letter from the British Legation in Rome to the 
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British Legation to the Holy See 
Rome 
July 2nd 1935 
Sir 
  I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, slight y abbreviated, a translation 
of an article published in the “Osservatore Romano” of the 29th ultimo, over the 
initial of its editor, Count della Torre, on the subject of an attack which appears to 
have taken place in Edinburgh, on a Eucharistic Congress recently held there, 
when the intervention of police is said to have been n cessary to restore order. 
   You will observe that the style of the aged Count is a very involved one; and I 
feel that his report of intolerance would carry more weight, if he made it clear that 
he dislikes it wherever met with and in every form. As the “Osservatore Romano” 
is an official organ and this article is by its editor, I feel bound, however to bring 
it to your notice; though I do not think that any other action is called for by this 
legation. 
                   I have the Honour to be, 
                      Etc. Charles Wingfield 
To Sir Samuel Hoare 
Foreign Secretary523 
 
As mentioned above Archbishop MacDonald wrote to the Secretary of State for Scotland 
on 28th June and it is obvious he was a very unhappy man and had no doubt as to who bore 
the responsibility for the anti-Catholic campaign, Cormack, and who would be responsible if 
widespread sectarian fighting broke out if nothing was done, Collins: 
 
       I wish, however, to again stress the fact tha if disturbances ensue, the blame 
will not rest on the Catholic population. They have, as the Press has testified, 
borne themselves with commendable restraint in the fac of this campaign of 
vilification and slander of themselves and all they old dear. I trust that they will 
continue to do so, and shall do everything in my power to achieve that end, as one 
can realise that if trouble should break out it will be years before peace can be 
restored. But I fear that unless something is done  the other side a breaking 
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point may be reached, and serious consequences ensue thro ghout a great part of 
Scotland.  
   There can now be no doubt that there has been incitement to violence and 
disturbance has ensued, yet those responsible for it are apparently to be allowed 
to continue unchecked to publicly preach a continuance of this conduct. 
  I would beg that you give the matter your most serious consideration, and that 
the danger to the commonweal which is thus being engendered should no longer 
be underestimated. Only by a complete understanding and an immediate and firm 
grasp of the situation can peace and tranquillity be preserved to the community. 
  In view of the seriousness of the situation, it is my intention to send a copy of 
this letter to each member of Parliament – and I reserve the right to publish the 
correspondence.524 
 
While the Scottish Office was digesting this and initiating enquiries, Archbishop 
MacDonald was conducting an investigation of his own and asking for witness statements 
from his clergy as to the violence at the Eucharistic Congress. Many of these are still retained 
in the Scottish Catholic Archives. As these came in it appears that the Archbishop became 
even more unhappy and, with an unconscious irony, issued a lengthy  statement to the press 
that appeared on the 12th July. In it he repeated many of the points made in the letter to 
Collins and reiterated his point that if widespread violence did break out it could not be laid 
at the door of the Catholic community. He also, in this case, made an appeal to the city itself: 
    
The disgraceful scenes to which I have referred have become known in every 
quarter of the globe, and have sullied the fair name of a city which was justly 
regarded as a leader in all culture, thought and civilisation. It seems to me that the 
public of the capital of Scotland cannot regard such a result with equanimity. I am 
certain that the bulk of the citizens, fair minded and enlightened as I know them 
to be, must when the facts are brought to their knowledge regard with abhorrence 
the actions of what after all is a mob of the lowest elements in the city, supported 
by importees of a similar class from other parts of the country.525 
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It was perfectly understandable that MacDonald was m king a case for the authorities to 
arrest and try Cormack for incitement to violence and he expected the wider public to support 
that call. From his point of view the facts of the case were self-evident and irrefutable. 
Cormack and his supporters had spent the summer vilifying the Catholic Church, he had 
called for mass demonstrations, his language had certainly seemed to imply the threat of 
violence and violence had ensued. Unfortunately every word of his statement was most likely 
to have been music to Cormack’s ears and there is no doubt that the authorities thought that 
he exaggerated his case. In a letter to the Scottish Office from the Lord Advocate which 
accompanied the Procurator Fiscal’s report: 
 
Letter from the Lord Advocate 3rd August accompanied by PF’s report 2nd August 
 The situation is being closely watched by the Crown Office and no case has been 
reported which would justify a prosecution for incitement to violence. 
  …  The Archbishop’s letter is considerably exaggerated. I suggest that in reply 
he be informed that the S of S has made enquiries and finds the situation is being 
closely watched by the criminal authorities. It might be added that the result of 
the enquiries show that during the period of the Congress certain disturbances 
took place owing to religious feeling running high and violence was used in some 
cases but that on the whole order was well maintained by the police and arrests 
were made and prosecutions followed when possible 
   I am arranging for any future disturbances or anythi g in the nature of 
incitement to violence being reported to the CO526 
 
Perhaps the most telling comments on the Cormack phenomenon come in the last page of 
the Procurator’s report: 
 
   On the question generally, there is in my view no doubt that Cormack keeps 
the Society alive very much through publicity. When the newspapers are not 
giving him paragraphs in the news columns, he rushes in with striking 
advertisements. He, however, apparently prefers to have the actions of the Society 
and its propaganda blazoned forth in the news columns, and there is little doubt 
but that a number of reporters play up to him in ths matter. The trouble caused on 
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these occasions to which I have referred was invariably very much exaggerated in 
the majority of the newspapers, and one can conceive that if it could be possible 
to stop publicity for him his whole propaganda would come to a quick and 
ignominious end. 
The exaggeration, however, is not wholly on the part of the press. There is too 
considerable exaggeration on the part of His Grace the Archbishop. He went to 
the press with a statement on 12th July which accompanies this report.527  
  
The procurator was not alone in his attitude. Those who had to deal with Cormack on a 
daily basis, the Town Council, also considered Cormack a creature of the press, and did not 
consider the Archbishop’s public interventions helpful. In a revealing minute from a meeting 
of the City Magistrates Committee on 25th August to discuss a letter from the Scottish Office 
inviting their comments on the Archbishop’s letter i  was officially noted that: 
 
  There was submitted a letter dated 8th August last from the undersecretary of 
Scotland transmitting copy letter dated 16 July from Archbishop MacDonald and 
a copy of the Scottish Office reply thereto relative to events which took place in 
Edinburgh on the occasion of the Civic reception to the Catholic Young Men’s 
Association and of the Eucharistic Congress. There was also submitted letter 
dated 15th July on the same subject from Councillor Cormack on behalf of the 
Protestant Action Society asking the Lord Provost t require an apology from 
Archbishop MacDonald for certain statements alleged to have been made by him. 
   After consideration the Magistrates instructed the Depute Town Clerk to reply 
to the Scottish Office that the corporation are satisfied that everything possible 
was done to meet the situation caused by the disturbances referred to, that steps 
considered adequate in advance to deal with any situation that might emerge and 
that the Authorities were quite satisfied that they have the matter well in hand, 
and, further resolved to take no action on the letter from the Protestant Action 
Society.528 
 
What is particularly interesting is that in the letter sent to the Scottish Office is the 
following statement that does not appear in the minutes: 
                                                 
527 NRS,  HH1/777. 
528 Edinburgh City Archives, Minutes of the Magistrates Committee 1935, p202 paragraph 29. 
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  The view is held that the late sectarian strife is subsiding and that the less public 
notice taken of it the sooner it will finish. The situation, however, is not helped by 
certain communications which have been sent to the press. The Authorities are 
quite satisfied that they have the situation well in hand.529  
  
It would seem that there had been more discussion of the issue than would appear from the 
minutes and the apparent consensus between the Council, the legal authorities and the 
Scottish Office was not to pander to Cormack’s craving for publicity by making him a 
martyr. Legally it might have been difficult to mount a successful prosecution for incitement 
to violence that would stand up in court. In any case, with Cormack at the height of his 
notoriety, a successful case could only increase hi stature while an unsuccessful one would 
be potentially disastrous. The approach appears to have been to officially ignore him as far as 
possible, while keeping a close watch on his activities and at the same time handing out 
especially stiff sentences to his adherents involved in violent actions. In this case the 
Procurator Fiscal made it clear that any such were to be dealt with in the Sheriff Court and 
not the police court. 
   
 
 I have given definite instructions to the Police that cases arising out of any of 
these meetings are to be reported to me, and not set dir ct to the Police Court in 
future, as I think it very undesirable that such cases, if they are at all serious, 
should be dealt with by Magistrates, who are in touch with the two Councillors 
referred to, and who are being faced with electoral questions, and asked to take 
sides for or against the party which is organising much of this disturbance.530     
 
 It is clear from the press reports that fines of £10 pounds or thirty days in jail were 
commonplace. £10 was a substantial sum in 1935 (Cormack himself only made £4:5/- a week 
from the Society and his council colleague, James Marr, £2)531 There is equally no doubt that 
they took a dim view of the Protestant Action Society  and the evidence does not support the 
contention that were covertly in sympathy with him. As Michael Rosie points out: ‘One 
                                                 
529 Ibid 
530 NRS, HH1/777, Procurator Fiscal’s Report. 
531 NRS, HH1/777, Procurator Fiscal’s Report. 
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reason for the exaggeration of the extent and effectiveness of PAS violence is the palpable 
shock experienced in a city relatively unused to sectarian controversy and where, until very 
recently, Catholic activities had been rarely publicly criticised let alone physically 
challenged. Archbishop MacDonald complained that the fact that a “riot…did not actually 
take place” in Morningside was due only to police action “deserving of the highest 
commendation” and to the commendable self-restraint of Catholics. He urged that further 
steps be taken against ‘incitement to violence.’532 The scale of the remembered violence 
seems to have been rapidly magnified by the absence, in MacDonald’s view, of an adequately 
wide and sympathetic recognition of the Catholic experience. Equally Gallagher contends 
that: ‘Isolated and almost friendless, with Protestant Action dominating the streets, 
Cormack’s threat to Edinburgh Catholics seemed only too real as the hot summer of 1935 
drew to a close.’ This is somewhat exaggerated also. At no time did the police lose control of 
the situation and the sympathies of the Edinburgh establishment were not with Cormack, 
however irritated they may have been MacDonald on occasion. 
 
VI Conclusion 
 The Cormack phenomenon had some more time to run and in 1936 saw a high point with 
more Protestant Action Councillors elected, although it was brief victory. Cormack himself 
would retain his Council seat until 1962 and would still regularly harangue passers-by at the 
Mound on a Sunday afternoon.533 Nevertheless, the summer of 1935 remains a puzzling and 
almost bizarre episode in the city’s history. It certainly caused more ink to be spilt than blood 
to be shed and at a distance of 77 years it is still difficult to establish all the facts. The object 
here has been to examine the position from the perspective of those who had to deal with 
Cormack as an issue of public order. In many ways it was an awkward and invidious position. 
The authorities had obviously not taken his threats of violent disorder seriously enough. This 
was Edinburgh after all. On the other hand the disor er had not been all that serious and if 
they were seen to be mounting a prosecution at the be st of Archbishop MacDonald it could 
have inflamed the situation even more. MacDonald’s understandable outrage grew after the 
events as the tales came into his office but a more measured response than some of his 
statements to the press might have engendered a little more official sympathy and a little less 
official irritation. Cormack, to the authorities, was a rabble-rousing trouble maker, and worse, 
                                                 
532 M. Rosie, Protestant Action and the Edinburgh Irish,  p150. 
533 The author’s mother recalls Cormack speaking at the Mound in the 1950s although by this time he had 
become something of a figure of fun to the younger generation. 
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in Edinburgh terms, an embarrassment. He was not, however, solely an embarrassment to the 
City. The General Assembly of May 1935 had indulged in some fairly inflammatory 
language of its own and now reaped, if not quite the w irlwind, an uncomfortably cold blast 
of reality.  This had been obliquely pointed out in he Bulletin’s editorial and expressly in the 
unnamed clergymen’s letter to the Scotsman. Thirteen years of unremitting hostility to the 
Irish immigrant community, and by extension their rligion, had resulted in violent disorder 
in the streets and opprobrium for the nation’s capital city, all done in the ostensible defence 
of Protestantism. The Menace to our Scots Nationality had not turned out to be the Irish after 






Conclusion and Epilogue 
 
  The anti-Irish campaign in Scotland was, ultimately, a failure but was it an exercise in 
futility? It was undoubtedly based on pseudo-scientific racism, dubious statistics and, in some 
cases, sheer sectarian prejudice. Its motivation was fe r – fear of the Irish certainly – but fear 
of Scotland also. The Great War had swept away all the certainties of the past but rather than 
view this as an opportunity the Kirk chose to take a reactionary path. Callum Brown has 
argued, ‘the sense of insecurity within Presbyterianism in the 1920s forced Protestantism on 
the retreat.’534  The retreat was to an intellectual and social laager that saw itself surrounded 
by the foes of Romanism, modernism and socialism. This was not the Scotland with which 
these men (and women) had grown up. If the Irish were aliens then Scotland, too, was 
becoming alien. The ‘churchless million’ were arguably a greater threat to Presbyterianism 
than any number of ‘Irish Catholics’. The social and economic upheavals of the 1920s and 
1930s were more responsible for the decline in the C urch’s pre-eminent position as social 
and moral arbiter of the nation than any notion of b lshevism. The suburban and middle-class 
identification of the Church that roundly condemned the General Strike and Labour MPs as 
men ‘bringing disgrace and scandal on the house of Commons’535 did little to attract working-
class Scots to emptying pews. A concerted attack on the Irish did not change British 
immigration policy, indirectly led to some public disorder and may have unnecessarily 
embittered Catholic – Protestant relations for years to come. Given that unenviable record the 
answer to the question posed in the first sentence would appear to be an unequivocal yes. 
However, putting aside the ethical and moral dimension, the main argument of this thesis is 
that the Church case was also an extremely effective and, in some ways quite sophisticated, 
political campaign that came far closer to success than previous scholarship has allowed.  
   It could be argued that ‘almost’ does not count in politics but that would be to miss the 
point here. The Churches managed to put the Irish campaign high on the political agenda on 
several occasions between 1923 and 1935. They initiated several large scale internal 
enquiries and debate within Government and prompted a major press investigation by the 
Glasgow Herald. At various times the Church had influential supporters in Governments of 
every political persuasion who sought to convince th ir colleagues of their case. The 
intellectual arguments deployed, while distasteful, not to say repugnant in the light of 
subsequent world events were not considered so at the time. It should be remembered that the 
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nativist and eugenicist argument had been at the int llectual heart of the Immigration 
Restriction League in the United States. Those self-same arguments had been largely 
instrumental in persuading the largest liberal democracy in the world at the time, a nation 
founded entirely on immigration, to introduce a national origin quota system for immigrants. 
If those arguments could be successful there, there was no reason to suppose that the same 
case could not be successfully argued in Scotland. O e of the striking things to come out of 
an examination of the official documents was the almost universal consensus that the Irish 
population in Scotland were considered a ‘problem,’ even if there was no consensus on how 
to deal with it. Tom Gallagher has argued that in 1935 for Walter Elliot ‘the manipulation of 
religious feeling was repugnant to him.’536 Perhaps in 1935 it was, but that repugnance was 
not quite so in evidence in 1928/9 when he was attemp ing to persuade his party to introduce 
restrictions on Irish immigration and writing to Baffy Dugdale that, ‘The anti-Irish Bill…is 
the absolute minimum we can get away with.’537  
   Gallagher further argues that, ‘it would be quite wrong to assert that Scottish Tory MPs 
invariably adopted an Orange position on Ireland or related religious matters.’ In this he is 
quite correct but only up to a point. Antipathy to Irish immigration was an Orange position 
but it was not an exclusively Orange position.  It will be noted that in this thesis there has 
been comparatively little mention of the Orange Order because there is no evidence to 
suggest, with the possible exception of Gilmour, that they had any meaningful impact at a 
decision-making level. There were plenty of individuals with no Orange connection who had 
no great love for the Irish.  Ramsay MacDonald thought Irish immigration ‘a perfect 
scandal,’538  Sir Archibald Sinclair formally reserved his right to reopen the question539 and 
Sir Godfrey Collins produced a memorandum for the Cabinet in 1933 arguing for the 
restriction of Irish immigration using many of the Kirk’s points.540 John Jeffrey was outraged 
at the Free State’s refusal to consider a reciprocal arr ngement for the repatriation of paupers 
and take back a ‘small proportion of the “misfits.”541  Even Tom Johnston thought that the 
Irish of the third generation should still be classified as Irish and that ‘So long as our own 
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folk are unemployed there should be no importation’.542 The point is that for a variety of 
reasons, not all of them religious or even racial, the idea of restricting Irish immigration, or at 
the very least repatriating paupers, had its attractions for the political class of all parties and 
none.  
    The immigration argument also had international dimensions. The Empire Migration 
Committee of the Economic Advisory Council certainly took on board the Scottish Office’s 
submission with regard to Irish immigration543 and that submission was heavily, if not 
entirely influenced by the anti-Irish campaign. Certainly without the Church’s persistence on 
the issue it is highly unlikely that such suggestions would ever have been made. The Scottish 
debate also informed British-Irish relations and the development of Dominion nationalism.  
The concept of what was, and what was not, a British subject bedevilled the whole question 
of the restriction of immigration, as it would the constitutional and economic wrangling 
between the Free State and Britain. What is interesting about this aspect of the debate is that 
there appears to have been much more willingness on the part of Scottish politicians and 
officials to consider the Irish as aliens than there was in the wider British Government. The 
‘immemorial policy’ of allowing British subjects, no matter where they were born, free entry 
into the mother country did not appear to have had t e same emotional resonance in Scotland 
as it did in Whitehall. The fact that Australia, Canada and New Zealand imposed immigration 
restrictions on British migrants made it seem perfectly equitable that these should be imposed 
in turn on Dominion citizens. It was an argument consistently made by the Scottish Office 
and consistently opposed by the Dominions and the Home Office. Once again this was an 
issue that was first seriously addressed as a direct consequence of the Church campaign. It is 
a question that may well have arisen on its own during the Economic War in the 1930s but it 
had been given a thorough airing in the previous deca  and the issues raised informed the 
subsequent debate. What sort of a Dominion was Ireland?  Did it actually have the same 
constitutional status as Canada or did it is physical proximity mean that it was a special case? 
If Ireland became a Republic would the imposition of immigration restriction still be, as 
argued by the Home Office, practically impossible to enforce?  At the time of the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty it was envisaged, by London at any rate, that Ireland was still firmly 
within the Empire. Before the Free State had reached its first birthday the Church of Scotland 
was effectively questioning if being within the Empire was the same as being British. Even if 
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it were the case, was it possible to be British andstill a threat to Scots nationality? It does 
raise the question of a possible divergence of the concept of Britishness in the immediate 
aftermath of the Great War.    
   Why was the Irish community in Scotland the recipient of so much of this attention? It has 
been argued at the beginning of this thesis that the Irish War of Independence made the Irish 
community visible in Scotland in a way that it had not previously been. Certainly they 
appeared a lot more threatening than they had previously. Prior to 1914 the common middle-
class perception, or misperception, of the Irish was of a convenient cheap labour force; with 
an unfortunate predilection for strong drink and brawling, priest ridden undoubtedly, but 
useful nonetheless. Those that had the vote could be counted on to provide it solidly for the 
Liberals, as much as their Orange counterparts could be counted on for the Unionists. This 
was not a particularly sophisticated understanding of the Irish in Scotland but at the high 
noon of Empire prosperity for Scotland there were not that many that felt the need to make 
the effort. The very insularity of the Irish population did not help alter this view. As 
‘strangers in a strange land’544 the natural tendency to keep to themselves and look t  their 
own institutions, in this case the Catholic Church, did little to advance their absorption into 
the mainstream of Scottish society or dispel the comm n anti-Irish prejudices. Even the 
Scottish Catholic Church was less than enthusiastic about their presence. Despite this the 
Irish were not unduly threatening. Certainly, the successive Home Rule crises impinged on 
Scottish politics but with a large part of the country solidly Liberal the Irish could even be 
viewed as allies in some quarters. There were many in Scotland who viewed Carson with as 
much askance as others did Redmond, despite attempts to appeal to a common Covenanting 
tradition between Scotland and Ulster. 
      The Irish War changed that perception radically. The Irish were no longer just an ‘other’ 
they were a dangerous ‘other.’ As the economic position worsened and unemployment rose 
there was a natural disposition to protect one’s own and a less forgivable tendency to turn on 
a minority. Why should Scots be forced to compete in a shrinking job market with a 
dangerous, disloyal alien group who drove down living standards with their willingness to 
undercut wages? Why should hard pressed rate payers nd taxpayers be forced to support the 
non-indigenous poor? Why should the law-abiding majority tolerate a criminally disposed 
foreign underclass? Why should this group’s religion be given apparently exceptional 
privileges in education at public expense? From the source of cheap labour that had provided 
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much of the basic muscle power that had allowed Scotland’s industrial expansion the Irish 
were now a luxury the country could no longer afford. At the very least no more should be 
allowed entry.  It was a simple but effective argument,  which is probably why it has been 
used, to a greater or lesser extent, against almost every migrant group in the United Kingdom 
ever since, and is still brought out by certain sections of the popular press to this day. It may 
have been a ‘straw man’ argument applied to an entire e hnic group, but it was populist and 
plausible and in fairness to its advocates they undo btedly genuinely believed it. The Church 
and Nation Committee certainly went to great lengths to prove it statistically. Dr White 
argued the case from a moral and modern scientific standpoint. The moral may have been 
dubious and the ‘science’ a nonsense but there is the danger of being anachronistic here. At 
the time it was a highly respectable argument.  It had the added attraction of being an 
apparent solution to the economic woes of the time. With politicians struggling with 
unprecedented levels of unemployment anything that could provide even a partial remedy had 
it appeal. Even when it had been conclusively and repeatedly proven that high Irish 
immigration was a myth, and publicly exposed as such, that they were no more disposed to 
pauperism, criminality or lunacy than any other section of the population, the issue was 
constantly re-examined for some possible way in which action could be seen to be taken. 
    This raises two vital points. Firstly, as stated above, there were those who sympathised 
with the anti-Irish case and secondly that, as far as the Scottish Office was concerned, they 
were sensitive to the pressure being brought to bear y the Churches. The evidence presented 
here suggests that it would be wrong to assert that politicians and officials were hostile or 
indifferent to the Kirk’s representations. Why should this have been the case?  The 19th 
century idea of blaming the poor for their poverty s ill had a conceptual hold on middle class 
opinion and whatever else the majority of the ‘Irish’ population was at the time they were 
largely poor. Classical liberal economics as well as Victorian concepts of class and race were 
as much a part of the intellectual make-up of the Scottish Office as they were of the General 
Assembly. They were men (and in this case largely men) who were a product of their time 
and if the times were changing they had not changed yet. 
   This thesis has set out to provide another narrative to the anti-Irish campaign. This is not to 
say that it is an alternative narrative to that of previous scholars or indeed the definitive one. 
It is hoped that it is a complimentary one. As was pointed out in the introduction much of the 
historiography concerned with religion and Scots-Iri h relations in this period has tended to 
come from a particularly West of Scotland viewpoint. The aim here has been to approach the 
period from an alternative perspective, that of the political and official establishment. The 
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thesis has sought to demonstrate that this was much more complex question for decision 
makers than a simple reluctance to get involved in the issues. In the process this has required 
the examination of some fairly dense archival materi l but it has brought to light some 
surprising, and hitherto quite unsuspected actions and attitudes of some of the major Scottish 
political figures of the inter-war period many of whom were not previously thought to be 
concerned in the issue. In concluding a thesis one is also acutely aware of the questions that 
remain unanswered rather than of the ones that have been. It is especially so in this case when 
so many promising, and unexpected, avenues of enquiry have been opened up that for reasons 
of time and space (and in some cases economics) it was not possible to pursue. For example a 
thorough re-examination of the Ramsay MacDonald’s papers with a view to establishing his 
private views on Irish immigration may well provide a fresh perspective on British-Irish 
relations at the beginning of the ‘Economic war’. It is not an area that has been explored by 
any of his biographers perhaps because they did not rec gnise the significance.  It has been 
pointed out here that there was a particular Scottish input on this issue and one which could 
be profitably further investigated. Equally the relationship between the State, Kirk and 
commerce on the question of Irish, or indeed Roman C tholic employment between the wars 
would bear further examination. The Church Interests Committee was instructed by the 
General Assembly to pursue the matter with Scottish employers, as indeed the Scottish Office 
had been encouraged to do by Joynson-Hicks. As yet the ‘smoking gun’ of archival evidence 
has not been found, but given some of the material discussed here it is perhaps time for 
another search. There is, of course the last of the great conundrum of the period, the 
comparative silence of the Catholic Church. A possible explanation has been advanced here 
but it is still an area that requires further enquiry. Sadly, at the time of writing, proposals are 
afoot to disperse the Catholic archives currently based at Columba House which would make 
this an even more difficult proposition. It may well be that some of the answers lie in the 
Vatican archives.  
   This thesis ends prior to the outbreak of war because it closes a particular chapter in the 
history of the anti-Irish campaign. This section of the thesis, however, is entitled conclusion 
and epilogue for a reason. There are still other chapters to be written. The effect of Irish 
neutrality in Scotland during the Second World War; the position of the post war Kirk and the 
political tensions between the traditionalists and the modernisers; the rise of a catholic 
middle-class and its relationship with the Catholic Church are but some of the issues yet to be 
fully explored. The history of the Irish in Scotland in the second half of the 20th century is yet 
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to be written. It is hoped that what has been discus ed here will provide at least one starting 
point for that history. 
    
                                      
 





































National Records of Scotland HH1/541Church and Nation Committee of the Church of 
Scotland Pamphlet on Irish Immigration in Scotland 
Open letter to Sir John Gilmour December 1925 
   
Sir, 
       In accordance with a remit from the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, the 
United Free Church, and the Free Church, and after consultation with other Churches, we 
desire to approach His Majesty’s Government upon a question of vital importance to our 
Scottish people – viz., the serious situation that has arisen in Scotland owing to the influx 
during the last number of years of many thousands of Irish immigrants, and to the emigration 
of many thousands of the native population. 
    While migration under normal circumstances may be a good thing, we are convinced that 
the situation in Scotland to-day is such that there is urgent need for the regulation thereof in 
the interests of the Scottish nation. 
    Our reason for this is that the process of unregulated migration out of and into Scotland in 
the past has brought about a situation where there is the danger of the control of the affairs of 
their own country passing out of the hands of the Scottish people, and even to the 
endangering of the continued existence of Scottish nationality and civilisation. 
     If this were for the good of Scotland, if it were the case of an inferior race being 
supplanted by a superior race, however unpalatable it might be, we would be compelled to 
resign ourselves to it. 
     But we are convinced that the very opposite is the case; that a law abiding, thrifty and 
industrious race is being supplanted by immigrants whose presence tends to lower the social 
conditions, and to undermine that spirit of independence which has so long been a 
characteristic of the Scottish people, and we are of the opinion that, in justice to our own 
people steps should be taken to prevent the situation becoming worse. 
   We recognise the fact that the presence of the immigrants referred to was due originally to a 
demand for their labour. They accepted lower wages and were satisfied with poorer 
conditions of life and work, and by doing so have doubtless helped Scotland to win her 
present place among industrial nations. We have no desire to do anything in the nature of 
injustice to those whose services the country has accepted, and who have now settled down 
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and made their homes in our midst. With the question of the price Scotland has paid for these 
services, in the drain on her public and philanthropic funds, in the creation of slums in her 
large industrial centres, and in the increase of the legal machinery necessary to deal with this 
immigrant population, not to mention the demoralising effect on her own people, we will deal 
later. The point that we would draw attention to here is that, though there is now no longer 
any demand for immigrant labour – in fact there are many tens of thousands walking the 
streets idle – they are still coming in. It has been stated in the House of Commons that 9,000 
persons immigrated to Scotland in 1924, and yet there are as many as 70,000 unemployed 
persons in Glasgow alone. And it is a fact that, thanks to the influence of Irish foremen, 
recent immigrants are often able to secure a job which there are thousands of Scotsmen 
competent and willing to take.545  
     Apart from the financial aspect of the question, this constitutes a very grave injustice to 
our own working people, who are beginning to feel that the position is growing hopeless that 
their only chance of a decent livelihood is to emigrate, with the result that the industrial areas 
are being largely recruited from a people whose whole s cial, mental and moral outlook is on 
a lower plane than that of the stalwart sons and daughters of our native hills and glens. 
Already many of the larger towns in this industrial area are one third Irish. We refer you to 
such towns as Coatbridge, Wishaw, and Dumbarton, which are examples of what is 
happening all through the populous and wealth producing counties of Renfrew, Dumbarton 
and Lanark, where there seems unfortunately only too good reason to believe that in the not 
very distant future the Scottish race may actually be in the minority. For wherever the Irish 
population tends to dominate, the Scottish population will not stay. 
     The Scot, who as a colonist is eagerly sought after by all the Dominions and by America, 
is being driven from his own shores and his place tk n by an immigrant who makes a very 
much less satisfactory citizen. That is not only our own opinion, but finds striking 
corroboration in an official inquiry in the United States of America. The Congressional 
Committee that conducted that inquiry furnished statistics which proved that, while the 
Balkans and Russia provided undesirable immigrants, Ireland provided the most undesirable 
of all. Under the heading of “Dependence on the Community or Pauperism” Ireland 
contributed nearly six and a half times its normal quota. 
                                                 
545 We know of a recent case where an Irish foreman was dismissing Scotsman and engaging Irishmen, and was 
even bringing men over from Ireland and putting them on the job. 
    We have known cases where public schemes undertaken o provide work for our own unemployed have ben 
partially recruited from immigrants of a few weeks and months standing. 
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     The result of this inquiry is seen in recent legislation with regard to immigration into the 
United States. At present the British quota is 34,000 and the Irish quota 28,367. In 1927 the 
British and North of Ireland quota is to be 83,000 and that of the Irish Free State only 8,000. 
America is anxious to have a larger number of British (including Scottish) immigrants, but 
she has determined ruthlessly to cut down the number from the Irish Free State. What the 
result of this will be on Scotland is only too manifest. It means large numbers of those 
refused admission to the United States will come to Sc tland. The 8,000 to be admitted from 
the Irish Free State will, we may be sure, be the best of those who apply, and Scotland will 
get those that America does not want. If the situation is bad at present, it promises to become 
very much worse before very long.  
     The following are some of the figures upon which our conclusions are based:- 
Between 1881 and 1901 Irish population increased by 32 ½% 
    “            “             “     Scottish  “             “                 18 ½% 
    “           1901       1921 Irish       “            “                  39% 
    “            “               “    Scottish  “            “                  6% (sic) 
   And since 1921, as is manifest from the returns of the Registrar-General for Scotland, the 
same tendency still prevails. There is evidence of a persistent decrease in the numbers of the 
Scottish race, and a steady increase in the numbers of the Irish race. 
   This disproportion cannot be explained by the difference in the birth rate. Our inquiry leads 
us to believe that the birth rate among the Scottish working class is as high as among the 
Irish. 
    As regards the general thriftlessness of the Irish people, and the readiness with which they 
seek financial relief, we have made extensive enquiry from those who administer parochial, 
municipal and philanthropic funds, and the opinion is unanimous that, out of all proportion to 
their numbers, they are a heavy financial burden to the community. In Glasgow, for example, 
where they number about 25% of the population, they account for about 70% of the relief 
funds. And the anomalous position is that, though recent immigrants from the Irish Free State 
become chargeable to the parish, no claim can be made against their native parish. In theory 
they may be repatriated on a Sheriff’s warrant, but in practice the law is ineffective, as they 
just come back again. 
   From judicial statistics it is clear that this immigrant population is responsible for crime 
again out of all proportion to its numbers. Those describing themselves as “Irish” contributed 
33% to the “convictions” in 1920, and 29% in 1921. It does not seem clear whether in these 
returns the term “Irish” means “born in Ireland” or“of Irish extraction”. Those “born in 
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Ireland” constitute about 3 1/3% of the population of Scotland: those of “Irish extraction” 
about 14%. So that in either case this immigrant population is proved to be excessively 
productive of crime. In fact, we are convinced that, if anything it is an underestimate to say 
that in proportion to their numbers, they are three times as productive of crime as the rest of 
the population. 
   Such are the people who are gradually taking possession of our native land. Meanwhile 
what is happening to our own people? In 1922, 31,014 left our shores for lands overseas: on 
1923, 71,042; in 1924, 80,000. It might be argued that what is Scotland’s loss is the Empire’s 
gain. But that is not wholly true. From July to November 1924 it is estimated that, while 
25,000 Scots emigrated to Canada, 30,000 went to the United States of America. America 
was the chief gainer and not the British Empire. 
     These tens of thousands of emigrants, representing some of the finest young manhood and 
womanhood of Scotland, have left our shores for good; and the tragedy of it is that many of 
them might have been kept at home, and found ample scope for their Scottish grit and 
stamina in our industrial areas. Instead of which this great race movement is allowed to 
continue, and Scotland is being gradually divided into two great racial camps, different in 
ideals, with different traditions, and with widely diverging characteristics. These two races do 
not fuse to any appreciable extent. The tendency is the very reverse. The Irish race in 
Scotland keep largely by themselves, and their habits re such that our Scottish people do not 
readily mingle with them. The condition is such as to make the danger of racial strife and 
hatred very real. 
     We wish it to be understood that our criticism of the Irishman in this statement refers to 
the unsatisfactory type of immigrant into this country, and is not meant to apply to the Irish 
people as a whole. 
      In view of the above considered statement, we would respectfully urge upon His 
Majesty’s Government to institute an inquiry into the whole subject, and thereafter to take 
such action as may seem to them to be necessary or desirable. 
                                             We remain 
                                                  Sir, 
                                                   Your humble Servants 
                                                             John White, Joint-Convenor 
                                                              J. M’N. Frazer, Hon. Secretary  
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Appendix Two 
National Records of Scotland, HH1/541 
Irish Immigration Briefing Paper for the Secretary of State for Scotland 24th December 
1926  
 
Note for the Secretary of State’s use at Deputation fr m the General Assembly’s Committee 
on Church Nation with regard to Irish Immigration – Edinburgh 24 September, 1926.    
 
Previous history of the question 
     The question has not so far had much Parliamentary prominence. In February, 1925, Mr 
Stephen Mitchell asked for statistics as to the number of immigrants from the South of 
Ireland to Glasgow and the West of Scotland and wastold that the information was not 
available; and in July, 1925, Sir Alexander Sprot called attention by a question to the fact that 
Irish Free Staters, their country having acquired Dominion status, could not be deported nor 
the cost of their maintenance be recovered. 
 
Memorial of the Church of Scotland Committee on Churc  and Nation. 
       In December 1925, the Church of Scotland Committee on Church and Nation forwarded 
a memorial on the subject and asked for a reception of a deputation. The main points put 
forward were as follows:- 
I. The proportion of Scottish folk in Scotland is decreasing and that of Irish increasing, since 
Scots emigrate largely to places outside the British Empire, and the Irish immigrate. 
   Apart from other reasons immigration of Irish into Scotland is increased by – 
(a) the practice of Irish foremen to give jobs to compatriots; 
(b) the restriction of Irish immigration into the United States of America.  
The proportion of Irish in the population is especially noticeable in large industrial towns 
such as Coatbridge, Wishaw and Dumbarton. 
II. The results are:- 
(a) general lowering of social conditions; 
(b) competition with Scottish unemployed; 
(c) heavy burden on poor, etc., funds without the possibility of deportation or recovery of 
cost of maintenance; 
(d) filling of prisons; 
(e) danger of social strife; 
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Information on the subject from Government Departments tc., 
I. The Registrar General reports that – 
(a) at the 1921 Census there were fewer born-in Ireland persons enumerated in Scotland 
than at the 1911 census; 
(b) the percentage of Roman Catholic marriages is growing, but only slowly 
II.  The Prison Commissioners report that, while the criminal statistics do not 
distinguish persons of Irish extraction as opposed to persons born in Ireland, the 
number of Roman Catholic prisoners who may be taken to be for the most part of 
Irish birth or extraction is a high proportion of the total, and they say that there is 
no doubt that a very large section of the criminal population is Irish. 
III.   A report by the Scottish Board of Health shows that – 
(a) The number of Irish-born persons in receipt of ordinary poor relief has not grown 
recently; it is less than it was in 1910 and the percentage of the total number 
chargeable (excluding able-bodied unemployed) is also less. 
The figures, as at 15.5.25, were:- 
9,300 Irish chargeable, excluding able bodied, 
= 7.1% of total 
   1,844 Irish able-bodied chargeable with 4,542 dependents = 8.4% of total able 
bodied + dependents 
   At the census of 1921 there were 159,020 Irish born persons in Scotland, about 3% 
of the population. 
  As regards the employment of Irishmen in Scotland, the Scottish Board of Health 
hold that there is reason to think that men from Ireland secure, in the face of serious 
unemployment in Scotland, some of the low paid work there, especially in industrial 
areas in the Clyde valley. 
IV.   
   The Glasgow Inspector of Poor reports that the position is now much the same as it was in 
January, 1925, when figures for 20 parishes showed that there were therein 1,206 Irish Free 
Staters, who would have been removed to Ireland but for he Dominion status of the Irish 
Free State. To check the influx of Irish the Glasgow council decided to refuse to relieve Irish 
immigrants before they had been three months in Scotland. 
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      The Association of Poor Law Unions, after communication with the    Scottish Poor Law 
authorities, recently approached the Ministry of Health with a view to reciprocal legislation 
with the Irish Free State for the repatriation of pau ers. 
     The Dominions Office have told the Ministry of Health that they were ready to 
recommend such reciprocal arrangements to the Irish Free State, but could not guarantee that 
the Free State Government would agree; as a first step they suggested investigation by 
English and Scottish departments and possibly an inter-departmental conference. 
        It would appear that although the figures above cited supplied by Scottish Departments 
do not reveal a very serious state of affairs, there certainly is an Irish problem in the South 
West of Scotland, and that there has been one for some time. There is no doubt that the Irish 
impose an undue burden upon poor law authorities and that too great a proportion of the 
prison population is of Irish birth or extraction: and, further, it seems that Irish, (sic) whether 
by accepting lower wages and worse conditions or thr ugh the action of compatriot foreman, 
obtain employment in the face of serious unemployment among Scotsmen. 
    It is doubtful whether there has recently been any serious intensification of the problem, 
but there are two important factors of which the influence may prove greater as time goes on. 
These are – 
(i) The acquisition of Dominion status by the Irish Free State and the consequent 
inability to repatriate pauper Irish: 
(ii)  The check put by the United States of America upon Irish immigration. 
Any mitigation of (ii) is probably out of the question, but something may be done with regard 
to (i) In the past pauper Irish could be repatriated from Scotland to Ireland (but not vice 
versa). That is now impossible since the Free State w s constituted and the difficulty is that it 
is doubtful whether the Free State would agree to recip ocal arrangements for repatriation, 
such as suggested by the Poor Law Unions, for presumably more Irishmen would fall to be 
repatriated than Englishmen or Scotsmen. It would appe r to be desirable, as the Dominions 
Office suggest, for the problem to be investigated first by English and Scottish Departments 
in consultation before the Free State Government is approached.  
     It is of course possible for immigration from the Free State either by itself or along with 
immigration from other Dominions to be restricted by Statute, and this possibility has been 
kept in view, as is shown by the attached copy of a memorandum by Captain Elliot dated 7th 
July, 1925. 
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    The Deputation might be informed that the matter is receiving the careful consideration of 
the Secretary of State in consultation with other Dpartments interested, and it might be 
pointed out in this connection that the question affects England as well as Scotland. 
Scottish Office 
September 1926. 












































Appendix Three  
National Records of Scotland HH1/556 Elliot Strategy Document 
Major Elliot February - April 1929 Scottish Government Factors which must be 
considered before the General Election 
   A re-examination of Scottish government and its relation to the United Kingdom 
Parliament is imminent. The governing fact of the situation is that two parties out of three are 
definitely committed to the proposition of a legislature for Scotland. These two parties have 
almost for twenty years or more, held a majority of Scottish seats, and even when they have 
not, as in the present Parliament, they practically balance the Conservatives. It is not within 
the range of practical politics to suppose that this situation will be altered to the Conservative 
advantage in the forthcoming election. 
     The imminence of the situation arises from the fact that Ireland is now out of the way. The 
existence of the Irish problem meant that the Scottish question was entirely academic. The 
Conservative party was opposed to Home Rule on princi le, and the Liberal party recognised 
that, in fact Irish Home Rule would require all the power of at least one Parliament. Any 
establishment of a Scottish legislature was accordingly always at least one or possibly two 
General Elections away, and this meant that for all parties it was shelved indefinitely. 
     This ‘shelving’ factor does not now exist. Do we recognise, however, that this means that 
the establishment of a Scottish legislature is thusbrought forward as a possibility not of the 
next ten years, but as a possibility of the next eight en months? Both Liberal and Labour 
parties are deeply pledged to the proposal of such a measure, and resolutions in its favour 
have been repeatedly carried in Parliament, with their official support, over many years. I do 
not know that the Conservative party has recently made any clear statement of policy on the 
matter.  
     It is not necessary to consider the prospects of the General Election, save to say that in any 
election, there are three possibilities of a clear m jority against the Government, or even with 
an indeterminate situation, it may be taken that the combined Labour and Liberal 
representation in Scotland would exceed the Conservative. In either of these cases a Scottish 
Home Rule Bill would almost automatically be brought forward in the first year of the new 
Parliament. I do not think that it is a matter on which English Conservative members feel 
themselves bound on principle. They would certainly demand a very clear and reasoned lead 
from Scottish Conservatives, and they would attach more weight than usual to the attitude of 
non-party men and of the press. 
 250
     But even in the event of a clear Government majority there are several factors which 
demand very close examination. The first is in the existence of the Scottish Grand 
Committee. This Committee is a constitutional anomaly of the first magnitude.  It is a 
committee (so called) which does not represent the composition of its parent body. It is also a 
committee to which a mass of important business stand  automatically referred, which 
business cannot be considered elsewhere, save by explicitly waiving the definite procedure 
laid down by the house. The Committee has the unfettered right of coming to decisions in 
conflict with the presumed wishes of the main body, and the main body has the equally 
unfettered right of overturning these decisions (on report). It is clear that this Committee has 
power without responsibility, and all the ingredients for friction are present and must at some 
time become active.  
     As has been pointed out earlier, the normal rel tion of parties in Scotland under present 
conditions is much closer to the Liberal Labour majority than is the case in England. The 
return of a purely Conservative administration at once makes this apparent. The most recent 
and most useful example was the return of the Bonar Law Government. Here the 
Conservative party had a majority of about 80, a comfortable working majority. The Scottish 
representation made Labour the largest single Scottish party (it approached in fact a majority 
over both other parties combined) and left the Governm nt with such a negligible minority 
that it was impossible for it to face the Scottish Grand Committee at all. 
      That Parliament came to a sudden end and the full implications of the situation did not 
become apparent. Mr F C Thomson and myself, however, who with Mr Patrick Ford were at 
that time responsible for Scottish business in the Commons, had the precariousness of our 
position deeply impressed upon us. The difficulties in the first year were dealt with by 
‘tacking’ carried to almost absurd lengths. (The prolongation of payments of relief to Scottish 
able-bodied unemployed for instance, was tacked to a bill regulating London inter-borough 
finance.) I do not think that affairs could thus have continued for a whole Parliament, and in 
fact the then Secretary for Scotland had had to consider the only logical step. That is, the 
abolition of the Scottish Grand Committee. 
    Scottish Members will readily realise the extreme difficulty of taking any such step in the 
1929 Parliament, as practically the first proposal of the new administration towards the 
Scottish. Only the Chief Whip can give any firm estimation of the possibilities of such a 
situation arising, but it would seem that unless we do better in 1929 than we did in 1924, it is 
certainly highly probable. (The added members reflect the proportion of the house, and 
cannot be relied on for so heavy a Conservative weighting in the next Parliament as this.) 
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       English Members would certainly look askance at such a step. The arguments of 
congesting the business of Parliament would be urged with much force. They would also feel 
they are being led into an untenable position.  It is therefore improbable that this step would 
be taken. The machine would no doubt be made to run for some time by tacking, by stringent 
use of financial resolutions, and by taking vital business in Committee of the whole House. 
But it would leave the Government open to all sorts f humiliations for its own business, and 
at the mercy of the Oppositions for any Private Memb rs Bills brought in, of which a Scottish 
Home Rule Bill would be amongst the earliest. 
       In all this I have said nothing of the Nationalist movement in Scotland. It is undesirable 
to emphasise new developments unduly. All the factors which I have enumerated were 
present in 1923. But the new movement at least does n t point to any weakening in the 
autonomist position. It seems to me possible that the anti-Government swing of the pendulum 
may lead to a certain number of the disgruntled fining in the ‘Nationalist’ label a handy 
compromise, of the same kind as that which leads to the return of independent Members 
when discontent is about, and when no alternative Government exists. 
        The Nationalist movement however contains two elements naturally opposed whose 
temporary union has given them strength. These elements are the ‘Gaelic-Irish’ and the 
‘Edinburgh Protestant’. The ‘Gaelic Irish are the lit rary men and some of them, such as 
Compton Mackenzie, preach the re-constitution of Scotland on a Roman Catholic basis. 
Needless to say this is an anathema to the East-coun ry men and the Kirks. It would be easy 
to split these two. The steps hereafter detailed would do so. But it is probable that Unionist 
action along the lines previously considered might consolidate them. 
        In any case it is clear that several members will have Nationalist candidates run against 
them at the next election and that very clear pronouncements will be demanded from all of 
us. 
       The essence of the relationship between the two kingdoms is finance. It is for 
consideration whether Conservatives should not be prepared to set up a Royal Commission 
on the relationship between the two countries with special reference to finance. It would be 
no use, of course, to set up such a commission unless th  Conservative party were prepared to 
accept fully its findings, and give legislative effect to them if desirable- in fact to envisage a 
Conservative Home Rule Bill- for that is what it might lead to. 
       But the proposal of a Royal Commission might be taken as simply a device to shelve 
indefinitely an awkward problem. It would not be so in fact, since, as has been shown, the 
permanent factors of the situation will remain and will demand some action. Is there any 
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immediate line we can take for the coming campaign? I think there is. Consider the present 
situation of the labour market in relation to immigration. We have a mass of unemployed 
labour comparable to a refugee problem. We are appealing right and left for charity, and are 
quite rightly pleased with every dozen or so men we can transfer into other districts and other 
employments. We take advantage of the demand for seasonal labour in Canada to move 8,000 
men to and fro across the Atlantic. 
      These facts seem to me the justifiable basis for suspending overseas immigration 
altogether at present, (that is to say Irish immigration). As all Scots Members know this goes 
much deeper than any surface or temporary questions and indeed accounts for a large 
proportion of the autonomist movement. 
Hitherto it has been difficult to see what practical steps could be taken to give effect to any 
such policy. The administrative problem seems however capable of solution along the 
following lines 
1. Use the machinery of unemployment insurance and refuse to issue a new insurance 
book to any save scheduled classes of applicants (home born). This at once gets rid of 
any ‘Ellis Island’ immigration control station difficulties, and gives a scale of 
penalties for contravention. Precedent exists for this in the present limitation of entry 
into the mines, and to some extent in limitation for entry into sugar beet factories. 
2. Defend this on the basis that the insurance fund balances at some figure, (I believe 
800,000, 900,000) but certainly far below the existing figure. Promise, if desired, to 
review the situation, or even to withdraw the embargo, when unemployment falls to 
that figure. 
3. Leave immigration open to all countries within an Uemployment Insurance scheme. 
This obviates difficulties with England and Northern I eland. 
4. Introduce Scottish legislation making paupers charge ble to their country of origin 
and accepting the same responsibility for Scottish paupers overseas. 
To sum up  
1. The position of Scotland vis-à-vis England will come up for review at a very early 
date 
2. The existence of the Scottish Grand Committee makes it impossible to allow things to 
drift 
3. The Conservative Party must be able to make some clear statement of its position 
4.  Scottish members are hereby asked to consider the desirability of:- 
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A) A Royal Commission on the relations between the two countries, not blinking the fact 
that it might report in favour of some sort of autonomy. 
B) An embargo on immigration worked through Unemployment Insurance, not blinking 
the fact that this would be an embargo on Irish immgration and would raise all the 
questions of race, religion and our own emigration overseas. 
C) Legislation laying down reciprocal responsibility for paupers, again recognising that 



























National Records of Scotland HH1/563 Final memo submitted to the Economic 
Advisory Council Committee of Empire Migration signed by William Adamson dated 
October 1930. 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Scotland on Irish Migration into Scotland 
1. During the past few years strong representations have been made to me and my 
predecessor in office by the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church, and by 
others, in favour of legislation to enable Irish immigration into Scotland to be 
regulated and to provide for the repatriation of immigrants who become dependent on 
public funds. It has been argued in support of these proposals :- 
(a) That there is already a large Irish population in Scotland: 
(b) That Irish immigration into Scotland is continuing on an unduly large scale: 
(c) That the Irish population does not assimilate with the Scots: 
(d) That the Irish population is less independent than t e native population and gives rise 
to a disproportionately heavy burden on the poor rates nd on public funds generally: 
(e) That the Irish population in Scotland is less orderly than the native population and is 
responsible for an undue proportion of crime: 
(f) That their low standard of living enables them to accept employment at low rates of 
wages, thereby under cutting Scotsmen who are being driven to emigrate from 
Scotland. 
2. As regards these contentions:- 
(a) The following table gives particulars as to the Irish born persons in Scotland at the 













1901 4,472,103 205,064 - 4.59% 
1911 4,760,904 174,715 30,349 3.67% 
1921 4,882,497 159,020 15,695 3.26% 
 
The figures in column 4 show that there was a decrease in the number of persons 
of Irish birth in each of the inter Censal periods. Further information on this point 
will be furnished by the 1931 Census. 
(Marginal note in pencil: The original Para (a) gave most of this information in 
narrative form. It has now been put in tabular form). 
The above figures do not of course give a complete picture of the Irish element in 
the Scottish population, since they do not include the Scottish born descendants of 
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ancestors who came from Ireland. Information as to the number of such 
descendants is not available. 
(Marginal note: The original had for ancestors ‘parents who were born in’). 
(b) No definite figures are available to show the extent of immigration into Scotland 
from Ireland during the present or recent years. During the first 5 months of 1930 
approximately 390 persons arrived at Scottish ports from Irish Free State ports in 
excess of the number of persons who arrived at Irish Free State ports from 
Scottish Ports. On the other hand, during the year 1929 the persons arriving at 
Scottish ports from the Irish Free State ports were 251 fewer than the persons 
moving in the contrary direction ( this has been confirmed by information 
contained in the Irish Free State returns). During the 5 years 1925 – 1929 the 
persons arriving at Scottish from Irish Free State ports exceeded those going to 
Irish Free State ports from Scottish ports by 6,136. Deductions however can only 
be drawn from these figures with much reserve. The figures (which are collected 
by the Board of Trade) relate to passenger movement and not actual migration. 
There is no record of numbers actually travelling between ports in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland (which may be substantial) (margin l note: These words did 
not appear in the original memo), or of the movement over the land frontier 
between the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland,  there is no record of the 
number of migrants who may proceed from Ireland to Sc tland and vice versa via 
English ports. There is, however, undoubtedly some migration from the Irish Free 
State into Scotland via ports in Northern Ireland such as Belfast and Portrush or 
via England. (Marginal note This sentence did not appe r in the original memo). 
A summary of information furnished by the Ministry of labour in July, 1930, 
which tends to indicate that there is little evidenc  of any pronounced volume of 
immigration at the present time from the Irish Free State to Scotland, is contained 
in appendix 1 to this memorandum. 
(c) This is to some extent a matter of opinion. But insofar as Irish immigrants into 
Scotland are of Roman Catholic denomination there is no doubt that there is a 
strong tendency, in the absence of any considerable Scottish Roman Catholic 
population, towards intermarriage of Irish immigrants, and that this is 
accompanied by the formation of ‘colonies’ of Irishmen in various parts of the 
country, particularly Lanark, Dumbarton and Renfrew. 
(d) The following statistics regarding Irish born paupers in Scotland have been 
furnished by the Department of Health for Scotland 
Year Irish – born persons 
(percentage of total 
population) 
Irish born paupers 
(percentage of total number 
of paupers) 
1911 3.67% 7.9% 
1921 3.26% 6.8% 
1929 (see below) 7.4% 
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(Marginal note: In the original memo this information was given in narrative 
form. It has now been put in tabular form) 
Although definite figures as to the total population and the total number of Irish-
born persons in Scotland during the years 1929 are not available , there seems 
little reason to doubt that the pauperism percentage remains, as in past years, 
much in excess of the population percentage. On the ot r hand it may be noted 
that in no year from 1921 onwards has the percentag of Irish pauperism in 
Scotland reached the level (7.9%) which it attained i  1911. 
  Opportunity has also been take to consider to what extent Irish born persons, and 
Roman Catholics, contribute to the population of lunatic asylums in Scotland. The 
Following figures have been supplied by the General Board of Control for 
Scotland:- 

































14,744 914 6.2% 2,267 15.4% 
 
(e) As regards the total numbers of convicted prisoners, Borstal inmates and criminal 
lunatics in Scotland, information collected by the Prisons Department for Scotland 









These percentages include persons born in Ireland and persons born elsewhere if 
the father is Irish. The figures bear out the contention that in Scotland the Irish 
population is responsible for an undue proportion of crime. At the same time it 
will be seen that from 1925 onwards this proportion has progressively diminished. 
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It may be mentioned that the figures for the first six months of 1930 indicate that, 
of the total number of persons  (1,180) included in the proportion of 17.1% 
approximately half were born in the Irish Free State or elsewhere of Free State 
fathers: approximately half were born in Northern Ireland or elsewhere of 
Northern Ireland fathers.  
(f) No definite information is available to indicate the average wage received by Irish 
born persons employed in Scotland. During the 5 years 1925 – 1929, however, 
211,899 persons emigrated from Scotland to places out of Europe presumably to 
seek employment or better their condition – while during that period, as indicated 
in (b) above, there is reason to suppose that a number of persons may have 
migrated from the Irish Free State to Scotland. Further, information supplied by 
the Scottish Education Department indicates that during recent years the 
enrolment of pupils in Roman Catholic Schools in Scotland shows a marked 
tendency to increase, whereas enrolments in other schools are decreasing. The 
total average enrolment of Roman Catholic schools in Scotland rose progressively 
from 71,293 in 1901-02 to 123,430 in 1928-29. The total average enrolments of 
other schools in Scotland was 713,662 in 1901-02 and rose to 756,491 in 1919 – 
20 but fell to 696,109 in 1928-1929. The following fi ures give the percentage of 
the total school population, in the years specified, attending Roman Catholic and 
other schools respectively:- 
 Roman Catholic Schools Other Schools 
1901 - 02 9.1% 90.9% 
1910 – 11 10.9% 89.1% 
1919 – 20 13.1% 86.9% 
1928 – 29 15.1% 84.9% 
 
As the Roman Catholic Schools are mainly recruited from persons of Irish 
descent, the school figures point to a rapid multiplication of the Irish population in 
Scotland, in spite of bad trade and falling wages.  
In this connection reference may also be made to the seasonal movement of 
Agricultural workers in considerable numbers to Scotland from Ireland. It is 
understood that one potato firm alone employ from 300 to 400 Irish workers for 9 
or 10 months in each year. (Marginal note: These words are new and the words  
‘and vice versa’ after Ireland in the original Memo have been deleted.) 
Information furnished by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland on this 
subject in July 1930, is contained in appendix II to this memorandum. 
3. As regards repatriation to Ireland of persons who become chargeable to the poor rates 
in Scotland, this is possible by statutory process a  between Scotland and Northern 
Ireland; but following on the Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation of 
Enactments) Order, 1923, warrants authorising the removal to the Irish Free State of 
paupers born there can no longer be obtained by Scottish Poor law Authorities, and  
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removals to the Irish Free State can only be effected on a voluntary basis. 
Negotiations with a view to arranging for reciprocal repatriation of persons who had 
become chargeable to the poor rates were entered into some years ago with the Irish 
Free State, but no settlement has been reached. 
4. As regards control of migration from Northern Ireland or from the Irish Free State to 
Scotland, this would be a matter of great practical difficulty owing to the variety of 
possible routes, and the opportunities for evasion. Further, it would involve a 
departure from the immemorial policy of allowing British subjects, from whatever 
Dominion to enter Great Britain freely. 
As an alternative, it has been suggested that control might be exercised through 
legislation prohibiting for a term of years the employment of any person arriving in 
Great Britain after a specified date who had not obtained a permit from the Ministry 
of Labour. The permit would specify a particular occupation and a particular 
employer, and no such permit would be issued if workmen capable of performing the 
work were available locally, or could be made available from other Employment 
Exchanges. The proposal, of course, involves the taking of power to remove an 
immigrant found to be in contravention of the scheme. 
5. The information available about immigration from the Irish Free State to Scotland 
cannot be regarded as conclusive but taken as a whole it appears to indicate that there 
is no very pronounced volume of such immigration at the present time: and that the 
growth of the Roman catholic element in Scotland (as evidenced, for example, by the 
school population figures) is due to the rapid multiplication of relatively old 
established ‘colonies’ in Scotland, rather than to any existing substantial volume of 
immigration from the Irish Free State. 
Nevertheless, I consider that the reciprocal arrangements for repatriation of paupers, 
mentioned in paragraph 3 above, should be restored. 
The existence in Scotland of considerable State benefits, such as Health and 
Unemployment Insurance, State-aided housing schemes, unemployment relief 
schemes, etc., is a matter which will require careful consideration in connection with 
the forgoing questions. ( Marginal Note: The words after etc., have been substituted 
for the following words which appeared in the original memorandum “appears to 
render it not unreasonable that provisions should be made whereby the right to draw 









National Records of Scotland HH1/564 Economic Advisory Committee Empire 
Migration Committee part III (VI) Miscellaneous Questions Irish Immigration into 
the United Kingdom 11th   July 1931 
173. In appendix II (note 12) we give figures showing the trend of population for Ireland 
as a whole from 1821-1921, and from that year for the Irish Free State separately. Since 
the famine the population of the Free State has been d clining in spite of an excess of 
births over deaths owing to the fact that emigration has removed more than the natural 
increase. The crude birth rate has been low for a number of years and has shown no 
marked tendency of late to decline further. The lower birth rate is due almost wholly to 
few and late marriages. The fertility of married women shows little change, and there is, 
therefore, little sign of contraception. The marriage distribution has reached a condition of 
approximate stability, and, though the material forthe necessary calculation is not 
available, it can hardly be doubted that there is at le st a replacement birth rate and 
probably more. 
174. According to the figures of the Irish Free State Department of Commerce and 
Industry the passenger traffic (British and aliens) between Irish Free State ports and the 
rest of the British Isles showed an outward balance of 15,253 in 1928. This figure takes 
no account of the movement across the land frontier. Of the 15,253, however a substantial 
number, about 3,400 were emigrants travelling overseas via United Kingdom ports. Thus 
the net influx into Great Britain and Northern Ireland via Free State ports may be put at 
nearly 12,000. (The correction to be made on account f aliens is negligible). There are 
no statistics which throw light on the extent of the influx across the land frontier, which 
includes not only those who after crossing the frontier remain in Northern Ireland, but 
also those who move on thence to Glasgow and other places in Great Britain. But it 
probably amounts to a considerable number. 
175. The magnitude of this immigration from the Irish Free State into Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland thus materially reduces the benefits to this country of the Emigration 
resulting from the Empire Settlement Act. We realise that any restriction on the free entry 
into this country of British citizens from the Irish Free State or any other Dominion would 
constitute a striking departure from the historic policy of this country and would require 
careful consideration before it was raised with theDominion Governments. We feel, 
however, that this question merits serious consideration by His Majesty’s Government in 
the United Kingdom. We suggest that, in any case, steps should be taken to obtain such 
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powers as may be necessary to secure fuller statistics, with a view to determining the full 
extent to which Irish immigration is neutralising the effect of the expenditure incurred by 
the Overseas Settlement Department.  
 
B. Repatriation of Migrants within the Empire  
176. The immigration laws of all the Dominions make provision for the deportation to the 
country of origin of immigrants who become a public charge, at the expense of the 
Steamship Company by which they were carried to the Dominion. In the latest periods 
available (1929-30 in the case of Canada and in 1930 in that of Australia and New 
Zealand) the number of such deportations was as follows:- 
Canada 2,350 
Australia 218 
New Zealand 1 
177. On account, mainly, of the present economic depression these figures are abnormally 
high, but those from Canada are always considerable. From that Dominion, persons can 
be, and are deported if they become a public charge, even for a short period during winter 
unemployment, at any time within five years of their arrival in Canada. Even after the 
expiry of that period, persons are deported on this and other grounds if the Dominion 
authorities are satisfied that they come within anyof the classes of ‘prohibited migrant’ at 
the time of their arrival. 
178. It appears to us inequitable that the Canadian Government should thus send back to 
this country migrants who have proceeded to Canada with the encouragement of that 
Government and who, owing to the prevailing economic conditions, have become 
unemployed and for the time being a public charge, especially when the persons 
concerned may have been in Canada for as long as five years. We are confirmed in this 
view by the consideration that there is no restriction on the admission of Canadian or 
other Dominion citizens into the United Kingdom and o power to deport to the 
Dominions any British subject from in the Dominions who becomes a charge on the 
public funds of the United Kingdom. As we have pointed out above a considerable 
number of immigrants enter the United Kingdom every year from the Irish Free State. 
Many of these subsequently become a charge on the public funds, but there is no power to 
deport or to recover any part of the cost of their maintenance. 
179. In our own view there is no justification for the continuance of the present one sided 
arrangements in this matter, operating as they do to the detriment of the interests of this 
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country. We  are strongly of the opinion that His majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom should be free to refuse admission to citizens from the Dominions falling within 
any of the categories of ‘prohibited immigrants’ viz.:- persons with criminal records, 
insane persons &c. The repatriation of migrants who become a public charge in any part 
of the Empire is a more difficult question, we suggest should be carefully considered by 
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom with a view to its being discussed with 






























National Records of Scotland HH1/564 Correspondence between Prime Minister’s 
Office and The Scottish, Dominions and Home Offices concerning the Empire 
Migration Committee 21st July 1931 to 13th  August 1931 
 
Letter from PM’s Office 21st July 1931 to Adamson     
Dear Secretary of State 
The Prime minister has been reading EAC(c) 66- the report of the Committee appointed by 
the Economic Advisory Council to consider Empire Migration-and he wishes to draw the 
attention of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and yourself to paragraphs 174 and 
175, dealing with Irish Immigration into the United Kingdom. He would be glad if you would 
consider the question. He feels that it is one that s ould come before Cabinet. 
I am writing similarly to the Secretary of State for the Dominion Affairs. 
H G Vincent PS to PM 
 
Adamson to MacDonald 29th July 1931  
Dear Prime Minister 
   You invited my attention on the 21st July to EAC (c) 66 – the Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Economic Advisory Council to consider Empire migration and in particular 
paragraphs 174 and 175 dealing with Irish immigration into the United Kingdom. 
   The recommendation of the Committee on Empire Migrat on on this point (paragraph 175) 
is that “steps should be taken to obtain such powers as may be necessary to secure fuller 
statistics, with a view to determining the full extn  to which Irish immigration is neutralising 
the effect of the expenditure by the Overseas Settlement Department. 
   I have already given effect to this, so far as I am able to do by administrative action, by 
arranging, in connection with the 1931 Census for the incorporation in the Householders 
Schedule of a column asking for information as to the length in Scotland of persons from 
elsewhere but now permanently resident in Scotland. This (with suitable adjustments which 
the Registrar General is able to make on account of the death rate) will provide information 
for each year in the last 25 years or so, as to the number of persons who came from Southern 
or Northern Ireland and settled in Scotland. These figures should furnish a conclusive 
measure of the extent, from year to year of Irish imm gration into Scotland. The full figures 
for Scotland will not be available until the census code and card punching operations have 
been completed – probably in 1932. 
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 While I agree entirely with the Empire Migration Committee’s view that immigration from 
the Irish Free State may at any time become serious in its extent and effects, and should 
therefore be carefully measured and closely watched, I do not think at the present time 
serious apprehension need be occasioned by any existing volume of immigration from the 
Irish Free State into Scotland. 
 The Report of the Committee on Empire Migration quotes figures for the year 1928. There 
is, however, reason to believe that in that year immigration into the United Kingdom may 
have been exceptionally high. Thus in 1928 persons la ding at Scottish from Irish Free State 
ports exceeded persons moving in the contrary direction by 3,055, but in 1929 the balance 
swung on the other side, the persons landing at Scotish from Irish Free State ports being 
fewer by 251 than the persons moving in the contrary direction. 
  I went into this matter very closely in connection with the enquiry by the Committee on 
Empire Migration, and collected a good deal of information on the subject, including 
information from the Ministry of Labour as to the numbers of Irishmen (a) being registered 
for employment in Scotland: (b) to whom Unemployment Insurance books were being issued 
in Scotland: and (c) being employed on state assisted relief schemes in Scotland etc. All this 
information was put before the Committee on Empire Migration, and I need not recapitulate 
it here. While not conclusive, it appeared as a whole t  indicate that there is no very 
pronounced volume of immigration from the Irish Free state into Scotland at the present time; 
and that the growth of the Roman Catholic element in Scotland (which is clearly evidenced 
by the enrolment figures in Roman Catholic and other schools respectively) is occasioned by 
the rapid multiplication of relatively old established Irish ‘colonies’ in Scotland rather than 
by any existing substantial volume of immigration from the Irish Free State. 
 Accordingly, while I should be glad, even in existing circumstances, to have power to 
control immigration from the Irish Free State into Scotland, I cannot claim that this is a 
matter of great urgency at the present moment; and I think that further consideration of this 
question might await the Census information. I may point out that the complete stoppage of 
immigration from the Irish Free State would not remove what appears to be the main ground 
for the complaints addressed to me – the marked tendency for the Irish (and Roman Catholic) 
element already in Scotland to increase in numbers, as compared with the native population. 
  Control of immigration leads to the question of the repatriation of migrants. Persons coming 
to Scotland from Northern Ireland and becoming charge ble to the poor rates in Scotland 
before completing five years continuous residence there, can be repatriated by statutory 
process to Northern Ireland; but since the Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation of 
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Enactments) Order, 1923, similar warrants can no loger be obtained by the Scottish Poor 
Law Authorities, and removals to the Irish Free State can only be effected on a voluntary 
basis. I am most anxious that reciprocal arrangements should be made with the Irish Free 
State on the lines of the existing position in regad to Northern Ireland, for the repatriation of 
persons who become chargeable to the poor rates, i.e. that arrangements should be made 
which will in effect restore the pre 1923 position so far as the Irish Free is concerned. The 
whole subject was raised in a Dominion’s Office dispatch of February 1928, to the Irish Free 
State Government; but the Irish Free State Government appears to have shown no disposition 
to come to any decision. The matter was again raised at a Conference with representatives of 
the Irish Free State at the Dominions Office in April last – the Conference being held to 
discuss various other points on which agreement with the Irish Free State Government 
appeared desirable. The Irish Free State representatives said however, that they had not come 
prepared to discuss the question of the mutual repatriation of paupers, and they were only 
able to undertake that on their return they would take up the matter with a view to a reply 
being sent to the Dominions Office Dispatch of February 1928. I have heard nothing more on 
the subject and I think that the point should be further pressed. It is of considerable 
importance so far as Scotland is concerned, because statistics show clearly that in proportion 
to the native population, Irish born persons from an undue proportion of the total numbers of 
paupers, and are responsible for an undue burden upo  Scottish poor rates. If arrangements 
for the repatriation of paupers cannot be obtained, then the case for considering some control 
of immigration will be strengthened. 
   Finally, on the question of repatriation of migrants, I feel that some arrangement must be 
arrived at with the Dominions generally, as the Empire Migration Committee recommend 
(paragraph179). The matter is largely one for the Home Office and no doubt they can furnish 
full information. But in recent years various cases have come to the notice of the Scottish 
Office where very undesirable persons, with little connection to Scotland, have been deported 
to Scotland from the Dominions. A person born in Scotland may go abroad in his early 
childhood; may spend all his life in one of the Dominions; and in his old age, after his 
becoming a criminal may be deported to Scotland. He has no friends or relatives in Scotland, 
and has indeed no connection with Scotland beyond the accident of his birth there. He is 
bound on deportation to become a public charge in Scotland, and may engage in crime there. 
The knowledge that cases of this kind do occur leads me to endorse very strongly the 
recommendations if paragraph 179 of the Empire Migrat on Committee’s report 
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Reply by Marsh, Private Secretary to Thomas, to Vincent 5th August 1931  
Dear Vincent 
   Mr Thomas has carefully considered the passage relating to emigration from the Irish Free 
State into the United Kingdom in the report of the Empire Migration Committee of the 
Economic Advisory Council to which, at the Prime Minister’s wish you called his attention in 
your letter of July 21st. 
   This question has, as no doubt the PM will rememb r been before the Cabinet on previous 
occasions. It was considered by the late Government in the summer of 1928 when the then 
Home Secretary was authorised to consult the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 
confidentially on the subject. The matter was furthe  considered by the late Government in 
February 1929, and ultimately by the then Secretary for Dominion Affairs undertook to press 
Mr Cosgrave to concur in proposals previously made for the mutual repatriation of persons 
from the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom who had become a public charge. Mr 
Amery did so but without result. 
   The subject first came before the present Governm nt in July 1930 see CP 35(30) 
Conclusion 6 – when the Secretary of State for Scotland undertook to collect further 
information which will be found in CP in CP229(30). This was considered by the Cabinet 
(CP 47(30) Conclusion 6) when further consideration of the matter was postponed until after 
the Imperial Conference. It will be remembered thate Empire Migration Committee of the 
Economic Advisory Council was set up immediately befor  the Imperial Conference, and 
after the Conference was over, as it was understood that the Committee would deal with the 
question, the matter was left to them. They had before them memoranda by the Secretary of 
State for Scotland (EAC (EM) 55) and by the Home Secretary (EAC (EM) 93). Mr Adamson 
was of the opinion that the information available appeared to indicate that there was no very 
pronounced volume of such immigration but he considere  that the reciprocal arrangements 
for the repatriation of paupers should be restored. Mr Clynes took the view that the broad 
conclusion to be drawn from the figures was that they furnished no evidence of any 
considerable migration of labour from the Irish Free State to Great Britain, and that the 
comparatively small migration did not appear to warrant any departure from the traditional 
policy of allowing free admission into this country of all British subjects whatever their 
origin. 
    It was, however, in the figures supplied by theSecretary of State for Scotland and the 
Home Secretary that the Empire Migration Committee came to conclusion that “the 
magnitude of this migration from the Irish Free State into Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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thus materially reduces the benefits to this country of the migration resulting from the Empire 
Settlement Act…we feel…that this question merits serious consideration by His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom. We suggest that in any case steps should be taken to 
obtain such powers as may be necessary to obtain full statistics with a view to determining 
the full extent to which Irish migration us neutralising the effect of the expenditure incurred 
by the Overseas Settlement Department. 
   Mr Thomas has not the material, and, in any case, hardly feels that it is for him to attempt 
to reconcile these diverse opinions. Moreover, it would appear to be primarily for the Home 
Secretary to say to what extent it is possible to carry the recommendations of the Committee 
(namely that more accurate statistics should be obtained) into effect. So far as Mr Thomas is 
concerned he would only wish to make the following observations:- 
(a) that however logical it may be to regard the Irish Free State as an “overseas 
Dominion” in connection with migration as in other matters it seems doubtful whether 
the Irish Free State and Great Britain (and still more the Irish Free State and Northern 
Ireland) can, as a matter of practical politics, be so sharply distinguished as the report 
suggests. In the case of two countries so close to one another and possessing so similar 
a social structure there must always be a certain flu dity of population. In other words 
the problem is one of Labour supply, not of migration. For a similar reason the 
Overseas Settlement department has never regarded as seriously affecting the policy of 
assisted migration to Canada the fluidity of population between Canada and the United 
States (to which the Empire Migration Committee does not allude). 
(b) That the principle that every British Subject has a right to remain in the United 
Kingdom is a long established one and should not be lightly abandoned. It is possible, 
of course, that if any drastic action were taken by Canada as regards deportations (this 
was rumoured in the press but now, fortunately, seem  unlikely) such action would 
affect the question from this point of view. 
Mr Thomas assumes, however, that it would be the Prime Minister’s wish that he 
should continue to press for a reply from the Irish Free State on the question of the 
mutual repatriation of persons in receipt of relief. On this point a dispatch was sent to 
the Irish Free State as long ago as February 16th, 928, since when a number of 
reminders have been sent without producing anything except promises of the supply of 
information which has not materialised. 
At Mr Thomas’ wish, I am sending copies of this reply to the Private Secretary at the Scottish 
Office and of your letter and the reply to the Private Secretary at the Home Office. 
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G Marsh 
PS Many thanks for sending us a copy of Mr Adamson’s letter of the 29th July (received since 
the above was prepared), which Mr Thomas read with interest. So far as he is in a position to 
judge, he is disposed to agree generally with Mr Adamson’s views as to Irish Free State 
immigration and the mutual repatriation of paupers. The general question of the repatriation 
of migrants, referred to in the last paragraph of Mr Adamson’s letter is under consideration in 
the Dominions Office but as the PM will appreciate it is one of considerable difficulty. 
I have added a copy of Mr Adamson’s letter to the PS at the Home Office 
 
Clynes Home Secretary to Ramsay MacDonald 13th August 1931  
Dear Prime Minister 
In your letter of the 30th July you asked me consider the question of Irish Immigration into 
the United Kingdom, which is raised in paragraphs 174- 75 of the Report of the Committee 
on Empire Migration appointed by the Economic Advisory Council. This question is by no 
means novel. Various aspects have continually come to my notice while I have been Home 
Secretary and my predecessor also devoted a good deal of attention to the problem. 
I had considerable enquiries made at the request of the Committee on Empire Migration and 
furnished them with such information as I was able to collect. I need not trouble you with the 
details, but briefly, the conclusions which I reached were, that the Irish born population in 
England (sic) is decreasing, that there is now no great volume of Irish immigrants, that the 
balance of immigrants from the Irish Free State to England (sic) (after allowing for those who 
emigrate from English ports) consists mostly of women who are no doubt mainly domestic 
servants, and the damage, such as it is, caused by Irish immigration is already done and the 
problem in England (sic) is rather one of the natural increase of the Irish population who 
settled here some time ago. 
…There is at present no power to exclude or deport fr m the United Kingdom a person who 
is a British subject, and any proposal to take such power would involve legislation, which, in 
view of the entirely new principle introduced, could only be justified by absolute necessity. 
Moreover the practical difficulties are enormous. 
In the first place, it would be necessary to define which British subjects properly belong to 
the United Kingdom. This is already a difficulty with which we face in the negotiations 
referred to above. 
…Secondly even if the United Kingdom and each Dominion establish which particular 
British subjects are to be regarded as what I may call for convenience “local subjects”, it is 
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easy to see that there may be a considerable number of persons who possess British 
nationality but do not fall to be regarded as local subjects of any particular part of the Empire. 
…Thirdly – and this brings me back from the more general aspects of the problem to the 
particular issue question of the Irish immigration nto the United Kingdom – experience has 
shown that the effective maintenance of a system of control over the passenger traffic 
between Great Britain and Ireland is a matter of great difficulty. The opportunities for 
evasion are almost unlimited. The cost of establishing and maintaining a staff to control the 
traffic throughout the length of the west coasts of England, Wales and Scotland would be 
very heavy and could not be justified in peacetime; nor could there be any guarantee that 
there would be no slipping ashore at unfrequented places from small boats which could easily 
cross the Irish Sea or even from fishing boats etc. in the course of their legitimate traffic. In 
addition the land frontier between Northern Ireland  the Irish Free State could not possibly 
be adequately closed; so that it would be necessary to t eat Northern Ireland for this purpose 
it would be necessary to treat Northern Ireland for this purpose as outside the United 
Kingdom. Finally, any such control as would be necessary would arouse intense resentment 
among the business and travelling community. 
I have no means at my disposal to obtain any statistics to assist in determining the full extent 
of the Irish immigration, but, subject to any further information which other departments may 
be able to collect, I am bound to say that I am not satisfied that there is any urgent necessity 
which would justify legislation to reverse the historic policy of the mother country 















Appendix Seven  
National Records of Scotland HH1/561 Letter from Patrick McGilligan to J.H. Thomas 
12th January 1932  Dispatch No.17 
Sir 
    I have the honour to refer to Mr Amery’s Dispatch of the 16th February, 1928, no 54, 
inquiring whether His Majesty’s Government in the Irish Free State would be prepared to 
agree in principle to a reciprocal arrangement for the compulsory repatriation of persons of 
Irish Free state origin who become chargeable to the poor rate in Great Britain before they 
acquire a status of irremovability and for the repatriation in similar circumstances of persons 
belonging to Great Britain from the Irish Free State. 
   His Majesty’s Government in the Irish Free State whilst recognising the circumstances 
which have led to this proposal cannot conceal their vi w that, though equitable in form, it 
would not differ substantially in practice from a revival of the Poor Removal Acts which for a 
long period regulated the compulsory deportation of p or persons from Great Britain to 
Ireland and in their operation gave rise to widesprad resentment amongst the poor law 
authorities in this country. 
   In the Irish Free State there is no law of settlement and no power of compulsory removal of 
poor persons from one area to another. The general practice is for destitute persons to be 
given assistance in the district in which they happen to be. The relieving authority has no 
power to remove them compulsorily out of the area to some other place to which by birth, 
residence or otherwise they are said “to belong”. The Government have resisted proposals to 
introduce a law of settlement and a power of removal, being of the opinion that such 
measures would be out of harmony with the modern conception of public social services 
freely given to all residents however recently they have migrated to a new district. The 
utmost concession that the law in the Irish Free state has given to those who favour the 
removal of poor persons out of the district in which they are to some district to which liability 
for their maintenance is assumed to attach is to permit the poor law authorities in Dublin City 
and County to pay for the expenses of removal of a poor person who has not been two years 
in their area if they are satisfied it is generally for his benefit and that of his dependants. 
    Compulsory removal not being permitted by the law of the State the Government find it 
difficult to commit themselves to any agreement to facilitate the deportation of poor persons 
from outside and this difficulty is accentuated by the fact that there are now no workhouses to 
which able bodied people could be delivered in transfer, all the former workhouses outside 
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Dublin, that have not been closed altogether, having been converted into homes for the aged 
and infirm or Hospitals for the sick poor. 
  It is and always has been recognised that cases occur which removal is in the best interest of 
persons who have emigrated to Great Britain and who have become public charges there and 
the Government have not raised objection to the return of such persons when they wish to be 
sent back to their place of birth. 
   But there are wider considerations that seem to merit attention before machinery for 
deporting poor persons is set up. The laws of Settlement and Removal as they now stand in 
Great Britain are the residue of a more rigorous code that has in the course of time been 
modified  so that large classes of poor persons that would formerly have been removed under 
these laws are no longer affected by them. The growth f humane ideas and the recognition 
of the wasteful expenditure and the hardship which arose from time to time in their in their 
operation were steadily bringing the practice of compulsory removal in desuetude. The Poor 
Law has in recent years been reformed in Great Britain and the extension of administrative 
areas which has been part of that reform will reduc still further the number of poor persons 
liable for removal. An arrangement to regulate removals would, therefore seem a step out of 
keeping with the trend of legislation. In Great Britain its effect would be to perpetuate a 
practice that appears to be dying out and exists only in connection with the Poor law Service. 
In the Irish Free State its effect would be to set up for the first time a system of deporting 
poor persons to Britain and to revive the poor removal acts.  
   For these reasons His majesty’s Government in the Irish Free State feel that they should not 
depart from the view expressed in the letter of the 22nd May 1922, from the late Mr Collins to 
Mr Churchill. They will be prepared to give the fullest consideration to all cases in which 
removal back to this country is desirable in the int rests of the person whom it is proposed to 
deport. They are not convinced that a reciprocal arr ngement proposed would be of any real 
benefit to either country but on the contrary there is good reason to apprehend that it would 
give rise to unnecessary expenditure and hardship and irritation. 
I Have etc. 
P. McGilligan 







National Records of Scotland HH1/561 Observations on the letter from The Minister of 
External Affairs by John Jeffrey, Department of Health Scotland, 8th March 1932. 
  A reply refusing to agree to reciprocal arrangements was not unexpected. It has to be 
admitted that, even if reciprocal arrangements had been come to, removals from Scotland to 
the Irish Free State would seriously outnumber removals from the Free State to Scotland. On 
this ground the unwillingness of the Free State is natural. Nevertheless the fact remains the 
Scottish Authorities in addition to carrying the burden of relieving their own poor are saddled 
with the costs of maintaining a considerable number of Southern Irish poor. Removal 
machinery is operative as between Scotland, England and Northern Ireland and Scottish 
Authorities are at a disadvantage in that they are now precluded from returning to Southern 
Ireland cases that are a burden on them. It can be fairly claimed that, so long as folks from the 
Irish Free State continue to move to Scotland, tending to congest an already overcrowded 
labour market, the Free State should at least raiseno difficulty when it comes to supporting 
some of the social failures. 
  It is submitted that the Free State while entitled to cherish conceptions as to “public social 
services”, referred to in Mr McGilligan’s letter inso far as they affect only the Free State’s 
pocket, are hardly within their rights in urging these conceptions as a reason for refusing to 
relieve Scotland of burdens they themselves should assume. 
  Irishmen from the Free State use Scotland as a field for employment but their Government 
refuse to take back a small proportion of the “misfits”. Compare this attitude with that of 
America or Canada. These countries have hitherto offered considerable opportunities of 
employment to the English, Scotch (sic) and Irish. We know that those who break down, for 
one reason or another, are being returned in considerable numbers. The Dominion of Canada 
is willing to admit workers but she asks to be relieved of the failures. Scotland’s position is 
parallel, except that she claims to be relieved, not of all failures but only of a relatively 
limited class – broadly speaking, those who become chargeable on the ordinary poor roll. In 
return she is prepared to take back Scottish cases being afforded poor relief in the Free State. 
   As regards the specific points put in Mr McGilligan’s letter the following remarks are 
made:- 
 Paragraph 2. Under the Poor Removal Acts referred to Ireland was not afforded the power to 
remove Scots poor persons from Ireland to Scotland, the reason being that the Irish guardians 
would have no use for such powers. 
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  If “widespread resentment” existed it was occasioned not so much from the absence of such 
powers as from the knowledge that removals from Scotland to Ireland were in fact taking 
place from time to time. The Poor Law (Scotland) Act, 1898 modified the earlier removal 
procedure giving, inter alia, rights of appeal. In cases appealed the Department of Health are 
enjoined to have regard, among other things , “to any circumstances tending to show that the 
exercise of the power of removal would unduly injure the interests of the poor person on 
account of the industrial employment of his children or otherwise.” 
  In short, the 1898 Act puts checks on indiscriminate removals, so that at least from 1898 
until the setting up of the Free State in 1920 (sic) any harshness that could be urged against 
earlier procedure was to a great extent, if not entir ly, removed. Certainly the 1898 Act did 
not confer on Ireland the right to remove Scots persons from Ireland, but in negotiations 
initiated with the Free State a number of years ago reciprocal removal arrangements were 
proposed to the Free State. 
   While at one time there may have been widespread sentment in Ireland it has to be 
pointed out that ever since the constitution of the Fr e State Scottish Authorities have felt the 
inequity, not to put it too high, of the loss of their right to remove poor persons to Southern 
Ireland, while they can competently remove cases to Northern Ireland and particularly when 
they are prepared to consent to reciprocal arrangements with the Free State. An incidental 
grievance of Scotland is that the obtaining of a warrant for removal frequently has the effect 
of terminating chargeability in Scotland. Inability o apply for such a warrant will thus 
adversely affect the costs of relief in Scotland. 
    Paragraph 3. While the absence of a law of settlement and power of compulsory removal 
may be suited to conditions in Southern Ireland generally, exception has been made in Dublin 
City and County. The fact that this exception has been made weakens the argument set forth 
in this paragraph, and strengthens the case for the eciprocal arrangements proposed. If it is 
felt to be unfair to burden a populous centre like Dublin belonging to other parts, who for one 
reason or another drift into Dublin, it is no less unfair that authorities altogether out with the 
Free State should be deprived of the right of removing selected Southern Irish cases to their 
home country. The law of settlement and power of compulsory removal were reviewed when 
the Scottish Local Government bill was being drafted and it was not felt practicable or 
desirable to repeal them. Only if Scotland had no law of settlement or power of removal 
would the argument set forth in paragraph 3 hold. 
    Paragraph 4. It is suggested that if removals from Dublin are permissible there should be 
no inherent difficulty in arranging for removals from Great Britain to Ireland or from Ireland 
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to Great Britain. Again the closing of workhouses is not an insuperable difficulty. It is 
understood that institutions still exist in the form of Homes for the aged and Infirm, as well as 
Hospitals, and to these institutions the disabled cases that would be removed could be 
delivered on transfer. As regards able bodied poor, they could be removed to their last place 
of residence in Ireland and assisted by outdoor relief if necessary. 
    Paragraph 5. If by the removals to Ireland refer d to in this paragraph are meant 
deportees, a much more involved and cumbrous procedure is involved. The interests of those 
having to support such cases, it is submitted, should be considered as much as the wishes of 
the individuals involved. Again, removals merely by deportation would not usually be suited 
to poor law cases and would not mitigate materially the burden resting on Scottish Poor Law 
Authorities. 
       Paragraph 6. Admittedly, as already mentioned, the rigour of the Removal Laws has been 
modified and, so far as Scotland is concerned, there are now reasonably adequate checks on 
removals, securing a distinct measure of “fair play” to individuals. 
    To say that the Poor Law has in recent years been r formed in Great Britain is incorrect. 
There has been in England, to a greater extent than in Scotland perhaps, a refashioning of 
administrative machinery. But there has not been any material amendment in the scope or the 
purpose of the poor laws as such with, perhaps, the exc ption in Scotland since 1921 of the 
admission to relief of the destitute able bodied unable to obtain employment. Certainly there 
has been the extension of administrative areas but that must be regarded as in the nature of a 
purely administrative change. How that extension of areas will reduce the number of poor 
persons liable to removal is not quite clear. Certainly it may afford to a greater number of 
people the right of appeal to the Central departmen against a warrant for removal. 
    That the regulation of removals would seem a step out of keeping with the trend of 
legislation is a suggestion that is not entirely borne out. Settlement certainly only exists in 
connection with the Poor Law service but various good reasons can be brought forward for its 
continuance. Whatever may be urged against it, the fact remains that it has persisted for 400 
years and that it still remains the law here. 
   The effect of the reciprocal arrangements would be, on the one hand, to give the Free State 
a right they never had before to carry out removals and, on the other, to secure, so far as Poor 
Law Authorities in Great Britain are concerned merely a restoration of the powers prior to the 
partition of Ireland. 




National Records of Scotland HH1/568 Cabinet Committee on the Question of the Irish 
Free State Land Purchase Annuities Memorandum by the Home Secretary 8th March 
1932 Proposed Measures Against The Irish Free State 
Part 1 
1. In the preparation of this part of this memorandum it has been assumed that steps taken by 
the new Irish Free State Government in breach of the treaty of 1921 and of the allegiance to 
the Crown, but without any formal declaration of independence or formal act of secession 
from the British Commonwealth. It is further assumed that HMG do not contemplate that as a 
preliminary to any measures that may be taken there should be anything in the nature of any 
formal recognition of the secession, but may wish to consider what is the position which 
would automatically arise as a result of the action of the new Irish Government, with a view 
to warning them of the practical consequences of their action. 
2. Unless and until the fact of secession is established by some formal declaration, the question 
whether or not there has been a secession will depen  on the true legal inference to be drawn 
from the state of affairs at any moment. Circumstances might arise in which this question 
might come before the courts to be decided; but so long as it remains unsettled it would be 
hazardous to act on the assumption that a secession has occurred. 
3. The most important immediate consequences of secession would be that:- 
(1) Irish goods would be foreign goods and as such not e ti led to any exemption or advantage 
enjoyed by goods coming from a Dominion 
(2) The inhabitants of the Irish Free State as a whole would cease to be British subjects and 
would become aliens and as such would be liable to the restrictions generally applicable to 
aliens or any other restriction which His Majesty’s Government might wish to impose. 
4. As soon as secession is complete, the inhabitants of the new state will, generally speaking, 
owe allegiance to that state and not the Crown, i.e. they will become aliens in British law. In 
seeking to apply the Aliens Restriction Acts to such persons the Government would at once 
be confronted with a difficulty arising from the uncertainty whether in any individual case the 
person concerned had or had not ceased to be a British subject. There would be little doubt in 
the case of persons arriving from the Irish Free State in possession of Free State passports, 
since these documents would be evidence that the holders were recognised as Free State 
citizens. In any warning given to the new Irish Government it might be stated that HMG 
would require all persons coming from the Free State o be in possession of passports, and 
that further, HMG would hold themselves free to take the legislative steps to treat as aliens all 
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persons born in what is now the Free State unless they assert their desire to remain British 
and not acquire the nationality of the new State. For the purpose of applying in the United 
Kingdom any restrictions upon them as aliens, doubtful cases would obviously arise until the 
conditions determining who are the persons who have changed their allegiance as a result of 
the secession have been settled. It follows that until the conditions have been settled, the 
application in the United Kingdom to persons belonging to the Free State of any law relating 
to  aliens would give rise to serious difficulties. So long as it remained uncertain whether a 
particular person had ceased to be a British subject, his treatment as an alien would be open 
to challenge in the courts and an adverse decision would have embarrassing consequences. 
Moreover, one of the most important powers in regard to aliens - that of deportation – could 
not be effectively exercised until the relationship of the Free State to this country is definitely 
recognised to be that of a foreign state, so the ordina y rule of international law that a state is 
bound to receive back its nationals could be invoked against the new state. 
5. It is obvious therefore that if any warning were given to the Irish Free State as to the 
consequences which would follow from secession, a period of delay must elapse before HMG 
would be in a position to apply to all persons belonging to the Free State any or all of the 
existing laws of the United Kingdom as to aliens, icluding provisions as to deportation. This 
would have the advantage of allowing time for a change of policy and feeling in the Free 
State, with the result that they might abstain from further action which might lead to a 
breakaway from the British Commonwealth. The delay would, moreover, give time for any 
consideration of the practical difficulties of applying the aliens law to the new circumstances, 
and of preparing the machinery necessary for the purpose. 
6. The main restrictions imposed on aliens in the United Kingdom are:- 
(1) A requirement that no alien shall land without the permission of an immigration officer, and 
that he must be in possession of a passport 
(2) Registration with the police 
(3) A requirement that if coming for the purpose of employment an alien must be in possession 
of a permit issued to the employer by the Ministry of Labour 
(4) Liability to deportation 
Conclusions  
1. On secession the Irish Free State would become a foreign state and its nationals would 
become aliens in British law 
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2. While it might be possible to take immediate steps to treat as aliens persons arriving from the 
Free State with Free State passports, it would be unsafe to treat all persons belonging to the 
Irish Free State as aliens until their status had been clearly defined by law. 
3. In the meantime, any warning that may be given as to the consequences which must follow 
upon secession might include statements that 
(a) Any advantages that the Irish Free State may enjoy as a Dominion in relation to trade would 
be withdrawn. 
(b) HMG would require all persons coming from the Free State to be in possession of passports 
and would treat as aliens those holding Free state p ssports and, further, that HMG would 
hold themselves free to treat as aliens all persons b rn in what is now the Irish Free State 
unless they assert their desire to remain British and not to acquire the nationality of the new 
state. 
(c) Nationals of the new state would become subject to the provisions of the Aliens Restrictions 
Acts and. In particular, to control on entry into the United Kingdom registration, restrictions 
as to employment, and liability to deportation. 
(d) Nationals of the new state would in the United Kingdom become subject to the disabilities to 
which aliens are subject, including ineligibility for the franchise, for Parliament, and for the 
Civil Service. 
Part II 
12. The position discussed in paragraphs 3 to 11 above is as already stated, based on the 
assumption that action has been taken by the Irish Free State which amounts to secession. It 
is now proposed to consider whether any, and if so what, action might be taken by the HMG 
on the basis that the Irish Free State, while formally retaining membership of the 
Commonwealth, has, nevertheless, by breaking the Treaty (e.g. by abrogation of the oath of 
allegiance) forfeited all claim to the privileges and advantages of its membership of the 
Commonwealth so far as its relations with the United Kingdom. On that basis, so far as action 
by the Home Office is concerned, it is necessary to consider whether the Irish Free state, 
though not legally or diplomatically a foreign state, is to be treated as though it was a foreign 
state and whether Irish Free State citizens, though they will remain British subjects for the 
time being should be subjected to restrictions similar to those applicable to aliens. 
13. Any measures taken against  IFS citizens while still British subjects would require special 
and highly controversial legislation, and would mean discriminating against a particular class 
of British subjects. Such measures might include: 
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(a) the control of the entry of Irish Free State citizens into the United Kingdom, including 
special restrictions on those coming for employment; 
(b) registration of Irish Free State citizens residnt in the United Kingdom 
(c) power to deport Irish Free State citizens 
14. In carrying out such measures the difficulties r ferred to in Part I would be greatly 
increased by reason of the fact that the persons cocerned were British subjects; and one of 
the main difficulties to be considered would be the definition of the class of persons against 
whom the measures were to be directed. Amongst that class it would not presumably be 
thought desirable or practicable to include the Southern Irish Loyalists. Whether the control 
were established on the Northern Ireland boundary or at the ports of Great Britain, it would 
be necessary that everyone coming from the Free Stat should be in possession of a document 
of identity and nationality. Every such person would be presumed to be an Irish Free State 
citizen unless, being an alien, he possessed a passport of his country, or being a British 
subject possessed a British passport. The control could not hope to be effective. It would in 
any event be cumbrous and expensive and would probably inconvenience British subjects 
who are not Irish Free State citizens more than Irish Free State citizens, especially as there 
would probably be no means of obtaining British pass orts in the Free State. 
15. Further, it must be pointed out that, apart from penalties for breach of the law, the 
ultimate sanctions for the enforcement of restrictions on Free State citizens as though they 
were aliens would be a power to deport them. Even if statutory power were provided for this 
purpose, it could not be made effective unless the Free State Government agreed to admit 
such of their citizens as the United Kingdom might desire to deport. The Irish Free State so 
long as it remained a member of the Commonwealth would be under no international 
obligation to admit its citizens on deportation from this country. 
16. Apart from these practical difficulties, any measures differentiating between various 
classes of British subjects would mean a complete change of the policy, which has hitherto 
been maintained in this country, that a British subject irrespective of his origin has a legal 
right to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. A constitutional principle of the highest 
importance is thus involved. The readiness of the Mother Country to receive all British 
subjects is an extremely valuable bond of Empire and y change of policy in this respect 






HH1/568 August 1933 Draft memorandum to Cabinet from Secretary of State for 
Scotland 
Immigration from the Irish Free State and Other Dominions. Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland 
 
1. During recent years numerous representations have been addressed to the Scottish Office on 
the subject of the number of immigrants into Scotland from the Irish Free State and the 
problem caused by the existence there of large and steadily increasing numbers of persons 
who have either been born in Ireland or are of Irish descent. The representations which have 
been made by the Scottish Presbyterian Churches and other bodies, have maintained that the 
Irish population does not assimilate with the Scots, that it is less independent than the native 
population and gives rise to a disproportionately heavy burden on the poor rates and public 
funds generally, that it is responsible for an undue proportion of crime, and that its low 
standard of living enables it to accept employment at low wages thereby undercutting 
Scotsman who are being driven to emigrate from Scotland. The Churches have suggested 
various courses of action for the consideration of the Government, including restrictions on 
immigration, provision for repatriation of immigrants who become a charge on public funds, 
and the requiring of proof from immigrants that they have work awaiting them and of proof 
from their employer that suitable labour cannot be o tained in Scotland. [and an approach to 
the Vatican with a view to securing the withdrawal of the Ne Temere Decree so far as it 
concerns Scotland, in order that the validity of mixed marriage may be recognised by the 
Roman Catholic Church.] 
2. The question of immigration from the Irish Free State into the United Kingdom was 
considered in some detail by the Empire Migration Committee of the Economic Advisory 
Council which reported in July 1931 (EAC (c) 66). The Committee felt that the question of 
imposing restrictions on the free entry into the United Kingdom of British Subjects from the 
Irish Free State and the other Dominions merited serious consideration by the Government, 
and recommended (paragraph 175) that in any case steps hould be taken to obtain powers to 
secure fuller statistics as to immigration. The Committee also drew attention to the fact that 
many of the Dominions not only imposed restrictions upon the entry of British Subjects but 
also exercised powers of deportation of British Subjects who, after immigration became 
chargeable to public funds or committed offences or who could have been refused entry on 
the ground that they fell within the class of ‘prohibited immigrant.’ The Committee took the 
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view (paragraph 179) that there was no justification f r the continuance of the present one 
sided arrangements in this matter and recommended that His Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdom should be free to refuse admission to ci izens from the Dominions falling 
within any of the categories of ‘prohibited immigrants’ viz.:- persons with criminal records, 
insane persons, etc., and that the repatriation of migrants who become a public charge in any 
part of the Empire should be carefully considered by the Government with a view to its being 
discussed at the next Imperial Conference. 
3. The unsatisfactory position of Great Britain as regards immigrants from the Irish Free State 
was rendered worse in 1923 by the fact that in that ye r, and subsequently, persons of Irish 
Free State birth who become chargeable to the Poor Rate in Great Britain before completing 
5 years continuous residence in Great Britain ceased to be liable to compulsory repatriation to 
the Irish Frees State. Proposals were made to the Irish Free State by the Dominions Office in 
1928 for the conclusion of a reciprocal arrangement by which such persons could be 
repatriated compulsorily, and by which in similar circumstances persons belonging to Great 
Britain could be repatriated to Great Britain from the Irish Free State. The Free State’s reply 
to this proposal was not forthcoming until January 1932, and constituted in effect a rejection 
of this proposal. 
4. As regards statistics, I am now in a position to submit to my colleagues the attached summary 
of the main features of the special information relating to the Irish born population in 
Scotland which was obtained in the 1931 Scottish Census. The figures relate only to persons 
who were born on the Irish Free State or in Northern Ireland. Comparable figures relating to 
people of Irish descent are not available, and would be practically impossible to collect. 
It will be observed that the tables show that in 1931, out of a total population of 4,842,554 
there were 124,296 Irish born people in Scotland, of whom 122,944 were recorded as resident 
and 1352 as visitors. 54, 854 of those recorded as resident and 632 of those recorded as 
visitors were natives of the Irish Free State. The percentage of the population of Scotland 
who are Irish born has steadily declined since 1861. In that year it was 6.66% in 1921 it was 
3.26% and in 1931 it had declined still further to 2.5%. Moreover the tables show that the 
average immigration into Scotland of about 2,000 Irish born persons a year between 1921 and 
1931 appears to have been more than counter balanced by deaths and by the abnormally 
heavy emigration which took place from Scotland during this period. Table B show the extent 
to which the Irish born population are concentrated in certain areas. 
5.  While the census figures are reassuring in that they clearly demonstrate that there has been a 
steady diminution of the numbers of Irish born peopl  in Scotland, it is necessary to take 
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other factors into account in considering what action would be justified to meet the 
representations of the Scottish Churches and other bodies who are dissatisfied with the 
existing state of affairs in Scotland, and to give effect to the recommendations of the Empire 
Migration Committee. In my view the main factors so far as Scotland is concerned are:- 
(a) The strong tendency, in the absence of any considerable Scottish Roman Catholic population, 
towards intermarriage of Irish migrants and the descendants of Irish migrants and the 
consequent formation of “Irish colonies” of Roman Catholic denomination in certain districts 
(b) The frequent and sometimes serious outbreaks of sectarian disorder caused by the existence 
of these ‘colonies’ in the midst of Protestant communities, which impose a heavy burden on 
the police forces of certain districts, and lead to abnormal expenditure for the purpose of 
preserving law and order 
(c) The prolific multiplication in Scotland of the Irish born population and their descendants. As 
indicated in paragraph 4 above no definite figures are available to show the total number of 
persons of Irish descent, but some indication of the rapid multiplication of the Irish 
population in Scotland is given by the fact that the average enrolment of Roman Catholic 
schools, which are mainly recruited from persons of Irish descent rose progressively from 
71,293 in 1901-2 to 132,289 in 1931-2. 
(d) The unduly high percentage of pauperism of the Irish born population e.g. 
  
 Irish Born % of population Total No. % of Irish born to total 
1911 3.6 8,444 7.9 
1921 3.26 6,717 6.8 
1931 2.57 11,595 7.4 











(e) The unduly high percentage of Irish born persons in the criminal population. Of the total 
numbers of convicted prisoners, Borstal inmates andcriminal lunatics in Scotland, the 











These percentages include persons born elsewhere if the father is Irish born 
(f) The unduly high percentage of Irish born persons in the lunatic population e.g. in July 1930 
4.2% of the persons in private lunatic asylums and 6.2% of the pauper lunatics in Scotland 
were Irish born 
 
6. On a review of all circumstances I am strongly of the opinion that the time has now come 
when the Government would be fully justified in taking powers already taken by many of the 
Dominions in respect of their own territory. 
(i) to prohibit the admission to the United Kingdom of British Subjects from any of the 
Dominions, including the Irish Free State, in cases where the persons have criminal records 
or are insane 
(ii) to deport from the United Kingdom to the territo y of the Dominions in which they were 
born or with which they have the closest connection persons who become a charge on the 
public funds or commit offences within a specified period (say 5 years) after their arrival in 
the United Kingdom or are discovered to have been prohibited immigrants at the time of their 
arrival in the United Kingdom. 
  And I desire to recommend that the Cabinet should a thorise the necessary steps to be taken 
to give effect to these proposals. 
If it were feasible, I should also welcome legislation prohibiting for a term of years the 
employment of any persons arriving in the United Kingdom after a specified date who had 
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not obtained a permit from the Ministry of labour specifying a particular occupation and a 
particular employer, no such permit being issued if persons capable of performing the work 
were available through either the local or other Employment Exchanges. I recognise, 
however, that any such provision might have repercussions in the Dominions which would 
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